外包、创新与工资不平等

本文构建了一个纳入发达国家创新活动的外包模型,来研究发达国家对发展中国家的外包转移,对发达国家和发展中国家之间的工资不平等以及作为发包方的发达国家企业创新活动的影响.我们发现,外包转移活动中不同因素对发达国家和发展中国家之间的工资不平等有着较为复杂的影响效应;更为重要是,发达国家对发展中国家的外包转移程度越大,越能激励作为发包方的发达国家企业的创新活动.进一步,考虑到作为外包转移接受方的发展中国家之间普遍存在的模仿行为特征,在外包模型中引入了发展中国家企业之间的模仿系数.模型结果表明,发展中国家代工企业之间的模仿程度越大,则会缩小发达国家和发展中国家之间的工资不平等;而且,作为代工方的发展中国家企业之间的模仿程度越大,越能激励作为发包方的发达国家企业的创新活动,越能激励发达国家对发展中国家的外包转移.本文的结论对于重新思考与理解外包活动对作为发包方的发达国家和作为接包方的发展中国家所具有的复杂影响效应,无疑具有非常直接的现实政策含义.     

外包与技术转移:基于发展中国家异质性模仿的分析

本文构建了一个模型来研究外包以及依附于外包活动中的技术转移,对发展中国家经济发展的多重影响效应.我们的研究表明,在发展中国家为低模仿类型时,外包活动中发达国家对发展中国家的技术转移,有利于发达国家与发展中国家双方的福利增进;在发展中国家为高模仿类型时,技术转移有利于发达国家,而不利于发展中国家可持续发展能力的培育.我们的研究支持这样一种观点:外包条件下发达国家对发展中国家的技术转移,并不必然会带来发展中国家的经济可持续增长,一个不可忽略的必要条件是,发展中国家自身制度条件制约了外包与技术转移对发展中国家可持续发展能力的作用.     

外商直接投资、知识产权保护与发展中国家的社会福利——兼论发展中国家的引资战略

本文在一个由发达国家企业和发展中国家企业所构成的寡头垄断的产量竞争模型中 ,考察了在发达国家企业所进行的产品创新型R&D投资具有溢出效应的情况下 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的外商直接投资 (FDI)所产生的福利效果。本文发现 ,即使发展中国家拥有生产成本相对低廉的优势 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的FDI也只有在溢出效应较小时才可能发生。但这种情况下的FDI也可能损害发展中国家的同类竞争企业 ,甚至损害发展中国家的社会福利。当然 ,以上结论并不意味着引进外资必然损害发展中国家的利益 ,外资引进对发展中国家所产生的福利效果 ,在很大程度上取决于FDI的性质 (产品市场的所在国 )、发展中国家成本优势的大小以及它对知识产权的保护力度等因素。     

外包与技术转移：基于发展中国家异质性模仿的分析

本文构建了一个模型来研究外包以及依附于外包活动中的技术转移,对发展中国家经济发展的多重影响效应。我们的研究表明,在发展中国家为低模仿类型时,外包活动中发达国家对发展中国家的技术转移,有利于发达国家与发展中国家双方的福利增进;在发展中国家为高模仿类型时,技术转移有利于发达国家,而不利于发展中国家可持续发展能力的培育。我们的研究支持这样一种观点：外包条件下发达国家对发展中国家的技术转移,并不必然会带来发展中国家的经济可持续增长,一个不可忽略的必要条件是,发展中国家自身制度条件制约了外包与技术转移对发展中国家可持续发展能力的作用。     

发展中国家对外直接投资、逆向技术转移与母国技术提升

近年来越来越多的研究发现,处于技术劣势的发展中国家跨国公司正逐渐把对外直接投资作为在国际上寻求技术优势的有力工具和手段.发展中国家跨国公司通过对发达国家的对外直接投资,可以利用东道国的技术资源优势获得逆向技术转移,并向母国返流和传递,进而促进母国企业、产业和国家整体技术水平的提升.积极利用技术寻求型对外直接投资进行技术学习和逆向技术转移,是发展中国家跨国企业在经济全球化形势下的一种适宜选择.     

外包对于我国环境污染影响的实证研究:基于行业面板数据

发达国家和地区的外包行为,究竟是促进了发展中国家的技术进步,从而减少了经济活动对环境的污染呢,还是通过向发展中国家转移生产过程中的加工组装环节,从而扩大了对发展中国家的环境污染?本文在中国业已成为全球最大的代工平台的经济背景下,利用中国行业面板数据实证检验了发达国家和地区的外包对我国环境的影响.实证结果表明,外包行为显著降低了我国的环境污染强度.与此同时,本文还给出了我国规模效应、技术效应、结构效应、产权制度以及要素禀赋等的结果.本文的结论对于理解我国紧迫的产业升级等问题有启发意义.     

人民币大幅升值严重影响中国经济发展

1.人民币升值会对中国的优势产业产生严重损害。从国际分工格局看,相对于发达国家以研究开发和服务业为主来讲,中国作为发展中国家是以制造业为主的,这种贸易结构极易受到汇率水平变动的影响。人民币升值,出口商生产成本和劳动力成本则会相应提高;相对于发达国家以资本技术优势参与国际分工来讲,中国作为发展中国家是以劳动力成本为优势的。作为中国优势企业的劳动密集型企业的产品档次不高,附加值含     

碳关税下政府补贴政策及企业减排研发决策的研究

以碳关税政策下发展中国家选择减排研发补贴政策为背景,构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型。第一阶段为发达国家和发展中国家各自设定碳关税率及研发补贴率;第二阶段为发展中国家企业根据补贴率及税率确定减排率;第三阶段为发达国家及发展中国家企业在发达国家市场上进行产量竞争。利用逆向递归方法求解该动态博弈的最优决策,并对其进行深入分析,分析结果显示:碳关税在一定条件下可以促进企业碳减排并改善环境,但关税会对两国之间的贸易造成一定负面影响。关税政策和补贴政策能够有效提高各自企业的竞争力,但过多的政府干预会影响市场正常秩序。对于发展中国家来说,补贴政策能够促进企业的减排行为,并且企业的成本优势越明显,减排效果越好。     

减排技术的跨国转让与环境政策选择——基于Stackelberg竞争的博弈模型

细分外国企业对减排技术的转让方式,使转让方式与东道国环境政策相匹配,是一个有待深入研究的问题.在Stackelberg竞争模型中考虑拥有减排技术的外国企业作为市场跟随者在东道国市场上与东道国企业竞争,分析外国企业减排技术的最优授权方式,提出东道国政府的最优环境政策选择.从分析结论看:固定收费和特许权收费的技术授权都可以增加外国企业利润,但外国企业更偏好于特许权收费的技术授权,而双重收费可能降低外国企业的利润;技术授权对东道国的社会福利不确定,特许权收费的技术授权总可以增加外国社会福利,固定收费和双重收费的技术授权可能恶化外国社会福利;特许权收费和双重收费下减排技术的扩散可以有效改善环境,而固定收费则可能增加排放总量;特许权收费的技术授权需要东道国制定相对宽松的环境政策.东道国政府需要根据不同污染物的污染属性和扩散程度适时调整环境税政策,以实现企业利润、社会福利和环境的共同改善.     

海外市场需求与跨国垂直并购——基于低端下游企业的视角

本文构建了一个产品从低端到高端分布的Hotelling模型,以探讨我国低端下游企业进行跨国垂直并购的时机选择和决定因素。研究表明,垂直并购国外高端上游企业能实现扩大市场份额、提升产品定位的双重效能。海外市场需求环境对低端下游企业拓展战略起关键性作用。在正常需求条件下,与直接出口及先并购国内上游企业再出口两种模式相比,跨国垂直并购并非最优选择。在遭受负向需求冲击时,国外上游企业生产成本的大幅上升以及国外下游竞争对手品牌价值的下降给跨国垂直并购带来了契机,此时在技术密集度较高的上游产业进行跨国垂直并购成为国内低端下游企业的最优选择。如果并购能实现足够大的品牌价值效应,还会改善被并购企业所在国的社会福利水平。     

国际垂直专业化对中国环境效率的影响

理论上,发达国家跨国公司主导下的国际垂直专业化通过工序配置和价值分配对发展中国家的环境技术进步及其技术效率产生负面影响,从而导致后者环境效率的恶化。本文基于我国省级和行业面板数据模型的检验表明,国际垂直专业化对中国环境技术进步和环境效率变化具有显著负作用。为提高环境效率,中国应改变在国际垂直专业化中被支配的地位,同时发达国家和国际组织应加强自身在环境技术扩散中的作用。     

Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results.     

Subsidizing healthcare in the presence of market distortions

The paper develops a three-sector full-employment general equilibrium model for a small open developing economy with exogenous labour market imperfection and a non-traded sector providing healthcare services, the consumption of which generates positive externalities. Our main objective is to show that the optimal consumption subsidy to healthcare, if solely judged from the standpoint of economic growth, is strictly positive (zero) when the production technology of the healthcare sector is of the variable (fixed) coefficient type. However, in the variable coefficient case, the optimal per capita expenditure on healthcare crucially hinges on the degree of labour market imperfection and the quality of services provided by the healthcare sector. The latter result can possibly be considered as a theoretical justification why the magnitude of per capita public spending on healthcare services is significantly lower in the developing countries compared to that in the developed nations. Besides, using the Sen's (1974) index of social welfare that takes into consideration both the growth and income inequality aspects, we have proved that the optimal health subsidy is positive irrespective of the nature of production technology of the healthcare sector. Furthermore, most of these results are found to be valid even in the presence of Harris-Todaro type unemployment. Finally, the results lead to a few important policy implications in the context of the developing countries.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

基于环境成本的比较优势理论及政策启示

在李嘉图模型中,将环境成本用追加的劳动投入来衡量,发现环保技术及环境成本对比较优势格局的修正.在H-O模型中,假定环境作为一种生产要素,则所形成的比较优势建立在包含环境资源真实价格的基础之上.社会环境成本与企业环境成本的差额,使"显示的比较优势"有可能偏离真实的比较优势,从而损害效率与公平.因此,要鼓励清洁技术创新,并通过制度变革来推进环境成本内部化.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

SUSTAINING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS THE GOLDEN EGG: A CONTINUOUS TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER

This paper proposes a simple model of the trade-offs perceived by innovating firms when investing in countries with limited intellectual property rights (IPR). The model allows for a continuous treatment of technology transfer and production cost gains occurring through FDI. While it does not consider possible changes in rates of innovation caused by changes in IPR in developing countries, it allows one to uncover a potentially non-monotonic relationship between welfare and IPR in the recipient country.     

How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.