反倾销应诉和诉讼中被忽略的几个问题

在以往的反倾销应诉和诉讼中，世贸组织反倾销协议中的“承诺”条款、地区产业化为国内产业条款、公共利益条款，以及实质阻碍损害等，未引起我国企业的足够重视，使我们在反倾销调查中经常陷入被动。本文将对这几个问题展开讨论，以期对我国企业的反倾销应诉和诉讼有所帮助。     

出口企业反倾销胜诉的会计障碍

在应对国外反倾销方面，我国存在两个问题：一是反倾销应诉率低，约在50％～70％之间：二是胜诉率低，不足30％。应诉不力很重要的原因是缺少反倾销会计信息支持系统，在时间非常紧迫的情况下，企业或相关产业的现行会计信息系统很难提供反倾销调查所需要的会计、财务及相关方面的信息资料。因此，我国企业反倾销存在着严重的会计障碍。     

我国反倾销的现状与对策

当前，国外对我国出口反倾销指控日趋增多，我国出口商品是国外反倾销的“众矢之的”，成为近年来国际反倾销案件最大的受害者，出口产品受到一些国际组织和国家反倾销指控高居全球之首，而且投诉的国家也由美国、欧共体等发达国家扩展到巴西、阿根廷、土耳其等发展中国家。经过多年来的努力，我国出口反倾销应诉率得到明显提高，应诉结果好转。     

中国反倾销会计现存问题及策略选择

本文首先分析了会计准则差异对反倾销应诉的影响,进而重点分析了中国在企业反倾销应诉中存在的会计问题,即反倾销应诉中相关会计资料准备不足,现有会计资料通用性差,缺少反倾销会计信息平台,相关专业人才匮乏,并提出了中国企业反倾销应诉中的会计支持对策。     

浅议我国反倾销应诉中存在的问题及会计支持

从根本上说,反倾销就是一项"拼会计、抠成本"的工作,一旦反倾销调查发起,涉及的就是会计的问题,从调查问卷的填写,到应诉证据的提出都跟会计有关.会计信息在反倾销提起、反倾销调查和反倾销应诉过程中,占有关键地位.企业反倾销应诉需要会计参与,需要会计准备或提供会计资料,进行会计陈述或会计举证,准备会计抗辩等等.因此,建立完备的反倾销会计信息系统,提供完整的反倾销应诉会计资料,将有助于提高中国企业在国际贸易中的竞争力,提高反倾销调查的应诉率和胜诉率.     

欧盟对华花岗岩反倾销案述评

欧盟对华花岗岩反倾销案以申诉方欧洲国际天然石产业联合会撤诉告终，是中国企业应诉欧盟对华反倾销的又一成功案例。本文一方面分析了本案取得胜诉的原因，另一方面，也指出了本案中依旧暴露出的在中国企业应诉欧盟反倾销指控时普遍存在的若干问题，并提出了解决问题的对策。     

论反倾销应诉的基金模式

近些年针对中国企业的反倾销愈演愈烈，如果纯粹按市场化方式操作，反倾销应诉过程中存在市场失灵。有鉴于此，本文提出了规避市场失灵的应诉基金模式，重点分析了确定应诉基金规模的依据、管理应诉基金的方法、企业利用应诉基金应对反倾销的策略以及应诉基金的功能和局限性等问题。     

企业应诉反倾销会计支撑体系结构研究

缺乏有效的会计信息支持是出口企业在应诉反倾销时胜诉率低的重要原因.如能构建基于应诉反倾销的会计支撑体系,则可增强企业应诉能力和应诉信心,从而提高企业应诉反倾销的成功率,最大限度地维护企业权益.本文试从应诉反倾销预警、成本核算管理、内部审计三个方面入手,对中国企业应诉反倾销会计支撑体系结构进行研究,并论述了三者之间的逻辑关系.     

中国应对美国反倾销案的策略选择

中国近年来日益受到美国反倾销的困扰,美国对华反倾销的焦点问题主要是:中国的非市场经济地位、市场导向产业、进口是否存在紧急情况、统一税率和分别税率、替代国的选取等。针对这些问题,中国企业在应诉美国反倾销案时,首先要有积极全面应诉、据理抗辩的态度,坚定长期博弈和赢取最优结果的信念,还要建立应诉工作小组,选聘有足够经验和能力的律师,等等。     

浅析我国企业频遭反倾销的原因及对策思考

20世纪90年代以来，由于对国际反倾销游戏规则十分陌生，而国内反倾销立法又不完善，因此国外反倾销的达摩克利斯剑频频高悬在我国企业头上，给我国对外贸易造成很大损失。本文试图从法律角度分析我国相关出口产业频频遭受以欧盟、美国为首的WTO成员国反倾销的原因，并在此基础上为我国出口企业加强对外反倾销应诉工作，完善国内相关法律制度出谋划策。     

Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.     

从效率优先到更加注重公平——改革开放以来我国在公平与效率关系上的演变

改革开放以来,我国在公平与效率关系的权衡上,经历了从"公平优先→兼顾效率和公平→效率优先,兼顾公平→初次分配注重效率,再分配注重公平→更加注重公平"的演变过程。     

How to talk to multiple audiences

Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.     

Committing to transparency to resist corruption

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.     

如何应对日本的贸易制裁

日本农水省近日正式宣布,从4月1日起到10月底,对所有进口农产品实施检疫管理;从4月23日起,对来自中国的大葱、鲜香菇及灯芯草三种农产品实施“紧急限制进口措施”。该措施规定,对于一定数据的上述进口农产品实施原税率,而对规定数字以外的上述农产品实施高额税率,最高税率可达260％。