短生命周期产品的临时价格折扣模型

从零售商的角度出发，考虑了零售商面向顾客采用临时价格折扣，同时临时价格折扣会影响顾客需求的变化。另外，由于短生命周期产品的特殊性，产品的生命周期在经历了成长期和成熟期后就退出市场，所以零售商在产品的成熟期选择某一时间采取临时价格折扣，并且通过考虑使采用价格折扣后的产品的总利润与不采用价格折扣的总利润差额最大，来决定零售商的折扣价格。     

时间和价格影响需求的变质物品促销研究

质物品的销售策略是商家制定销售计划的重点。价格折扣是目前商家最为常用的策略。但大都是供应商面对零售商的价格折扣。文章结合实际情况,研究了在需求和价格随时间同时变化条件下,零售商面对顾客时如何制定变质物品的临时价格折扣策略．并发现临时价格折扣会影响物品的销售速度。通过建立模型及对模型求解。得出使零售商利润最大时的最优折扣价格和实施临时价格折扣的最佳时刻,实例分析表明零售商采用最优的临时价格折扣策略后利润会有明显的增大。     

考虑市场冲击下易变质商品的临时价格折扣模型

文章从零售商的角度出发．考虑当零售商能够预知市场变化并采用价格折扣时所得到的利润收入,同时价格的变化会影响顾客需求的变化。由于采取价格折扣时刻的不同会导致零售商利润收入的不同．文中给出了零售商的最优定价策略,并通过实例对模型进行分析。     

需求扰动下含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

对含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链,研究了市场需求发生扰动后的供应链协调问题。考虑线性数量折扣契约,首先分析了需求无扰动时制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,然后讨论了需求扰动时制造商对最优批发价格的调整以及生产成本和需求扰动对线性数量折扣契约设计的影响,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

需求扰动下含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

对含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链,研究了市场需求发生扰动后的供应链协调问题。考虑线性数量折扣契约,首先分析了需求无扰动时制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,然后讨论了需求扰动时制造商对最优批发价格的调整以及生产成本和需求扰动对线性数量折扣契约设计的影响,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

在含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链中研究了供应链的协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时主导零售商的最优零售价格和服务水平,考虑了线性数量折扣契约,分析了制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

长尾市场网络销售商的订单履行渠道选择模型

研究传统市场和长尾市场条件下,网络零售商保有库存策略和直运策略的选择模型。建立了单周期动态仿真模型,进行了算例仿真,测算了市场竞争、供应商折扣、零售商订购策略和消费者对网络销售方式的接受程度等影响因素对网络零售商总利润的影响。结果表明,在缺乏定价权的实际条件下,网络零售商要获得更高的销售利润,需要增加产品品类、争取更大的价格折扣、采购合适数量的产品、选择合适的订单履行渠道。在未来的长尾市场中,产品品类更多、竞争更激烈、消费者选择产品的视野更开阔,直运方式将代替保有库存方式成为许多网络零售商的主流订单履行方式。     

价格决斗策略前智

零售价格促销领域分化为两个截然不同的集团。虽然天天低价战略(EDLP，every day low pricing)使一些公司在其行业中脱颖而出，促销订价战略(如：折扣、定期特价商品、清仓销售)也使一些公司地位得到了强化。但是，零售商还是希望明确他们在促销上花的钱是给他们带来更多的利润还是侵蚀了他们的利润。长期采用高促销战略的零售商希望知道转     

含有主从零售商的供应链Groves批发价格契约

研究了含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时的最优零售价格和服务水平。然后利用Groves批发价格契约来协调供应链,得出了Groves批发价格契约下制造商的最优决策、主导零售商和从属零售商的利润,并给出了制造商给予主导零售商的最优批发价格。最后通过一个算例进行分析和验证。     

含有主从零售商的供应链Groves批发价格契约

研究了含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时的最优零售价格和服务水平。然后利用Groves批发价格契约来协调供应链,得出了Groves批发价格契约下制造商的最优决策、主导零售商和从属零售商的利润,并给出了制造商给予主导零售商的最优批发价格。最后通过一个算例进行分析和验证。     

Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full-information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high-demand state and output is distorted in the low-demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all-units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market-share contracts need not be harmful for welfare.     

All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts

All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer ever would charge less for a larger order if its intentions were benign. In this paper, we show that all-units discounts may profitably arise absent any exclusionary motive. All-units discounts eliminate double marginalization in a complete information setting, and they extract more profit than would a menu of two-part tariffs in the standard incomplete information setting with two types of buyers. All-units discounts may improve or may reduce welfare (relative to menus of two-part tariffs) depending on demand parameters .     

Length of residence discounts,turnover, and demand elasticity. Should long-term tenants pay less than new tenants?

Previous academic work on rental contracts has predicted that landlords will attempt to minimize turnover costs by giving discounts to long-term tenants. If long-term tenants have less elastic demand than short-term tenants, however, landlords might prefer to give discounts to short-term tenants. A model is developed in this paper in which landlords take account of both turnover costs and demand elasticity. Evidence from a survey of apartment managers is consistent with the model and shows that length-of-residence discounts are less common than discounts on the first month’s rent for new tenants.     

Identifying regime changes in closed-end fund discounts

In seeming contradiction of the efficient markets hypothesis, closed-end fund shares typically trade at discounts to their portfolio values. We find that about half of these discounts are nonstationary. Focusing only on those funds that have stationary discounts, this study applies the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a,b) methodology to test for structural breaks in the mean discounts. Virtually all have structural breaks, and our findings contradict previous studies that indicate closed-end fund discounts revert to a long-term mean value. The data indicate that closed-end fund trading strategies are more risky than they superficially appear. As structural breaks in mean discounts do not occur together, our analysis does not find support for a common factor (possibly investor sentiment) causing these breaks.     

国有股转让折价:流动性限制与控制权收益--一项基于上市公司的经验研究

本文以1999-2001年沪市上市公司209项国有股股权转让事件为研究样本,从两个理论层面展开讨论股权转让折价的影响因素:国有股的流动性限制与控制权收益。研究发现,国有股权折价水平主要取决于公司经营的不确定性,公司较大的经营波动性,提高了股权转让折价水平,也正说明了转让折价主要是由于国有股权不可流通造成的;从控制权收益角度,本文发现公司规模、业绩对股权转让折价水平的影响是负向的。     

Competitive Mixed Bundling and Consumer Surplus

Mixed bundling in imperfectly competitive industries causes some prices to rise and others to fall. This paper studies under what conditions mixed bundling works for or against the consumer interest. We find that if buyers incur firm-specific costs or have shop-specific tastes then competitive mixed bundling lowers consumer surplus overall and raises profits—the same is true of competitive volume discounts. Competition without these volume discounts causes all prices to be kept low as larger customers are targeted; with volume discounts the prices for heavy users drop, but more is extracted from small users. The consumer surplus result is reversed if the differentiation between components as opposed to firms is key.     

Paying Customers to Switch

This paper studies the business practice of offering discounts to new customers in markets with switching costs. In a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of discounts increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. In equilibrium, firms offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have different market shares, and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more elastic. Firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while consumers need not necessarily benefit from it. There is costly equilibrium switching of consumers, which creates a dead-weight loss to the society.     

一类数量折扣新形式的设计:模糊两级供应链的完美协调

针对市场模糊需求,考虑了由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的两级供应链系统。以供应商为第一视角,构建了一类新的数量折扣形式,并研究了其在分散决策下如何制定数量折扣,使供应链避免"双边际化"效应,实现系统完美协调。基于可信性理论,给出了LR型模糊变量期望值计算式。利用模糊期望利润函数,得到了实现供应链完美协调的条件。数值分析证明了该形式数量折扣的有效性。     

A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market

We present an analysis of occupancy discounts and suggest a decomposition of the discount into two components, a “sit” discount and a length of residency discount. Data from the national longitudinal survey of the Annual Housing Survey in which 75,000 housing units from around the United States were followed from 1974 to 1977 are used to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of those discounts. The econometric models account for censoring in the data by endogenously treating the tenant's staying decision. The estimation indicates that neither discount is significant. This result is contrary to the commonly accepted result in the urban literature that landlords offer discounts to their current tenants when contracts are renegotiated.