Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?

Libertarian paternalists hold that biases and distortions in human decision-making justify paternalistic interference affecting individuals’ decisions. The aim of this paper is to analzye to what extent an evolutionary outlook supports libertarian paternalism. I will put forward three arguments in favour of libertarian paternalism and six objections that strongly oppose it. While evolutionary economists should take seriously the contention that our positive knowledge of real-world decision-making will have to influence our normative assessment of these decisions, the objections against libertarian paternalism brought forward in this paper serve as a cautionary note. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, libertarian paternalism is neither inevitable, nor does it provide an adequate measuring rod of normative rationality. It is prone to abuse by anchoring its standard of rationality pragmatically to norms and can thus promote conservative bias and stifle innovative exploration. It also presents the policy-maker with a compounded Hayekian knowledge problem. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, libertarian paternalism’s manipulative shaping of preferences might lock-in individuals into heteronomous preference learning paths without them being even aware of it.     

要用科学态度研究马克思主义经济学

本文首先在阐述科学的含义、基本特征及检验一种理论是否为科学的标准的基础上,分析了马克思主义经济学的规范性和实证性以及相应的科学属性和意识形态属性,指出马克思主义经济学是实证理论而非规范理论,既是科学理论,又是意识形态.然后,对作为科学理论的马克思主义经济学所面临的十大难题进行了研讨.最后,就如何发展和创新马克思主义经济学,提出了三项基本原则.     

Knowledge and economic behaviour. A constructivist approach

The knowledge of human knowledge claims a place of its own in economics. Beyond the walls of our discipline, spectacular progress is taking place in the field of empirical research into human knowledge -the so-called “cognitive sciences”. In the light of such advances, the old and new classicals' axiom that nothing scientific can be said beyond the axioms of substantive rationality now looks very much like the protective belt of a degenerating programme. On the other hand, criticisms and alternative programmes will hardly be effective so long as their arguments are purely negative or are drawn from armchair introspection. In the present study I wish to outline a pattern of human knowledge emerging from cognitive research that may be called “constructivist”, and to point out the restrictions it sets on economic analysis. It is also my argument that such a pattern is consistent with the present non- or post-Walrasian trends in economic theory, and that it may provide them with firmer cognitive foundations.     

Positive public economics: reinterpreting ‘optimal’ policies

The standard positive/normative divide fails to capture the way economists use ‘optimal’ taxation models. This paper argues that the better way to understand public economics is through a three-part division between positive, normative, and instrumental models. An instrumental model is about means and ends. Once this additional dimension is acknowledged, one can see that ‘optimal’ taxation models are closely connected to what are generally seen as purely positive models. I argue that economists have been using similar standards to assess ‘optimal’ taxation models as they use to assess positive models. Recent advances in optimal taxation theory have embraced the positive aspects of models, even about social welfare functions, something that is generally classified as a normative.     

The difficulty of applying the economics of time and ignorance

The Economics of Time & Ignorance (1985) is a key text within Austrian economics. Among the so-called “third generation” of modern Austrian economists, however, the book seems to have had very little impact compared to the notable influence it had upon the proceeding generation. Several possible reasons are considered, including a disagreement with the substantive claims made in Time & Ignorance or the possibility that Time & Ignorance has nothing to offer this generation. We challenge these potential explanations and, argue, that the root cause of this seeming neglect is the movement by this generation towards applied research, an area where Time & Ignorance has relatively less to offer.     

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. I discuss three arguments in favor of this hypothesis: (i) eminent institutional economists have examined the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; and (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics. In this context, I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. In order to distinguish between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam’s razor.     

Varieties of paternalism and the heterogeneity of utility structures

A principal source of interest in behavioral economics has been its advertised contributions to policies aimed at ‘nudging’ people away from allegedly natural but self-defeating behavior toward patterns of response thought more likely to improve their welfare. This has occasioned controversies among economists and philosophers around the normative limits of paternalism, especially by technical policy advisors. One recent suggestion has been that ‘boosting,’ in which interventions aim to enhance people’s general cognitive skills and representational repertoires instead of manipulating their choice environments behind their backs, avoids the main normative challenges. A limitation in most of this literature is that it has focused on relatively sweeping policy recommendations and consequently on strong polar alternatives of general paternalism and strict laissez faire. We review a real instance, drawn from a consulting project we conducted for an investment bank, of a proposed intervention that is more typical of the kind that economists are more often actually called upon to offer. In this example, the sophistication of current tools for preference attribution, combined with philosophical externalism about the semantics of preferences that makes it less plausible to attribute their literal self-conscious representation to people as propositional attitude content becomes more tightly refined, blocks applicability of the distinction between nudging and boosting. This seems to call for irreducible, context-specific ethical judgment in assessing the appropriateness of the forms of paternalism that economists must actually wrestle with in going about their everyday business.     

Guidelines For Pre-College Economics Education: A Critique

While economists of all persuasions undoubtedly agree that universal economic literacy would be desirable, there appears to be substantial disagreement over what economic literacy is, what problems most need to be addressed, and how they can best be solved. These differences are clearly reflected in their diverse views as to what the goals should be for teaching economics in secondary schools. This paper specifically examines the recommendations offered in a paper on economic content standards by leaders of the economic education movement in the U.S. and finds them seriously wanting.     

The economist’s oath: a review Essay

George DeMartino’s 2011 monograph, The Economist’s Oath: On the Need for and Content of Professional Economic Ethics, provides an excellent basis for the development of a discourse on the ethics of economists. This review focuses on the way in which mainstream economists’ arguments against consideration of ethics follow from their presentation of economics as a purely technical subject, and the implication that this pretense itself is unethical. The complexity of ethical issues within a pluralist approach to economics is explored, ranging from the institutional environment within which economists practice to epistemological questions.     

A proposal for more sophisticated normative principles in introductory economics

Introductory textbooks teach a simple normative story about the importance of maximizing economic surplus that supports common policy claims. There is little defense of the claim that maximizing surplus is normatively important, which is not obvious to non-economists. Difficulties with the claim that society should maximize surplus are generally not addressed. Economists are thus frequently criticized by non-economists for having a poor moral foundation for our normative claims. We should tell a more sophisticated normative story that justifies the moral importance of surplus, but acknowledges that other moral values may conflict with generating surplus and that distribution is not always separable from efficiency. This would allow students to make more compelling arguments in favor of normative positions they accept, regardless of the values they hold.     

Marx's critique of “eternal” political economy: how Mill is alien to Marx's attacks

Marx deplored political economy's claims to establish “eternal” – or “natural” – laws. This paper seeks to defend John Stuart Mill from his critique. It argues that, contrary to what Marx alleged, these two economists have a great deal more in common on this topic than is frequently realised. Both on the theoretical level and on the political one, Mill's views about the relativity of capitalism seem very close to Marx's. This paper also suggests that Marx may have ignored Mill's insistence on the relativity of economic theories because it may have challenged his own “scientific socialism”.     

Between mathematical formalism,normative choice rules,and the behavioural sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Abstract

This paper discusses why mathematical economists of the early Cold War period favored formal-axiomatic over behavioral choice theories. One reason was that formal-axiomatic theories allowed mathematical economists to improve the conceptual and theoretical foundations of economics and thereby to increase its scientific status. Furthermore, the separation between mathematical economics and other behavioral sciences was not as clear-cut as often argued. While economists did not modify their behavioral assumptions, some acknowledged the empirical shortcomings of their models. The paper reveals the multifaceted nature of rational choice theories reflected in the changing interpretations and roles of the theories in those early years.     

Sociology of economics or sociology of economy? theoretical-methodological arguments for sociological economics

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life. There is nothing surprising in the habit of economists to invade the sociological field. A major part of their work—practically the whole of what they have to say on institutions and on the…[social] forces which shape economic behavior—inevitably overlaps the sociologist’s preserves. In consequence, a no man’s land or everyman’s land has developed that might conveniently be called economic sociology … [or sociological economics] (Schumpeter 1956:134). The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.     

The duty of the firm in selling to the poor: A question of the person,justice, and subsidiarity

Mainstream economists do not address the question of the duty of the firm in selling to the poor. To them the issue is normative, and they have taken pains to delimit economics as a positive discipline. They separate value and fact, and engage themselves in questions relating to what is and not what should be. Forensic economists hold a different view. Firms are liable for damages due not just to deception and fraud but to negligence as well, and governments have consumer protection agencies to examine cases involving the duty of the firm well beyond deception and fraud. Social economists reject the argument based on libertarianism and individualism that the firm has only one purpose: increasing shareholder value. Social economists view the firm as having several constituencies — shareholders, managers, workers, customers, suppliers, neighbors, partners — and duties associated with each one. Those duties are grounded in the virtue of justice: to render to another that which is owed. The firm has a duty to its customers, its suppliers, and its employees deriving from the principle of equivalence; to its shareholders and employees from the principle of distributive justice; to its competitors and neighbors from the principle of contributive justice. This article argues that the firm has a special duty in selling to the poor which is grounded in the person of the one who is poor, the three principles of economic justice, and the principle of subsidiarity. Mainstream economists address poverty apart from consumer behavior as if the two were unrelated. This article brings the two together and in so doing helps throw light on the question of the duty of the firm in selling to the poor.     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice.     

On the Econ within

This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden (ILS) offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: (i) a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, (ii) an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and (iii) a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The essay also distinguishes the view of welfare economics defended in Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare from the claims of behavioral economists ILS criticize.     

Early Evolution of the Assumption of Non-satiation

The paper explores the mostly tacit transmission of the assumption of non-satiation from the outset of classical political economy to the advent of marginal analysis in Great Britain. The evolution of the assumption is traced back to contributions to the philosophy of mind in the early British enlightenment, which provided scientific ground not only to the economic agent's insatiable nature but also to a delusional dynamic of association that challenges the causality between acquisitiveness and pleasure. The paper claims that, because there is evidence that such delusional aspect was known to the early political economists, the assumption of non-satiation might have become a mainstay in economics not only for its scientific status but also as a result of a strategic choice that can only be explained within the political, cultural, and social context in which it was made. Had this been the case, the exportability of the assumption through time and space must be further questioned. The consistent inclusion of non-satiation in economic theories, policies, and institutions may have had extraordinary consequences, and may have nurtured rational behaviors that in fact fulfill the assumption itself.     

On the Anthropological Study of Economies: A Comment

This paper deals with the moral justification behind policy positions. Squeezed between the inevitability of having a welfare ideology and the mantra of value-neutrality (depoliticization), neoclassical policy economists tend to disguise their normative positions on policy matters as common sense. This attitude is particularly pronounced in what I will call "the rhetoric of worthiness," whereby the neoclassical approach justifies its advocacy that certain people should not be helped. This normative position is disguised by a vocabulary (e.g., moral hazard) claimed to be politically neutral. The present paper criticizes this neoclassical mode of policy evaluation in favor of a more socially conscious and innovative policy approach.     

BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND POLICY

Court decisions in the 1990s are widely viewed as having opened the door to a flood of business method and financial patents at the US Patent and Trademark Office, and to have also impacted other patent offices around the world. A number of scholars, both legal and economic, have critiqued both the quality of these patents and the decisions themselves. This paper reviews the history of business method and financial patents briefly and then explores what economists know about the relationship between the patent system and innovation, in order to draw some tentative conclusions about their likely impact. It concludes by finding some consensus in the literature about the problems associated with this particular expansion of patentable subject matter, highlighting the remaining areas of disagreement, and reviewing the various policy recommendations.     

Is ‘new’ behavioral economics ‘mainstream’?

When comparing ‘new’ and ‘old’ behavioral economics (BE), many argue that ‘new’ BE has close ties with what is often called ‘mainstream’ economics. The aim of this paper is to reframe the ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ BE debate and investigate the nature of the relationship between psychologists, behavioral economists, and ‘mainstream’ economists. This will lead us to develop the concept of ‘space of interaction’, building on Galison’s metaphor of ‘trading zones’, to emphasize the role of outsiders, strategic thinking, and negotiation in ‘new’ BE. By discussing some often implicit arguments in an otherwise disconnected literature, we seek to bring new arguments to the discussions through a careful study of those relationships in the history of ‘new’ BE and its more recent developments. Leaving aside the orthodox/heterodox contrast and comparative approaches, we hope to provide a different account of the changes in ‘new’ BE and its relationship with the ‘mainstream’.