Scientific misconduct and the responsible conduct of research in science and economics

Abstract

Considered here are matters relating to the responsible conduct of research in economics and science in the United States for the last forty years. In science there was a “late 20th century wave” of scientific misconduct and then a “millennial wave”. For economics in the former era, episodes of honest error and replication failure occurred. Recently plagiarism and data manipulation have been reported. Overall few economists seem to fabricate data, but falsification of data, replication failure, and plagiarism occur. Furthermore, replication failure is the one thing that scientific misconduct and honest error have in common. In economics and compared to the sciences, there have been no misconduct hearings, no economist has been charged with a crime, nor has anyone served time in prison for scientific misconduct. Science and economics seem to be sufficiently self-corrective so that systemic science failure does not utterly thwart scientific progress in the long run.     

Two-tier rationality and reflexivity: an examination of the foundations of economic reason

This paper develops a two-tier concept of rationality which broadens the orthodox notion of instrumental rationality in economics. In the first section, I conceive the idea of “background rationality” to consist in the ability to act normally, i.e., according to social conventions appropriate to the context. Background rationality is a necessary condition for the exercise of its instrumental counterpart. Implications and applications of this for economic phenomena are investigated in Section II. The third section draws parallels between the approach to rationality developed in this paper and Thorstein Veblen's notion “habits of thought”. I argue that a viable concept of rationality must itself be subject to explanatory scrutiny and justification and not merely posited as given.     

A Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Role of Gender in Persistence in the Economics Major

So much has been done in terms of measuring the impact of economics courses on student knowledge and understanding of facts, concepts and principles, and so little research has dealt with the possible effects on student political attitudes, that this study by Scott and Rothman should be of great interest to economics instructors. The authors address themselves to George Stigler's assertion that “the education of an economist makes the person who receives it more conservative.” They report on the use of their own “Social Opinion Questionnaire” and how it was employed to investigate “the different effects, if any, introductory economics and introductory psychology have on opinions related to economic issues.”     

Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986*

This paper tests a simple asset market model of campaign contributions, using data from recent U.S. Senate races. When applied to “investor” PACs, the model performs surprisingly well, and suggests that the contributions market is relatively efficient. When applied to “ideological” PACs, political parties, and individuals, the model is rejected. The results not only provide empirical support for the model, but also point out important differences in the apparent motives behind different types of contributions.     

Normative ecological rationality: normative rationality in the fast-and-frugal-heuristics research program

The purpose of this paper is to examine the normative interpretation of the fast-and-frugal research program and in particular to contrast it with the normative reading of rational choice theory and behavioral economics. The ecological rationality of fast-and-frugal heuristics is admittedly a form of normative naturalism (Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012) – it derives what agents “ought” to do from that which “is” ecologically rational – and the paper will examine how this differs from the normative rationality associated with rational choice theory. I will also attempt to assess the relative adequacy of normative ecological rationality.     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

Scientific misconduct and research ethics in economics: an introduction

Abstract

Since the screening of Inside Job in movie theatres around the world in 2010, research integrity in economics has been questioned by scholars and public intellectuals. Prestigious economists and policy makers are accused of conflicts of interest while prominent economists are charged with plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Some of these economists replied to accusations about themselves while many others have preferred not to respond at all. These days, economists hear the following question more often than before: “what is wrong with economics?”     

Is the economics of time and ignorance a “classic”?

A history of economic thought perspective on The Economics of Time and Ignorance reveals that the book rehabilitates some major themes in the Austrian tradition that were all but lost subsequent to the formalist revolution in economics that took place in the middle of the twentieth-century. The book also anticipates some important ideas that were extended and applied in Austrian economics after it was first published. Reviews have claimed that the book was a “classic” and also “original”. The book is too close in a temporal sense to judge whether or not future generations will canonize it as a “classic”. Using Stigler’s criteria as to what constitutes scientific “originality”, it is concluded that, taken as a whole, the book was not original. From the vantage point of the overall discipline of economics, it was a work advancing controversial ideas that would not easily change the beliefs, practices and interests of economists in general but it offered sound reasons for taking the Austrian thought-trajectory more seriously. It would be more fitting to view the authors as providers of many innovations contributing to the mature Austrian economics of the twenty-first century.     

新制度经济学委托代理理论视野的拓展*

新制度经济学中的委托代理理论基于“经济人理性”假定，设计出了精密、精巧、精致的委托代理制度，有效化解了现代企业中委托人与代理人之间利益冲突并提升了企业运营效率。然而，现代企业实践已经证明，即使委托代理制度十分精密、精巧、精致，仍然没有彻底解决委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突和企业运营效率进一步提升问题。因此，必须拓展既有理论视野，从“经济人理性”假定拓展到“经济人+社会人+家庭人复合理性”假定，这样就能够实现委托代理理论视野的拓展。运用新制度经济学研究方法和双边对称信任数理模型表明：基于委托代理制度，进一步强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度，可以进一步化解他们之间的利益冲突并且改善企业运营效率。基于这一结论，强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度的具体路径是优化社会信任环境系统。     

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

Economists in the neoclassical tradition do their best to avoid using the word “need.” Social economists have traditionally been more open to discussions of need. Philosophic discussions of need are also scarce but nevertheless helpful. This essay will argue that need is “a word we cannot do without” in economics, and not only in social economics. Need is objective, satiable, and absolute, by contrast with want or preference as it is defined in neoclassical economics. With this clarification, 1) it is reasonable that public policy should consider need as well as want and aim to satisfy some needs, and 2) for some purposes, such as the economics of health care, conventional demand cannot be understood without the concept of need. Thus, even the narrower purposes of neoclassical economics cannot be achieved without clarifying and using the concept of need, in addition to the more usual motivational assumptions of neoclassical economics.     

Thinking Like an Economist: The Neoliberal Politics of the Economics Textbook

This article surveys 10 introductory economics textbooks to examine whether and how economics contributed to the rise of neoliberalism. It defines neoliberalism as a political rationality characterized by market constructivism. In contrast with conventional liberal approaches that view limited government as legitimized by the failure of naturalist markets, neoliberalism constructs the market as norm and means of government. Economics textbooks overall have a liberal outlook, as exemplified by Samuelson's classic, however, with three liberal subgenres: the imperfect market view, the free market view, and an institutionalist view. While the introductory textbook cannot be construed as an instruction manual for neoliberalism, the article nevertheless identifies two important neoliberal moments: the discussion of market-based forms of government and the rise of a new genre of principles textbook that urges students to “think like an economist.” The article concludes with novel insights on how economics may have contributed to the spread of neoliberalism.     

Fuzzy revealed preference theory

Rationality has traditionally been defined as choice behaviour which can be explained in terms of some implicit binary preference. The point of departure of this paper lies in permitting the binary preference relation to be “fuzzy.” Concepts from fuzzy set theory are used to formalise different notions of rationality, including degrees of rationality. The relation between these and traditional concepts is formally explored. In welfare economics, quasi-orderings have often been used to capture the inherent imprecisions of human value judgements. It is argued here that, in many situations, a more appropriate tool for this may be fuzzy orderings.     

The legacy of R. Coase (1910–2013): toward a theory of institutional 'moving equilibrium'?

Over almost a century, Ronald Coase’s works have largely differed in their contents. Under the general umbrella of the “law and economics” field, Coase’s scientific production has indeed covered a large variety of topics and policy issues. However, Coase’s analyses reveal a common framework, if not a structured methodology. We highlight five key ingredients of the “Coasean methodology” and apply them to revisit Coase’s main contributions. The resulting picture reveals a comprehensive theory of institutional “moving equilibrium”, where the institutional design of socioeconomic transactions is affected by the dimension of transaction costs.     

Teaching Principles Of Economics Without Lectures

Lectures have generally been considered essential to good instruction. Indeed, some colleges have severely penalized truant students who dared absent themselves from the lecture hall. In this article, McConnell and Lamphear present important evidence that “students taking principles of economics with lectures, and those taking the course on a lectureless basis [perform] equally well on an intensive battery of objective examinations.”     

Fair is foul,and foul is fair: experimental evolutionary studies of mismatch

We describe two types of experimental evolution studies of “mismatch” that are relevant to economics. “Evolutionary mismatch” is the concept that an organism can be importantly “out of sync” with its environment. In such cases, an organism may choose an option that is inferior to a feasible alternative. Mainstream and behavioral economics do not address the notion of evolutionary mismatch. We argue for an empirical program on mismatch utilizing the methodology of experimental evolution.     

Getting beyond neo-institutionalism: Virgil Storr’s culture of markets

Storr is a free trader in ideas, bringing back into economics meaning, long banished by behaviorist dogma. His elegant little book, though, is too kind to neo-institutionalists. The followers of Douglass North, repeating without much thought over and over, “Institutions matter,” mean to say that “Institutions are constraints like budget lines. They are not human conversations.” Since the conversational character of markets is Storr’s main point, he would do better to make common cause with “humanomics,” that is, an economics keeping its mathematics and statistics but entering, too, the human conversation since the Epic of Gilgamesh.     

A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

Marxism and economic determination: clarification and defence of an “old-fashioned” principle

This paper clarifies and defends economic determination as a defining principle of explanation of Marxist political economy and state theory. Economic determination is a principle of causation or explanation which involves the claim that “politics” is “explained” by “economics” in a relevant sense of those three terms. This principle is refined by clarifying the meaning of each of these terms, particularly focusing on “determination.” A defense is mounted on theoretical grounds by showing that Jessop’s critique of “reductionism” and related argument for “contingency” does not succeed. Economic determination is defined as a strong tendency but consistent with a notion of the relative autonomy of the state.     

A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice

In light of Wittman (1995) and Caplan (2007) this paper contends that the rational-choice approach to political science (“Public Choice theory”) has reached a dead end. By critiquing their treatment of rationality, knowledge assumptions, and views of the democratic process, an alternative is presented based on the core insight of the “Epistemic Primacy Thesis”. This subjectivist approach to political economy is introduced in light of an existing debate between the compatibility (or otherwise) of Austrian economics and Public Choice theory.