Public Consumption and Unemployment

This paper introduces public consumption—hence the size of the public sector—into an efficiency wage model of the labour market. The effect of a simultaneous rise in taxes and public consumption on unemployment is derived. There arises an unambiguous positive relationship between the size of the public sector and equilibrium unemployment if public and private consumption are substitutes and wages are taxed. The impact of taxes on consumption on unemployment, although in general not equal to zero, is ambiguous.     

Economic reforms and labour markets: policy issues and lessons from Chile

Over the last twenty years sweeping reforms have deeply transformed the labour market in Chile. A visible outcome has been the reduction of Chile's rate of unemployment from 'European' to 'US' levels. Even though the political context makes this experiment special, are there economic lessons to be learnt? This paper concentrates on reforms to job security, on the decentralization of the wage bargaining process, and on the reduction in payroll taxes. It concludes that the reduction of payroll taxes (within the context of the social security reform), and the decentralization of bargaining increased labour market flexibility and contributed to the reduction of unemployment. On the other side, the analysis suggests that the reform on job security had no significant effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment.     

What goes up sometimes stays up: shocks and institutions as determinants of unemployment persistence

We analyse the determinants of unemployment persistence in four OECD countries by estimating a structural Bayesian VAR with an informative prior based on an insiders/outsiders model. We explicitly insert unemployment benefits and labour taxes so that our identification is not affected by the Faust and Leeper (1997) critique. We find widespread hysteresis: demand shocks play a dominant role in explaining unemployment also in the medium‐run. Moreover real wages have low sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations and to labour market disequilibria. Our results emphasise the real power of the unions and their interactions with structural shocks and other institutions as crucial determinants of hysteresis.     

Technology–Policy Interaction in Frictional Labour-Markets

Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labour-market outcomes? To address this question, we develop a model with vintage capital and search-matching frictions where irreversible investment in new vintages of capital creates heterogeneity in productivity among firms, matched as well as vacant. We demonstrate that capital-embodied technological change reduces labour demand and raises equilibrium unemployment and unemployment durations. In addition, the presence of labour-market regulations (unemployment benefits, payroll taxes, and firing costs) exacerbates these effects. Thus, the model is qualitatively consistent with some key features of the European labour-market experience relative to that of the U.S.: it features a sharper rise in unemployment and a sharper fall in the vacancy rate and the labour share. A calibrated version of our model suggests that this technology–policy interaction could explain a sizeable fraction of the observed differences between the U.S. and Europe.     

Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment

We study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons: those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. Voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences, while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage. We consider the employment policies of a well-informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies. The model is simple, yet rich enough to reflect real-world policies, including transfers to the disabled, welfare for non-working employables, unemployment insurance, employment subsidies, and taxes on workers and firms.     

Unemployment, tax evasion and the slippery slope framework

The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ??slippery slope?? framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance, tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm??s decision to evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on tax compliance. The main result is that with the ??right mix?? of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment.     

Labour Taxation in a Unionised Economy with Home Production

The impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare are examined in a model with household production and union–firm wage bargaining. The analysis shows that unemployment typically falls as the payroll tax rate in the market sector for household substitutes (the service sector) is reduced. This holds even when the payroll tax rate in the non-service sector is raised in order to maintain a balanced government budget. Welfare improves with a reduced-service-sector payroll tax rate only if unions are equally strong and firms are equally labour intensive across the sectors.
JEL classification : E 24; H 21; J 22; J 51     

Labor taxation, public finance, and wage determination: evidence from OECD countries

This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment, average effective labour tax rates and public spending in 17 OECD countries. The focus is on the degree of centralization and cooperation in wage setting. Estimation results from a dynamic time-series-cross-section model suggest that the countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less extensively in financing welfare spending, compared to countries with centralized or decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with another finding, according to which labour taxes distort the labour demand the least in the countries with firm level bargaining.     

Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters' Demand for Redistribution Policy

This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters' demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation of union wage–setting implies lower unemployment and taxes because a fiscal externality is internalised. Under some conditions about the composition of the population, the political–economic equilibrium can further be improved upon by cooperation between the government and the central union. This seems to have happened in the Netherlands where the unions and the government agreed to cut taxes and restrain wages, which has led to the 'Dutch Miracle'.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

The NAIRU reconsidered: why labour market deregulation may raise unemployment

According to the mainstream theory of equilibrium unemployment, persistent unemployment is caused mainly by ‘excessive’ labour market regulation, whereas aggregate demand, capital accumulation and technological progress have no lasting effect on unemployment. We show that the mainstream non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) model is a special case of a general model of equilibrium unemployment, in which aggregate demand, investment and endogenous technological progress do have long‐term effects. It follows that labour market deregulation does not necessarily reduce steady‐inflation unemployment. Theoretically, if the decline in real wage growth claims owing to deregulation is smaller than the ensuing decline in labour productivity growth and in the warranted real wage growth, then in that case steady‐inflation unemployment may increase. Empirical evidence for 20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (1984–1997) indicates that the impact of labour market deregulation on OECD unemployment is zero, and possibly negative (causing a higher rate of unemployment).     

The “greening” of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes

By embedding labour market bargaining considerations in an influence-seeking framework, we show how a union's stance on environmental policy depends on the exposure of their members to the risk of job loss. With a risk of unemployment, unions lobby with employers to resist stricter environmental policies. When employment is secure, unions may support policies that reduce employment opportunities for nonunion workers. “Environmentalism” can therefore arise without explicit environmental concerns among workers. Consequently, pollution taxes may yield a negative welfare dividend in the form of inefficiently high unemployment.     

Unemployment,long-term employment relations and the determination of unit labour cost growth in US manufacturing industries

This paper examines the effect that unemployment and long-term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labour costs. The paper proceeds in three sections. Section one analyses the relationship between labour market conditions and unit labour costs by developping a simple model of a firm that relies upon dismissal threats to elicit work effort. The comparative static properties of this model suggest that a tightening of labour markets may result in an increase in unit labour costs. In addition, it is argued that the labour market disequilibrium that occurs at full employment levels of unemployment will likely result in an increase in the growth rate of unit labour costs. The second section of the paper reviews diverse theories of long-term employment relations (LTERs), each of which suggest that the presence of LTERs ought to reduce the effect that labour market conditions exert on unit labour costs. The third section of the paper presents empirical estimates of the effect unemployment and LTERs exert on unit labour costs. The central empirical findings can be briefly summarized. First, movements towards full employment increase the growth rate of wages, reduce the growth rate of labour productivity and increase the growth rate of unit labour costs. Secondly, where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of unemployment on wage, labour productivity, and unit labour cost growth is diminished. The paper concludes by discussing the implications these findings have for effort regulation models and the macroeconomic foundations of microeconomic labour market structures     

Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries

To the layman, the upward trend in European unemployment is related to the slowdown of economic growth. We argue that the layman's view is correct. The increase in European unemployment and the slowdown in economic growth are related, because they stem from a common cause: an excessively rapid growth in the cost of labour. In Europe, labour costs have gone up for many reasons, but one is particularly easy to identify: higher taxes on labour. If wages are set by strong and decentralized trade unions, an increase in labour taxes is shifted onto higher real wages. This has two effects. First, it reduces labour demand, and thus creates unemployment. Secondly, as firms substitute capital for labour, the marginal product of capital falls; over long periods of time, this in turn diminishes the incentive to invest and to grow. The data strongly support this view. According to our estimates, the observed rise of 14 percentage points in labour tax rates between 1965 and 1995 in the EU could account for a rise in EU unemployment of roughly 4 percentage points, a reduction of the investment share of output of about 3 percentage points, and a growth slowdown of about 0.4 percentage points a year.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

Labour Market Policies and Long-term Unemployment in a Flow Model of the Australian Labour Market

This paper develops a general equilibrium job matching model, which is used to assess the impact of active labour market policies, reductions in unemployment benefits and reductions in worker bargaining power on long-term unemployment and other key macro variables. The model is calibrated using Australian data. Simulation experiments are conducted through impulse response analysis. The simulations suggest that active labour market programs (ALMPs) targeted at the long-term unemployed have a small net impact and produce adverse spillover effects on short-term unemployment. Reducing the level of unemployment benefits relative to wages and worker bargaining power have more substantial effects on total and long-term unemployment and none of the spillover effects of ALMPs.     

Unemployment and interindustry labour mobility in Canada in the 1980s

The determinants of interindustry mobility of labour, and its relationship to the unemployment rate is examined, using micro-data on Canadian workers from 1980/81, 1982/83 and 1985/86. It contrasts the implications of the ‘dynamic reallocation’ model (Lilien, 1982) in which rising aggregate unemployment is due to in creased dispersion in the net hiring rates of firms (implying positive covariance of interindustry mobility and unemployment rates) with the older ‘Keynesian’ perspective that high unemployment ‘chills’ labour market mobility, implying a neative relationship. Qualified support is obtained for the ‘chilling’ model, as well as standard results on the role of job tenure, hours worked, etc. The general moral is the cyclical sensitivity of labour market behaviour, i.e. individuals appear to react to the aggregate unemployment rate.     

Does the unemployment invariance hypothesis hold for Romania?

This article questions whether the unemployment invariance hypothesis of Layard et al. (2005), which states that movements in labour force do not significantly affect unemployment rates, holds true for Romania. Using quarterly labour force data for the 1996–2012 period, we explore the time-series properties of the two variables. We find that unemployment rates and participation rates have unit roots, and that they are not cointegrated, meaning that no significant long-term relationship exists between them. The analysis carried out on the first differences of unemployment rates and participation rates shows discouraged and added worker effects for Romania’s female labour force. This conclusion diverges from findings that point out to a stable, long-term relationship between unemployment and participation in several developed countries (Japan, Sweden, USA) and shows that Romanian labour market is highly adaptive, where changes in labour force participation do not lead to increases in unemployment. This finding can help model the influence of adverse developments such as ageing and emigration, and show their true impact beyond demographic doom scenarios. It also points out the role played by labour demand in shaping the evolution of the Romanian labour market.     

The effect of shocks to labour market flows on unemployment and participation rates

This article presents an analysis of labour market dynamics, in particular of flows in the labour market and how they interact and affect the evolution of unemployment rates and participation rates, the two main indicators of labour market performance. Our analysis has two special features. First, apart from the two labour market states – employment and unemployment – we consider a third state – out of the labour force. Second, we study net rather than gross flows, where net refers to the balance of flows between any two labour market states. Distinguishing a third state is important because the labour market flows to and from that state are quantitatively important. Focusing on net flows simplifies the complexity of interactions between the flows and allows us to perform a dynamic analysis in a structural vector-autoregression framework. We find that a shock to the net flow from unemployment to employment drives the unemployment rate and the participation rate in opposite directions while a shock to the net flow from not in the labour force to unemployment drives the rates in the same direction.     

Sectoral shifts and unemployment persistence

This paper deals with possible explanations of unemployment persistence within a sectoral approach to the Austrian labour market. First the concept of unemployment persistence is specified in terms of the time series properties of the unemployment rate. Sectoral job gains and job losses form the labour market flows in this approach. The standard matching model is replaced then by a model of the competition between the unemployed and new entrants in the labour market for new jobs as an ‘adding up’ demand system of the AIDS type. The estimations of different system specifications indicate, that the sectoral structure of job gains plays a role in the competition mechanism between unemployed workers and new entrants.