法律作为合约安排

科斯提出交易费用解释了制度之存在,但其未将之操作化,令庇古式外部性理论借之还魂了。张五常将租值消散、交易费用与制度费用等同视之,避免了此一缺憾。在此理解下,法律是合约安排,而非吓阻诱因。法律作为合约安排,才能合理解释物权效力与过失责任之现实存在。更重要的是,法律作为合约,必然要求了法律的规范体系性,而法律作为诱因,则令法律工具化,失去其规范之本质。法律内在价值,例如自由或正义,也只有在此才有意义。     

Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality

Why is it so common for the seller to provide guarantees that say “Satisfaction guaranteed or your money back” along with the sale of a product? Newly introduced goods and mail-ordered products are usually sold with such guarantees. In honoring money-back guarantees, why is it a common business practice to pay back exactly the purchase price rather than a portion of it? In this paper we study the informational role and optimality of the common business practice of money-back guarantees in a signaling model with quality uncertainty and risk-neutral buyers. We find that money-back guarantees and price together completely reveal a monopoly firm's private information about product quality, Moreover, the private information is revealed at no signaling cost. Furthermore, we show that in terms of the level of monetary compensation specified by a guarantee, price is the profit-maximizing level of monetary payback in case of product failure.     

Excess cash holdings and investment: the moderating roles of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment

Our study investigates the relationship between excess cash holdings and investment behaviour under two dimensions of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment, based upon a sample of Taiwanese firms operating in an environment characterized by poor legal protection for investors, with data covering the years 2000–2006. We find that excess cash is significantly correlated with capital expenditure, particularly for firms financially constrained and with severe managerial entrenchment. However, the evidence shows that excess cash is insensitive to R&D expenditure under these two dimensions.