时间和价格影响需求的变质物品促销研究

质物品的销售策略是商家制定销售计划的重点。价格折扣是目前商家最为常用的策略。但大都是供应商面对零售商的价格折扣。文章结合实际情况,研究了在需求和价格随时间同时变化条件下,零售商面对顾客时如何制定变质物品的临时价格折扣策略．并发现临时价格折扣会影响物品的销售速度。通过建立模型及对模型求解。得出使零售商利润最大时的最优折扣价格和实施临时价格折扣的最佳时刻,实例分析表明零售商采用最优的临时价格折扣策略后利润会有明显的增大。     

短生命周期产品的临时价格折扣模型

从零售商的角度出发，考虑了零售商面向顾客采用临时价格折扣，同时临时价格折扣会影响顾客需求的变化。另外，由于短生命周期产品的特殊性，产品的生命周期在经历了成长期和成熟期后就退出市场，所以零售商在产品的成熟期选择某一时间采取临时价格折扣，并且通过考虑使采用价格折扣后的产品的总利润与不采用价格折扣的总利润差额最大，来决定零售商的折扣价格。     

基于价格折扣下的供应链管理库存控制研究 ——以G在线药品公司为例

随着社会的发展,市场销售情形会随国家政治经济变化而变化.在这种情况下,为刺激需求,供应商大多在顾客采购货物过程中采取分批量制定价格策略,促进零售商对自身的供应链库存进行价格折扣管理.研究表明价格折扣模型的假设条件与EOQ模型的假设条件有一定差别,因此在零售商管理自身的供应库存时,需要考虑不同采购批量下的价格变动因素,从而得出零售商的最佳订货批量Q0,使库存费用最低,从而使供应商与零售商都可以在采购订货方面达到一定的均衡.     

全局视角下的渠道费用

对消费品公司来说．渠道费用正处于历史最高水平。平均而言．消费者为一个产品支付的价格中．超过30％都在交易中落到了零售商的腰包里。给零售商巨大的折扣空间．就减少了生产商的利润。近年厂家已经尽量靠减少一般管理费用来提高利润．但这些节余以及生产力提高所节省的成本．都被零售商赚钱的贸易渠道费用的增加所抵消了。     

主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿研究

主导零售商折扣行为的最终目的只能是为了最大限度地获取利润,但主导零售商的折扣销售表明其商品价格远低于其竞争对手,由此文中主要研究主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿问题,以期为这一现象提供合理的解释。     

提前购买价格折扣与延期支付条件下零售商订货策略选择

提高产品周转率,减少在库产品成本是供应商、零售商追求的共同目标。提前购买具有价格折扣,延期支付赚取利息差额是零售商常面对的两种策略,现有研究多是孤立地从一方面进行研究。本文将提前购买价格折扣与延期支付结合起来考虑,并在价格折扣的研究中加入资金的价值,弥补现有研究的不足,为零售商进行订货策略决策提供参考。     

基于不同营销策略下的库存采购模型比较

把免费运货及价格折扣同时考虑,从供应商对零售商订单采取免费运货和对产品进行价格折扣出发,在顾客需求周期的基础上,建立了零售商的最优化库存采购模型,并给出了在一定条件下零售商的最优订货量.通过和运费统价模型比较,得出综合运用免费运货和价格折扣可以有效增加零售商的定货数量,它降低了零售商库存采购成本,是取得规模效应的一种方法,对于进一步稳定和增加客源有着重要的意义.     

长尾市场网络销售商的订单履行渠道选择模型

研究传统市场和长尾市场条件下,网络零售商保有库存策略和直运策略的选择模型。建立了单周期动态仿真模型,进行了算例仿真,测算了市场竞争、供应商折扣、零售商订购策略和消费者对网络销售方式的接受程度等影响因素对网络零售商总利润的影响。结果表明,在缺乏定价权的实际条件下,网络零售商要获得更高的销售利润,需要增加产品品类、争取更大的价格折扣、采购合适数量的产品、选择合适的订单履行渠道。在未来的长尾市场中,产品品类更多、竞争更激烈、消费者选择产品的视野更开阔,直运方式将代替保有库存方式成为许多网络零售商的主流订单履行方式。     

基于消费者预期和不同回收渠道的制造/再制造供应链定价决策研究

针对消费者在进行购买决策时会将产品的销售价格和心里预期价格比较确定是否购买产品的情形,建立不同回收模式的博弈模型,研究了消费者预期和不同回收渠道对制造/再制造供应链最优决策及利润的影响。研究结果表明：零售商和制造商总会随着参考价格因子和消费者渠道偏好的变化调整价格来接近消费者预期,且参考价格因子越大,零售商利润越低,第三方回收商的利润越高;当渠道间竞争激烈时,消费者预期对供应链整体利润是有利的;同时渠道销售成本的增加会损害制造商和零售商的利润。此外,我们与没有回收的情况进行比较,研究发现,回收再制造可以使得企业获利,且制造商回收效果更好。     

基于系统动力学企业库存转运决策研究

为了解决企业网络与实体零售商库存不均衡和低效问题,首先利用系统动力学,对不同转运价格下单个实体和单个网络零售商利润变化曲线进行了理论分析。研究表明:分散决策下,网络与实体零售商最优库存量均随着转运价格上升而上升。     

Strategic Delegation in a Multiproduct Mixed Industry

We examine strategic delegation in a multiproduct mixed duopoly with nonprofit organization (NPO) and for‐profit organization (FPO). We will demonstrate that the nonprofitable mission service can reduce both the interest conflicts between the NPO and FPO owners and those between the NPO owner and self‐benefited manager. The profit orientation in the compensation schemes will vary with different relative costs. Although the NPO owner may have a different objective from the FPO owner, they all end up having their managers raise their prices and reducing competition in the profitable market. Moreover, as the regulated price of mission service increases, both firms will charge more for their profitable services, but the owner of NPO could still overcompensate her or his manager, when the indirect impact on increasing the conflict of interest is higher than the direct impact on price. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring the sources of financial performance in Chinese banks: A comparative analysis of different types of banks

Since significantly organizational difference in Chinese banks, this study makes an attempt to investigate whether there exist some differences of the financial performance and its decomposed components for Chinese banks. We employ the decomposition of profit change model introduced by Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (2015, P215) and normalized price definition of Balk (2018) to develop a normalized profit change decomposition model which can well deal with the firms’ scale difference. This model also decomposes the normalized profit into the technical efficiency effect, technical effect, size effect, price and quantity margin effect, and price recovery effect. For the empirical evidence, we find that although there is an increase of profit gains, the profit growth rate decline by year. Furthermore, the productivity is not the main factor to expand profits, quantity margin effect also makes peer contributions. Finally, the productivity effect and its decomposed components present different functions in different kinds of Chinese banks.     

通货膨胀、财富波动对利润率的影响——利润率是上升还是下降？

从价格角度构建利润率公式，并证明了通货膨胀可以提高利润率。进一步分析发现，通货膨胀是资本保持与提高剩余价值的重要方式，然而利润率的实现并不容易，金融创新通过债务创造的模式改善了利润率的实现路径，减缓了利润率的下降，维持了经济繁荣。但这会推动企业与私人的债务相对过量，金融创新在推动财富（债务）增长的同时，也扩大了贫富差距。而财富的增长又需要更高的利润率支撑，这就减缓了资本的积累，强化了财富与利润率的双向波动，使得经济与金融危机更容易发生。另外，利润率也可以作为解释各种类型通货膨胀的基础理论。     

在铁路货运营销中运用价格策略的探讨

价格是市场营销组合的重要因素。铁路货物运价制度运用得当与否直接关系着吸引运量的多少和使路运输企业利润的高低。并影响着运输市场营销组合的其它因素。根据营销环境的变化，灵活调整价格，科学制定价格策略，才能使企业获得最佳的经济效益。本文通过分析现行运价体系存在的问题，就如何在铁路货运营销活动中运用价格策略进行了探讨。     

Profit maximization and marketing strategies: Demand rotation and social influences

Microeconomic texts discuss alterations in industry demand curves as movements to higher or lower levels. Consider, instead, the implications for a monopolist's profit of rotating its (linear) demand curve. Where this can be done without cost by pivoting at the current price it will be profitable to continue to pivot the curve until it is horizontal or vertical. The possibility of rotating the demand curve of a ‘new’ product on an arbitrarily selected price allows us to consider the optimality of different advertising strategies (‘bandwagon’ or 'snob').     

成市化过程中的住房价格与财富分配效应

在快速城市化过程中，住房价格持续上涨并不是由外部因素所决定的，而是内生于经济运行本身。由于住房的双重属性和较大的财富持有差距，一旦住房价格被需求触发，住房的投资属性必然会压过消费属性，由经济内部因素作用而持续上涨，直到价值增值的实现受到制约后，才会改变上涨趋势，经过一段时间之后，这个过程会重新开始。在价格上涨和价值增值的实现过程中，伴随着双重财富分配效应，价格持续上涨不但转移了无房人群的当期财富，而且转移了未来财富，同时具有持久性。要想抑制房价持续上涨，减弱这种分配效应，必须缩小投资收益空间，提高无房人群的支付能力。     

价格歧视下地产企业定价积极性因素探索

价格歧视似乎是垄断行业的产物,垄断市场条件下,价格歧视可以使企业利润最大化。由于区域的局限性,我国的房地产企业的竞争,大部分还是某一局部地区的竞争,它具有垄断行业的特性。不过随着大型房企业的业务逐渐铺开,地产市场会越来越明朗,亦步亦趋下的房能价也许会伴随着国家政策有所回落,能为公众所接受和认可。文章从房地产价格歧视下定价角度,对房地产定价方法作进一步分析与剖析,分析其有利于消费者的积极性一面。     

Decomposing profit change: Konüs,Bennet and Luenberger indicators

We introduce complementary decompositions of profit change that, relying on the duality between the profit function and the directional distance function, shed light on the different sources of profit growth including measures of technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and technological change. Our decompositions extend the literature on Konüs and Bennet quantity and price indicators to profit change. The first decomposition is ‘exact’ in the sense of Diewert, by completely exhausting the sources of profit change into profit inefficiency change (including technical and allocative inefficiency change), technological change, and output and input price change. The second decomposition equates the Bennet quantity indicator to a productivity measure represented by the Luenberger indicator plus allocative inefficiency change. We deem it ‘complete’ because in contrast to the existing literature, it retains the information on allocative inefficiency change while preventing the existence of residual terms capturing price variations, whose meaningful interpretation has not been addressed until now. Our proposed solution takes advantage of the flexibility of the directional distance function when choosing a suitable directional vector. All decompositions have the same structural form and therefore their components can be compared to each other vis-à-vis, providing alternative measures of equivalent sources of profit growth.     

考虑产品替代和环保水平的供应链优化与协调

针对由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的供应链,考虑制造商生产两种碳足迹不同的可替代的产品,建立供应链优化决策模型,确定最优的产品环保水平与销售价格,提出供应链系统的协调机制.分析了产品之间不同的替代程度对均衡解和各成员利润的影响,并进一步讨论了收益共享契约对于提高供应链环境的作用.研究表明,产品环保水平竞争强度的增加会带来供应链成员利润的增加而价格竞争强度的增加会带来供应链成员利润的减少.集中式决策不仅有利于供应链利润的提高,而且有利于供应链环境的改善.当消费者对产品之间环保水平的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.