考虑紧急订货的供应链库存控制策略研究

库存控制的研究一般只考虑正常订货的情况，但实际上紧急订货经常出现。供应链库存控制策略的制定时，上游厂商为下游厂商的紧急订货准备一定量的产品，可以减少缺货损失，降低成本。本文在分析了考虑紧急订货的供应链库存控制成本的基础上，提出了关于最优策略的数量模型，并给出了求取最优解的方法。     

考虑成本利润率的供应链优化与协调

文章研究了以成本利润率为目标优化函数,在收益共享契约下,构建单一供应商和单一零售商构成的供应链优化与协调模型.建立未提供收益共享契约和提供收益共享契约、零售商风险中性和风险规避的不同情形下的决策模型,给出不同情况下的最优订货量及实现供应链协调的收益共享系数的区间范围.研究认为:收益共享契约下的零售商最优订货量大于未提供收益共享契约下的最优订货量;不论是否提供收益共享契约,利润最大化为优化目标的零售商最优订货量均高于以成本利润率最大为优化目标的最优订货量;此外,研究给出了零售商的最优订货量与收益共享系数的关系.     

风险规避零售商加盟的闭环供应链协调契约设计

考察了分散独立决策和集中联合决策情况下,产品销售及废旧产品回收均由风险规避零售商负责的闭环供应链中节点企业的优化决策与协调问题。研究发现,分散独立决策情形下,双重边际化效应在有风险规避零售商加盟的闭环供应链中也存在;收益费用共享契约能够实现风险规避型闭环供应链的协调。     

均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。     

零售商公平关切下闭环供应链的回收模式比较与协调机制研究

针对制造商主导的闭环供应链,在考虑零售商为公平关切者的前提下,建立了三种回收模式(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收)下的四个Stackelberg博弈模型,求解和比较不同情形下的最优价格、最优回收率和成员利润,分析零售商公平关切程度对最优决策的影响,得到了一系列有益的管理学结论。最后针对分散式决策下的效率损失,提出了基于二部定价契约的协调机制。     

风险规避对闭环供应链决策的影响

构建了3种不同回收渠道(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收商回收)下的闭环供应链模型,以制造商为Stackelber领导者,分析了分散化决策下的3种最优决策模型,考察了闭环供应链各参与方的风险规避程度对其定价决策和期望利润的影响,并借助数值分析对求解结果进行了验证。研究结果表明:随着风险规避程度的增大,零售商趋向于降低零售价格,回收方趋向于提高回收价格;在其他因素不变的情况下,闭环供应链各参与方的风险规避程度增大往往会导致其期望利润减少。     

基于回购合同的供应链协调策略研究

在一种通过回购合同实现供应链协调的供应链中，生产商提供一种产品给具有随机需求的一个零售商：生产商为鼓励零售商多订货而对零售商剩余商品规定一个回购价格进行回购。这种协调策略可以视为Stackelberg博弈。本文在阐述了解决该博弈问题的方法后，进行了数值实验，分析了采用这种协调策略的利益。     

基于参照点的损失厌恶企业订货决策比较研究

考虑损失厌恶企业的决策者在评估损失或收益时心中存在参照点。将企业分为两种类型:类型一企业,即当订货量大于需求量时才存在参照点的企业;类型二企业,即无论订货量大于或小于需求量均存在参照点的企业。基于前景理论,构建了上述两类企业的效用函数,得到了企业的最优订货决策模型,并对比分析了两类企业的订货量与损失厌恶系数、零售价格、批发价格和缺货损失之间的逻辑关系。主要结论如下:类型一企业的最优订货量小于类型二企业的最优订货量;随着损失厌恶系数、零售价格和批发价格的增大,类型一企业和类型二企业的最优订货量可能递增,也可能递减;随着缺货损失的增加,类型一企业的最优订货量一定递增,而类型二企业的最优订货量可能递增,也可能递减。     

报童投资组合模型中的批发价契约设计

当风险规避型报童的订货资金有限,却有多种产品可供订购时,供应商需要设计恰当的契约,以引导报童的订货行为,实现最大化自身收益的目的。针对上述问题,本文运用投资组合理论处理报童的决策问题;在此基础上建立了供应商与报童之间的博弈模型,设计了求解最优批发价契约的算法;通过数值算例,说明了最优契约的求解过程。结果表明,与未经优化而随机选择的契约相比,基于该算法求得的契约显著提升了供应商的期望收益。     

需求依赖销售努力情形下过度自信零售商的决策

研究了市场需求随机且受零售商努力行为因素影响的情形下过度自信零售商的决策问题。通过模型推导得到过度自信零售商的最优订货量和最优销售努力水平,讨论了过度自信零售商与理性零售商在最优订货量和最优销售努力水平上的偏差。通过比较静态分析,研究了零售商的过度自信水平对其最优订货量和最优销售努力水平的影响,对需求方差进行了敏感性分析,分析了市场环境参数对零售商最优决策的影响。结果显示:当零售商面临低收益市场环境或更高收益市场环境时,过度自信行为可促使零售商做出趋近于理性决策的选择。     

需求扰动下供应链契约协调机制研究

本文根据需求扰动的影响力大小,将其分为日常需求扰动和突发需求扰动,并对比了两种不同需求扰动的产生原因和特征;具体阐述了需求扰动是如何对供应链上各企业造成影响的,并给出了两种不同的传导模式;通过剖析需求扰动风险传导机制,从3个角度提出了针对需求扰动的控制策略;最后,通过建模探讨了在需求扰动后价格敏感系数改变的情况下零售商对产品价格的调整。同时,为了保证零售商按发生需求扰动后的最优订购量订购产品和按最优产品零售价给产品定价,根据需求扰动不同的影响程度,分类讨论了与供应链相协调的适用契约。     

An analytical framework for retailer price and advertising decisions for products with temperature-sensitive demand

The demand for weather-sensitive products, such as beverages, ice creams, or chocolate varies with changes in temperature. Yet, retailers lack a framework to adapt the marketing mix elements, such as price and advertising, in line with such changes. We provide a theoretical framework to fill this gap by developing an analytical model to derive the optimal marketing mix when product demand depends on temperature. The model prescribes how price and advertising for different demand characteristics should be set following a temperature change. Integrating the temperature element in the marketing mix offers an original profit-enhancing strategy.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.     

RETURNS SYSTEM WITH REBATES*

We consider a variant of the newsvendor problem. Atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market‐determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand. After the orders are filled, the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not. We show that, in this setting, a returns system with rebates (with previously set buy‐back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold) implements the optimal production and sales strategy, attaining maximum expected profit in the channel.     

Price competition between big and small supermarkets: evidence from Seoul

This article empirically investigates the level of competition between superstores and smaller retailers in the Korean retail industry where market entry and operational hours of the former are restricted in order to protect the latter. Applying spatial econometric methods to store-level price data from Seoul, we find that while spatial price correlations among same-size stores exist, product prices across different-size stores are spatially uncorrelated. This result implies that consumers may not view superstores’ and smaller retailers’ products as close substitutes, and thus their markets are likely to be segmented from each other.     

基于三重底线原则的第三方物流回收运作模式决策研究

在三重底线原则和回收物流相关理论的基础上,以博弈论为基本方法,研究了由制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商构成的回收物流运作体系以及政府的环境规制对相关成员企业构成的供应链的影响。研究结果显示:在集中决策下,新产品零售价、旧产品回收价以及系统利润均为最优;以回收率为基准的激励机制能有效提高废旧产品回收水平,使得制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商的利润均有所增加,同时提高了消费者剩余和社会福利。指出政府设置合适的目标回收率和奖惩力度可以实现环境保护、经济利益提高与社会发展的均衡。     

An evolutionary stable strategy for retailers selling complementary goods subject to indirect network externalities

A two-population evolutionary game model is constructed for retailers and used to investigate the effect of indirect network externalities (INEs) and product complementarity on the strategic choice of marketing objective of the retailers. The results show that their strategic choice of marketing objective is correlated with market reservation price (MRP) when the strength of the INE is low. When the MRP is low, the retailers tend to adopt a strategy of profit maximization. As MRP increases, low-cost retailers adopt a strategy of revenue maximization instead of profit maximization to maximize revenue at an earlier stage than high-cost retailers. However, when the strength of the INE is high, retailers only choose a strategy of revenue maximization as their marketing objective. The probability that a retailer uses a revenue maximization strategy increases as the strength of the INE grows, and product complementarity increases, when there is an equilibrium between two pure marketing objective strategies. An optimal preference ratio for retailers may exist when the strength of INE is found to be not large enough. Numerical examples reveal that the degree of preference of retailers to maximize profit is shown to be negatively correlated with both INE and product complementarity. On the other hand, their profits are positively correlated with both of these factors.     

Price–Cost Margins and Structural Change: Sub-Contracting within the Salmon Marketing Chain

Some recent studies have benefited from advances in time series econometrics in order to evaluate price transmission mechanisms along the marketing chain. Due to the length of time series, structural changes may affect the evaluation of price–cost margins. In the case of the fresh salmon trade between Norway and France, the gross margin between producers and retailers has changed in level between January 1988 and December 1999. This article accurately identifies the date of a structural change using a range of recent ADF testing procedures (Gregory–Hansen tests, forward and backward recursive tests), before looking for the causes of the change through a survey. Two major factors can be identified: the product form and the marketing channel. Interestingly, both the increasing level of processing and the development of supermarket chains have resulted in a new role for the intermediaries, shifting from mere commercial intermediation to sub‐contracting for the big retailers.     

Shopping hours and price competition

This paper develops an argument why retail prices may rise in response to the deregulation of opening hours. We make this point in a model of imperfect duopolistic competition. In a deregulated market retailers view the choice of opening hours as a means to increase the degree of perceived product differentiation thus relaxing price competition. If the consumers’ preference intensity for time is sufficiently high the equilibrium configuration has asymmetric shopping hours where one retailer stays open for longer than the other. Both retailers charge higher prices than under regulation, and both are strictly better off.