Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion

Empirical evidence suggests that low-income countries are characterized by high levels of labor and capital income tax evasion while the opposite is true for high-income countries. This paper proposes a model to study the relationship between economic growth and both types of income tax evasion. We show that the existence of a social norm towards tax compliance generates a complementarity between capital and labor income tax evasion which explains the decline of both the share of evaders in the population and the amount of tax evasion when countries accumulate capital. The model predicts that the level of tax morale is positively correlated with both types of income tax evasion and the level of income per capita, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases the share of evaders in the population and aggregate tax evasion.     

Tax evasion policies and the demand for cash

This paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the demand for cash by studying the effects of two measures to fight evasion: accessing taxpayers’ bank data and imposing thresholds for cash payments. We study the effects of these policies in Italy, where visibility of bank data and cash thresholds were recently increased. We show that both significantly affected cash holdings, which grew by about 1.5 percent of the GDP. Using unique high frequency data on cash operations and exploiting regional heterogeneity in tax evasion propensity, we find that accessing bank data pushes regions with higher propensity to evade taxes to convert more deposits into cash. On the contrary, higher cash thresholds do not increase cash holdings more in these regions. We rationalize the findings with a simple model of tax evasion and payment choices, where cash and deposits have different degrees of privacy.     

Decentralization,social capital,and regional growth: The case of the Italian North-South divide

This paper aims to show how a region's constant level of social capital may have a very different impact on its economic growth depending on whether the central or the local level of government is responsible for regional policy.Our case study is the economic performance of Northern and Southern Italy in the post-World War II period, when a long phase of regional convergence came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s. We focus on the economic effects of the 1970s institutional reforms on government decentralization and wage bargaining. Our main hypothesis is that decentralization allocates the provision of public capital to institutions, the local ones, more exposed to a territory's social capital. Since social capital is lower in the Southern regions, decentralization made their developmental policies less effective from 1970 onwards, and regional inequality increased.We build an endogenous growth model augmented to include the interaction between social capital and public investment as well as the reform of the Italian labour market. We calibrate our model using data of the Italian regions for 1951–71. Our quantitative results indicate that decentralization triggered the influence of local social capital on growth and played a central role in halting the convergence path of the low-social-capital regions.     

Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?

This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. [Cardarelli, R., Taugourdeau, E., Vidal, J.-P., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 19-38], and Catenaro and Vidal [Catenaro, M., Vidal, J.-P., 2006. Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 72, 1-17], who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular, this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination. It is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase, regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination.     

A three-sector model for real property tax incedence

This article presents a new three-sector general-equilibrium model for tax incidence analysis. The model differs from the usual two-sector model not only in the addition of an extra sector but also in abandoning the classical tradition of specifying with capital and labor arguments. The property tax in the model is specified as a partial tax applying to real — but not to personal — property used in the production of housing services and other goods.The model is quantified by selecting numerical values for its parameters in order to estimate percentage changes in the endogenous variables caused by the introduction of an exogenous property tax. The major effect of the tax is to make real property relatively more expensive and to cause less real property to be produced.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

Possibilities for the exportation of production taxes: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper re-evaluates previous discussions of inter-regional tax incidence and tax exportation. A two region general equilibrium model is developed that allows for inter-regional capital mobility and explicit commodity price determination, where one of the two regions is incompletely specialized. Conditions are determined under which either region will be able to export a production tax. Also, the link between tax exportation and the welfare of the taxing region is analyzed. In the case where taxes are not equal to zero initially, tax exportation may be inadvisable even when it is possible.     

Dynamic analysis of bribery firms’ environmental tax evasion in an emissions trading market

Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare.     

HARD OR SOFT? INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AS DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA*

We examine whether hard infrastructure in the form of more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions and deeper reforms lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). We use data on FDI from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Korea to various regions of China from 1990 to 2002. We control for the standard determinants of FDI—regional market sizes, wage rates, human capital and tax policies. Then we add indices of hard and soft infrastructures. We found that empirically soft infrastructure consistently outperforms hard infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.     

Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption*

We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion.     

Tax evasion and labor markets

Concern with revenue losses, inequities, and inefficiency that may result from tax evasion has produced a number of formal analyses of taxpayer dishonesty. Most of this work has concentrated on the behavior of individual evaders and has ignored the interaction between evasion and labor market equilibrium. To remedy this, our analysis uses a model with two labor markets — which differ in the potential for evasion — to examine how changes in various tax parameters affect evasion and labor market equilibrium. We also simulate the effect of switching from a proportional to a progressive tax system in order to evaluate the well-known claim that progressivity encourages evasion.     

台湾创业投资税收政策及其启示

台湾地区的创业投资是推动科技产业发展的重要力量,目前其活跃程度仅次于美国排名全球第二.在创投业发展的不同阶段,台湾政府主要采用对创投公司股东提供投资税收抵减优惠政策、健全创投业筹资、投资范围及退出渠道建设等方法,来引导创投业的发展.从台湾的经验中我们可以看出税收政策支持创业投资事业的必要性、有效性.相比而言,大陆地区针对创业投资行业的税收政策存在缺位现象.借鉴台湾经验,可以对创业投资采取阶段性倾斜政策.     

The incidence of taxes: A dynamic macroeconomic analysis

This paper analyzes the incidence of various tax changes using the intertemporal optimizing framework developed by Brock and Turnovsky. The model contains a reasonably complete specification of the corporate sector, in which firms have the choice of financial structure. It also allows for a range of government financial policies, although only one is considered in detail. Both the short-run and the long-run effects of changes in the personal income, capital gains, and corporate profit tax rates are analyzed. It is shown that the effects of tax changes (a) vary between the short and long run; (b) the effects of tax changes depend critically upon the financial structure adopted by forms; and (c) may also depend upon government financial policy.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

Labor market integration policies and the convergence of regions: the role of skills and technology diffusion

We study the role of different labor market integration policies on economic performance and convergence of two distinct regions in an agent-based model. Production is characterized by a complementarity between the quality of the capital stock and the specific skills of workers using the capital stock. Hence, productivity changes in a region are influenced both by the investment of local firms in high quality capital goods and by the evolution of the specific skill distribution of workers employed in the region. We show that various labor market integration policies yield, via differing regional worker flows, to distinct regional distributions of specific skills. Through this mechanism, relative regional prices are affected, determining the shares that the regions can capture from overall consumption good demand. There occurs a trade-off between aggregate output and convergence of regions with closed labor markets resulting in relatively high convergence but low output, and more integrated labor markets yielding higher output but lower convergence. Furthermore, results differ substantially in several respects as distinct labor market opening policies are applied.     

Tax morale and tax evasion reports

The study proposes a new measure of tax morale for Italy based on voluntary tax evasion reports. Using this measure, I detected a positive relationship between tax morale and social capital, political participation, and immigration, but a negative relationship between tax morale and the dissatisfaction with public services and unemployment.     

Economic integration and fiscal devolution

In this paper we investigate how economic integration influences the political decision of integration and separation of jurisdictions. In a model with (imperfect) capital mobility, we consider that, not only the redistributive policy itself, but also the level of policy centralization is decided by a majority vote. We find that the net benefit from integration is not monotonic with the level of world capital market integration and present a case where integration of two regions occurs only for intermediate levels of mobility. This conclusion relies on the comparison of the regional majorities’ utility under the various regimes. The benefits from integration arise from the elimination of tax competition across jurisdictions, which allows for more income redistribution, whereas the costs are linked to the diversity of preferences across regions, namely that of the decisive voters. We also show that a federal regime is better than complete centralization in keeping a nation united.     

Taxation without commitment

This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is forced to keep budget balance in every period, then it may not be able to sustain zero capital taxes in the long run, as shown in Benhabib and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 77:231–259, 1997) and Phelan and Stachetti (Econometrica 69:1491–1518, 2001). However, (Dominguez in J Econ Theory 135:159–170, 2007) shows that if the government is allowed to borrow and lend to households, the optimal capital income tax still converges to zero in the long run, as long as the value of defaulting is independent of the level of government debt. This paper provides a game theoretic setup with government debt where the value of the worst equilibrium only depends on the initial level of capital and can be determined in advance. This implies that under our assumptions the best sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes in the long run, even in the absence of government commitment.