关于诚信的经济学诠释

诚信是市场经济的基石。现代诚信概念不仅属于道德范畴,也属于经济范畴。主要从诚信内涵的现代转变、诚信作为资本的共性和特性、诚信的建立过程以及诚信的经济绩效等方面对诚信进行经济学分析。     

用诚信规范市场竞争

竞争是市场经济的本质特征。但竞争必须遵守一定的规则，这就是法律与道德。我国市场经济中，由于缺乏诚信从而导致市场秩序混乱。从对市场经济主体失信行为的概括和分析，提出诚信道德是市场经济发展的必然要求，也是维护市场经济有效动作的保证。我们要在加强市场经济法制建设的同时，推进政府信用建设，加强诚信道德教育，企业也把诚信作为一种无形资产来经营。     

基于诚信的企业文化建设

诚信,顾名思义就是诚实守信。企业作为经济运行过程中最重要的微观经济主体,其诚信状况不仅直接关系到企业自身的信誉度,也影响到企业的生存与发展。诚信具有道德、法律和经济等方面的重要价值。它既是对企业在道德、法律等方面价值的肯定,也是企业在市场经济中取得成功的基础。它是企业无形资产的重要组成部分。企业文化通常是由企业的精神文化、物质文化、行为文化和制度文化等四个层次构成。企业文化是企业的指导思想、经营理念和工作作风的体现,它包括行为规范、价值观念、道德规范、文化传统、管理制度以及企业形象等。企业对诚信行为…     

诚信缺失及其根源分析

诚信是一种社会资源，但在社会经济运行的过程中，由于利益摩擦的增加，不但这种资源的功能没有发挥出来，而且诚信缺失现象大量存在，增加了诚信成本，扰乱了市场秩序，目前，应通过诚信环境的建设，促进社会主义市场经济的发展。     

提高我国会计诚信水平的措施与途径

会计诚信是市场经济的要求。近年来会计诚信问题成了社会热点,各界议论纷纷,“会计信息失真”、“会计假账泛滥”、“会计道德失范”等字眼充斥报章杂志,会计诚信问题成了媒体关注的焦点。会计诚信缺失增加了交易成本,加大了企业生存的隐形危机,降低了经济运行效率。会计诚信问题受到了全社会的关注。     

以诚信为本 发展道德经济

诚信作为一种道德要求，意思是诚恳老实，有信无欺。诚信是一切道德的基础和根本，是人之为人的最重要的品德，也是衡量一个国家和民族是否文明的重要标志。社会丰义市场经济，是一种秩序规范的经济，也是讲诚信道德的经济。特别是随着我国改革开放的深入和加入WTO，我们更要大力倡导诚实守信，加快健全社会信用制度。     

诚信是市场经济的根基

在市场经济条件下，经济行为的合理性不仅反映在节约资源、提高效率方面，还在于能否符合共同利益，至少不损害他人利益。市场经济体制的确立是在社会诸要素相互作用的复杂过程中完成的，不仅取决于技术条件，也取决于其内在的人文条件和历史背景，特别是市场秩序的维护，需要与之相适应的种种道德信条加以支撑。要使市场经济健康发展必须要有坚实的伦理基础。诚信就是这个基础的重要组成部分。一、诚信是市场行为主体必须具备的品质市场经济活动遵循的是“最小——最大”原则，物质利益驱动是经济活动的最根本动因，功利原则也就必然成为经…     

诚信是市场经济健康发展的基础

大力整顿和规范市场经济秩序，是提高国民经济整体水平和竞争力的必然选择，是建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制的重要措施，也是我国经济工作的一贡重要任务。这项任务的完成，有待于提高全民族对诚信道德在发展市场经济中的地位和作有的认识，这是发展市场经济的基础。     

资本运营中的信息、信誉与规制:理论考察与现实分析

资本运营是在信息不完全与不对称的资本市场环境下进行的 ,因此 ,均会产生以逆向选择与道德陷阱为主要表现形式的信誉缺失问题。纵使在发达的市场经济国家 ,也不可避免地会存在欺诈与不诚信问题。在经济转型过程中 ,由于发展与转型问题相互交融 ,发育、发展过程中的资本市场的不完善与不规范 ,致使资本运营过程中产生的信息不完全与不对称以及由之而引发的信誉危机更为突出、也更为特殊。为此 ,本文在综述现代信息经济学关于信息、信誉与规制以及以此为基础的金融经济学关于资本运营信息、信誉与规制问题的理论考察的基础上 ,结合我国资本运营过程中所产生的问题的特殊性 ,进行相应的特殊背景假设下的特殊国情分析 ,并从中引出具有针对性的应对措施与政策。     

浅谈会计人员职业道德

诚信不仅仅是一种道德要求，而且是市场经济下的基本游戏规则；道德是市场经济运行的基本保障。加强会计人员职业道德建设，具有十分重要而现实的意义。     

信用制度建设的道德思考

道德与信用是一个被社会广泛关注，却又在人们的行动中常被忽略的问题。针对信用在社会生活中严重缺失，人们对诚信的呼唤和祈求，建立以资产信用和道德信用为基础的信用制度，确立市场经济是信用经济的观念，重视对道德责任法制化和政府管理职能道德化的研究，是信用制度建设和道德建设需要共同关注的课题。     

信用关系对市场经济发展的促进作用

市场经济是建立在信用关系基础上的经济形态,人们之间的信用关系影响和制约市场交易的形成和发展。信用是市场要素中的一种社会资本,市场交易特别依赖信用机制、交易规则和市场秩序。信用关系和信用机制以其特定而独到的功能表现出强大的调节经济运行秩序的作用,促进市场经济的发展。     

宏观调控下我国票据市场发展研究

票据市场是金融市场的组成部分,联系着实体经济、信贷市场和资金市场,是传导宏观调控政策的重要载体。票据市场的发展对缓解企业融资困难,改善银行信贷资产质量,促进经济发展具有重要的意义。近一段时期我国票据市场发展较快,呈现出一些新特点。从分析票据市场发展状况着手,揭示影响票据市场发展的因素、存在的问题,进而对推进票据市场发展提出政策建议。     

Lotteries, inequality, and market imperfection: Galor and Zeira go gambling

This paper analyzes a simple extension to the work of Galor and Zeira (Rev Econ Stud 60:35–52, 1993). Allowing for endowment lotteries alters the dynamics of the model fundamentally: the poverty trap found in the original work vanishes for a wide class of parameters. Moreover, it turns out that in the presence of lotteries the relationship between the severity of credit market imperfections and long run aggregate income may be non-monotonic. We identify cases such that reducing the scope for moral hazard on the capital market decreases aggregate utility and may create a poverty trap and persistent income inequality in the economy. I am grateful for many helpful comments to Hans-Peter Grüner and an anonymous referee and for valuable discussion to Stefan Behringer and Petr Zemčík, and to seminar participants at Mannheim University and ENTER Jamboree 2003, Tilburg. Financial support from DFG is gratefully acknowledged.     

Credit Availability and Capital Crunch: On the Role of the Heterogeneity of the Banking System

We analyze the impact of a credit crunch on aggregate investment via the heterogeneous structure of the banking system. We develop a model of endogenous credit allocation in which investors and two banks differ according to their level of capital and monitoring technology. In a context of moral hazard problem, we show that banks' cost advantage in the monitoring of small businesses must be compared to their relative amount of capital in order to explain firms' optimal choice of financing, the credit allocation in the economy and the asymmetric impact of a credit crunch on aggregate investment. A shock of the same magnitude on the two banks level of capital may have a different effect on total investment. We stress that the credit crunch is maximum when the shock hits the bank specialized in the financing of small businesses and when this bank is also the less capitalized. This result is supported by recent empirical studies ( Hancock and Wilcox 1998 ).     

Credit market imperfection,lack of entrepreneurship and capital outflow from a developing economy

This paper explores the impact of credit market imperfection on lack of demand for capital, trade, and capital flows in an economy with wealth heterogeneity. In particular, we look at the implications of wealth heterogeneity. We show that the low return of capital and lower output of credit-intensive output in autarky may reflect lack of entrepreneurship and demand for credit due to wealth heterogeneity and eventually may lead to capital outflow from a capital-scarce country. This is a different way of echoing the sentiment of the well–known Lucas paradox, which suggests that capital might flow from the poor to the rich countries. We also show the possibility of trade and capital flow being complements and not substitutes, as is usual in standard trade models driven by factor abundance.     

Economic Volatility and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Countries

Economic volatility has increased drastically in the age of financial liberalization. The tendency among mainstream economists has been to explain this trend by government misdeeds and various market imperfections. For instance, government overspending was the main culprit in the first generation models of currency crises. Following the Asian crisis the emphasis shifted onto capital flow reversals, and arguments based on the ‘moral hazard’ problems began to replace the emphasis on the monetized government deficits. This paper outlines an explanation of economic volatility that is not based on moral hazard problems or other market distortions. Two stylized facts associated with the aftermath of financial and capital account liberalization are singled out for emphasis and brought together in the context of a macroeconomic framework that draws from Keynes’ Treatise. These are: (i) liquidity preference becomes intertwined with currency substitution, producing a macroeconomic destabilizer that explains procyclical changes in bank credit independently of moral hazard problems; and (ii) asset prices become fairly easy to predict, stimulating destabilizing ‘trend’ speculation by foreign investors, which means that profit seeking and market rationality might lie behind erratic shifts in capital flows.     

Capital Flight, North-South Lending, and Stages of Economic Development

We present a two-country OLG economy in which international capital mobility exists in the presence of moral hazard in financial contracts. The difference in the extent of asymmetric information is a source of capital movement and capital flows from the South to the North. Even though there exists a unique steady state under autarky, multiple locally stable steady states may emerge in a world economy with an integrated capital market. However, the integration may drive the South down to further impoverishment. The South's government therefore should take into account seriously the timing of capital market liberalization as a conduit of economic development.     

论信用文化

作为经济范畴的信用是一种经济能力与交换手段。它与信任和诚信有着密切的关系。信用文化是指有关信用这种特殊的经济行为在社会意识层面上的反映,它包括有关信用的知识、价值观和习惯等内容。信用文化对于市场经济的道德基础信任和信誉的建设,以及对于整个社会信用的建设,有着不容忽视的作用。为此,要把信用文化作为一项系统工程来抓,调动一切社会力量参与信用文化建设。     

Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints. With a labour market that is subject to moral hazard, the increased effort raises social welfare. Policies that reduce credit market imperfections, or redistribute income, may reduce welfare by dampening this effect.