Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Central bank rules in historical perspective

This article explains that, while Walter Bagehot׳s Lombard Street had a rule about the central bank׳s role as a lender of last resort, it was not a precursor of the rules-based approach to monetary policy. Monetary policy rules came into fashion in the 1980s and 1990s when it became clear from the 1970s just how dangerous discretion could be. Under different historical circumstances before that and in more recent times, it was rules that seemed much inferior to discretion.     

Rules for a lender of last resort: An historical perspective

The Federal Reserve was established in 1913 to be a lender of last resort. Paul Warburg, its principal architect had in mind that a U.S. central bank would follow Bagehot׳s strictures ‘to lend freely at a penalty rate’ in the face of a scramble for high powered money. Yet the Federal Reserve Act never spelled out how the Fed was supposed to act as an LLR. This omission came to the fore in the Great Contraction 1929 to 1933 when the Fed failed to prevent four banking panics which turned a serious recession into the Great Contraction. Reforms in the 1930s corrected some of the Fed׳s failures but clamped down on financial activity for 40 years. The financial crisis problem returned in the 1970s with financial liberalization. The Fed abandoned Bagehot׳s strictures and adopted the ‘Too big to fail’ doctrine and ‘creative ambiguity’. This policy shift contributed to moral hazard and created new threats to financial stability with the rise of the ‘shadow banking system’. The subprime mortgage crisis prompted the Fed to take unprecedented LLR activities which have opened up a Pandora׳s box of perils. The Fed has moved away from rules based policy in its LLR function.     

Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

We study how a central bank in a small open economy should conduct monetary policy if it fears that its model is misspecified. Using a new-Keynesian model of a small open economy, we solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule and the equilibrium dynamics, and we separately analyze the consequences of central bank robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output, and the exchange rate. We show that an increase in the preference for robustness makes the central bank respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.     

Finance-neutral potential output: An evaluation in an emerging market monetary policy context

In this paper, output gaps that include financial cycle information are evaluated against policy analysis models used by the Colombian central bank. This is an important feature, since policy-related models are the only relevant yardstick and emerging economies (such as Colombia) have been historically more vulnerable to financial imbalances. Unlike previous works, finance-neutral gaps were evaluated in a monetary policy context exactly as it is routinely performed by a central bank. The distribution of output gap revisions is analyzed and a metric to compare real-time robustness across models is developed. This metric constitutes a novel way to summarize the distribution of real-time uncertainty around output gaps, and policymakers should employ it for comparison purposes. Also, the real-time policy performance of finance-neutral gaps is studied, separating suggested ex post from operational ex ante usefulness. The results suggest that finance-neutral gaps are neither more robust in real time nor more operationally useful than the benchmark estimates. These results have important implications for policymakers and for the relevant literature.     

The shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure

Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank׳s financing structure. In our model the bank׳s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long-term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow”) costs on the bank׳s shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long-term debt financing. These shadow costs limit the bank׳s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank׳s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank׳s reliance on repos.     

Optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with animal spirits and financial markets

This article presents a macro-finance-interaction model that integrates a NKM with bounded rationality and an agent-based financial market model. We derive four interactive channels between the two sectors where two channels are strictly microfounded. We analyze the impact of the different channels on economic stability and derive optimal (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy rules. We find that coefficients of optimal Taylor rules do not significantly change if financial market stabilization becomes part of the central bank׳s objective function. Additionally, we show that rule-based, backward-looking monetary policy creates huge instabilities if expectations are boundedly rational. Our model is externally validated by showing that it generates fat tailed output growth rates.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Do credit market imperfections justify a central bank׳s response to asset price fluctuations?

Do credit market imperfections justify a central bank׳s response to asset price fluctuations? This study addresses this question from the perspective of equilibrium determinacy. In the model we use, prices are sticky and the working capital of firms is subject to asset values because of a lack of commitment. If credit market imperfections exist to a small degree, the Taylor principle is a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium determinacy, and monetary policy response to asset price fluctuations is good from the perspective of equilibrium determinacy. However, if credit market imperfections exist to a large degree such that the collateral constraint is binding, then the Taylor principle no longer guarantees equilibrium determinacy, and monetary policy response to asset price fluctuations becomes a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. We find that the existence of credit market imperfections makes it unsuitable to initiate a monetary policy response to deal with asset price fluctuations. We also find that reductions in credit market imperfections can enlarge the indeterminacy region of the model parameters.     

The dynamics of the leverage cycle

We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of leveraged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice versa; a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is possible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage policies can be used to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal control of the bank׳s riskiness via the bank׳s required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show how they can control the leverage cycle.     

Financial regulations and bank credit to the real economy

We present a new agent-based model focusing on the linkage between the interbank market and the real economy with a stylised central bank acting as lender of last resort. Using this model we address the tradeoff between stability and economic performance for different structures of the interbank market. We also explore the efficacy of recent regulatory reforms using our richer model. Our results suggest that the effects of regulatory leverage ratios on the banking sector׳s performance can vary in a complex and non-monotonic way with the state of the economy, the degree of connectivity of the interbank market and the amount of information available to market participants on bank risks.     

Communication and transparency – The example of the ECB

Communication by central banks has two goals to fulfill: One is to be accountable and transparent to the public for its policy. The other is to make monetary policy by guiding expectations as effective as possible. Diversity of views inside the bank is instrumental for appropriate monetary policy decisions, but creates a tremendous challenge for communication. Central banks dispose of a variety of communication tools. Forward guidance seen as a revolution in central banks׳ communication raises new questions. Not maximum, but optimal transparency should be the final stage to strive for.     

公司管理层权力与银行信贷融资决策

运用中国上市公司2010—2013年相关数据,考察公司管理层权力与公司融资结构及银行信贷资源配置,结果显示：公司的管理层结构及高管层权力是公司融资政策选择和银行信贷资源配置的重要动因,公司管理层权力越大,管理层向银行借入短期借款越多,公司管理层权力与短期借款结构正相关。在债务约束效应下,管理层可能会出于个人任期和控制权私利的原因做出影响公司融资决策的行为,在公司银行信贷融资中表现为银行信贷融资规模与公司管理层权力呈现负相关关系,即管理层权力越大,公司配置的银行信贷资源越少;同时,公司管理层权力中结构权力与所有者权力对公司信贷决策有重要影响。     

Monetary policy and asset prices in an open economy

This paper examines whether central banks should respond to asset price fluctuations in a two-country sticky price model. We compare a monetary policy rule that targets both domestic asset prices and foreign asset prices with several alternative monetary policy rules. This paper shows that this policy rule can produce preferable outcomes because the domestic central bank incorporates important information that both domestic and foreign asset prices possess into its monetary policy. Our model suggests that central banks should consider both domestic and foreign asset prices in a two country framework with asset price fluctuations.     

Can money matter for interest rate policy?

In this paper it is shown that money can matter for macroeconomic stability under interest rate policy when transactions frictions are non-negligible. We develop a sticky price model with a shopping time function, which induces the marginal utility of consumption to depend on the (predetermined) stock of money held at the beginning of the period. Equilibrium stability and uniqueness are then ensured by a passive interest rate policy, whereas activeness is associated with an explosive equilibrium. By reacting to changes in beginning-of-period real balances, the central bank can restore stability. Interest rates further depend on lagged real balances even if the central bank acts in an entirely forward-looking way, as under discretionary optimization. If the model is revised such that end-of-period money provides transaction services, money can in principle be neglected for a stabilizing interest rate policy. Discretionary monetary policy is, however, likely to be associated with equilibrium indeterminacy, which can be avoided if interest rates are set contingent on beginning-of-period real balances.     

Redistribution effects of inflation

This note discusses Lee Ohanian׳s paper on “Monetary policy in the midst of big shocks”. In particular, it asks what would happen if assumptions are changed so inflation have redistribution effects. Evidence on nominal positions suggests that such effects can be quantitatively important.     

基于产业异质性的银行贷款政策效应分析——来自上市银行的经验证据

在银行信贷资金配置存在产业间差异的假定下,建立引入产业因素的银行贷款决定模型,考察产业因素影响银行贷款渠道有效性的内在机制,并运用2007年到2010年14家上市银行和5组产业数据展开动态面板模型估计,结果表明:从贷款需求角度看,各个产业的产出对产业贷款的影响效应存在产业间差异;从贷款供给角度看,人民银行运用货币政策工具调控产业贷款的影响效应也存在产业间差异。也就是说,产业因素确实影响到人民银行调控各个特定产业贷款的力度。     

Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe

Marvin Goodfriend׳s (2014) insightful, informative and provocative work explains concisely and convincingly why the Fed needs rules and boundaries. This paper reviews the broader institutional design problem regarding the effectiveness of the central bank in practice and confirms the need for rules and boundaries. The framework proposed for improving the Fed incorporates key elements that have already been adopted in the European Union. The case of ELA provision by the ECB and the Central Bank of Cyprus to Marfin-Laiki Bank during the crisis, however, suggests that the existence of rules and boundaries may not be enough to limit harmful discretion. During a crisis, novel interpretations of the legal authority of the central bank may be introduced to create a grey area that might be exploited to justify harmful discretionary decisions even in the presence of rules and boundaries. This raises the question how to ensure that rules and boundaries are respected in practice.     

Model uncertainty and intertemporal tax smoothing

In this paper we examine how model uncertainty due to the preference for robustness (RB) affects optimal taxation and the evolution of debt in the Barro tax-smoothing model (1979). We first study how the government spending shocks are absorbed in the short run by varying taxes or through debt under RB. Furthermore, we show that introducing RB improves the model׳s predictions by generating (i) the observed relative volatility of the changes in tax rates to government spending, (ii) the observed comovement between government deficits and spending, and (iii) more consistent behavior of government budget deficits in the U.S. economy. Finally, we show that RB can also improve the model׳s predictions in the presence of multiple shocks.