科研腐败浅析

近些年来,科研腐败现象频繁出现,违法违纪案件时有曝光,科研经费的使用五花八门,科研经费管理存在使用混乱,官员、中介机构和科研人员利益勾结,科研产出效率与科研投入严重不匹配等问题。致使科研腐败的原因是多方面的,可以从科研人员、科研机构、大众媒体等三个主体来寻求具体的原因,最终通过加强科研人员道德建设、明确科研政府部门职责、完善科研法律体系、规范科研行为以及搭建信息公开平台、加强媒体舆论监督等对策,从而达到有效治理科研腐败的目的。     

新生代农民工组织嵌入、职业嵌入与工作绩效研究

在工作嵌入理论基础上拓展出新生代农民工的组织嵌入与职业嵌入理念,运用398个样本探讨了它们与任务绩效、组织公民行为和反生产行为的关系。研究发现:新生代农民工组织嵌入与职业嵌入是可区分的2个独立变量;新生代农民工的组织嵌入正向影响任务绩效、组织公民行为和负向影响反生产行为;新生代农民工职业嵌入正向影响任务绩效和负向影响反生产行为;新生代农民工的社区嵌入对组织嵌入与任务绩效和组织公民行为关系具有调节作用,对反生产行为调节作用不显著;新生代农民工社区嵌入对职业嵌入与工作绩效的3个变量不存在调节效应。     

对优化高校科研经费管理的几点思考

随着高校科研事业的迅速发展,科研经费的财务管理显得日趋重要。如何科学、规范地使用有限的科研经费,提高其使用效益,不仅直接影响着科研质量、科研水平和科研人员的积极性,而且最终会影响到科研事业的发展。为此,文章对高校科研经费管理中存在的一些问题进行了分析,并就如何推进科研经费财务管理规范化、制度化提出了相关建议。     

网络嵌入、动态能力与企业创新绩效——一个模糊集定性比较分析

网络嵌入、动态能力与企业创新绩效间关系一直是战略管理领域研究的热点话题,但以往研究忽视了网络嵌入与动态能力各构成维度间不同组合对创新绩效的复杂性影响。因此,基于组态视角和集合论思想,采用模糊集定性比较分析法,以220家中国企业为样本,从企业外部网络嵌入和内部动态能力培育两个层面,探讨网络嵌入和动态能力的不同维度影响企业创新绩效的多重组合路径。研究结果表明：企业创新绩效提升路径包括网络嵌入—能力促进型、双元能力推动型、网络嵌入—能力冲突型和创新能力缺失弥补型4种构型,且网络嵌入三维度间存在一定的替代性。     

战略网络对企业绩效的影响研究综述

战略网络不仅是一种新型的组织形式,更是一种全新的竞合战略思想,它深刻影响着企业的行为和绩效。文章将战略管理和社会资本两个领域的相关研究相结合,采用网络分析方法,从结构、关系和文化等三个网络嵌入维度研究战略网络对企业绩效的影响机制,同时将网络知识资源引入模型,探讨网络通过影响网络知识资源的转移进而对企业绩效发挥作用的影响路径。     

工作嵌入的理论进展及在离职管理中的应对策略

工作嵌入理论是国外近年来预测离职现象,解释留职原因的一个新的管理学理论。文章通过梳理工作嵌入理论的最新研究进展,回顾了工作嵌入的内涵和结构,对工作嵌入的结构、测量、相关变量和跨文化方向的研究进展进行了理论综述,并揭示出工作嵌入理论对离职管理的实践意义及应对策略。     

基于PSM-DID的科研经费“包干制”政策激励效应研究

随着科技体制机制改革的深入推进，科技政策环境不断优化，科研经费“包干制”对于扩大科研人员自主权、激发科研人员创新活力、提高科研经费使用效率具有重要意义，但目前对于科研经费“包干制”政策效果的实证分析较为欠缺。基于实验经济学研究思路，构建对照组和实验组，采用双重差分（PSM-DID）方法对中国实施科研经费“包干制”产生的政策激励效应进行实证分析。结果表明，科研经费“包干制”政策实施对科研人员工作满意度起正向调节作用和正向激励作用，“包干制”政策初步体现出较强的激励效应。未来在科研经费“包干制”实施中应进一步扩大科研人员自主权、适度提高间接费用比例、健全柔性化科研经费管理体系、加强部门间协同与沟通、建立人性化监督审计机制，充分发挥科研经费管理改革对科研人员的政策激励效应，促进科研绩效不断提升。     

社会嵌入视角下的能力构建研究

在分析社会网络中不同企业的能力差异后,本文提出了以梯度转移为形式的能力构建模式。社会嵌入机制可以通过强化企业间的网络联结来提供支撑,其中结构嵌入是基于网络特性来拓展联结广度,关系嵌入则基于企业行为来增强联结深度,两者的融合会进一步促进企业的跨组织边界知识互动,以维持能力梯度转移的持续和稳定。     

组织创新氛围、网络嵌入对员工创新行为的影响

员工创新行为是企业获得持续竞争优势的关键，并受到员工所拥有资源的影响。新时代背景下，员工借助组织嵌入网络获取的异质性资源成为促进创新行为的关键要素。基于资源保存理论，构建组织创新氛围、网络嵌入和员工创新行为关系模型并进行实证调查研究，结果发现：组织创新氛围各维度中，资源供应、团队协作显著促进员工创新行为，而领导效能影响不显著；组织创新氛围与员工关系嵌入显著正相关，资源供应、团队协作与结构嵌入显著正相关，但领导效能对结构嵌入影响不显著；网络嵌入在资源供应、团队协作与员工创新行为关系中发挥中介作用，但在领导效能与员工创新行为关系中不起中介作用。最后，提出建立高绩效工作系统、优化和完善激励机制、强化内部创新文化氛围建设、提升企业和员工网络嵌入水平等管理建议。     

企业转移模式、本地化嵌入行为与知识转移绩效

产业转移作为产业生产系统与知识系统的共同转移,是承接地获取新知识、实现知识创造的重要途径。基于SCP（结构—行为—绩效）范式及复杂网络视角,研究了产业转移中转出方企业转移模式及承接地集群网络结构通过影响转移企业本地化嵌入行为,进而影响知识转移的机理,并通过构建知识转移动态仿真模型,比较分析了不同转移模式及集群网络结构下的知识转移绩效。结果表明：在不同转移模式及网络结构下,企业本地化嵌入行为及知识转移绩效存在显著差异;相比无核网络,有核网络对促进集群知识转移具有显著优势。此外,在无核网络中,合资企业对集群中合作企业的适度更新能促进承接地集群知识转移绩效提升;在有核网络中,组团式转移企业的“小社团”强度对知识转移绩效具有显著负向影响。该研究不仅有助于从微观层面理解产业转移中的企业行为,也对承接地选择适宜的招商策略和集群发展战略、促进企业知识转移、提升承接地创新能力具有重要意义。     

如何降低科技行政审批腐败发生率——模型、机理与实现路径

科技行政审批在缺乏有效的制度约束下，极易引发腐败行为。通过构建科技行政审批与腐败发生率关联机理模型，经过相关性分析、内在一致性与EFA检验以及二阶验证性因素分析，拟合出结构方程模型路径系数。结果显示，市场激励型科技行政审批能够直接影响腐败发生率，命令控制型科技行政审批与市场激励型科技行政审批都可以通过科技行政审批人员滋生消极腐败的公共服务动机进而产生腐败行为，市场化程度提升带来的外在影响相对于内在公共服务动机变异对于腐败发生率增加的影响表现得更加显著。因此，针对不同类型科技行政审批，可实施差异化腐败预防控制机制，转变审批人员公共服务动机，阻断腐败发生的中介，深化科技行政审批制度改革，推进审批制度化、标准化、规范化建设，精简优化科技行政审批流程，提高审批集约化程度，以效能提升倒逼腐败发生率下降。     

Corruption in a neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production function

In this article, we analyze the bureaucrats’ corruption problem in a simple neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production function. In this model, we consider direct relations between product (income) taxation and corruption, and between corruption and public goods provision. As the main result, we show that the optimal consumption growth path in this economy is higher in a non-corrupt environment than in a corrupt environment and the higher the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, the higher the cost of corruption to society.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.     

The endogenous formation of scientific research coalitions

The paper develops a formal model of coalition-building ("network" formation) among research units that seek competitive funding from a supra-regional program, while also drawing support from their respective regional funding agencies. This analysis is motivated by the absence of frameworks of analysis applicable to problems of design of public R&D funding arrangements in the European Union, and in other regional systems were independent programs of "federal and state" support for research co-exists. The model assumes a fixed finite population of research units and an associated distribution of reputed quality, or scientific reputation, which may be modified as a consequence of research results. Non-cooperative games of coalition formation developed by Bloch (1995), and Ray and Vohra (1999), provides a useful single-period framework for this part of the analysis. Collaborations are formed in the expectation of attracting incremental research funding, given the selection criteria of the agency that offers funding for "networks". Invitations to join proposals for networks are initiated and acted upon following a specific ordering procedure. This gives rise to a repeated non-cooperative game of coalition (or collaboration) formation, in which the distribution of payoffs within the collaboration is governed by a fixed rule. Following Keely (2002), this type of game is applied to a multi-period setting in which a distribution of coalitions is tracked, along with the levels of funding received. The latter are determined according to a rule comparing the distribution of reputations within proposed collaborations, and the effects upon the distribution of reputations in the entire population are analysed. Alternative possible external funding rules are evaluated with the help of a numerical example, to determine how their impacts upon collaboration formation, and the resulting evolution of the reputation distribution (as that will be affected by the allocation of funding).     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

政府研发资助促进企业创新的有效性:激励效应异质性假说与检验

关于政府研发资助能否促进企业研发创新活动以及在创新过程中如何更有效地发挥政府的作用，一直存在争议。本文基于理论分析，提出了政府研发资助促进企业创新的有效性以及激励效应存在异质性的假说，利用工业企业的创新活动数据检验了中国政府研发资助对企业研发创新活动的影响效应。总体来看，政府研发资助对企业自身研发投入存在激励作用，同时也会提升企业研发创新的专利和新产品的产出水平。政府资助的激励效应存在企业异质性，在企业规模越大、人力资本水平越高、劳动生产效率越高的企业中，政府资助的激励效应越大，并且对非国有企业的研发创新产出的促进效用要高于国有企业。另外，本文还发现科技活动的产出更多地依赖于研发人员的贡献。政府对企业研发创新进行资助时，应该根据企业具体的微观特征，制定针对性的资助方式，更有效地发挥政府资助的激励效应。     

R&D cooperation with scientific institutions: a difference-in-difference approach

Economists and business managers have long been interested in the impact of research and development (R&D) cooperation with scientific institutions on the innovation performance of firms. Recent research identifies a positive correlation between these two variables. This paper aims to contribute to the identification of the relationship between R&D cooperation with scientific institutions and the product and process innovation performance of firms by using a difference-in-difference approach. In doing so, we distinguish between two different types of scientific institutions: universities and governmental research institutes. For the econometric analyses, we use data from the German Community Innovation Survey. In total, data from up to 560 German service and manufacturing firms are available for the difference-in-difference analyses. The results suggest that R&D cooperation with universities and governmental research institutes has a positive effect on both product innovation and process innovation performance of firms.     

Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality

This paper examines the accuracy of corruption perceptions by comparing Indonesian villagers' reported perceptions about corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of ‘missing expenditures’ in the project. I find that villagers' reported perceptions do contain real information, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between corruption in a particular road project and general corruption in the village. The magnitude of the reported information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where it is hardest for villagers to detect. I also find that there are biases in reported perceptions. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions, whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.