中国地区间财政能力差异的度量及地区分解——基于地区间公共支出成本差异的视角

本文基于地区间公共支出成本差异的视角,引入人均公共支出成本的变量,采用加权变异系数对中国地区间财政能力差异进行度量,认为中国地区间财政能力差异小于地区间财力差异;并采用Theil系数对地区间财政能力差异进行地区分解。得出的结论为：东部地区内部的差异和东中西部地区间的差异是构成中国地区间财政能力差异的主要因素;地区间经济发展水平的差异、曾经的区域性税收优惠政策、包干制财政体制、分税制财政体制的收入划分办法和转移支付办法是导致地区间财政能力差异的重要原因。进而提出逐步扩大增值税的征收范围,建立以一般性转移支付为主的财政转移支付制度等政策建议。     

The co-evolution of tax evasion,social capital and policy responses: a theoretical approach

The dynamic model presented in this paper intends to account for the evidence, which appears to be particularly significant for Italy, of the incidence of tax evasion in a certain region being negatively correlated with the level of social capital existing in that region. Besides including social capital among the determinants of tax evasion, we extend the model so as to incorporate a mechanism whereby the existing volume of opportunistic behavior—which is proxied by the level of tax evasion—has negative effects on the formation of new social capital, thus helping to explain how regional differences in the endowment of social capital and in the incidence of tax evasion co-evolve and why they tend to be highly persistent. The model seeks also to capture the fact that in a democracy the political determination necessary to effectively repress tax evasion depends on the voters’ propensity toward the phenomenon. Hence, one should expect that–in areas where a relatively large (small) number of citizens are tax cheaters—the consensus in favor of tough policies against tax evasion tends to be weak (strong) and short (long) lasting. Consistently with this intuition, the model shows that regions where social capital is relatively low and tax evasion is relatively high can do better in the long run (i.e., they can reach a steady state characterized by a higher level of social capital and a lower level of tax evasion) when tax-enforcement policies are determined at the national level rather than at the regional level. The opposite holds for regions where social capital is relatively high and tax evasion is relatively low.     

Identifying Laffer Bounds: A Sufficient‐Statistics Approach with an Application to Germany

We derive a simple sufficient‐statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax‐transfer system is second‐best Pareto efficient. If it is not, then it is beyond the top of the Laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self‐financing. The test depends on the income distribution, extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, and income effect parameters. A tax‐transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income. We apply this test to the German tax‐transfer system, and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out.     

我国区际产业转移与产业结构优化升级实证研究

基于2007—2016年中国30个省份的面板数据,从产业结构合理化和产业结构高级化两个维度实证检验区际产业转移对产业结构优化升级的影响及区域异质性。研究结果表明:区际产业转移显著促进了地区产业结构的合理化,但是短期内抑制了产业结构高级化。分区域的结果说明,区际产业转移对我国中部地区的产业结构合理化有显著的促进作用,对西部地区的影响暂不显著,区际产业转移对中西部地区的产业结构高级化都产生了一定的阻碍作用。此外,人力资本水平对产业结构优化升级未产生显著作用。最后,基于研究结果提出关于区际产业转移与产业结构优化升级的对策建议。     

人口流动性、公共收入与支出--户籍制度变迁动因分析

本文分析了人口流动性的内生决定 ,以此解释中国户籍管理政策变迁的动因。文章表明 ,分权框架下的区际竞争将推动政府降低人口流动成本。一般而言 ,集权 ①框架下的最优流动性水平普遍低于分权框架下的流动性水平。与我国近 2 0年来户籍政策变化相一致的是 ,跨区劳动力配置需求的上升增加了户籍管制的效率损失成本 ,将推动人口流动成本下降。我们认为 ,除了协调地方公共品供给外部性、限制地区间税收竞争以最大化税收收入这两个基本原因之外 ,我国户籍管制的另一个特殊原因是便于执行地区差别政策。而设置流动成本的效率性取决于政府目标与社会福利最大化的一致性程度。     

Optimal Income Taxation and International Labour Mobility

This paper considers how a linear income tax should be set optimally when individuals are internationally mobile. The optimum tax analysis is founded on a social welfare function where each individual counts in the social welfare according to residence time in the home country. The discussion of the optimal income tax is organized from two perspectives. The first relates to the optimum income tax when a uniform lump sum transfer is used, while the second concerns the optimal rate of tax when a transfer is used which depends on time of residence in the taxing jurisdiction.     

税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为

中国财政分权体制下的地区间招商引资竞争广泛存在。本文通过一个纳入经济集聚因素的新古典投资决策计量模型,考察了税收激励对投资地域选择的影响。研究发现目前在中东部地区经济集聚可为地方财政带来一定的集聚租金,这使地区间税收激励政策呈现为差异化竞争策略;投资的流动性、地区经济基础、投资的产权性质等均对地区的税收激励政策选择有重要影响。本文的研究意味着,实现区域均衡发展需要构建稳定的地区间财力分享制度、改善欠发达地区的产业发展基础。     

PUBLIC FINANCE AND REGIONAL ACCOUNTS*

This paper discusses the problems that arise in the regional allocation of public sector accounts. These problems arise mainly in connection with the regional allocation of government expenditures on a governing rather than a procurement basis, and in the derivation of a meaningful surplus or deficit. The latter in turn requires an examination of the real geographic incidence of government revenues—to avoid, for instance, the assignment of the whole tobacco tax to Virginia and North Carolina. The use of a procurement basis for government product and the real geographic distribution of direct tax incidence for government revenue would produce a more complete and meaningful regional surplus or deficit measure, and gross regional products will not be as subject to spurious inter-regional variation.     

Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocation Payments in Financing Rail Noise Abatement Programmes: Results from a Stated Choice Valuation Study in Italy

The paper examines the use of stated choice experiments (SC) to assess the economic value of alternative rail noise reduction interventions on the Brennero railway in Italy. The paper formally tests the econometric robustness of the SC estimates under three payment regimes: (a) a regional tax, where consumers must trade off welfare gains due to noise reduction for part of their income; (b) a transport tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the public transport sector; and (c) an administration tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the administration sector. The test results are varied. On the one hand, the SC estimates are found to be statistically different for the tax reallocation and the tax introduction regimes. This confirms previous valuation research results, and thus reiterates the hypothesis that states the inequality between marginal values of private income and public money. On the other hand, the SC estimates are not found to be statistically different for the two proposed tax reallocation regimes, suggesting that, in the case study investigated here, the marginal value of public money does not depend upon the budget source.     

The Feasibility of the Double‐Dividend Hypothesis in a Democratic Economy

The two dividends in the double‐dividend hypothesis are assumed to be independent. This assumption can be misleading when it comes to formulating policy. I construct a model where the pollution tax rate is voted for by heterogeneous people. In addition to the revenue‐recycling effect, the equilibrium pollution tax rate depends on two opposite forces: the tax‐cutting effect and the profit effect. The two forces show that an instrument that exploits a greater revenue‐recycling effect can cause a more severe environmental deterioration, thereby resulting in the infeasibility of the hypothesis. The introduction of the interdependence between the two dividends can also mean that non‐revenue‐raising instruments are more efficient than revenue‐raising instruments.     

Incentives and income taxation: the implementation of individual revenue requirement functions

Consider an economy where a fixed amount of revenue is to be raised, perhaps to finance a public good, by a tax on income. The only two goods in the economy are labour (or capital) and a consumption good, and workers are differentiated by only one parameter. A map describing ability to pay, from the agent types to tax liability, is given. Under what conditions on preferences can such a map be implemented by an income tax, in the sense that each agent pays exactly what is desired, after all behavioural adjustments? We find sufficient conditions on preferences and the map, as well as necessary conditions. The only restriction on tax functions is that they be measurable; bunching and gaps are allowed. Applications to both normative and positive public finance are discussed.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

ON THE CONSUMPTION TAX AND THE TAX TREATMENT OF BEQUESTS IN DIFFERENT MODELS OF BEQUEATHING BEHAVIOUR*

The tax treatment of bequests under the consumption tax policy is studied in two models of bequeathing behaviour, a model where the parent cares about the bequest itself and a model where the parent cares about the welfare of his offspring instead. It is shown that the two models make precisely opposite predictions of the effects of the consumption tax including the conditions under which the tax is neutral, the differential incidence of the tax in a closed economy when it is non-neutral, and the international transmission effect of the tax when it is non-neutral.     

Effects of tax benefits on the price elasticity of charitable contributions in South Korea

Using South Korean panel data from 2008 to 2019 and censored quantile regression method, this study calculates the effects of different tax incentives on charitable contributions. We observe price elasticity under two different tax-benefit systems in South Korea and find that, first, taxpayers tend to be more sensitive to tax incentives under a tax deduction system than a tax credit system. The price elasticity gap between a tax deduction and tax credit is approximately −2.3 to −1.0. Second, we show the existence of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ behaviour: the price elasticity of charitable contributions exhibits a convex shape, where more significant donors have lesser reactions to tax incentives. We further show that socioeconomic contexts, such as income, gender, marital status, and education, affect people's attitudes. In sum, the results are as expected: tax deductions work more efficiently than tax credits.     

The Role of Central Government in Tax Competition Between Heterogenous Regions

This paper analyzes the role of central government in a Nash tax competition between two heterogenous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors. Regional governments use a source-based unit tax on mobile capital to finance their public service expenditures. The central government employs excise subsidies and lump-sum taxes to induce the two regions to efficient resource allocations. We answer to the question that whether the central government can induce an efficient equilibrium, and investigate the effects of endowments difference on the optimum subsidy rates. We find that there exists a unique tax rate under which the efficiency is achieved. We identify the set of endowment allocations for which the subsidy rate to one region is higher (or lower) than the subsidy rate to the rival. The large poor region receives a higher subsidy than the small rich region, but the subsidy to the small poor region may be higher or lower than that to the large rich region. [H2]     

碳税对我国区域经济发展的影响

从基本的投入-产出模型出发,运用2007年地区投入产出表以及各省统计数据,按照消费者责任原则,在考虑地区间贸易因素的情况下,对我国东、中、西部样本地区的碳排放量进行了估算,得出不同碳税水平下样本地区的税负水平。结果表明:与中、西部地区相比,东部发达地区大部分产业部门的碳排放强度较低,生产技术水平相对较高;不同碳税水平下各地区税负有较大差别;随着碳税水平的提高,地区(如西部)越不发达,税负增幅越大,所承受的税负越重,进而导致区域经济发展不平衡。为此,合理选择碳税水平对统筹我国区域经济协调发展非常必要。     

Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.     

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads.     

Regional policy implications from inter-regional input–output tables: a comparison of two UK inter-regional tables

Two inter-regional input–output tables for the UK are used to consider three questions relating to regional policy. The two regions considered are Scotland and The Rest of the UK (RUK). It is shown that the feedbacks from RUK to the Scottish economy are of the order of 3.5%. The paper demonstrates that expenditures by government (amongst others) will have different total effects depending on the location of the initial injection. Finally, the paper shows that the input–output framework may be used to provide an estimate of the cost of regional policy where that policy is designed to create jobs, and provide a comparison of different ways of increasing employment.