Does Libertarian Paternalism Reconcile Merit Goods Theory with Mainstream Economics?

In the wake of Musgrave's move to question the absolute hegemony of individual preferences for normative economics in the 1950's by propounding the existence of merit goods, a recent book by Thaler and Sunstein is now making a similar claim under the label of ‘libertarian paternalism’. This paper tackles the question of why the framework of libertarian paternalism has received a so much more friendly reception among economists than the theory of merit goods. The main reason is a better foundation, not only for the conditions under which paternalism may be justified but also for the tools that should be applied, utilizing transaction cost theory.     

Oil,Local Content Laws and Paternalism: Is Economic Paternalism Better Old,New or Democratic?

Abstract

Although paternalism has long been studied, the ‘new paternalism’ has received relatively little attention, and much less attention in the oil and gas industry where interferences into preferences centre more strongly on the supply, rather than on the demand, side. The ‘choice architects’ in Ghana have succeeded in nudging local businesses to go into the provision of services for the oil industry and the supply of goods and services needed in the petroleum sector. Yet, the new paternalism in the petroleum industry has had major limitations too, including re-enforcing systemic inequality and labour exploitation, while paying scant attention to the destruction of local content. These problems can only be addressed through systemic redistribution, structural transformation of the economy, comprehensive social protection and deliberate interventions for ecological sustainability. In this process of social change, an embrace of old paternalism will not do neither will asserting a new paternalism as the philosophy behind local content laws and policies. A philosophy and praxis of democratic paternalism provide a surer path for more effective transformation.     

Narrativity and identity in the representation of the economic agent

We critically survey explicit discussions of the narrativity of economic agents by economists. Narrativity broadly refers to the way humans construct and use stories, notably to define their personal identity. We borrow from debates outside of economics to provide the critical dimension of our survey. Most contributions on the narrativity of economic agents do not discuss one another. To establish communication, we suggest a structure of oppositions that characterize these contributions taken as a whole. These oppositions are notably characterized by three tensions: in terms of methodological attitudes (‘scientism’ vs. ‘humanism’), of underlying theories of personal identity postulating the existence of a unique sense of self or not (‘diachronicity’ vs. ‘episodicity’) and of the normative implications of narrativity (‘welfare-increasing’ vs. ‘welfare-decreasing’). The main goal is to clarify the structure of opposite positions within a more or less explicit debate about the identity of individuals in economics.     

On the Anthropological Study of Economies: A Comment

This paper deals with the moral justification behind policy positions. Squeezed between the inevitability of having a welfare ideology and the mantra of value-neutrality (depoliticization), neoclassical policy economists tend to disguise their normative positions on policy matters as common sense. This attitude is particularly pronounced in what I will call "the rhetoric of worthiness," whereby the neoclassical approach justifies its advocacy that certain people should not be helped. This normative position is disguised by a vocabulary (e.g., moral hazard) claimed to be politically neutral. The present paper criticizes this neoclassical mode of policy evaluation in favor of a more socially conscious and innovative policy approach.     

Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?

Libertarian paternalists hold that biases and distortions in human decision-making justify paternalistic interference affecting individuals’ decisions. The aim of this paper is to analzye to what extent an evolutionary outlook supports libertarian paternalism. I will put forward three arguments in favour of libertarian paternalism and six objections that strongly oppose it. While evolutionary economists should take seriously the contention that our positive knowledge of real-world decision-making will have to influence our normative assessment of these decisions, the objections against libertarian paternalism brought forward in this paper serve as a cautionary note. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, libertarian paternalism is neither inevitable, nor does it provide an adequate measuring rod of normative rationality. It is prone to abuse by anchoring its standard of rationality pragmatically to norms and can thus promote conservative bias and stifle innovative exploration. It also presents the policy-maker with a compounded Hayekian knowledge problem. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, libertarian paternalism’s manipulative shaping of preferences might lock-in individuals into heteronomous preference learning paths without them being even aware of it.     

Richard H. Thaler: A Nobel Prize for Behavioural Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of Richard Thaler’s career and the contributions to behavioural economics that earned him the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It focuses on his role in exposing and making sense of empirical anomalies in orthodox economics, his analysis of mental accounting, and his work with Cass Sunstein on the notion of libertarian paternalism and the ‘nudge’-based behavioural approach to economic policy. It then considers his contributions critically and explores how, unlike previous behavioural economics, Thaler succeeded in getting his new approach to behavioural economics accepted by mainstream economists.     

Positive public economics: reinterpreting ‘optimal’ policies

The standard positive/normative divide fails to capture the way economists use ‘optimal’ taxation models. This paper argues that the better way to understand public economics is through a three-part division between positive, normative, and instrumental models. An instrumental model is about means and ends. Once this additional dimension is acknowledged, one can see that ‘optimal’ taxation models are closely connected to what are generally seen as purely positive models. I argue that economists have been using similar standards to assess ‘optimal’ taxation models as they use to assess positive models. Recent advances in optimal taxation theory have embraced the positive aspects of models, even about social welfare functions, something that is generally classified as a normative.     

Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power’

‘Normative power’ is an increasingly popularised concept in the study of EU external relations in fields including military policy, human rights, and international trade. Defined by Manners, it acknowledges the normative foundations of the European project, examines how Europe acts to (re)shape internationally accepted norms, and makes the claim that Europe ought to influence external partners' conception of ‘normal’ behaviour in pursuit of a just global order. This article, however, argues that a moral economy perspective is central to a critical reorientation of the concept of normative power towards appraisal of discrepancies between nominal EU norms and material EU policy outcomes. Examining Europe's ‘normative power’ in its relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, it demonstrates how a moral economy of ACP–EU ties has been instituted in negotiation with European ethical norms as to solidarity with ‘the poor’. Nevertheless, the moral economy of ACP–EU ties is seen not to be ‘moral’ in terms of outcomes for vulnerable citizens in ACP countries. Rather the embedding of moral norms concerning pro-poor ‘development’ has rationalised asymmetric economic ties. ‘Normative power’ is understood as the EU's utilisation of moral norms in the public legitimisation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gain in its relations with external ‘partners’.     

Inside the Crystal Ball of Finance: Understanding Financial Economists' Attitudes to Market and Society

Market economists are thought to wield tremendous power—not only over financial markets but over governments that stray from the ‘market way’. Still, there is mystery about what economists think, and how they form their judgements. This article reports results from a survey of over 50 financial market economists from leading financial institutions in Australia conducted in December 2003 and January 2004. It provides insight into the opinions of economists who impact on markets and policy, especially through media commentary. The article identifies their economic and social views, comparing them with the Australian public. We then examine how professional views of economists differ from their personal views. Differences in professional and private views—especially over the role of government and labour markets—are an opportunity to ponder how judgements are formed and used. We offer tentative answers to the question: do these professionals—highly paid for their opinions—occasionally self‐censor?     

A new definition of and role for preferences in positive economics

Positive economic models aim to provide truthful explanations of significant (aspects of) economic phenomena. While the notion of ‘preferences’ figures prominently in micro-economic models, it suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity and rigor. After distinguishing narrow homo economicus models (self-interest maximization) from broader ones (preference satisfaction) and rehearsing the criticisms both have met, I go into the most promising attempt to date at addressing them, developed by Hausman. However, his definition of preferences as ‘total comparative evaluations’, I argue, plays into the general disregard that economists have for human psychology. My alternative definition of preferences as ‘overall comparative evaluations’ – and hence as one of the many factors that influence people’s behavior – allows for more adequate causal explanations of people’s dutiful, committed, and norm-guided actions. Against Hausman but in agreement with Sen, it also allows for (motivated) counterpreferential choice.     

What Have We Learned from the Global Financial Crisis?

According to the policy ideas that have dominated the policy debate since the 1970s, the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent slump in the United States and Europe should never have happened. The crisis provided sufficient evidence to reject the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, along with the dominant models in academic macroeconomics and policy claims such as the ‘trickle‐down’ hypothesis and the case for comprehensive privatisation. In reality, few of these lessons have been learned and much of the policy response to the crisis has been irrelevant or counter‐productive. As a result, we have learned some unflattering lessons about the economics profession, including policy‐makers, commentators, central bankers and academic economists.     

The breakdown of the IS–LM synthesis: implications for post-Keynesian economic theory

The monetarist and the new classical economics attack routed the IS–LM version of Keynesian theory and the large scale econometric models from the centre of macroeconomic research. However monetarism and the new classical economics were more successful as a critique of the IS–LM orthodoxy than as a basis for fruitful research and policy analysis.

Post-Keynesian economists also attack the IS–LM orthodoxy, mainly because it misspecified ‘… the economic society in which we actually live’. Post-Keynesians that emphasized financial and labour markets argued that properties of the real world economy made instability normal results ofmarket interactions.

The vacuum in main line theory that developed as the shortcomings of monetarism became evident led to a revival of interest in basic Keynesian propositions. This has spawned what is now labeled a new Keynesian economics. New Keynesian economists conform to the modeling standards set by the new classical rational expectations school but claim to get Keynesian results. To a degree these results are compatible with propositions of post-Keynesian economics.

It is suggested that a convergence between the new and the post-Keynesian economics can be expected, and the result is likely to be fruitful.     

On the Econ within

This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden (ILS) offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: (i) a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, (ii) an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and (iii) a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The essay also distinguishes the view of welfare economics defended in Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare from the claims of behavioral economists ILS criticize.     

Transnational Economists in the Eurozone Crisis: Professional Structures,Networks and Ideas

ABSTRACT

In recent years IPE and EU studies scholars have examined how actors in international organisations and EU institutions shape policy ideas. This article explores the professional structure of economists affiliated to two Brussels-based think tanks, Bruegel and CEPS, who, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, sought to contribute to the production of policy solutions to douse the flames of the crisis and put forward long term recommendations for the EMU’s stability. Through the analysis of more than 300 CVs and by drawing on network and sequence analysis, the article shows that in their search for solutions, Brussels-based think tanks bring together economists from different EU member states, whose authority draws on academic qualifications, experience, and seniority. They are ‘multiple insiders’ connected to a wide range of institutions and professional networks, who move back and forth between professional and organisational networks and serve as bridges between revisionist, orthodox, and mixed economic ideas.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

P.W.S. Andrews' Manufacturing Business Revisited

P.W.S. Andrews (1914–1971) was a remarkable industrial economist at Oxford University, prominently as a member of the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG) and Nuffield College. In the final few years of his life, he held a professorship at Lancaster University. As a self-described ‘practical theorist’, Andrews thought economists, particularly in the 1930s, inappropriately extended Marshall in a more formal, technical manner whereby the detailed reality of industrial economics was overshadowed. Such a ‘methodological mistake’ of a priori reasoning trumping the inductive method was countered by the OERG’s emphasis on grounded empiricism featuring extensive primary research on real businesses. A product of this research was Andrews’ Manufacturing Business that proffers a novel theory of the business firm. This article revisits Andrews’ signature book, paying particular attention to its apparent curiously harsh reviews by Austin Robinson and Arnold Plant, two distinguished Marshallian industrial economists. Moreover, Manufacturing Business is considered as a possible precursor of business strategy, a nascent discipline in the 1960s.     

A coming ‘Magnesian’ age? Small states,the global system,and the international community

Since Plato, we have considered that the ideal polis, or political community, is the small state, akin to the idyllic ‘Magnesia’ of the Laws. The Platonic ideal, however, generally has been considered unrealistic. Even in the ancient world, the Alexandrine model ‐ an expanding, pluralistic network of large trading cities under a single aegis ‐ came to contradict it. Subsequent history, especially the imperialism of the nineteenth century which swallowed up many small polities around the world, seemed to prove that only large and powerful entities were ‘fit’ to survive. Why, then, are there still so many small‐sized countries in the world today? Why is their number actually increasing? Decolonisation, the end of bipolarity, democratisation, trade liberalisation and the digital revolution are five factors that have given small states more freedom. Yet many are vulnerable, and the economics of their situations are precarious. The workings of the global system, particularly the globalisation of business, may harm them even while promoting their freedom. The international community, a large part of which is now in fact made up of small states, should be prepared to act, for the global public good as well as out of sheer political and also environmental self‐interest, to help safeguard the livelihood of the world's many and varied small states, whose ‘Magnesian’ venues and values can be of both functional and normative importance for mankind as a whole.     

Psychological versus economic models of bounded rationality

That the rationality of individual people is ‘bounded’ – that is, finite in scope and representational reach, and constrained by the opportunity cost of time – cannot reasonably be controversial as an empirical matter. In this context, the paper addresses the question as to why, if economics is an empirical science, economists introduce bounds on the rationality of agents in their models only grudgingly and partially. The answer defended in the paper is that most economists are interested primarily in markets and only secondarily in the dynamics of individual decisions – specifically, they are interested in these dynamics mainly insofar as they might systematically influence the most useful approaches to modeling interesting markets. In market contexts, bounds on rationality are typically generated by institutional and informational properties specific to the market in question, which arise and are sustained by structural dynamics that do not originate in or reduce to individuals' decisions or psychological dispositions. To be sure, these influences interact with psychological dispositions, so economists have reason to attend to the psychology of valuation. But no general model of bounded rationality should ever be expected to feature in the economist's toolkit, regardless of the extent to which psychologists successfully identify specific human cognitive limitations. Use of moderate rational expectations assumptions should be understood in this light. Such assumptions are readily relaxed in specific applications, and in ways customized to modeling circumstances, that modelers, experimentalists, and econometricians are making steadily more sophisticated.     

Is ‘new’ behavioral economics ‘mainstream’?

When comparing ‘new’ and ‘old’ behavioral economics (BE), many argue that ‘new’ BE has close ties with what is often called ‘mainstream’ economics. The aim of this paper is to reframe the ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ BE debate and investigate the nature of the relationship between psychologists, behavioral economists, and ‘mainstream’ economists. This will lead us to develop the concept of ‘space of interaction’, building on Galison’s metaphor of ‘trading zones’, to emphasize the role of outsiders, strategic thinking, and negotiation in ‘new’ BE. By discussing some often implicit arguments in an otherwise disconnected literature, we seek to bring new arguments to the discussions through a careful study of those relationships in the history of ‘new’ BE and its more recent developments. Leaving aside the orthodox/heterodox contrast and comparative approaches, we hope to provide a different account of the changes in ‘new’ BE and its relationship with the ‘mainstream’.