Aid and institutions in transition economies

We investigate whether aid contributed to institutional development in transition economies. We find that aid flows have a positive effect on democratization, especially on constraints on the executive and political participation. At the same time, total aid has no effect on overall quality of governance, while US aid appears to have a negative impact on some dimensions of governance. Aid’s differential impact on democracy and governance is consistent with uneven development of institutions and the democracy consolidation hypothesis. We also find that aid has a non-linear effect on democracy. Openness has a positive effect on both democracy and good governance. Oil resources have an adverse effect on democracy. Adult mortality, civil war and adherence to Islam are all detrimental to good governance.     

Does Democracy Lead to a Better Environment? Deforestation and the Democratic Transition Peak

The relationship between democracy and environment is subject to controversy. Some scientists find that democracy has a positive impact in reducing environmental disruption. Other scholars claim that democracy tends to accelerate environmental degradation. By using deforestation rates as a proxy for environmental disruption, we suggest that both sides might be right. Our quantitative analysis has three important outcomes. First, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between deforestation and democracy. Second, countries in democratic transition experience the highest deforestation rates, compared to non-democracies and mature democracies. Third, in explaining deforestation rates democracy has larger explanatory power than income. This last result implies that in reducing deforestation rates the emphasis should not only be on economic development but even more on democratization.     

Does travel inspire? Evidence from the superstars of modern art

This paper investigates whether travel increases the value of paintings produced by modern visual artists. The analysis is based on the 214 most prominent modern visual artists born between 1850 and 1945 and auction records of their paintings over the past 20 years. We find that artworks produced in the year of a journey are 7% more valuable than paintings produced in periods with no travel. We attribute this effect to human capital investments, knowledge spillovers and inspiration from the travel destination itself. There are persistent, but declining benefits to travel over the subsequent 4 years. The analysis shows that the impact of travel is smaller for later periods as modern art becomes more abstract. The effect on the value of paintings differs depending on the purpose of a journey: work-related, recreational and politically motivated journeys have a positive contemporaneous effect on value, whereas educational journeys have a negative effect. In addition, we find that France, Germany and the United States are the most frequently visited destinations for modern artists and also yield considerable benefits during times of strong innovation.     

探析明清时期的闺阁绘画

作为一个女性绘画的潮流,明清闺阁绘画群体性特征在我国历史中绝无仅有,对于我们重新解读中国古代绘画史具有不可或缺的价值。文章从明清时期的闺阁画家入手,探析明清闺阁绘画产生的原因、风格和艺术特点,讨论这些女性绘画之于中国绘画史及女性艺术史的价值与局限性。     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

政治关联影响农业企业社会责任行为吗——基于中国农业上市公司的经验证据

如何有效引导农业企业积极履行企业社会责任是解决农业企业社会责任缺失的关键。以中国农业上市公司为样本,采用面板数据进行回归模型分析,实证检验政治关联、制度环境和农业企业社会责任之间的关系。研究结果表明：政治关联与农业企业社会责任之间存在正相关关系;制度环境负向调节政治关联与农业企业社会责任之间的正相关关系。具体而言,在制度环境较差的地区,政治关联对农业企业社会责任的积极影响增强,反之亦然。     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

SEN,ETHICS, AND DEMOCRACY

Amartya Sen's ethical theorizing helps feminists resolve the tensions between the claims of women's particular perspectives and moral objectivity. His concept of "positional objectivity" highlights the epistemological significance of value judgments made from particular social positions, while holding that certain values may become widely shared. He shows how acknowledging positionality is consistent with affirming the universal value of democracy. This article builds on Sen's work by proposing an analysis of democracy as a set of institutions that aims to intelligently utilize positional information for shared ends. This epistemological analysis of democracy offers a way to understand the rationale for reserving political offices for women. From a political point of view, gendered positions are better thought of as an epistemological resource than as a ground of identity politics v - v that is, of parochial identification and solidarity.     

Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance

The paper investigates the effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance. Previous studies have found that diversity has various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public sector performance, and has large detrimental effects on the overall growth rate. I develop a simple model of the effect of ethnic diversity on a government decision problem in which there is a tradeoff between growth and distribution, in the contexts of democracy and dictatorship. I find that in democracy ethnic diversity has no effect upon the decision, whereas in dictatorship ethnic diversity leads to a government choice which reduces the growth rate. I then test these propositions on two data sets. The first is for 94 countries over the period 1960–1990. I find that whether diversity adversely affects overall economic growth depends upon the political environment. Diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies. The second is for World Bank projects in 89 countries. I find that the same relationship between diversity and democracy affects the proportion of projects which are successful.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

制度环境对企业家精神配置的影响:金融市场的调节作用

综合考虑政治法律制度环境和金融环境,实证分析制度环境对企业家精神配置的影响机理。结果发现,政府行政管理质量对企业家创新精神、企业家创业精神和生产性企业家精神综合水平具有正向促进作用;企业经营法制环境、金融环境质量与企业家创业精神存在负相关关系;金融环境在政府行政管理质量与企业家创新精神关系中起正向调节作用,而在企业经营法制环境与企业家创业精神关系中起负向调节作用。     

The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis

This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption. Interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption. Economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment. Democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low.     

From education to democracy: evidence from long-run time-varying estimates

This study reinvestigates the hypothesis that education is expected to have a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy for a panel of 169 countries over the period 1990–2014. Unlike previous studies, we employ the time-varying cointegration approach of Bierens and Martins (Econom Theory 26:1453–1490, 2010) to show the time-varying coefficient associated with education has a positive impact on democracy. Further examination of the countries by income classification reveals that education has a positive and increasing impact on democracy with the greatest impact in low-income countries.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

A few signatures matter: Barriers to entry in Italian local politics

Competition for public office is an essential feature of democracy but having many candidates competing for the same position might lead to voter confusion and be counterproductive. In current democracies, ballot access regulations limit citizens’ right to become candidates, seeking to balance this trade-off by discouraging frivolous contenders. This paper examines the causal effect of signature requirements – a widespread ballot access regulation – and finds that their impact goes beyond this goal. I use data on Italian local elections and apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the effects of these requirements on electoral competition, candidates’ selection, voter participation and administrative efficiency. I find that signature requirements reduce the number of candidates running for office, decrease electoral competition, lead to a more experienced pool of candidates, and reduce voter turnout. The positive effects of this policy are observed in municipalities with fragmented political systems, where signature requirements lead to fewer wasted votes and fewer spoiler candidates. The downside is observed in municipalities with concentrated political systems: signature requirements increase the frequency of uncontested races and reduce voter participation. Findings reveal how this barrier to entry impacts key dimensions of democracy and indicate that designing efficient electoral institutions requires a clear understanding of local political contexts.     

Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions

This article considers the impact of sub-national political systems on economic growth by applying the case of Russian regions from 2000 to 2004. It investigates two dimensions of the sub-national systems. First, it studies the influence of democracy on economic performance, providing evidence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth. Regions with high levels of democracy, as well as strong autocracies, perform better than hybrid regimes. Second, this article considers the influence of the size of the bureaucracy on economic outcomes and confirms the ??grabbing hand?? view on bureaucracy rather than the Weberian idea. Increasing the size of the bureaucracy is associated with a decline in economic performance. In addition, this article analyzes the potential interaction between these two characteristics of sub-national politics as factors of economic growth, but does not establish any robust results.     

The Limitations of Karl Marx' Social Economics ∗

Studies of the relationship between political democracy and economic inequality have produced diverse findings. This study attempts to mitigate some conceptual and methodological problems inherent in such studies by using multi-indicator concepts of inclusive democracy and economic inequality. Data from the five major historically and culturally homogeneous South Asian countries covering 1980–2003 suggest some bidirectional, positive relationship between inclusive democracy and economic inequality indicating that democracy and equality may not be fully compatible in this region. The paper offers contextual explanations and some mechanisms that may have led to these findings for the region, somewhat deviating from the conventional arguments.     

Political Business Cycles,Elections and Entrepreneurial Finance: A Framework

Political processes affect the real economy. An important channel through which politics affects economics is uncertainty. It has been observed that political uncertainty is high around national elections and negatively affects corporate investments and foreign capital inflows. If national elections affect corporations and foreign investors, we should expect them to also affect entrepreneurial finance provided by investors like venture capitalists (VCs). To add to that, in a complex federal democracy, state level politics is a significant source of political uncertainty. This is the first paper to examine the impact of national and state elections on entrepreneurial finance and provides a framework of VC investment behavior in the face of political uncertainty. We find that VC investments decrease significantly due to political uncertainty around national and state elections. VCs respond strongly to national elections by decreasing the total investment value and the number of deals in election years. However, they give a softer response to regional political uncertainty around state elections by decreasing only the average deal size. The findings have important implications for governments, regulators and policymakers, and open up an opportunity to examine a variety of new questions which can provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the impact of elections on VC investments.