REGULATION OF POLLUTION IN THE LABORATORY: RANDOM INSPECTIONS,AMBIENT INSPECTIONS,AND COMMITMENT PROBLEMS

We compare experimentally a traditional random inspection policy and a variant where the agency may carry out a preliminary inspection of the level of ambient pollution before implementing any individual inspection. Since the agency may have an incentive to announce high inspection probabilities and then secretly renege on its announcement to avoid implementing costly inspections, we are also interested in the agency's commitment power. We find that overall, ambient inspections increase efficiency but the effect is weaker than expected when the agency has no commitment power; and polluters' reactions to the lack of commitment power of the agency vary depending on whether the agency uses ambient inspections or not.     

Agency rulemaking, political influences, regulation, and industry compliance

This article empirically examines the impact of congressionaloversight and agency rulemaking on firm compliance behaviorin FDA-regulated industries. Congressional oversight hearingsprovide signals to firms about future changes in regulatoryenforcement strategies. Agency rulemaking influences firms'incentives to comply with regulation because firms must investsignificant resources to keep up with changing agency policy.This analysis uses three-stage least squares to simultaneouslyestimate both the numbers of FDA inspections and industry violatorsbetween 1972 and 1994. Results show that congressional oversightdeters industry noncompliance. The effect of agency rulemakingon noncompliance differs between industries. For instance, anincreasing stock of human drug rules has raised compliance amongdrug firms because newer more, cost-effective rules have replacedolder, more costly rules. In contrast, the increasing stockof medical device rules has reduced industry compliance amongdevice firms because these rules have increased the complexityand the scope of regulation.     

The geographic distribution of environmental inspections

Models of the enforcement of environmental regulations regarding point source pollution suppose that the probability of inspection or audit is independent across facilities. However, there are a number of reasons why regulators may choose to inspect many sites in a particular geographic area at one time. If the probability a site is inspected also depends on its compliance behavior, the expected payoff from choosing to violate will depend upon the compliance decisions of neighboring sites, creating a game of strategic interdependence between firms. In this paper, we use a dataset of inspections at petroleum storage sites in Manitoba between 1981 and 1998 to consider to what extent inspections are spatially correlated and whether inspection probabilities are a function of the inspection and violation history of the site and its neighbors. Further, we examine to what extent firms take into account whether their neighbors have been previously found in violation in determining compliance.     

Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information.     

How predictable are environmental compliance inspections?

The goal of this paper is to examine the timing of environmental compliance inspections and determine the extent to which such inspections can be predicted. The paper focuses on modeling the inspections at hazardous waste facilities in the U.S. using detailed data on individual inspections and facilities. The paper uses a number of parametric and semi-parametric duration models to predict the timing of inspections and finds that the exponential model provides the best balance in terms of the explanatory power and simplicity of the model. However, even with this model it is difficult to accurately predict the timing of most compliance inspections. The paper also examines the extent to which using data on individual inspections can improve empirical predictions about aggregate inspections. If the goal is to estimate the annual number of inspections at hazardous waste facilities, neither the exponential model or a Poisson model is clearly superior. Which model is more appropriate depends on the question the researcher wants to answer. Similarly, if the focus is on whether any inspection occurred in a given time period, the benefits of using the exponential model depend on the nature of the questions to be answered. While the exponential model performs better than a probit model in predicting which entities will be inspected, it also results in a higher number of “false positives,” that is predicting an inspection when no inspection actually occurs.     

An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs

A policy of effective environmental protection, inthe present political atmosphere, will requirelow-cost monitoring and enforcement (M&E) strategiesthat do not rely on draconian penalties. Infinite oreven very high penalties for environmental violationsare socially and politically unacceptable.Environmental violations are often classed as civiloffenses, and the occurrence of a violation may bethought insufficient to establish intent. If penaltiesare upper-bounded and each firm is inspected randomly,compliance cannot be maintained with arbitrarily smallinspection probabilities and, hence, small agencycosts. In this paper we examine possibilities forreducing agency M&E costs, including the requirementfor self-reports of effluents and the adjustment ofthe inspection probability to reflect a firm'scompliance or reporting reputation.     

The threat of regulatory environmental inspection: impact on plant performance

The expected costs of violating a regulation would typically increase if the probability of regulatory inspection increases. Thus, changes in the anticipated threat of inspection should affect firm compliance. Like environmental protection agencies in several other countries, the Norwegian agency typically emphasizes compliance with institutional requirements (e.g. firm-internal routines and auditing systems) rather than emission caps. Using a panel dataset of polluting Norwegian plants, we find that the threat of inspection significantly reduces the probability of serious violation. However, emissions are not significantly affected. We point at various reasons for the regulator to emphasize institutional requirements, but we also argue that the lack of effect on emissions encourages the agency to review the pros and cons of the common emphasis on institutional requirements over emissions.      

Do environmental audits improve long-term compliance? Evidence from manufacturing facilities in Michigan

Using a unique facility-level dataset from Michigan, we examine the effect of environmental auditing on manufacturing facilities’ long-term compliance with U.S. hazardous waste regulations. We also investigate the factors that affect facilities’ decisions to conduct environmental audits and whether auditing in turn affects the probability of regulatory inspections. We account for the potential endogeneity of our audit measure and the censoring of our compliance measure using a censored trivariate probit, which we estimate using simulated maximum likelihood. We find that larger facilities and those subject to more stringent regulations are more likely to audit; facilities with poor compliance records are less likely to audit. However, we find no significant long-run impact of auditing on the probability of a regulatory inspection or compliance among these Michigan manufacturing facilities.     

Do Regulators Respond to Voluntary Pollution Control Efforts? A Count Data Analysis

This article addresses whether environmental regulators are responsive to voluntary environmental behavior. Mixed results are obtained. In two of four frequently inspected manufacturing industries, state regulators do indeed undertake fewer current inspections at those plants that report lower per unit output Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) chemical releases. Moreover, regulated pollutant releases and statutory compliance history also influence inspection activity. Finally, in the pulp and paper industry, plants that account for a larger share of state manufacturing employment are inspected less frequently. In other sectors, this appears not to be the case. (JEL K32 , L51 , Q21 )     

Environmental enforcement when ‘inspectability’ is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties

If a firm can influence its monitorability vis-à-vis an environmental regulator, it is shown that increasing the thoroughness of inspections induces the firm to substitute towards more transparent technologies, whilst increasing their frequency may cause substitution the other way. Perversely, when the effect of such substitution is taken into account, an increase in the frequency of inspections (or, equally, the stringency of penalties) may worsen the firm's environmental performance. The agency should favour more thorough inspections than existing theory suggests, particularly in sectors where the scope for such substitution is great. Moreover, when monitorability adjusts only sluggishly to policy shocks (because it is an embodied characteristic of capital, for example) the environmental impacts of increased frequency and increased thoroughness well over- and under-shoot their respective long-run impacts. In assessing regulatory reform, therefore, it is important to leave sufficient time for the class of adjustments identified to occur. The possibility of overshooting can be used as an alternative to existing regulatory capture theories to explain why the efficacy of some classes of regulatory reform may fade through time.     

Learning about compliance under asymmetric information

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agency's monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard.     

Monitoring,Appeal, and Investigation: The Enforcement and Legal Process

In this article, I consider a model of law enforcement in which a regulatory agency faces the following problem: To induce firms which are required to adopt a certain level of environmental care, the agency can make spot checks. This monitoring, however, measures a firms degree of protection only with error. On the basis of the observed signal, the agency then has to decide whether or not to fine a firm for taking insufficient protection. If it fines a firm which has actually met the level of environmental protection, the firm has the right to lodge an appeal. To plead the cause, the agency then is required to investigate at high cost the actual degree of the firms protection.In this context we ask how the regulatory agency allocates resources between different enforcement activities. We show how the structure of the optimal enforcement policy depends on the cost of the enforcement activities, on the uncertainty of observation, on its enforcement budget and other factors.     

Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance

We examine the U.S. hazardous waste management industry to assess the role that consumers play in encouraging environmental compliance. We first examine whether environmental performance affects consumer demand and find that noncompliance does decrease demand, at least in the short term. Next we consider whether market characteristics affect compliance behavior. While we do not find evidence that market size affects behavior, local competition does appear to increase compliance. However, as competition becomes less localized, it has a smaller effect. Finally, regardless of the pressures exerted by consumers to comply, commercial managers are less likely to be in compliance than on-site managers. For example, President Bush’s 2006 budget request for EPA significantly cut funding to the states who are responsible for over 95% of environmental inspections (ECOS, 2005). At the federal level, the number of positions for compliance monitoring decreased by over 17% from FY 2001 to FY 2003 (U.S. GAO, 2002).     

Agency Structure and Firm Culture: OSHA, EPA, and the Steel Industry

We compare models of Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcementand compliance for steel plants during the 1980s. We find thatOSHA and EPA respond similarly to plant-level compliance andmeasures of hazardousness, but differently to firm-level complianceand risks of plant closing, and we relate the differences tothe agencies' differing organizational structures. Plant-levelcompliance is affected by enforcement pressure, compliance costs,and the firm's overall compliance behavior in similar ways forthe two regulatory areas, but environmental compliance was alsosensitive to plant size and risk of closing. Finally, we findthat the likelihood that a plant was in compliance with oneagency seemed at most weakly related to whether it was in compliancewith the other, but that plants likely to receive enforcementattention from one agency were also more likely to receive enforcementattention from the other agency.     

试论我国环境刑事政策

我国正在建设“资源节约型、环境友好型”社会。“两型”社会的建设目标就是保护环境和资源。这就需要我们运用各种手段，采取各种措施，加大保护环境资源的力度。政策手段是一个主要的调控杠杆，环境刑事政策作为运用刑法手段控制环境违法行为和惩治环境犯罪的策略和方针，近年来在环境资源保护方面发挥的作用越来越大。环境刑事政策既是刑事政策，也是环境政策，既是立法政策、司法政策，也是执行政策，理论上对环境刑事政策进行研究，可以指导决策机关制定符合“两型”社会建设需要的方略，进而更好地运用刑事手段保护环境和资源。     

Why we need a commitment approach to environmental policy

The principal reason why economists have advocated environmental policies based on incentives is that their conception of business behavior derives from the neoclassical model of the firm. Businesses certainly do respond to profit incentives, but firms' behavior is also greatly influenced by socio-political considerations and their organizational capabilities. In recent years, a significant group of businesses that are highly innovative, competitive and socially responsible has emerged. These are not the firms that policy makers envisioned when they formulated command and control and market incentive environmental policies, i.e., control-oriented policies. Because of this, there is a need for new types of environmental policies. Thus, the first purpose of this paper is to propose a new class of environmental policies. The second purpose is to explain why the neoclassical model is deficient as a basis for environmental policy and to explicate the nature of a more appropriate model.Control-oriented policies were designed for firms that behave like neoclassical firms. For high performance organizations (HPOs), what is needed is the opposite of control-oriented policy. What is needed is an environmental policy that takes advantage of HPOs commitment, responsibility, and trustworthiness. The appropriate policy should take into account that overall environmental performance is a product not just of firm behavior but of the whole environmental system of which firms are a part. What is needed is a commitment approach to environmental policy.A commitment approach (CA) to environmental policy is first of all not a control-oriented policy. A CA is a nonregulatory approach in which firms are self-regulated. The CA is only for firms that are able to 1) make a commitment to high environmental performance and 2) develop the capabilities to meet these commitments. The environmental protection (EP) agency that administers the CA would be charged with selecting the particular “high commitment” (HC) firms that would be subject to the policy. Low and intermediate commitment firms would presumably continue to be regulated under the usual control-oriented environmental policies. The selected HC firms would be eligible for government technical assistance and information. In addition, the EP agency could aid the functioning of the environmental systems (ES) in which HC firms are embedded by, for example, providing education and information to these businesses' stakeholders. Finally, it would be necessary for the EP agency to accomplish periodic assessments of how ESs performance departs from the ideal and how these systems' operations require rectification.     

MARGINAL DETERRENCE THROUGH AMBIENT ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS

We consider the enforcement of an environmental standard if the probabilities of inspection are determined by an inspection agency who permanently monitors ambient pollution. This monitoring creates strategic interactions between polluters, which imply that the probability of inspection is increasing in the transgression level. These interactions also imply that marginal deterrence is possible, even with penalties that are not increasing in the transgression levels.     

To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning

In this paper, we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard, a probability of inspection and a fine for non-compliance, in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly, and the penalty may include gravity and non-gravity components at the regulator’s discretion. Under given penalties, the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met. Non-compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages. Interestingly, the appropriate structure of the penalty under non-compliance is highly progressive, while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear. If the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine, linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance.      

经济危机环境下冗余资源与公司绩效的关系研究——基于行业竞争强度的调节作用

对于组织冗余资源与公司绩效之间的关系,组织理论和代理理论有着截然相反的观点。组织理论认为冗余资源能够缓冲环境变化的冲击,改善企业绩效;而代理理论认为冗余资源的存在给公司带来代理问题,会损害企业绩效。本文选取2008年沪、深两市A股市场的制造业上市公司为研究样本,检验了在危机环境下不同类型的冗余资源与企业绩效的关系,以及行业竞争程度的调节作用。本文验证了情境因素的重要作用,进一步拓展了相关理论在中国的应用。     

Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions