Banking Structure,Marketization, and Small Business Development: Regional Evidence From China

This paper provides an empirical examination of the regional banking structures in China and their effects on entrepreneurial activity. Using a panel of 27 provinces and four directly controlled municipalities from 1997 through 2008, we find that the presence of large banking institutions negatively correlates with small business development in local markets and that this negative relation is driven mainly by participation of large banks in the short‐term loan market. Rural banking institutions, in contrast, are found to promote regional entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, large state banks facilitate small business development in concentrated markets. When we interact measures of banking financing by state banks and rural banking institutions with a set of provincial‐level marketization indexes, we find that extensive marketization, factor market development and sophistication of legal frameworks mitigate the negative effect of large state banks on small business development. In provinces with advanced market development, efficient factor markets and favourable institutional settings, the positive effect of rural banking institutions on small business growth is even stronger.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

A Macro-Level Account of Money and Credit to Explain Gendered Financialization

ABSTRACT

The paper intervenes in the debate on macroeconomics, money, gender, and financialization. Generally, there is an omission in gender studies on gender-specific effects of monetary policy. Not only is there a blind-spot about the role of monetary policy in feminist political economy, there is equally a blind-spot in meso-level analysis which focus on the social construction of institutional mechanisms and the predatory market power of oligopolistic banks. Yet, monetary policy is neither neutral in the short-term nor long-term. Such policies have gender-differentiated effects on employment, income, consumption, savings which in turn have feed-back effects on economic growth. My intent is to focus on the changing role of monetary policy and highlight the omission in gender studies on financialization, as well as argue that the shift of the credit cycle to fictitious capital (future revenue) is one of the central explanatory variables in the predatory banking model of subprime lending. Yet, the financial crisis of 2007 did not usher in a normalisation of the credit and finance system. Exactly the opposite happened. Unconventional monetary policy continues to facilitate a credit system based on future claims which has gendered distributional effects, in the process increasing the wealth inequality on a global scale.     

Determinants of Interest Rate Pass-through for Emerging Market Economies: The Role of Financial Market Structure

It is essential for central banks to assess whether or not the pass-through from monetary policy rates to credit and deposit interest rates is complete in order to ensure price stability. In this article, we analyze interest rate pass-through process for emerging market economies. Since emerging market countries lack large panel data sets that are typically available for developed countries, it is hard to analyze the determinants of pass-through coefficients for emerging market countries. To overcome the data issue, we developed a country selection procedure that minimizes heterogeneity among the countries included in the analysis. Our findings indicate that banking sectors?? competition plays a more important role for emerging market countries than their developed counterparts.     

Risk-taking channel,bank lending channel and the “paradox of credibility”: Evidence from Brazil

If from one hand credibility is important for the conduct of monetary policy, on the other hand, greater credibility may eventually stimulate the creation of bubbles in the credit market and asset prices through the risk-taking channel, and as a consequence, bring to reality the “paradox of credibility”. The “paradox of credibility” is the new dilemma posed to central banking in the effort to conciliate monetary policy and banking regulation under inflation targeting regimes. Thus, the present work aims to: (i) analyze the impact of central bank actions and the macroeconomic environment on the risk perception of banks, and; (ii) analyze the influence of this risk perception of banks on the credit spread, considering both the credit channel and the risk-taking channel. Based on an econometric analysis, the work provides evidence about: (i) the “paradox of credibility” and the risk-taking channel; (ii) the influence of monetary policies on the risk perception of banks and, as a consequence, on the credit spread; (iii) the procyclical nature of banks in relation to economic activity, and; (iv) the adherence of the countercyclical indicator (called credit gap) proposed in Basel III for the Brazilian case.     

Incomplete interest rate pass-through under credit and labor market frictions

By introducing search and matching frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE model, we provide a novel explanation of the incomplete pass-through from policy rates to loan rates. We show that this phenomenon is ineradicable if banks possess some power in the bargaining over the loan rate of interest, if the cost of posting job vacancies is positive and if firms and banks sustain costs when searching for lines of credit and when posting credit vacancies, respectively. We also show that the presence of credit market frictions moderates the reactions of employment and wages to a monetary shock. Finally, we confirm the finding that pass-through incompleteness has limited short-term impacts on the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Sovereign Debt Management and the Transformation from Keynesian to Neoliberal Monetary Governance in Britain

ABSTRACT

Private financial markets are central to the implementation of monetary governance. This necessary integration of public and private finance means the way states govern must evolve with developments in financial markets. This article examines how the rise of liability management underpinned a shift to market-based banking and transformed the operation of monetary policy in Britain. It assesses the period of reform between 1967 and 1981 and what this meant for monetary governance. Political economy literature depicts this period as a shift to depoliticised, deregulated governance with public authority giving way to market power. This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it misconstrues the problem policymakers faced. The shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary governance came in response to the change in banking practice with the rise of liability management and a parallel money market. This underpinned an explosion of credit creation that the old system of monetary policy, organised around the Base Rate and ‘primary’ discount market could not fix. As a result, the monetary authorities had to render this new financial environment governable. The period should therefore be reassessed in terms of the capacities the state attempted to construct to conduct monetary governance.     

Credit creation under multiple banking regulations: The impact of balance sheet diversity on money supply

Since the recent financial crisis along with more concentration of banking supervision, we have stepped into a new regulatory regime where multiple regulations are at play simultaneously. In this paper, we study the collective impacts of multiple regulations on credit creation in a heterogeneous banking system. Each single regulation imposes a constraint on credit creation for each bank, while with multiple regulations, only the most stringent one plays the determinant role on money supply. For the homogeneous banking system with identical balance sheets, they share the same binding regulation. In contrast, for the heterogeneous banking system with diverse balance sheets, the binding regulation for each bank may be different from other's. Those banks, who are bound by different regulatory constraints from homogeneous banks, would bring about an overall reduction in money supply, because those binding regulations impose a lower capacity (compared with the one in the case of homogeneous banks) for the banks to extend their balance sheets in this condition. We put forward an agent-based model of commercial banks integrated with two processes: credit creation and fund transfer, to demonstrate the reduction effect. The results facilitate the understandings of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via banks and its interaction with prudential regulations.     

流动性过剩、法定存款准备与信用配给

本文旨在研究调整存款准备带来的信用配给问题,考虑银行对企业的监督机制,分析借贷市场均衡时调节法定存款准备率对利率、投资和经济增长等宏观变量以及经济主体的影响,利用模型检讨我国货币政策的实施,并进而提出完善我国货币政策实施的相关建议。     

Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of banking competition for capital markets and monetary policy. In particular, I develop a two-sector monetary growth model in which a group of agents is exposed to liquidity shocks and money is essential. Banks insure depositors against such risk and invest in the economy's assets. In this setting, I compare an economy with a perfectly competitive banking sector to an economy with a fully concentrated financial sector. Unlike previous work, banks can have market power in both deposits and capital markets. Compared to a perfectly competitive financial sector, I demonstrate that a monopolistic banking system can have substantial adverse consequences on capital formation, assets prices, and the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, multiple steady-states can emerge and the economy becomes subject to poverty traps. More importantly, market power in financial markets may overturn the Tobin effect present under a perfectly competitive financial sector. This necessarily happens in economies with high degrees of liquidity risk and low levels of capital formation.     

危机管理中美联储货币政策工具创新对我国的启示

为缓解本次危机对金融市场和实体经济的冲击,以美联储为代表的各主要央行推出大量以信贷宽松或数量宽松为特点的非常规货币政策,对危机中受损的常规货币政策传导渠道进行弥补,加强了各国央行的合作力度,有效缓解了危机带来的负面冲击。本文将集中研究美联储的货币政策工具的特点、效果,并总结对我国的启示,这也将有助于我国深入理解美联储即将采用的第二轮量化宽松货币政策的本质。     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

中国货币政策的区域效应研究——来自信用观点的解释

本文以货币政策的"信用观点"为理论前提,运用VAR模型对我国货币政策的区域效应进行了实证研究.分析结果表明,在我国直接融资还不发达、东、中、西部地区的银行体系特征还存在较大差异的现实背景下,中央银行统一的货币政策通过各地区的银行体系进行传导时,将通过影响各地区银行系统提供信贷的能力而影响各地区私人部门的信用可得性,从而导致各地区的经济发展水平体现出较大的差异,最终表现为货币政策的区域效应.为此中央银行必须实施差别化的货币政策和信贷政策以促进区域经济的协调发展.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

Monetary policy transmission under different banking structures: The role of capital and heterogeneity

This work deals with the transmission of monetary policy through the bank loan market, in the presence of a capital requirement regulation. Unlike standard models, based on the “representative bank” shortcut, we adopt the heterogeneous agents approach: this allows us to explicitly model the strategic interaction between well-capitalized and under-capitalized banks. The main results are the following. (I) The propagation of a monetary policy impulse through the loan market differs considerably, depending on the market structure: under monopolistic competition, strategic complementarity among well-capitalized banks leads to a “multiplier effect”; in the Cournot oligopoly framework, an effect of the opposite sign is at work, due to strategic substitutability. (II) Well-capitalized banks are more important, in shaping the adjustment following a monetary policy shock, than what is implied by their relative number over total; this fact strengthens the monetary policy effectiveness. This result holds under both monopolistic competition and oligopoly, although the interaction among banks, leading to such a result, differs across the two banking structures.     

货币政策能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放——基于宏观经济不确定视角的研究

本文研究在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放。首先,将货币政策引入考虑了宏观经济不确定性的银行资产组合模型中,论证货币政策、宏观经济不确定性与银行信贷资产配置的理论关系。然后利用我国181家银行2004—2018年的数据,检验在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具对银行小微企业信贷行为调控的作用效果。研究结果表明：宏观经济不确定性会抑制银行信贷行为。其中小微企业信贷占比较大的银行受到的影响更为显著。与数量型货币政策相比,价格型货币政策能够更显著地减轻不确定性对银行小微信贷的消极影响。其中银行同业拆借利率的调控效果最强。研究结论对于选择适宜的货币政策工具促进银行向小微企业信贷投放,化解经济不确定性对银行信贷行为的影响并助力小微企业发展等具有政策借鉴意义。     

市场规模结构、竞争程度与小微 企业关系型贷款*

本文研究了银行业竞争度与小微企业关系型贷款之间的关系，以及市场规模结构对该关系的影响。信息假说认为，由于信息不对称和代理问题，垄断增加了银行内部化关系型贷款的收益，关系型贷款与竞争度之间呈负相关。然而，越来越多的研究对信息假说提出了质疑。本文在数理推导的基础上，采用江苏省县域地区352家小微企业2011-2015年非平衡面板数据，运用Fractional Logit模型进行实证分析。研究结果表明：市场规模结构是决定竞争度与关系型贷款之间关系的重要因素，当信贷市场中大银行的市场份额占比较大时，银行竞争的加剧对关系型贷款是不利的；当市场中小银行的市场份额占比较大时，竞争的加剧有利于关系型贷款的发放。以往研究对于市场规模结构的忽视可能是导致不同研究结论存在巨大差异的重要原因。本文在此基础上，提出了完善金融基础设施等相关政策建议。     

Should Banks Be Banned From Creating Money? An Analysis From the Perspective of Hierarchical Money

We extend the concept of “hierarchy of money” to our current monetary and financial system based on fiat money, with monetary policy that is conducted through the sale and purchase of securities and credit intermediation by non-bank financial intermediaries. This exposes a feedback loop between the upper and lower level of the hierarchy, which allows for more than full use of otherwise dormant capital, but that also increases inherent instabilities manifested in asset booms and busts. From the perspective of hierarchical money, we find that the call to ban banks from creating money neglects the significant role of securities-based financing in the global financial markets at the lower level, as well as the money creation capacity of central banks at the highest level of the hierarchy. Moreover, the inherently expansive nature of the hierarchy of money contradicts the long-term feasibility of full-reserve banking.