"公司+农户"契约选择的影响因素研究:一个交易成本分析框架

笔者以"公司+农户"这一组织形式中的契约关系为研究对象,运用交易成本理论来探讨影响企业与农户对契约选择的因素,并构建模型对这些因素进行量化分析.通过分析我们认为,交易的不确定性、治理成本和双方的权力安排等对企业与农户间契约选择起决定性作用.由此获得的启示是,应建立契约的保障机制来降低交易中的不确定性,并通过建立长期的信誉与合作,使农户和企业保持利益上的协调一致.     

制度创新中的交易成本理论及其发展

很多学者把制度局限于市场交易契约进行分析,这是不适当的,交易费用不仅包括制度运行成本,还包括由于制度运行本身所附加的损失。交易成本理论重视了对制度本身的研究,但却忽视了制度创新对组织发展所产生的后续影响,而这些影响却在很大程度上是难以进行评估和衡量的。考察制度成本必须考虑到机会成本问题,很多时候,正是因为机会成本的存在,才会使得某项制度创新具有了超过交易成本节约的功能。在很多情形下,交易成本的存在是社会必要的一种制度安排或者是经济活动本身的一种必要形式。当选择某一个制度安排时,如果机会成本最小,这时候即使可能比原来的制度需要更多的交易费用,但仍然可以实现正的创新利润或收益。     

知识交易成本与企业网络的组织性质

传统的交易费用经济学因为假设知识获取是无成本的,因而较难有效地解释企业网络的组织性质。在构建知识交易成本理论框架的基础之上,从知识交易成本的新视角分析了企业网络的组织性质,得出企业网络是一种便于企业与企业间知识交易,能够有效地节约知识交易成本的企业间的制度安排,并进而解释了企业网络的多种组织类型。     

浅析报价驱动制度与指令驱动制度的成本比较

交易机制分为报价驱动制度和指令驱动制度,交易方式直接影响交易成本,价格稳定程度,长期投资回报和公司的集资成本.关于交易机制的选择受到广泛的关注,当今世界上有的证券交易所采取报价驱动,有的采取指令驱动,有的两者并存.本文从成本的角度出发比较两种交易制度,报价驱动交易方式主要包括存货成本、信息成本、交易成本,另一方面指令驱动交易方式主要包括交易成本、流动性成本、价格波动成本、信息成本.两种交易方式在很多方面优势互补,在选择交易方式的时候要结合自己的实际情况充分考虑成本收益采取合适的交易制度.     

企业交易成本与产权制度创新关系

进入21世纪以来,交易成本与产权制度之间的关系仍旧是社会、企业和研究者关注的焦点。任何组织制度安排确定资源配置的最佳方式,必须考虑到交易成本的存在。只有该制度安排,或者说制度创新所引起的效率收益大于其所需要的成本时,才能保证新制度的顺利形成。基于此,本文从分析交易成本和产权制度的内涵出发,进一步探讨了企业交易成本和产权制度创新之间的关系,并提出了创新企业产权制度顺利进行的相关建议。     

纵向交易理论与中国煤电的纵向交易效率

纵向交易理论的核心在于纵向专业化经济和纵向一体化经济之间的取舍与平衡。节约组织成本会产生纵向专业化经济,节约交易成本会带来纵向一体化经济。理想情况下,两条边际成本曲线的交点决定纵向交易关系(如煤、电关系)最优形式的决择。本文对煤电纵向交易关系进行了分类,构建了煤电纵向交易关系形式选择的理论分析框架,并结合中国煤电纵向关系实际,分析了中国煤电企业的纵向交易关系效率。     

关系交易、交易结构与经济绩效——东亚与中国经济解释的新视角

离散交易、关系交易和科层组织可看作交易一体化的一个光谱,离散交易和科层组织是两个极端,而关系交易是一种中间状态.这个一体化过程的关键变量就是交易间关系强烈的程度.交易间关系影响交易成本和交易方式.不同交易间关系形成不同的交易结构,包括交易的时空结构、信息结构、成本与收益结构和治理结构等.不同交易结构在不同的背景下影响经济绩效.本文超越契约范式,提出了交易结构的理论框架,并对东亚经济和中国经济问题做出了新解释.     

证券侵权纠纷与证券仲裁制度

本文通过构建一个三方博弈模型 ,对证券侵权行为进行博弈分析 ,揭示证券市场机会主义盛行的制度原因。证券侵权争议解决途径中 ,证券侵权民事赔偿诉讼存在制度性缺陷 ,而证券仲裁机制则受到忽视。事实上仲裁有“商人解决争议最优选择”的美誉 ,通过对比正式的诉讼制度与非正式的仲裁制度的交易成本 ,作者建议应借鉴成熟市场经济国家的证券仲裁经验 ,发展包括证券仲裁在内的多种交易治理机制     

产权变更、纵向一体化与企业绩效——一个“国进民退”的案例研究

标准经济学所给出的不同产权形态的产业分布规律得到了经济学界的普遍认同,但是,这一认识并不排除在竞争领域里的某些特殊时点上出现国进民退的产权安排。本文在已有研究文献的基础上,以淮南矿业重组芜湖港为典型案例,依托交易成本和产权经济学理论,不仅在威廉姆森纵向一体化模型基础上分析组织形式变化对企业交易成本和将来绩效的影响,而且针对产权制度的变革对企业治理成本产生的潜在影响进行综合讨论。本文强调的产权变革+组织变化的分析模式,描述出制度变革对企业绩效的影响。案例分析的结论:在某些特殊的情况下,国进民退的产权变更也许会带来额外增加的组织费用,但是,只要企业采取的有效治理结构使组织费用的增加额小于纵向一体化带来的企业效益增加额,国进民退的产权变更安排就不是一个失败的选择。     

公司治理效率:一个基于制度经济学的分析

相对于国家制定的法理制度而言，公司治理机制属于一个较为微观的层次，本主要从制度经济学的角度分析了影响公司治理效率的因素，探讨了公司治理成本，即治理交易成本、代理成本、组织成本和遵循成本的性质及其对公司治理效率的影响。章认为我国企业公司治理效率不高的制度性原因在于未能实现组织成本与遵循成本的最优化，并尝试给出了一些改进建议。     

Transaction costs and environmental policy design

This article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. The New Institutional Economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem. The physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them. Analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies, institutional environment, governance structures, or policy designs can be changed; some factors can only be adjusted to or “designed around” while others can be designed differently. This framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs. Another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost-effective in some circumstances. Policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change. Appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs, particularly if there is potential for technical change.     

投资选择的交易成本——一个从宏观调控层面的分析

本文基于现有的关于交易成本的研究通常集中在以产权为核心的交换过程 ,而对宏观调控层面可能会引起交易成本的分析没有受到应有关注的事实 ,认为新制度分析包含着政策层面上的交易成本思想 ,政府的宏观调控会导致投资选择的交易成本。文章根据投资者在投资选择过程中是否承担以及在多大程度上承担由政策引致的交易成本 ,将投资者在某时期的最终定位划分为三大集群 ,在给出相应的基本平衡式的基础上 ,运用交易成本范畴对投资者的投资选择作出了一种间接博弈的解释。本文的分析在一定程度上说明了现实投资容易偏离宏观调控的原因。     

农村非正规金融的微观机理与政策测度:国外文献评述

通过对国外文献关于农村非正规金融问题的研究进行概览,本文发现,农村非正规金融不仅能够降低农户借贷的外生交易费用,还能够降低制度性的内生交易费用;农村非正规金融自发生成的各种内在机制具有较高的制度效率,农村非正规金融可以与农村正规金融共存;以家庭为结点的社区网络是农村非正规金融私人治理机制的基础;为了缓解农户贷款难的问题,由发展中国家政府推出的各种扶贫项目的作用却很有限,因而政府要想有效干预农村金融市场,就必须考虑并充分利用农村非正规金融的作用。但已有研究并未定量分析农村非正规金融与正规金融之间的复杂关系,鲜有文献计量农村非正规金融的经济增长效应;相关的理论研究比较零散,尚未形成一致的理论框架。这就为进一步的研究指明了可选方向。     

The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances

Transaction cost economics argues that aligning transactionswith governance structures leads to more efficient outcomes.While empirical evidence demonstrates that firms choose governanceconsistent with transaction cost predictions, the performanceimplications of governance choices are less well explored. HereI examine the cost of misaligned governance in the context ofresearch and development (R&D) alliances. Two costs of misalignmentare evaluated: excessive contracting hazards and excessive bureaucracy.Using a sample of R&D alliances in the telecom equipmentindustry, I find that alliance governance selected accordingto transaction cost arguments improves collaborative benefitssubstantially over governance not so selected. Interestingly,governance misalignments imposing excessive bureaucracy reducecollaborative benefits more than misalignments imposing excessivecontracting hazards. These results provide empirical evidenceof the cost of misaligned governance and have implications forresearch on the limits of internal organization and links betweenorganizational form and innovation.     

基于正式契约和关系契约的BPO治理机制研究

契约结构选择恰当与否直接关系到企业业务流程外包(BPO)成败及绩效的高低。本文运用交易成本理论和关系契约理论,揭示了BPO的契约特征及契约选择机理,认为在外包绩效不可验证的情况下,关系契约可以弥补正式契约的不足,进而提出了基于正式契约和关系契约的BPO治理机制的概念模型,为我国企业发展BPO提出了建议。     

全球公司治理改革趋同之原因探析

20世纪90年代以来,在世界范围内出现了一股公司治理改革的潮流,并导致不同国家的公司治理呈现出一定程度的趋同.这场公司治理全球运动的背景是日益提高的全球化,尤其是经济全球化,而不同治理模式先后出现问题则是这场运动的导火索.此外,日益壮大的机构投资者、相关国际组织的推动以及全球范围内金融自由化的发展等因素,也对公司治理全球运动起到了积极的推动作用.     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Designing Global Governance for Agricultural Development and Food and Nutrition Security

We point to deficits in current global institutional arrangements in support of agricultural development and food and nutrition security. A framework for global institutional arrangements proposed here is the set of essential international public goods for a well‐functioning world food system. These public goods include international natural resource management; trade and transboundary competition policy; research and innovation; handling large scale food emergencies; and transboundary food safety. Based on the framework, and institutional economics considerations, causes of current malfunctioning of global food governance are analyzed. It is proposed to redesign global food governance by establishing an international platform with policy clusters mapped along the set of global public goods. To support the platform with needed research‐based evidence an International Panel on Food, Nutrition and Agriculture (IPFNA) is suggested, partly following the design of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Existing organizations and mechanisms would form building blocks of the strengthened and redesigned governance system. A gradual approach toward redesign is proposed. Some redesign in the suggested direction was triggered by the food crisis of 2008, as demonstrated by the reform of the Committee on Food Security (CFS) with its high level panel of experts, but more is needed.     

Trade,conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements

Many historians argue that the main goal of European trade integration was the preservation of peace. This paper investigates whether this reasoning is relevant for the EU and other regional trade agreements (RTAs). I provide empirical evidence that customs unions and common markets (deep RTAs) do reduce the probability of war between members. Partial scope and free trade agreements (shallow RTAs) however have no effect on war probabilities. Accordingly, international insecurity has a differential impact on incentives to create RTAs. Deep RTAs are signed between countries that are involved in many interstate disputes and that have low trade costs with the rest of the world, whereas the opposite is true for shallow RTAs.     

不完备市场的多层次治理-基于比较制度实验的研究

在不完备市场中,交易并不会因为正式的产权保护和契约执行制度不存在或者不作为而停止,人们往往会自发地演化出一些替代性的市场治理结构来支撑市场交往、实现潜在的市场剩余。本文的目的在于使用比较制度实验的方法来研究各种替代性市场治理方式的特征和治理效率以及它们之间的交互作用,本研究对于发展中经济体和转型经济体中市场经济的发展和完善具有重要意义。