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我国企业应对国外反倾销胜诉的启示 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
自1979年我国出口产品遭遇第一起反倾销调查以来,对我国出口商品投诉反倾销的国家和地区日益增多,反倾销所涉及的产品范围日益广泛,反倾销案件涉及的规模和金额日益增大。我国已成为世界上遭受反倾销立案调查最多的国家,是国际反倾销最大的受害者。在我国产品受到国外反倾销调查的案件中,我国企业赢的少,输的多。尽管赢的少,我们也可以从我国企业胜诉的案例中得到以下启示。 相似文献
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当前,国外对我国出口反倾销指控日趋增多,我国出口商品是国外反倾销的“众矢之的”,成为近年来国际反倾销案件最大的受害者,出口产品受到一些国际组织和国家反倾销指控高居全球之首,而且投诉的国家也由美国、欧共体等发达国家扩展到巴西、阿根廷、土耳其等发展中国家。经过多年来的努力,我国出口反倾销应诉率得到明显提高,应诉结果好转。 相似文献
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一、我国遭遇反倾销的情况与特点。近年来,我国的对外贸易发展迅速,但是当“中国制造”昂首走向世界的同时,也不可避免遭遇了严重的反倾销障碍。自1979年欧共体对我国提起第一例反倾销调查以来,截止2003年6月,我国出口产品遭受国外反倾销立案调查的数量已达到1527起。对我国出口产品发起反倾销调查的国家(地区)达33个,涉及出口金额约170亿美元。我国已经成为世界上反倾销的最大受害国,严重影响了贸易出口的增长。 相似文献
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倾销与反倾销如今已成为世界贸易领域的热点问题。自 1979年8月欧共体对我国出口的糖精及盐类反倾销以来,迄今已有28个国家和地区对我国提起反倾销案件300多起,涉及到我国机电、化工、轻纺、土畜、医保等行业的4000余种商品,其中涉案金额超过一亿美元的大案就有 15起。近两年,国际贸易保护主义进一步抬头,对华反倾销案激增,在数量上又以欧、美为最。这些案中,裁定倾销成立的占60%以上,其立案数、裁定率均居各国之首,使中国成为目前世界上遭受反倾销调查最多的国家和反倾销的最大受害国。与此同时,外国产品开始… 相似文献
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发挥好行业协会的协调作用 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
由于中国商品低廉的价格,我国已成为国际反倾销的主要目标,自1979年欧共体对我国出口的糖精、盐类和闹钟发起第一宗反倾销调查起,世界上发达国家对中国产品的反倾销诉讼快速增加,从1996年开始,我国就成为世界上出口产品受到反倾销调查最多的国家。据统计,20年来反倾销案件给我国出口造成的直接损失达100亿美元以上,仅1999年欧盟对我国反倾销立案调查就达13起,涉及金额5.4亿美元,相当于当年我国对欧盟出口的1.8%。越来越多的反倾销使我国部分主要出口产品市场不断萎缩,相应产业效益下滑,企业停产,工人… 相似文献
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陈桂荣 《经济技术协作信息》2006,(18):8-8
据统计,从1979年我国第一次遭受外国反倾销调查至2002年底,我国平均每年遭受反倾销立案调查20多起,近两年呈增长趋势,每年都在30起以上,有时达四五十起。更为严重的是,不仅遭受反倾销调查的案例数排在世界首位,而且遭最终裁定的比率也居世界前列。在这种形势下,深入研究企业在反倾销中的会计问题及应对策略就显得格外紧迫。 相似文献
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鲍康宁 《经济技术协作信息》2006,(35):33-33
一、我国所面临的反倾销严峻的形势
从1979年8月到今年6月底,世界各国对华反倾销案件累计高达584起,影响了我国几百亿美元的出口。国外反倾销已对我国出口商品构成严重威胁,且有愈演愈烈之势,堪称国际贸易保护主义的一股黑旋风,不可等闲视之,据统率,对我国反倾销最多的国家和地区有: 相似文献
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改革开放以来,我国在公平与效率关系的权衡上,经历了从"公平优先→兼顾效率和公平→效率优先,兼顾公平→初次分配注重效率,再分配注重公平→更加注重公平"的演变过程。 相似文献
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Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role. 相似文献
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We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology. 相似文献
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This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption. 相似文献
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Burg B 《Medical economics》1997,74(12):78, 81-2, 84 passim
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