Trade and Real Wages: a Macroeconomic Model*

We offer a new paradigm to understand the effects of trade on factor rewards. It utilizes the classical‐Keynesian model, and shows that normally a country’s trade deficit hurts labor by lowering the real wage, but benefits the owners of capital. The effects of tariffs on factor rewards and employment are opposite to those of the trade deficit, which falls with a rise in the tariff rate. Countries with trade shortfalls unambiguously benefit from their tariffs, because laborers far outnumber capitalists, who suffer from the declining interest rate. Thus, tariffs lead to a rise in social welfare in trade‐deficit countries.     

Labour mobility and the redistributive effects of trade integration

This paper addresses the role of mobility costs in shaping the effects of trade integration on wage inequality and welfare. We present a three-factor, two-sector model in which the production technology exhibits capital-skill complementarity and the cost of moving across sectors differs between unskilled and skilled workers. Results show that trade integration increases aggregate welfare, but it also raises wage inequality, both within and across skill categories. We also model a public re-training program, financed by a proportional tax levied on skilled workers, which reduces the mobility cost of unskilled workers. We show that even if the re-training programme entails some welfare losses, it can reduce both within and between wage inequality, while still making free trade Pareto superior with respect to the no-trade regime.     

The Distributional and Allocative Impacts of Virtual Labor Mobility across Time Zones through Communication Networks

Using a specific‐factors' model, with two goods (a shift‐working good and a non‐shift‐working good), three factors (capital specific to shift‐working, land specific to non‐shift‐working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night‐time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night‐shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night‐time wages and no one works at night, and night‐shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.     

ON THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION*

This article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare. We calibrate our model to U.S. data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax‐financed education depend on the main source of individual household income. Households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention, whereas high‐wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban, and low‐wage workers benefit most from free education. Introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains, whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses.     

Food supply and inflation

The paper presents an analytic version of the Latin American structuralist theory of inflation. It emphasizes the difference between the productive sectors of the economy and draws attention to the fact that the inflationary process is closely linked to inconsistent claims for shares in income. It describes a Keynesian economy with two (three) sectors. Real desired wages are rigid. Money is passive. It is shown that the structuralist hypotheses are capable of generating disequilibria that can lead to constantly rising prices without any built in mechanism to offset them. Steady inflation can only persist if workers allow their real wage to be kept below target. As the workers try to catch on, the model will blow up: an accelerating inflation can be observed in many Latin American countries during periods when wage settlements, aimed at restoring inflation losses, escaped the government control. The paper also explores the implications of foreign trade: it shows that, under structuralist hypotheses, external disequilibria cannot be corrected through exchange rate devaluations alone, and it examines the stagflationary impacts of an increase in the price of imported intermediates.     

WAGE SUBSIDY AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper seeks to answer if wage subsidy to workers displaced due to trade reform raises welfare in a developing country. We use a general equilibrium model with non‐specific factor inputs and trade liberalization as a policy variable. A combination of wage subsidy and tariff rate obtains the second‐best welfare level. The theoretical result is new, policy‐relevant and important in view of political‐economy aspects of free trade in developing and transition countries.     

Brain drain,illegal migration and capital exports from less developed economies: a neoclassical approach

This model shows that LDC's brain drain triggers emigration of unskilled labor and capital exports, skilled workers and agricultural capitalists gain, unskilled workers and industrial capitalists lose, and demodernization of the economy results. Demodernization of the economy occurs when labor force and output of the industrial sector decrease, and employment and production in agriculture increase. The problem analyzed in this model is what happens to the incomes of those who are left behind when some of the skilled workers migrate abroad. The results show that with the exodus of both skilled labor and capital, the marginal productivity of unskilled workers in industry also falls below the unskilled wage. Although one would expect a brain drain to result in gains for those skilled workers who remain in the source country, and for the capital owners who receive unskilled workers as a result of emigration, the losers are the unskilled workers and the capitalists in the sector where the migrants worked.     

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the International Division of Labor

The authors incorporate equilibrium unemployment due to imperfect matching into a model of trade in intermediate inputs. Firms are assumed to be price‐takers and their size is given by technology. Firms enter the market as long as expected profits cover the search cost they incur initially; jobs are endogenously destroyed by random shocks that affect firms’ price–cost margins. Trade increases productivity in the final good and then demand for each intermediate input. Steady‐state unemployment is reduced after trade integration because the rate of job destruction is reduced, which in turn induces an indirect positive effect on job creation. A more volatile environment faced by firms does not necessarily increase unemployment. However, the rate of job destruction unambiguously rises, and rises more under free trade.     

Labour Demand, Wage Mark-ups and Product Market Integration

Globalization makes it easier to relocate production and thus employment across countries. Therefore, it is often asserted that labour demand becomes more elastic, causing wage mark-ups to fall and thus erode the effective market power of trade unions. We explore this issue in a general equilibrium model where the elasticity of labour demand is endogenized and related to the facility by which production can be relocated across countries. Wages and employment increase unambiguously as a result of product market integration, but it is ambiguous whether wage mark-ups decrease or increase. A numerical illustration suggests that the elasticity effect – even when the wage mark-up falls – is of second order relative to the gains from trade.      

Gradual globalization and inequality between and within countries

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of gradual trade liberalization on intra‐country and inter‐country inequality. It assumes two countries, North and South, and two factors, skilled labour and unskilled labour. North is defined as the one that is relatively skilled‐labour abundant and larger. A marginal trade liberalization from autarky is shown to (a) increase (decrease) in skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the North (South) and (b) raise the inequality between North and South. As the global economy approaches free trade, a marginal trade liberalization has effects, which are the opposite of (a) and (b); that is, the relative wage falls in the North and rises in the South, and North‐South inequality decreases.     

Indra-Industry Trade,Endogenous Technical Change,Wage Inequality and Welfare

By using alternative intra-industry trade models (1. New goods cannot be introduced into the economy; 2. The possibility for a set of capital goods available in the economy to vary; the models consider the existence of intersectoral linkages), I show by means of Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) analysis that trade rises wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers; but the impact on wage inequality is far larger, when countries are assumed to exchange differentiated capital goods. The latter result has been obtained by using an imperfect competitive model, which embodies a sector bias technological change that arises from trade. In addition, the gains from trade, insignificant under the standard trade hypotheses, are extraordinarily large when endogenous technological change is taken into account. The main policy conclusion is that if policy makers of flexible wage economies introduce trade barriers to reduce wage inequality, these protective measures, by affecting the diffusion of technology, would cause a large welfare loss. [D58, f12, F43, J3, O3]     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Joint outputs and real wage rates

The magnification effect in standard international trade theory asserts that if the relative price of the labor-intensive commodity increases, the real wage will also increase, as will the wage/rental ratio. This result depends upon the assumption that both activities are nonjoint—each combining labor and capital to produce a single output, so that if activities are joint instead, the results are in jeopardy. It is shown that if the difference between the share of commodity one produced in the first activity and in the second activity exceeds the difference between the labor distributive shares in the first activity and the second, an increase in commodity 1's relative price raises the wage/rental ratio. The real wage unambiguously rises in this case if and only if the ratio of the commodity output shares in the two activities exceeds the ratio of labor shares.     

Trade and industrial structure with large firms and heterogeneity

We develop a model of trade and firm heterogeneity in an oligopolistic setting. This setting generates key differences in terms of modelling setup, modelling predictions and welfare implications with respect to the existing literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. In terms of modelling setup our approach allows us to explore interaction between potentially large heterogeneous firms, in contrast to recent trade literature with heterogeneity and atomistic firms. As a result variables like market price and total sales vary endogenously as different firms enter the market. We offer a solution for the integer problem inherent in small group models, based on stochastic dominance. The model generates testable predictions deviating from the benchmark firm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in terms of the effect of trade liberalisation on markups, market shares, the market price. We also derive predictions on the effect of distance and market size on the probability of zero trade flows and export prices. Our model features the possibility that welfare declines as a result of trade liberalisation. The result in Brander and Krugman (1983), the benchmark model for trade under oligopoly, that welfare unambiguously rises with free entry and might decline without free entry due to increased cross-hauling is reversed. In a setting with heterogeneous instead of homogeneous firms, welfare might decline with free entry. A negative welfare effect without free entry can be ruled out if the firm size distribution is sufficiently dispersed.     

Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages

We show in a monopsony model that accounting for changes in hours a minimum wage has ambiguous effects on employment and welfare. When all workers have the same preference ordering over leisure and consumption employment subsidies unambiguously improve welfare. Many countries have minimum wages and also tax minimum wage workers.     

Wage Inequality and Human Capital Formation under Migration Possibilities

I examine the problem in the relationship between wage inequality and human capital formation under migration possibilities. Unlike previous analyses, I incorporate the education market and the education price into the analysis, and assume that workers bear the pecuniary cost for receiving education. Given such an assumption, migration possibilities do not necessarily increase education demand since the larger demand for education raises the education price and lowers the net return on education. By modelling an economy where workers in the home country (the labour‐sending country) comprise skilled and unskilled workers and they can migrate to the foreign country (the labour‐receiving country), I show that brain gain and brain drain occur simultaneously in the home country. In particular, if wage inequality is larger in the foreign country than in the home country, skilled workers experience brain gain and unskilled workers experience brain drain in the home country. On the other hand, if wage inequality is sufficiently larger in the home country, brain drain occurs in skilled workers and brain gain in unskilled workers.     

Foreign Aid,Wage Inequality,and Welfare for a Small Open Economy with Tourism

While the welfare effect of foreign aid has been extensively analyzed, the impact on the distribution of income has received less attention. At the same time, there has been recent work on tourism where it is complementary to aid in improving welfare. By combining these two strands, this paper concentrates on wage inequality in developing countries. We find that an increase in aid in the form of tied aid can lower the relative price of nontraded goods. The rent extracted from tourists declines, reducing welfare of domestic residents. In addition, the fall in the nontradable price can widen the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, increased foreign aid may have detrimental effects on national welfare and the distribution of income. Rising wage inequality is confirmed by numerical simulations.     

Money and rank in the labor market

We analyze the gains/losses in wage and in rank position for workers switching firm. Voluntary movers enjoy a wage premium relative to stayers, but that premium declines with rank inside the new firm, indicating that movers are trading-off money and rank.     

Factor Taxation, Income Distribution and Capital Market Integration

This paper addresses the optimal mix of capital and wage taxation when policymakers maximize the political support of workers and capitalists, subject to a fixed revenue requirement. Capital market integration increases the efficiency costs of a tax on capital but simultaneously changes the political equilibrium through its effect on the distribution of factor incomes. These distributional effects are directly opposed in the capital importing and the capital exporting region. While the capital tax rate will always be lowered in the capital importing region, the tax rate in the exporting country will rise when political resistance to market-induced changes in the distribution of income is sufficiently high.