CAN UNIONS HURT WORKERS? A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY

This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has market power over wages. The presence of the union induces a social welfare maximizing government to implement a high level of immigration, leading to a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view but also from the workers' point of view. When interest group politics prevails and workers' ability to influence the policy-maker is strengthened by existence of the union, we show the conditions under which workers may benefit from the presence of the union.     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

Temporary and Permanent Immigration under Unionization

This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration.     

Impact of Chinese growth and trade on labor in developed countries

This paper examines the impacts of growth in China's economy and trade on the skill premium of labor in developed countries. We utilize a unique global dataset that disaggregates workers by occupations to identify impacts across labor categories with different skill sets, complementing the widely used GTAP Data Base in the CGE framework offered by the GTAP model. To study the impacts of China's fast-paced growth, we model the counterfactual, i.e., what if China grew and opened at a more modest rate; we then compare this baseline with China's actual growth. Results indicate that a strong rise in manufacturing exports from China to the US impacts output and employment in the US. The US shifts its production away from light manufacturing sectors to more service-oriented sectors that also tend to engage higher skilled labor. There is a small decrease in the real wages of unskilled labor and a rise in the real wages of skilled labor. Interestingly, not all categories of unskilled labor lose, rather those that are more directly linked with manufacturing sectors are impacted; unskilled ‘service and shop workers’ and the unskilled ‘agricultural workers, machine operators, assemblers, craft workers, and others’ observe a small decline in real wages, while the impact on unskilled ‘clerks’ is insignificant. For all categories of skilled workers, there is an increase in real wages primarily driven by the shift in production to services and high-skilled labor intensive categories, resulting in the rising skill premium. Hence disaggregating the labor data provides greater depth on the understanding of the differential impacts on domestic workers resulting from trade, and thereby guides policy on how these differential impacts can be smoothed through redistribution of benefits. Consistent with other study findings, there is a positive impact on overall growth and welfare in the US, EU and Australasia.     

Unions and Efficient Training

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm-level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum     

MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

Unions, monetary shocks and the labour market cycle

This paper provides a new growth model by considering strategic behaviour in the supply of labour. Workers form a labour union with the aim of manipulating wages for their own benefit. We analyse the implications on labour market dynamics at business cycle frequencies of getting away from the price-taking assumption. A calibrated monetary version of the union model does quite a reasonable job in replicating the dynamic features of labour market variables observed in post-war U.S. data.     

Public policy,footloose capital,and union influence

This document sets up a unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium model of countries, where capital is footloose and governments maximize utilitarian welfare. When capital owners have weak influence on public policy, there is unemployment and the governments compete for jobs, causing a distortion with suboptimal wages. Then globalization—as characterized by a decrease in impediments to international investment—increases the wage elasticity of capital flight, decreasing wages and increasing employment. This benefits the capital owners and the unemployed workers getting a job, but harms the other workers. International coordination of public policy alleviates these consequences of globalization.     

RESERVATION WAGES AND THE UNION JOB QUEUE: A SAMPLE SELECTION APPROACH

This paper uses a unique data set of unemployed semi-skilled workers to examine the relationship between reservation wages and the decision to queue for a union sector job. Estimation of selected reservation wage equations indicates that the failure of all previous estimates to model the queuing decision results in biased coefficients. Those workers who queue for a union job are subject to a distinct reservation wage formation process which differs from those not queuing. Moreover, a structural estimate of the queuing decision demonstrates that workers with the greatest differences between estimated reservation wages in the union and non-union sector are the most likely to queue. This estimate of the queuing decision stands as one of the few which focus on unemployed workers. Among other results, women and minorities are more likely to queue for union jobs, all else equal.     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

Duration of disability,job mismatch and employment outcomes

Workers with disabilities have functional limitations that affect their productivity in some, but not necessarily all, jobs. Workers who find a job that is a good match for their functional limitations (i.e. a job where their limitations have little or no impact on important job functions) should expect better employment outcomes (e.g. higher wages, longer job tenure) than workers with similar disabilities who are mismatched in their jobs. Merging data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation with O*Net data on job demands, we construct two continuous measures of job mismatch for workers with physical disabilities. We then extend the literature on disability and employment by exploring relationships between duration of disability, job mismatch, wages and hours worked. The results indicate that workers with long durations of disability are employed in jobs that are a better match to their physical limitations than are similar workers with shorter durations of disability. And, workers who are mismatched earn lower wages and work fewer hours than their counterparts whose jobs are a better match. Overall, the findings suggest that disability employment policies should include systematic efforts to help workers with disabilities find good job matches.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES

This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.     

AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non‐binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.     

Testing for uniform wage trends in West-Germany: A cohort analysis using quantile regressions for censored data

The rise of unemployment in West Germany is often attributed to an inflexibility of the wage structure in the face of a skill bias in labor demand trends. In addition, there is concern in Germany that during the 70s and 80s unions were pursuing a too egalitarian wage policy. In a cohort analysis, we estimate quantile regressions of wages taking account of the censoring in the data. We present a new framework to describe trends in the entire wage distribution across education and age groups in a parsimonious way. We explore whether wage trends are uniform across cohorts, thus defining a macroeconomic wage trend. Our findings are that wages of workers with intermediate education levels, among them especially those of young workers, deteriorated slightly relative to both high and low education levels. Wage inequality within age-education groups stayed fairly constant. Nevertheless, the German wage structure was fairly stable, especially in international comparison. The results appear consistent with a skill bias in labor demand trends, recognizing that union wages are only likely to be binding floors for low-wage earners.     

The Impact of Turnout on Turning Up: The Complementarity of Attendance among Co-Workers

This paper studies the effects of complementarities in work attendance on absenteeism. It investigates the case where workers, who turn up for work, cover the workload of absent colleagues. Thus, externalities arise from workers being absent from work. The effort workers exert in the workplace is negatively related to worker turnout. Attendance levels of workers are strategic complements, as workers are more likely to turn up when turnout is high. Firms increase wages and improve working conditions in response. In contrast to the more standard shirking literature, the firm sets employment levels higher. Workers may benefit from draconian firing rules.     

Education,training and employability

Two hypotheses are tested: (1) education and training increase the employability of workers at other tasks within the firm and reduce the need for help from supervisors when workers encounter small problems, and (2) greater employability and problem solving capability increase wages. The empirical results show that greater employability and problem solving capability are independent from each other. Formal work-related training increases employability. Workers in jobs requiring no induction training are less employable at other jobs or departments. Both general and specific human capital increase the ability of workers to solve problems on their own. Greater employability does not increase wages. Male workers who solve problems on their own earn more than men who need help from others. The effects of human capital variables on employability and problem solving capability do not differ between and men and women. However, it is found that the ability to solve problems on one's own has a pay off for men but not for women.     

How Does Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market Affect Unemployment Policies?

We consider a continuum of workers ranked according to their abilities to acquire education and two firms with different technologies that imperfectly compete in wages to attract these workers. The education cost to be borne by workers is higher in the high-technology firm. In equilibrium, we show that the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. We then study different policies that subsidize either education cost or wages. We found that the first-best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We analyze second-best nonselective policies and show that, in terms of welfare, subsidizing education costs or wages is strictly equivalent.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

The gender wage gap in Austria: eppur si muove!

We examine the change of the gender wage gap in Austria between 2002 and 2007 using Juhn et al. (Workers and their wages, AEI Press, Washington DC, pp 107–143, 1991) decomposition. We analyze data from Austrian tax records which we merge with social security records and Austrian micro-censuses of the years 2002 and 2007. We find that the gender wage gap declined from 21 % in 2002 to 18 % in 2007. The main determinant of this decline is the relative improvement of women’s unobserved characteristics. The decline of the gender wage gap is also due to women having attained more formal education and to a convergence of men’s and women’s returns to education. Women’s improved educational attainments were partly offset by a shift in the demand for skilled workers that disadvantaged unskilled workers, most of whom are women, resulting in a moderate decrease of the gender pay gap over these years. Robustness checks confirm our results.