农业有机废弃物能源化对化学农业负外部性纠正研究

针对化学农业的负外部性,利用能值理论建立了基于农业生态需求的农业外部性分析模式。理论分析表明,在兼顾粮食产量目标时,农业有机废弃物能源化、生态化可以从源头纠正化学农业的负外部性。以涟水县高沟镇为例的实证分析表明,通过60%的化肥替代,农业有机废弃物能源化可以纠正85.49%的化学农业负外部性。较之“税费”“标准”“行政监管”等手段,通过产业政策手段将农业补贴政策聚焦于农业有机废弃物能源化生态补偿是一种科学性与现实性较强的政策选择。     

Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis

The decision to allocate policy jurisdictions to different levels of government is related to a number of trade‐offs between the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized provision of public services. A trade‐off central to many discussions is that between the internalization of externalities under centralization versus an “accountability” advantage of decentralization. In this paper we formalize this trade‐off in the context of a class of principal–agent models known as common agency.     

Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination

The paper introduces trade into dynamic models with externalities and capital accumulation, and evaluates the efficiency of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. It considers mixed economies characterized by a blend of strategic and nonstrategic sectors. Also, there are two sources of interdependence: the existence of production externalities and the endogenous determination of market prices. It is shown that policy coordination is not needed when preferences are the same. In this case, the production externalities are internalized, so that an inefficient solution becomes the efficient integrated world equilibrium due to trade.     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

“More is less”: the tax effects of ignoring flow externalities

Using a model of non-linear, non-monotone decay of the stock pollutant, and starting from the same initial conditions, the paper shows that an optimal tax that corrects for both stock and flow externalities may result in a lower tax, fewer cumulative emissions (less decay in emissions) and higher output at the steady state than a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality. This “more is less” result emphasizes that setting a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality, or imposing a corrective tax at too low a level where there exists only a stock externality, may affect both transitory and steady-state output, tax payments and cumulative emissions. The result has important policy implications for decision makers setting optimal corrective taxes and targeted emission limits whenever stock externalities exist.     

Socially responsible investment in an environmental overlapping generations model

One of the problems associated with the conservation of the environment is that short-lived individuals fail to account for the long-term effects of pollution, which implies that future generations bear the costs imposed by the current generation. Such inter-generational externalities are usually tackled by (Pigovian) taxes, fiscal policy or environmental regulation. Alternatively, we propose that socially responsible investment funds create a role for the stock market to deal with intergenerational environmental externalities. We analyze the role of the stock market in an environmental overlapping generations model of the Diamond-type, in which agents choose between investing in “clean” government bonds or “polluting” firm equity. We show that although socially responsible investors are short-lived, the forward-looking nature of stock prices can help to resolve the conflict between current and future generations.     

Insurance,self-protection,and the economics of terrorism

This paper investigates the rationale for public intervention in the terrorism insurance market. It argues that government subsidies for terror insurance have the effect of discouraging self-protection and limiting the negative externalities associated with self-protection. Cautious self-protective behavior by a target can hurt public goods like national prestige if it is seen as “giving in” to the terrorists, and may increase the loss probabilities faced by others by encouraging terrorists to substitute toward more vulnerable targets. We argue that these externalities in protection are essential for normative analysis of government intervention in insurance markets and may also explain why availability problems in this market have engendered much stronger government responses than similar problems in other catastrophe insurance markets.     

Gender Bias in Education: the Role of Inter-household Externality, Dowry and other Social Institutions

We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two‐period model where women become part of extended families of their in‐laws. Each family decides how many sons and daughters are sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to internalize inter‐household externalities. “Groom‐specific” dowry worsens the situation. Under “bride‐specific” dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory “food‐for‐education” policy is shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment.     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

On Clustering in the Location of R&D: Statics and Dynamics

Empirical analyses of research and development find strong evidence that these activities tend to cluster geographically. Clusters are thought to emerge from the presence of localized positive externalities. This paper presents a model of this clustering behaviour. We find that phase changes in clustering exist both as the strength of local externalities changes and as the degree of heterogeneity among firms changes. The dynamics of the system are examined as it responds to shocks to the size of the market for R&D output, and the length scale of the spatially dependent externalities. Dynamic responses take place in two distinct stages: a rapid response to the change in market systems which takes place throughout the space, with litlle regard to externality effects; followed by a slow re-agglomeration process as producers change their spatial decisions to lower the costs of the new production level.     

Family Policies: What Does the Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?

Very few studies have explored the optimality properties of the “standard model” of fertility where parents must determine their optimal trade‐off between quality and quantity. The present paper works to fill that gap and find three main results. First, when there exist positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital, it is optimal to subsidize education and to tax births. Second, when the Social Welfare Function does not consist of the average utility, the social returns on educational investments can be weaker than the private returns when the optimal population growth rate is negative. In this case, the optimal economic policy consists in subsidizing births and taxing education. Finally, when the health expenditure is introduced as another source of positive externalities, it can be optimal to tax the parental health expenditure to decentralize the first‐best path even if this expenditure is always too low at the laissez‐faire equilibrium.     

Real-World Economics Today:The New Complexity,Co-ordination and Policy

More realistic economics has to start out from the most basic socio-economic phenomena and processes, i.e. dilemma-prone interdependencies and strong uncertainty among agents that have become ubiquitous phenomena in the world today. In the reality of the “new” economy these are represented by functional and spatial fragmentation of value-added chains, global de-regulation and disembedding of the most powerful economic agents, on one hand, and increasing complexity and high integration of goods and services and net-based tele-IC-technologies on the other hand. All these rather new phenomena entail ubiquitous actual or potential co-ordination failure, either in the form of conventional “market failure”, with a complete mutual blockage of action, or of “wrong” co-ordination, or technological “lock-in”. Both forms are indicative of an insufficient capacity of the co-ordinated action required. In contrast, capability of sustainable innovative action in a broad sense requires new forms of co-ordination beyond “market” and “hierarchy”. Economics thus has to be defined more than ever as a science of effective co-ordination and the generation of innovative and sustainable collective action capacity. The global corporate economy has developed individualist arrangements to cope with that new co-ordination problem, such as local clusters and hub&spoke networks, which all have severe shortcomings. Against this background, the paper develops a setting with ubiquitous direct interdependencies, net-externalities, “strategic” strong uncertainty and ubiquitous (latent) social-dilemma problems. It discusses the possibility of an ideal decentralized and spontaneous co-ordination through emergent institutionalized collective action, specifically of “well-governed” network co-operation. In conclusion, it is argued that only a hybrid system of networks together with a new public policy role, supporting collective learning and emergent institutional co-ordination, i.e. an “interactive” and “institutional” policy approach, is capable of solving the co-ordination problems of the “new” economy.     

Paternalistic Capitalism

Brazil’s political-economic structure has rapidly evolved over the past decade, shedding its shallow policy alignment with neoliberalism of the 1990s. Brazil’s large, diversified industrial base was painfully constructed over the course of the twentieth century. A major and sustained political realignment, which began in 2003, has resulted in two essential thrusts in development policy: (i) a “growth with equity” strategy that has dramatically reduced poverty and inequality; and (ii) a state-led “industrial policy” designed to upgrade manufacturing and direct the accumulation process toward specific sectors, highlighting and consolidating the National Innovation System (NIS). Nonetheless, as a result of the commodity boom that swept through Latin America, Brazil’s natural resource sector achieved outsized growth from 2002 to 2012. One result has been a shift toward resource intensive activities and a broad opening to low-cost Chinese manufactures. Utilizing an institutionalist framework and method, this article analyzes the cohesion of the NIS and the emergence of the “deindustrialization” debate. Also, it assesses the instrumental nature of the “growth with equity” strategy. The article hypothesizes the viability of an endogenous “neo-developmentalist” strategy, while acknowledging the emergence of fundamental exogenous forces and structural ceremonial/institutional factors that have impeded the consolidation of a Brazilian social structure of accumulation.     

From Industrial Policy to Innovation Policy: Japan's Pursuit of Competitive Advantage*

Japan faces significant challenges in encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship. Attempts to formally model past industrial policy interventions uniformly uncover little, if any, positive impact on productivity, growth, or welfare. The evidence indicates that most resource flows went to large, politically influential “backwards” sectors, suggesting that political economy considerations may be central to the apparent ineffectiveness of Japanese industrial policy. Rather than traditional industrial or science and technology policy, financial and labor market reforms appear more promising. As a group, Japan's industrial firms are competitive relative to their foreign counterparts. Where Japan falls behind is in the heavily regulated service sector. The problems appear to be due less to a lack of industrial policy than to an excess of regulation. Japan may have more to gain through restructuring the lagging service sector than by expending resources in pursuit of marginal gains in the industrial sector.     

Politics with(out) Coase

Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper, we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results suggest that bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space, although desirable in an ideal world of zero-transaction costs, is almost unavoidably affected by bargaining externalities. Disaggregating the policy choices and voting in a one-dimensional policy space can reduce bargaining externalities and lead to median voter outcomes. Bargaining by a limited number of players in a median voter situation can achieve a social first-best. We show the equivalence between the outcomes of multiple independent voting in one-dimensional space and the hypothetical outcome of Coasian bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space.     

产业集群辨识方法综述

以产业集群内涵的厘清为基础,系统论述并评价了产业集群辨识中所运用到的各种方法,认为:专家意见法、产业感知法和企业访谈法都具有针对性强、能够收集难以统计的时新信息等特点,但依赖于专家等个体感性认知,系统数据收集困难,结论普适化受限;多元统计聚类法透视出产业间重要的依存关系,但部门全覆盖及产业在集群间截然分组不符实际;主成分分析法辨识结果相对理想,但数理解释牵强;Czamanski法逻辑严密,突出集群内部产业间的相互关联,但对支撑性部门雷同的集群处理待改善;共识集群法所体现出来的综合集成理念值得借鉴。最后总结,集群辨识宜继续开发共识集群法所提供的多种分析整合的做法,量化研究为主,定性修正为辅,同时应增加对空间维度的考虑。     

VOTING,LOBBYING, AND THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM

This paper revisits the well‐known fiscal “Decentralization Theorem” by relaxing the role of the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of policy uniformity. If, instead, decisions are made by majority voting, the theorem fails. Specifically, (i) centralization can welfare‐dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities and regions are heterogeneous and (ii) decentralization can welfare‐dominate centralization even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogeneous. Similar results are obtained if a benevolent government is subject to lobbying. Hence, the Decentralization Theorem is not robust to relatively minor deviations away from the benchmark of a purely benevolent government.     

Useful Government Spending and Macroeconomic (In)stability under Balanced-Budget Rules

It has been shown that an otherwise standard one‐sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a balanced‐budget rule that consists of fixed and “wasteful” government spending and proportional income taxation. However, the economy always displays saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness if the government finances endogenous public expenditures with a constant income tax rate. In this paper, we allow for productive or utility‐generating government purchases in either of these specifications. It turns out that the previous indeterminacy results remain unchanged by the inclusion of useful government spending. By contrast, the earlier determinacy results are overturned when public expenditures generate sufficiently strong production or consumption externalities. Our analysis thus illustrates that a balanced‐budget policy recommendation which limits the government's ability to change tax rates does not necessarily stabilize the economy against belief‐driven business cycle fluctuations.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

FOUR CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CONSTRAINED PARETO EFFICIENCY IN CONTINUUM ECONOMIES WITH WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES*

In continuum economies, widespread externalities are those over which each individual has negligible control. Nash-Walrasian equilibria with lump-sum transfers are defined, and their existence proved. They are then characterized by the property of “f-constrained Pareto efficiency” for finite coalitions. More general “private good” Nash-Walrasian equilibria are characterized as private-good constrained-Pareto efficient. Introducing complete Pigou taxes or subsidies leads to equilibria that are characterized by constrained efficiency and f-constrained efficiency for given levels of the widespread externalities. But full efficiency requires resolving the public-good problem of determining those aggregate externalities or, equivalently, of setting appropriate Pigou prices.