Is corruption grease,grit or a gamble? Corruption increases variance of productivity across countries

The effect of corruption on economic growth has attracted interest in empirical development economics. The conventional view of corruption as impediment for growth has been challenged by the ‘grease-on-the-wheels’ hypothesis. We take a new perspective on the issue and suggest corruption as macro risk, referred to as a ‘gamble’ hypothesis. Using cross-country data and two alternative indicators of corruption, we find corruption to be a significant driver of heteroscedasticity in total productivity. This supports the new gamble hypothesis. We also note some misleading interpretations in the previously published frontier applications. To avoid these shortcomings, we apply a flexible semi-nonparametric estimator.     

Corruption clubs: empirical evidence from kernel density estimates

A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Countries characterized by the same economic, social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption. In this article, we use Kernel Density Estimation techniques to analyse the cross-country distribution of corruption. Particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak. We find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks. We also provide some evidence on the intra-distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption. We find the group of countries classified within the two ‘clubs’ to be very stable. Corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon. Substantial changes in the economic, political and cultural environment of countries within the ‘corruption club’ are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected.     

Corruption,product complexity and African exporters

Several studies have shown that African manufacturers perform poorly, especially in comparison to their counterparts from other developing countries. We build on these studies by (a) examining the decision to stop exporting among African manufacturers and (b) investigating whether these decisions can be linked to institutional dimensions (such as corruption). Consistent with previous studies, we observe that a significant fraction of African firms stop exporting every year. Using product complexity as a measure of an industry’s ‘sensitivity’ to corruption, we find that firms in more ‘corruption-sensitive’ industries are more likely to stop exporting if there is an increase in overall corruption in the exporting country. Firm characteristics (such as size and productivity) also seem to influence the decision to stop exporting. Our finding about the relationship between corruption and the decision to stop exporting supports the conventional wisdom that corruption is detrimental to economic performance.     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.     

Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010

We use a newly assembled indicator of corruption from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to examine the effects of corruption on economic growth. The V-Dem indicator is coded for almost all contemporary and historical polities since the year 1900 and, for some countries, since the French Revolution. This global dataset allows us to exploit long-run, slow-moving variation within countries for identification, circumventing many of the difficulties faced by previous studies based on cross-section data or short panels. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of corruption on steady-state growth. Yet, we find that corruption interacts with political regime type, giving rise to heterogeneous effects. In particular, corruption is found to be significantly more deleterious for growth in democracies than in autocracies. Since corruption tends to be decentralised in democracies and centralised in autocracies, these findings are in line with theories of the ‘industrial organisation’ of corruption. We find little to no evidence that institutional weaknesses along other dimensions (state capacity, regulatory quality, property rights protection) make corruption any less harmful for growth, casting doubt on the thesis that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ of dysfunctional institutions. Our findings provide a rationale to target anti-corruption efforts to young democracies.     

The ‘inventor balance’ and the functional specialization in global inventive activities

Inventors and organizational assets are inputs of inventive activities which are often provided at a global scale, where countries might specialize in the provision of one or the other type of inputs. We introduce a new patent-based metric, the ‘inventor balance’, to quantify this type of functional specialization, which we discover to be considerable, and we propose a conceptual framework to explain it. We observe a progressive ‘decoupling’ of national sub-systems providing respectively inventors and organizational assets. Moreover, we find that countries with a high level of innovativeness relative to their economic development, high technological specialization, and strong individualistic cultural traits, contribute relatively more inventors than organizations to the global production of inventions.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS POLITICAL FREEDOM: CROSS‐COUNTRY INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION*

Using a well‐known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more ‘clean’ society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed.     

Environmental performance,corruption and economic growth: global evidence using a new data set

This study investigates the relationship between environmental performance, corruption and economic growth using panel data of 87 countries covering the period from 2002 to 2012. The Environmental Performance Index is used for the first time to evaluate the environmental quality on economic growth. By employing both ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ panel models, we find that environmental performance is positively related to economic growth and is more significant in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries. Moreover, when corruption is incorporated, the empirical estimation results indicate that although lower corruption helps economic growth in non-OECD countries, the negative coefficients of the three interactive terms show that the positive effect of environment performance on economic growth will drop, while greater environmental performance combined with natural resource abundance inevitably leads to inefficient bureaucracies and hence disadvantageous economic growth. As a result, policymakers in non-OECD countries should carefully ensure better government quality when they exhibit strong environmental performance so as to avoid any disadvantageous impact upon economic growth.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.     

Do people gamble more in good times? Evidence from 27 European countries

We provide evidence of a positive relationship between the intensity of gambling and economic growth in 27 European countries for 2005–2013. Our proxy for gambling is represented by government revenues from taxes on lotteries, betting and gambling. This variable is linked to GDP growth in a panel regression framework and pooled OLS. However, when we split our sample to account for the heterogeneity among European countries, we found that the positive ‘gambling – GDP growth’ relationship is driven extensively by the Central and Eastern European countries. It appears that people in these countries tend to gamble more when the economy is expanding.     

Beyond Patrimonial Plunder: The Use and Abuse of Coconut Levies in the Philippines

This article re-examines a case of corruption that was perpetuated during a period of authoritarian rule in the Philippines: the subversion of ‘coconut levies’, a tax on coconut production imposed by strongman President Ferdinand Marcos from 1971 to 1982. Literature on the case has formed the basis for locating the political origins of the country’s struggles with long-run economic transformation in terms of the extent of ‘rent-seeking’ and articulations of ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in this middle-income developing economy. The article interrogates how extant analyses of the case have explained associated malign developmental outcomes with reference to institutional design and governance conditions. It forwards a re-interpretation that focuses on the distributional contest underpinning levy mobilisation, including the types of state-engineered privileges contested, and how access to these were politically determined and regulated during and after the Marcos period. This approach, in which developmental possibilities of rent-creating state interventions are not universally denied but considered with reference to configurations of power and structures of political bargaining, will be shown to address limitations of preponderant analyses and bear relevance to developing countries where, because of structural reasons, neo-patrimonialism may be endemic but rent-creating state interventions cannot be discounted as instruments for promoting economic development.     

Economic valuation of the Leuser National Park on Sumatra,Indonesia

The Leuser Ecosystem in Northern Sumatra is officially protected by its status as an Indonesian national park. Nevertheless, it remains under severe threat of deforestation. Rainforest destruction has already caused a decline in ecological functions and services. Besides, it is affecting numerous economic activities in and around the Leuser National Park. The objectives of this study are twofold: firstly, to determine the total economic value (TEV) of the Leuser Ecosystem through a systems dynamic model. And secondly, to evaluate the economic consequences of deforestation versus conservation, disaggregating the economic value for the main stakeholders and regions involved. Using a dynamic simulation model, economic valuation is applied to evaluate the TEV of the Leuser National Park over the period 2000–2030. Three scenarios are considered: ‘conservation’, ‘deforestation’ and, ‘selective use’. The results are presented in terms of (1) the type of benefits, (2) the allocation of these benefits among stakeholders, and (3) the regional distribution of benefits. The economic benefits considered include: water supply, fisheries, flood and drought prevention, agriculture and plantations, hydro-electricity, tourism, biodiversity, carbon sequestration, fire prevention, non-timber forest products, and timber. The stakeholders include: local community members, the local government, the logging and plantation industry, the national government, and the international community. The regions considered cover the 11 districts involved in the management of the Leuser Ecosystem. With a 4% discount rate, the accumulated TEV for the ecosystem over the 30-year period is: US $7.0 billion under the ‘deforestation scenario’, US $9.5 billion under the ‘conservation scenario’ and US $9.1 billion under the ‘selective utilisation scenario’. The main contributors in the conservation and selective use scenarios are water supply, flood prevention, tourism and agriculture. Timber revenues play an important role in the deforestation scenario. Compared to deforestation, conservation of the Leuser Ecosystem benefits all categories of stakeholders, except for the elite logging and plantation industry.     

Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities

We investigate the determinants of the efficiency of firms with a focus on the role of corruption. We construct a simple theoretical model where corruption increases the factor requirements of firms because it diverts managerial effort away from factor coordination. We then exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level information on 80 electricity distribution firms from 13 Latin American countries for the years 1994 to 2001. As predicted by the model, we find that more corruption in the country is strongly associated with more inefficient firms, in the sense that they employ more inputs to produce a given level of output. The economic magnitude of the effects is large. The results hold both in models with country and firm fixed effects. The results survive several robustness checks, including different measures of output and efficiency, and instrumenting for corruption. Other elements associated with inefficiency are public ownership, inflation, and lack of law and order, but corruption appears to play a separate and more robust role.     

The productivity challenge. What to expect from better-quality labour and capital inputs?

The aim of this article is to develop and implement an analytical framework assessing whether better-quality inputs, via a rise of TFP, could compensate an ageing-induced slowing of economic growth. Here ‘better-quality’ means more educated and older/more experienced workforces; and also better-quality capital proxied by its ICT content. Economic theory predicts that these trends should raise TFP. To assess these predictions, we use EU-KLEMS data, with information on the age/education mix of the workforce, as well as the importance on ICT in total capital, for 34 industries within 16 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2005. We generalize the Hellerstein–Neumark labour-quality index method to simultaneously capture workers’ age/experience or education contribution to TFP growth, alongside that of ICT. The conclusion of the article is that the quality of inputs matters for TFP. We find robust microeconometric evidence that better-educated and older/more experienced workers are more productive than their less-educated and younger/less-experienced peers. Also, ICT capital turns out to be more productive than other forms of capital. And when used in a growth accounting exercise covering the 1995–2005 period, these estimates suggest that up to 40% of the recorded TFP growth could be ascribed to the rising quality of inputs.     

The impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption

Liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country. Since bureaucrats value variety, this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe. This “benefit effect” is counteracted by an increasing “cost effect” from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can lead to a non-monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, pre-commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a non-monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries.     

“Crime” in the lab-detecting social interaction

According to the standard economic perspective, criminal activities vary with the ‘price’ of crime, which depends on the severity of punishment and the detection probability. An alternative view claims that crime is also influenced by social interaction phenomena, such as ‘peer pressure’ or ‘neighbourhood effects’. Detecting social interaction in the field is fraught with difficulties, however. In this paper, we argue that given its extensive control possibilities, experiments are well suited to show the potential existence of social interaction effects. We present an experimental study where people can engage in ‘criminal’ activities. We find support for the importance of social interaction: On average subjects steal the more, the more others steal. This behaviour can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity.     

Democracy,rent seeking,public spending and growth

Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a ‘U’ effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monopolistic competitors. Initially, more democracy increases their number, raising aggregate rents. However, rents per rent-seeker fall with the number of rent seekers. Due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers, aggregate rents fall in mature democracies. Thus, rents show an ‘inverted-U’ effect in relation to democracy. We find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.     

Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries.     

HOW MANY FIRMS BECOME LEADERS?*

This paper investigates a quantity-setting oligopoly model with endogenous timing. We formulate an n-firm two-period model. Each firm chooses whether to take its action in period 1 or take its action in period 2 after observing the first-period actions of other firms. We call firms taking their actions in period 1 ‘leaders’ and those taking action in period 2 ‘following’. We find that the number of followers is at most one regardless of whether leaders have first mover advantage.