分税制改革与中国地方政府的基础设施投资偏好*——基于财政激励假说的实证分析

已有文献认为,晋升政治激励是解释中国地方政府基础设施投资偏好的主要原因。但统计数据却表明,1995年以前基础设施资本存量增长速度与GDP增长速度是重合的,1995年以后基础设施资本存量的增长速度明显超过了GDP增长速度。由于改革以来晋升政治激励并未发生变化,因此已有文献无法解释1995年前后两个时期里为何出现基础设施增长模式的差异。本文提出的财政激励假说认为,分税制改革所带来的财政激励变化,是导致地方政府投资在1995年以后变得偏好于基础设施的主要原因。笔者利用省级面板数据对上述假说进行了检验,发现财政激励假说可以很好地解释分税制改革前后地方政府基础设施投资偏好的变化。这意味着进一步完善分税制对改进地方政府的支出偏好是至关重要的。     

中国基础设施超常规发展的土地支持研究

过去20多年,中国基础设施获得超常规发展,现有文献主要强调政治激励影响。而本文发现,土地制度结构变迁是一个重要线索,中国基础设施超常规发展是土地制度结构变迁的一个可以解释的结果。本文在理论上证明,在一个政治集权经济分权以及土地公有制的经济体,除政治经济激励外,地方官员通过调控土地出让价格所形成的自我融资机制是影响一个地区基础设施最优供给量的主要因素,而该机制能否形成取决于一国的土地制度结构,这有助于从理论上解释中国与其他发展中国家存在的基础设施差别。在实证上,我们采用省级面板数据发现,土地支持假说成立。本文的工作意味着,中国基础设施的"以地谋发展"模式确实为其超常规发展贡献了主要力量,但由于该模式自身的一些缺陷,目前正面临着重要转型,出路是土地制度改革和新型城镇化建设。此外,在"一带一路"战略下,中国基础设施建设的经验具有复制推广以及帮助发展中国家消除基础设施瓶颈的更广泛意义。     

企业寻租与政府竞争行为变异

政府竞争是全球范围内普遍存在的一种现象,也是当代中国府际关系的重要内容.政府竞争常用手段就是影响和改善投资环境.世界银行的研究表明,如果没有其他影响投资地点的因素,企业多半会选择在低成本、低经营风险、低竞争壁垒的优良投资环境进行投资.研究报告表明,政府在提供公共物品、支持基础设施建设以及减轻其他市场失灵等方面发挥着重要作用.     

政府生产性支出与中国的实际经济波动

中国过去的宏观经济实践显示出政府对生产性财政支出政策的强烈偏好,在涉及基础设施等公共资本的生产性支出方面更是着意倾斜。本文将政府生产性支出纳入生产函数,构建存在不完全竞争的动态随机一般均衡模型,研究了政府生产性支出对中国经济增长和经济波动所造成的影响。研究表明:(1)利用贝叶斯估计得到的公共资本产出份额大约为10%,同时表明政府支出确实会造成生产的外部性;(2)政府生产性支出冲击是产出波动的重要影响因素,该冲击能解释约23%的总产出波动;(3)政府生产性支出冲击对居民消费和私人投资造成了短期"挤出"效应,长期"挤入"效应,另外该冲击有利于促进经济体系资本持续性积累。     

论对外开放与分权改革的互动

已有的研究认为,中国改革开放30年来之所以能够在经济转型和增长方面创造出"中国奇迹",是由于分权改革发挥了重要的作用.本文认为,分权改革自身并不一定产生出"趋好的竞争","中国奇迹"的取得是对外开放与分权改革形成良性互动的结果.但是对外开放并不能从根本上消除分权改革所造成的负面影响,因而调整分权改革政策,重构中央政府和地方政府之间的关系是延续"中国奇迹"的必然举措.     

中央政府和地方政府投资行为博弈分析

笔者通过数据实证分析了20世纪80年代到90年代,中国中央政府与地方政府在基础设施投资行为上发生的变化,并且用博弈模型解释了这种现象产生的原因是政府投资行为适应性的结果,探讨了中央政府如何通过最优基础设施投资补贴率来加强投资调控能力和提高投资调控效率;特别指出了在中央政府支配资金相对不足的情况下,实现基础设施投资最优的方法与途径,并给出相关投资政策措施的理论解释和政策建议.     

新利率定价机制下地方政府性债务风险防范的实证研究——以内蒙古自治区为例

"十五"时期以来,在投资拉动下各地经济发展势头强劲,我国经济社会深入转型发展,工业化、城镇化、信息化和农业现代化稳步推进。投资对地区经济增长贡献也逐步提高,政府投资公共基础设施建设客观上刺激了债务融资需求,累积债务规模也进一步膨胀。我国地方政府性债务是经过多年形成的,在加快基础设施建设、推动经济社会发展、提高公共服务水平、弥补地方财力不足等方面起到了重要作用。但政府性债务持续扩张以及举债、使用、管理制度不完善,也累积了一定风险和隐患。各级各地政府应充分吸取"欧洲主权债务危机"和"拉美危机"教训,采取有效措施,加强债务管理,进一步完善财政预算管理体制,防范和化解财政经济运行风险。     

地方政府行为——资本深化和经济波动的另一种解释

本文从地方政府行为角度着手分析地方政府行为影响资本深化和经济增长的微观传导机制,并解释中国改革以来资本深化的原因及其过程中的投资效率变化,通过一个包含地方政府行为,资本深化和金融发展的动态框架分析了这种资本深化对经济增长和经济波动的影响。经验证据表明地方政府通过进入管制和信贷干预影响了资本深化路径,进而影响了投资储蓄转化机制,最终影响了经济波动,以及经济增长的长期趋势。宏观调控和财政改革的影响亦能在本文框架内得到较好的解释。     

地方政府建设开发区:左顾右盼的选择?

开发区重复建设、无序扩张是长期以来困扰中国经济持续健康发展的重要问题.文章基于2004?2014年100个城市数据,采用空间面板模型,以国家级经开区为例从空间策略互动视角考察了地方政府热衷推动开发区建设的行为动机.研究发现:(1)中国地市级政府在建设开发区上会充分参考"邻居"城市的行为作出自身决策,并且这种空间效应在地理距离相近的同级城市间更为显著.具体而言,如果地理邻近城市平均建设10个新的开发区,本市往往会相应建立5个开发区.(2)相对东部来说,中西部城市间在建设开发区上的空间策略互动更强,并受到经济发展水平、产业结构、基础设施、人力资本等因素的影响.(3)进一步的经验检验表明,财政分权和中央政府主导下的政绩考核带动了地方政府招商引资的空间竞争,强化了地方政府推动建设开发区上的策略互动.文章的研究发现在一定程度上反映和解释了"开发区热"的本质特征,揭示了地方政府合作困境的根源.由此,应从政绩考核体制、财税体制、地方债务管理体制等方面采取有效的改革措施,严格控制地方政府过度建设开发区的盲目竞争行为.     

农村基础设施公共投资的区域差距测度——基于回归的分解方法

农村基础设施公共投资对农业增长有重要作用,但也在一定程度上影响了区域差距的形成。我国的东部、中部和西部地区在农村基础设施公共投资方面的差距较大。通过基于回归的方差分解,运用1994～2009年的我国省级面板数据,研究发现我国农村间的区域差距,能够被农村基础设施公共投资上的差异所部分解释。要加大对西部地区的农村基础设施公共投资以改善当前我国农村区域差异过大的现状,倘若政府持续执行沿海侧重型的投资发展策略,则区域差异将有进一步恶化的趋势。为此,必须提高财政对农村基础设施的投资水平,尤其加大对中西部农村的投资,并改革农村基础设施的投资制度,促进投资主体的多元化。     

How a race to the bottom can make you fat

This article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the United States through education and health spending. We hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms results in lower business tax revenues and higher public infrastructure spending which crowds out education and health spending leading to an increase in obesity rates. We empirically test this hypothesis. We find that there is significant fiscal competition to attract firms. Next, we show that when business tax revenues are lowered and public infrastructure spending favouring businesses increased, public health and education spending declines and obesity rates significantly increase. Thus, fiscal competition significantly contributes to obesity rates through the education and health spending channel.     

Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?

This paper studies the links between public spending, governance, and outcomes. We examine the role of governance–measured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy–in determining the efficacy of public spending in improving human development outcomes. Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between public spending, governance and outcomes, and helps explain the surprising result that public spending often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. We show empirically that the differences in the efficacy of public spending can be largely explained by the quality of governance. Public health spending lowers child mortality rates more in countries with good governance. Similarly, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education attainment in countries with good governance. More generally, public spending has virtually no impact on health and education outcomes in poorly governed countries. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development effectiveness of public spending. The lessons are particularly relevant for developing countries, where public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often poor.     

Algeria: A three-sector macrofiscal model for debt sustainability and growth policy analysis

In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model to address the macrofiscal vulnerabilities and the effects of fiscal policy on growth and employment in Algeria. We first discuss the baseline scenario over the period 2021–2040. According to our baseline results, without fundamental changes in fiscal policies, even relatively high growth will not be sufficient to put public debt on a sustainable path. We then conduct four experiments and assess their impact on fiscal accounts, growth, and unemployment: an increase in the efficiency of public spending on infrastructure investment, a gradual reduction in the share of noninterest government spending in GDP, the same gradual reduction in spending combined with a permanent increase in the share of investment in infrastructure in total noninterest government expenditure, and a composite fiscal reform program that combines these individual policies, respectively. The results suggest that public debt sustainability can be achieved, and growth and employment can be promoted, as long as an ambitious fiscal reform program involving tax, spending, and governance reforms is implemented. Importantly, our quantitative analysis shows that, with a well-designed fiscal program, there may be no trade-off between fiscal consolidation and economic growth.     

Decentralization and sectoral expenditures in Europe

This article presents an empirical analysis of the recent impact of fiscal decentralization in Europe on total expenditure for specific government functions as well as on total government size. A panel data set for the years 2000–2009 for European countries has been constructed from EUROSTAT data. The effects of decentralization interact with the degree of vertical imbalances and tend to be negative as predicted by the Leviathan view of government. Effects vary strongly across government functions and are strongest in relative terms for social spending and infrastructure. Moderate restraining effects are found for education, while health spending is not significantly affected. This is consistent with competition between subnational entities, which try to attract taxpayers and shift expenses away from policies that benefit neighbouring jurisdictions.     

Corruption and growth: The role of governance,public spending,and economic development

This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy.     

In Search of Fiscal Interactions: A Spatial Analysis of Chinese Provincial Infrastructure Spending

Using a dataset for 31 Chinese provinces from 1998 to 2006, this paper provides a spatial Durbin panel analysis to test for fiscal interactions among China's provinces in their public spending on infrastructure. We find significant positive interactions across Chinese provincial governments. Further analysis attempting to distinguish between the possible sources of such fiscal interactions reveals evidence of expenditure competition instead of yardstick competition.     

The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends on both the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model with an analysis of the competitive effects of campaign spending limits. We show that under some conditions spending caps can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections.     

Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance Expenditure: Optimal Allocation Rules in a Growing Economy

This paper studies the allocation of public expenditure between infrastructure investment and maintenance in an endogenous growth framework. In the basic model, maintenance spending affects both the durability and efficiency of public capital. The balanced growth path is derived and transitional dynamics associated with a revenue-neutral increase in expenditure on maintenance are analyzed. The model is then extended to account for the possibility that public spending on maintenance affects also the durability of private capital. The growth-maximizing tax rate and share of infrastructure investment are calculated in both cases. First- and second-best welfare-maximizing solutions are also discussed.     

财政分权下地方政府卫生支出的竞争行为研究

分权体制框架下地级市政府在制定医疗卫生支出决策时往往会受到相邻城市相关策略的影响,从而引发城市间政府卫生支出的策略互动行为.文章选取了2007?2013年中国283个城市面板数据,运用动态空间面板模型检验了分权体制下地市级政府卫生支出的策略互动行为,并揭示出财政分权及其城市间空间策略互动对政府卫生支出的影响.研究发现,地市级政府在政府卫生支出上存在显著的互补型策略互动,这种效应在地理距离相近的同省区城市间更为显著.进一步分析发现,财政分权促进了政府卫生服务供给;而无论是短期还是长期,地市级政府间财政分权的策略互动对政府卫生支出产生明显的抑制作用,从而较好地解释了政府卫生支出比重徘徊不前的原因.由此,积极利用竞争、激励机制以及实现财政体制安排的优化变革来引导政府的卫生服务供给将是重要的政策选择.     

Health and infrastructure in a model of endogenous growth

This paper studies the optimal allocation of government spending between infrastructure and health (which affects labor productivity as well as household utility) in an endogenous growth framework. A key feature of the model is that infrastructure affects not only the production of goods but also the supply of health services. The rate of time preference is also endogenously related to health outcomes. The first part considers the case where health enters as a flow in production and utility, whereas the second focuses on a “stock” approach. Growth- and welfare-maximizing rules for income taxation and the allocation of public spending are derived.