共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
We study experimental two-sided markets in which the information structure is endogenous. When submitting an offer, a trader decides which other traders will be informed about the offer. This setup allows both a decentralized bargaining market (Chamberlin, J. Polit. Econ. 56 (1948) 95), and a double auction market (Smith J. Polit. Econ. 70 (1962) 111) as special cases. The results show that offers are typically directed to all traders of the other side of the market, but to none of the traders of the same side of the market. Even though traders receive much less information, the resulting market institution leads to the same outcomes in terms of prices and efficiency as a double auction market. In two additional treatments we examine the robustness of these results. First, it is found that the market institution adapts predictably, but not necessarily efficiently, to the imposition of transaction costs. Second, we find that the preference of sellers to conceal offers from competitors is strict. At the same time, sellers benefit collectively when they reveal offers to each other. 相似文献
2.
Todd R. Kaplan 《Economic Theory》2012,51(2):487-503
This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are unable to change their style, then there is no effect on the welfare of the sellers. If the sellers are able to make adjustments, extra information may either boost or damage the sellers?? profits. While the chance that there will be a proposal of a style preferred by the buyer cannot decrease, the buyer??s surplus may increase or decrease. 相似文献
3.
Damian S. Damianov 《Economic Theory》2012,51(1):105-137
This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment. 相似文献
4.
Daniel Sanches 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(5):1941-1964
We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrower?s ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender?s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms. 相似文献
5.
Patent Enforcement, Innovation and Welfare 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Uday Bhanu Sinha 《Journal of Economics》2006,88(3):211-241
This paper analyzes how the Southern patent enforcement affects the Northern firm's choice of licensing, subsidiary production
or exports for serving the Southern market, and the innovation rate in the North and ultimately the welfare in the South.
We show that for imperfect patent enforcement, licensing contract leads to more innovation in the North relative to subsidiary
or exports. When both subsidiary and exports are very costly options, no patent enforcement in the South is best for the South.
However, when either subsidiary operation or exports can be organized cheaply, the Southern government chooses some positive
degree of patent enforcement. We also establish that strengthening of patent enforcement in the South may lead to more licensing
and less subsidiary operations or exports. 相似文献
6.
为解决产需不确定性给绿色农产品供应链运营带来的复杂影响,寻求绿色农产品生产商和销售商面对产需双重不确定情形下各自的最优决策,研究从农产品产出和市场需求双重不确定性视角出发,结合目前消费者对绿色农产品的需求偏好,构建由生产商和销售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,探究收益共享契约能否有效协调产需都不确定的绿色农产品供应链。研究结果表明:分散决策时的批发价契约无法协调此供应链。引入收益共享契约后,在合适的共享系数范围内,生产商的农资投入量会增加,农产品的绿色度会比分散决策时高,同时销售商的销售价格降低;当农产品订购量变大后,引入契约后的生产商和销售商各自的利润相较于分散决策时更高。 相似文献
7.
Mikhail Anufriev Jasmina Arifovic John Ledyard Valentyn Panchenko 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2013,23(3):539-573
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents’ behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether learning behavior with and without information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider a simple market for a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers. The valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are given exogenously. Agents are involved in consecutive trading sessions, which are organized as a continuous double auction with order book. Using Individual Evolutionary Learning agents submit price bids and offers, trying to learn the most profitable strategy by looking at their realized and counterfactual or “foregone” payoffs. We find that learning outcomes heavily depend on information treatments. Under full information about actions of others, agents’ orders tend to be similar, while under limited information agents tend to submit their valuations/costs. This behavioral outcome results in higher price volatility for the latter treatment. We also find that learning improves allocative efficiency when compared to outcomes with Zero-Intelligent traders. 相似文献
8.
We develop a model of simple “reputation systems” that monitor and publish information about the behavior of sellers in a search market with asymmetric information. The reputations created influence the equilibrium search patterns of buyers and thus provide for market‐based “punishment” of bad behavior. We show that a reputation system that rewards honesty can enhance welfare by allowing good sellers to truthfully signal their type. However, the same system can be prone to strategic manipulation by sellers who always have low‐quality products. In that case, we show that an alternative system which assigns reputations based on product quality rather than honesty can be superior. 相似文献
9.
Derek Stacey 《International Economic Review》2016,57(4):1507-1533
I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions. Seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active. 相似文献
10.
Payment choice in international trade: Theory and evidence from cross‐country firm‐level data 下载免费PDF全文
Andreas Hoefele Tim Schmidt‐Eisenlohr Zhihong Yu 《The Canadian journal of economics》2016,49(1):296-319
When trading across borders, firms choose between different payment contracts. Theoretically, this should allow firms to trade‐off differences in financing costs and enforcement across countries. This paper provides evidence for this hypothesis employing firm‐level data from a large number of developing countries. As predicted, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the theory and also show empirically that the more complex an industry is, the more important is contract enforcement and the less important are financing costs for the contract choice. 相似文献
11.
By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms can mitigate moral-hazard problems
when particular buyers and sellers interact infrequently. However, these mechanisms rely on buyers sharing their private information
about sellers, and thus may suffer from too little feedback when provision is costly. We experimentally compare a standard
feedback mechanism to one in which sellers can inspect a buyer’s feedback-provision history, thus providing incentives to
share private information even when costly. We find fairly high trust and trustworthiness in all markets, with buyers providing
costly feedback, especially negative, sufficient to induce trustworthiness. However, feedback-provision histories did not
improve outcomes, and at least weakly decreased trustworthiness with experienced participants, as this information enabled sellers to discriminate and ship less frequently
to buyers lacking a reputation for information sharing. 相似文献
12.
We study how the efficient choice of contract enforcement interacts with the efficient allocation of capital in a simple production economy. Contract enforcement makes trade possible but requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for production. In such an economy, more dispersion in ex-ante marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement. Furthermore, implementing the optimal allocation requires a specific distribution of the cost for enforcement across agents that is not monotonic and results in a redistribution of endowments. At the efficient solution, agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution benefit the most from investment in enforcement and these investments lead to a reduction in consumption and income inequality. 相似文献
13.
14.
In this study, we investigate whether ‘Chonsei,’ the distinctive type of housing contract system in Korea, has a favorable impact on house prices during a market downturn. We show the mechanism in which Chonsei prevents a sharp drop in house prices based on sellers’ loss aversion behavior. Moreover, using data on the Seoul condominium (i.e. apartment) market during the 2006–2017 period, we find that Chonsei prices have a negative impact on the housing trade volume in a market recession. This finding is consistent with our argument that loss aversion behavior appears with regard to the rise in Chonsei prices and thereby Chonsei functions as a price protector in the Korean housing market. 相似文献
15.
Kenan Kalaycı 《Experimental Economics》2016,19(2):299-316
This paper examines the effects of competition in experimental posted-offer markets where sellers can confuse buyers. I report two studies. In one, the sellers offering heterogeneous goods can obfuscate buyers by means of spurious product differentiation. In the other study, sellers offer identical goods and make their prices unnecessarily complex by having multi-part tariffs. I vary the level of competition by having treatments with two and three- sellers in both studies, and having an additional treatment with five-sellers in one study. The results show that average complexity created by a seller is not different for the treatments with two, three and five sellers. In addition, market prices are highest and buyer surplus is lowest when there are two sellers in a market. 相似文献
16.
Bankruptcy and firm finance 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two
parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and
quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability
and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern
these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare
losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract
from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.
相似文献
17.
Larry D. Qiu 《European Economic Review》2006,50(7):1661-1682
We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market. 相似文献
18.
On the Trade-off Between Work-related Training and Labor Mobility: The Role of Firing and Exit Costs
Within an incomplete-contract framework, we examine the consequences of contract renegotiation for contract design/enforcement and training market efficiency. Specifically, we show how the imposition of either firing costs or exit costs can bind together employers and employees in longer-lasting employment relationships that allow both agents to amortize their training investments. Nevertheless, the model implies that, although firing and exit costs provide institutional solutions to the training under-investment problem, this is achieved at the expense of allocative efficiency (efficient separations). Empirical evidence supports the existence of such a trade-off.revised version received July 23, 2003 相似文献
19.
Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedback. This paper experimentally investigates which effect is stronger with the use of a rating system: buyers’ inflated inequity acceptance or sellers’ disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information condition on the buyers’ side. Our experiment shows that in a setup where the size of the pie is common knowledge for both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not display greater acceptance of inequity. By contrast, when only sellers are aware of the size of the pie, sellers behave aggressively to exploit buyers and their behavior does not change in the presence of a rating system; however, buyers display greater acceptance of inequity when a rating system is present. We discuss how these results can be explained by a theoretical model that includes sellers’ social disapproval aversion and buyers’ disappointment aversion in addition to the players’ inequality aversion. 相似文献