Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of banking competition for capital markets and monetary policy. In particular, I develop a two-sector monetary growth model in which a group of agents is exposed to liquidity shocks and money is essential. Banks insure depositors against such risk and invest in the economy's assets. In this setting, I compare an economy with a perfectly competitive banking sector to an economy with a fully concentrated financial sector. Unlike previous work, banks can have market power in both deposits and capital markets. Compared to a perfectly competitive financial sector, I demonstrate that a monopolistic banking system can have substantial adverse consequences on capital formation, assets prices, and the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, multiple steady-states can emerge and the economy becomes subject to poverty traps. More importantly, market power in financial markets may overturn the Tobin effect present under a perfectly competitive financial sector. This necessarily happens in economies with high degrees of liquidity risk and low levels of capital formation.     

Measuring the degree of competition in Pakistan’s banking industry: an empirical analysis

Pakistan’s banking industry has gone through significant transformation from being in a heavily state regulated and controlled environment to a more liberalized market structure in recent years. This liberalization of banking industry in Pakistan has raised concerns over the dominant banks’ exercise of market power on account of increase in market concentration due to mergers and acquisitions, high profitability in banking sector and increasing interest rate spread. Present study therefore explicitly tests the market conduct of banks using quarterly panel data of 30 banks from 2004 to 2012 and employing Panzar–Rosse, Bresnahan–Lau, Hall–Roeger and Boone’s approaches to study market power. Our findings suggest that Pakistan’s banking industry is working in a competitive environment and we find little evidence for the exercise of market power by the dominant banks. Our results remain robust across all these approaches to measure market power. These findings indicate that the liberalization and deregulation of Pakistan’s banking industry has been successful in improving the competitive conditions in the market.     

The size distribution of the banking sector and the effects of monetary policy

In recent years, the industrial organization of the banking system has received a large amount of attention. In particular, it is generally viewed that the size distribution of the banking sector has changed where it is dominated by a small number of large institutions. In this paper, we develop a model of imperfectly competitive banks that differ in terms of the size of their deposit base. Such differences are important for aggregate credit market activity and the effects of monetary policy. Notably, we explain how the optimal size distribution of the banking system involves trade-offs from distortions in credit markets due to imperfect competition across banking markets. Second, the effects of monetary policy on credit market activity are weaker in an economy dominated by a small number of large banks. Empirical analysis examining the role of concentration among the current members of the European Monetary Union is consistent with the predictions of the model.     

Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation on Unemployment Dynamics

I use state-level banking deregulation in the U.S. to study the causal impact of credit expansion on unemployment through its effects on the average monthly job-finding and job-losing rates. State-level analysis shows that deregulation increased the average job-finding rate and decreased the job-losing rate, and thus led to a lower unemployment rate. I also find that deregulation decreased the average unemployment duration. Extending the analysis to industry-state level, I find that the impact of deregulation on the job-finding rate is positive, but does not show any pattern across industries with respect to their needs for external finance. However, deregulation reduced the average job-losing rate, and the reduction monotonically increases with industries’ dependence on external finance.     

BANK COMPETITION,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT,AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Income inequality rises with financial development initially and then drops. We reach this conclusion by numerically solving a heterogeneous agent model parameterized to the Chinese economy. The model features a banking sector with Cournot competition, and the process of financial development in the model economy begins with the deregulation of the banking sector. Based on regressions with the fixed effects and the system generalized method of moments, the empirical analysis also suggests an inverted‐U relationship between income inequality and financial development using provincial data from China. (JEL E25, G21, G28)     

银行业市场准入监管及其绩效的实证分析

比较各国银行业的市场准入监管可以发现,监管的严格程度大相径庭,但从根本上是保护竞争与限制竞争的原则差异。通过对各国银行业市场准入监管及其绩效的实证分析,发现严格的准入监管与银行发展、产业效率负相关,但与银行危机正相关。文章回顾中国银行业的市场准入监管后,认为放松准入监管将有助于我国银行业发展,并就提高放松准入监管绩效的路径进行了探讨。     

FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE RISK OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY*

In the early 1980s the Australian economy underwent a period of rapid financial deregulation and liberalisation, the key symbol of this process being the floating of the exchange rate in December 1983. It has been suggested that one effect of such regulatory change is to alter the risk characteristics of economic units most directly impacted by the changes. In this vein, Brooks and Faff (1995) examined banking industry risk and found that deregulation coincided with a stabilising of the beta risk of banks. However, financial deregulation was expected to have widespread effects across the economy. Accordingly, in this paper we further test for possible effects by examining the level and stability of the beta risk of individual stocks and portfolios in other industries in both prederegulation and post-deregulation periods. From a comparison of the two periods we find that the effects on beta levels vary across industries. However in general post-deregulation betas have become stable across a large range of key industry classifications. This provides interesting insights into the effects of financial deregulation on relative risk and why different industries may have different experiences.     

商业银行竞争与公司盈余管理*

本文以2007—2017年我国上市公司为研究样本，利用银保监会公布的商业银行在各城市开设分支机构的数据，构造地级市区域银行竞争指标，检验了商业银行竞争程度与公司盈余管理之间的关系。研究发现，银行业竞争性的市场结构能够有效降低企业盈余管理水平。对机制的考察表明，企业会计信息质量的提高得益于银行债权人治理作用不断加强。本文选择2009年银保监会放开银行设立分支机构限制的政策作为外生事件，并通过构造工具变量等方法进一步验证了研究结论。本文的结果从债权人的角度丰富了企业会计信息质量的文献，同时对银行竞争方面的研究做出了有益补充。     

Deregulation,innovative entry and structural diversity as a source of stable and rapid economic growth

The importance of free innovative entry (deregulation) for diversity of structure and competition is studied. I demonstrate quantitatively that even with a narrow definition of entry (firms), and given observed entry behavior, successful entrants completely dominate the long-run performance characteristics of the economy. Rapid and stable long-run macro economic growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous. Free access to markets alone is a necessary condition, with competence a sufficient condition. It is probably wrong to believe that the (ex ante) threat of entry is sufficient for dynamic competition. A growing economy requires a steady showering with optimistic entrants, a few of which turn out ex post to be superior performers. Failing and exiting firms are part of the innovation costs to society for steady and rapid economic growth. The benefits of financial innovations like junk bonds are to reduce barriers to competitive entry to make both successes and failures possible.     

An Endogenous Growth Model of a Financially Repressed Small Open Economy

The paper develops a monetary endogenous growth model of a financially repressed small open economy, characterized by curb markets, capital mobility, transaction costs in domestic and foreign capital markets, and a flexible exchange rate system, to analyze the impact of financial liberalization – interest rate deregulation and lower multiple reserve requirements – on growth and inflation. When the model is calibrated to match world figures, we find that interest rate deregulation enhances growth and reduces inflation in steady-state. For relatively smaller transaction costs in the curb market, the above result is, however, reversed. Under such circumstances, lowering the transaction costs in the foreign capital market tends to restore the growth-enhancing (inflation-reducing) capabilities of interest rate deregulation. Lower reserve requirements, though, always ensures lower (higher) steady-state inflation (growth).     

Finance and sources of growth: evidence from the U.S. states

How does financial development affect economic growth: through its impact on accumulation of physical and human capital or by boosting total factor productivity (TFP) growth? We use a new data set on output, inputs, and total factor productivity for the US states to study this question. Unlike previous cross-country research that tries to disentangle the channels through which financial development impacts growth, we use a plausibly exogenous measure of financial development: the timing of banking deregulation across states during the period 1970–2000. At the same time our new data set allows us to go beyond what was previously done in the state banking deregulation literature and identify whether finance impacts states’ input accumulation or TFP growth. We find, in line with existing cross-country studies, that deregulation boosts growth by accelerating both TFP growth and the accumulation of physical capital without having any impact on human capital. In contrast to the cross-country studies, we also find that the effects of deregulation are largely independent of states’ initial level of development; both rich and poor states grow faster after deregulation. Additionally, since our data set breaks down aggregate output into three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and the remaining industries, we are able to show that deregulation accelerates the growth of productivity in manufacturing. This last finding answers an important critique of the banking deregulation studies which asserts that observed growth effects may be coming from the growth of financial industry itself and not from the beneficial effect of finance on other industries, such as manufacturing.     

Capital controls,macroprudential regulation,and the bank balance sheet channel

We incorporate a banking sector with balance sheet frictions into a model of a small open economy and compare the effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential regulation. We show that the welfare-improving effect of capital controls is larger than that of macroprudential regulation if the degree of financial friction between domestic banks and foreign investors is high, while the welfare-improving effect of macroprudential regulation is larger than that of capital controls if the degree of financial friction is low. We also show that the welfare ranking of the two policies depends on whether an economy suffers from liability dollarization.     

Systemic Characteristics of Financial Instability

I describe how in the new paradigm of a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE), introduced in Falahati (2019), macroeconomic imbalances with fluctuating levels of liquidity emerge endogenously. This provides a solid foundation for studying Minsky’s views on financial instability in an economy with a banking and risk-underwriting system. I identify an inverse relationship between liquidity premia and risk premia, which leads to endogenous risk-premium rating cycles, including credit-risk-premium rating cycles, and macroeconomic swings. Ceteris paribus, lower liquidity increases the prices of contracts covering risks (e.g., credit default swaps), whist it decreases prices of all other assets. The opposite occurs with higher liquidity. I analyze operations of banks, risk-underwriters, and the State/Central Bank, and present a new theory of banking which improves current understandings. This theory explains how a banking system uses the floating capital of the economy more efficiently, while it also generates greater systemic risks, compared to an economy without banks. I show how the banking system can induce macroeconomic booms and busts and generate endogenous asset price bubbles and bursts. I highlight other systemic problems of the economy and derive their implications for improving the financial management of the economy and its institutions.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

Inefficiency in the Spanish Cooperative Banking Sector

This paper researches X-inefficiency and scale economies in Spanish cooperative banking between 1988 and 1996, using the stochastic cost frontier methodology. The Translog cost function, with three outputs and three inputs, is used to measure X-inefficiencies across time and size. During this period of time there is no important reduction in inefficiency levels, so deregulation and internationalization has little effect on the Spanish cooperative banking market. We can see that large cooperative banks are less inefficient than small ones, indicating that it would be convenient to increase the size of these kinds of banks in order to reduce inefficiencies in this sector. We also find scale economies during this period.     

Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model

Summary. This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in all respects, except for the organization of their financial systems: in particular, one has a competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition, the sources of inefficiencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit financed investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system. Received: September 20, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Regulatory reform and labour earnings in Portuguese banking

This study examines changes in union contracts and wage structure during and after the introduction of regulatory reforms (deregulation and privatisation) in the Portuguese banking sector. The main finding is that, despite a relative wage erosion detected in the contract data, banking workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium in the period 1985–2000, probably reflecting the increasing profitability of the industry and the rise in labour productivity. The evidence also shows that some specific groups benefited relatively more than others: the least skilled and educated workforce and male workers gained more from the regulatory reforms. However, this unequal sharing of the wage premium did not raise wage inequality across ownership groups in the industry. I thank Mark Stewart, Odd Rune Straume, Ian Walker and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. I am indebted to the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade for allowing the availability of data from Quadros de Pessoal. Financial support was provided by the Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia under the grant BD/SFRH/2000/1291.     

Household debt,macroprudential rules,and monetary policy

Today's Canadian economy features a historic high of household debt and persistently low growth rate. The average debt-to-GDP ratio has reached the level experienced in the U.S. just prior to the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we ask whether monetary policy should lean against the household indebtedness or macroprudential policies are better suited for the task. To provide a quantitative answer, we develop a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring a micro-founded banking sector. We estimate the model using Canadian data and conduct policy experiments. Our findings favor macroprudential approach to reining in indebtedness: using monetary policy that reacts to household debt increases inflation volatility and lowers borrowers' welfare, while using macroprudential policies such as lowering the loan-to-value ratio limit increases borrowers' welfare.     

Financial Crisis,Capital Outflows,and Policy Responses: Examples from East Asia

Financial crises seem to have become the norm rather than the exception since 1992. The author examines the impact of a crisis of confidence and resultant capital outflows from a small and open economy and the possible policy options in response to such outflows, using simple tools and definitions that will be familiar to any money and banking or intermediate macroeconomics student. Examples are drawn from the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), although the analysis remains pertinent to emerging economies in general.     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.