非国有经济的成长壮大：国企战略调整的必要条件

由于传统经济体制的惯性 ,国企的战略调整 ,必然产生对原有体制不同程度的路径依赖 ,甚至出现新形式隐盖下的旧模式的原版复制。非国有经济的成长壮大 ,截断了国企回归的后路 ,也为国企的战略调整提供了政策操作空间。在市场经济中 ,国企的目标函数有社会福利最大化与利润最大化两种极端选择。而我国的渐进式改革允许国企在社会福利最大化与利润最大化这两个极端的目标函数之间作出多种多样地选择 :或者是加强与政府的关系 ,与政府目标保持最近的距离 ,从而获得更多的补贴和支持 ;或者提高市场份额 ,追逐利润以改善企业处境 ,通过竞争取得市…     

经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

任何转轨国家向市场经济过渡都要面临改革与开放的问题.因此,本文在经济开放的背景下,着重突出跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,分析开放程度和经济调控手段以及跨国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响.研究表明,转轨国家在经济开放的条件下,对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.而税率、技术、转移价格等也是影响转轨国家社会福利和转轨国家企业产量和竞争能力的重要因素.     

开放条件下的国有企业民营化及其路径选择

开放条件下,跨国公司与转轨国家经济之间有着紧密的联系。本文以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,建立一个跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,分析开放程度、经济调控手段和跨国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程以及竞争力的影响。研究表明,转轨国家在经济开放的条件下,对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则。税率、技术、转移价格等也是影响转轨国家社会福利以及转轨国家企业竞争力的重要因素。     

经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

在经济开放的背景下分析跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,剖析开放程度和经济调控手段以及垮国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响,表明对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.     

转轨经济中自然垄断行业规制改革及绩效差异的比较研究——竞争、所有制与激励机制选择

竞争与所有制改革是目前自然垄断行业规制改革的主要趋势。但原有的理论和经验都是针对经济发达国家而言,对于转轨国家如何协调经济转轨与自然垄断行业改革却没有现成的理论与经验。所以笔者从转轨国家自然垄断行业引入竞争可能性以及所有制改革模式的选择入手,研究在加入策略性激励机制后竞争与所有制模式的不同组合对自然垄断企业绩效的影响。研究发现,转轨国家自然垄断行业改革进程取决于转轨国家市场发育程度以及改革的初始条件;混合所有制的企业竞争模式比完全私有化的企业竞争模式的社会福利水平高,也是更适合于转轨国家自然垄断行业改革的所有制选择模式。     

经济转轨中自然垄断行业规制改革——竞争、所有制与激励机制选择

竞争与所有制改革是目前自然垄断行业规制改革的主要趋势.但原有的理论和经验都是针对发达国家而言,对于转轨国家如何协调经济转轨与自然垄断行业改革却没有现成的理论与经验.所以,本文从转轨国家自然垄断行业引入竞争可能性以及所有制改革模式的选择入手,研究在加入策略性激励机制后竞争与所有制模式的不同组合对自然垄断企业绩效的影响.研究发现,转轨国家自然垄断行业改革进程取决于转轨国家市场发育程度以及改革的初始条件;混合所有制的企业竞争模式比完全私有化的社会福利水平要高,也更适合于转轨国家自然垄断行业改革的所有制选择模式.     

会计信息失真的内在机理分析

1.企业经营目标定位分析。关于企业经营目标定位,企业界基本上将“利润最大化”作为企业经营管理的基本目标。建立在此目标的基础上,企业的经营管理行为趋向于短期利益的获得。在企业的日常行为决策过程中,只要是能提高企业利润的行为,都可能成为企业的有效选择。在此基础上,对会计信息进行调整,以使得调整后的会计信息资料更加符合企业的经营管理目标需要,成为许多企业的内在追求目标基础,这是企业会计信息失真的内在机理根源。因此,从企业经营管理目标的定位进行考虑,尽量将企业的经营管理目标由利润最大化目标转向综合社会经济利益的长期…     

福利经济学视角下中西方农村养老保险制度比较——兼论如何完善黑龙江省农村养老保险制度

建立新型农村社会养老保险制度,需要政府出资和补贴。福利经济学作为理论分析基础,从社会福利的角度对市场经济体制的优缺点进行评价,通过谋求实现社会经济福利最大化而进行各种政策的倾向性选择。同时,西方发达国家在工业化进程中,不断改革创新居民的社会福利制度,这一实践过程为我们提供了政府参与新型农村社会养老保险宝贵的改革经验,从而为进一步完善黑龙江省农村新型养老保险制度奠定基础。     

国有企业对市场绩效的影响——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

假设在国有企业主导的垄断竞争市场上,国有企业的经营目标是追求收入最大化,把国有企业引入古诺双寡头模型,一家国有企业与一家民营企业在不同的目标约束下展开古诺竞争,博弈最后的均衡结果与两家民营企业的古诺模型均衡结果相比较,发现国有企业的这种特殊的经营目标扭曲了资源配置,从而造成社会福利的损失。     

政府机会主义与民营企业成长——中国转型期民营企业成长的政治经济学分析

政府和企业的关系是转轨经济中的重要课题。该文在考察中国转轨时期大量案例的基础上指出,政府的机会主义行为已成为制约民营企业成长的重要因素。政府的机会主义行为不仅使大量的投资机会难以实现,而且内生企业的腐败行为。只有建立有效的法治,才能从根本上改善民营企业的生存和发展环境;有效的法治不仅能维护社会公正,而且还能实现经济活动的效率。文章同时认为,有效的法治对经济活动和政府行为的规范所起到的长期激励效应,使法治在一定程度上只是起一种威慑作用。法治作为市场经济体制的制度基础,它的建立是一个长期的过程,因此政府机会主义以及腐败等还将在我国转轨时期长期存在,民营企业成长环境的根本改善也将是一个长期的过程。     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

Location of public and private firms under endogenous timing of choices

This paper studies the choices of locations in a mixed duopoly when production costs are endogenously determined and the public firm maximizes a weighted sum of social surplus and its profits. We find that the locations of the two firms are decided simultaneously when the weight of the public firm’s profits in its objective function is high enough. When this is not the case we find that one firm (not always the public firm but sometimes also the private one) behaves as a leader in the choice of location and location decisions are made sequentially. Moreover, in equilibrium, the production cost of the public firm is never higher than that of the private firm.     

PHILANTHROPY AS A CORPORATE STRATEGY*

An attempt to formulate the implications of corporate “philanthropy” by private firms is made in this paper. By philanthropy we mean the public activities of private agents, which are not carried out through the ordinary price mechanism. From the point of view of social roles, corporate philanthropy complements the price mechanism as do the government sector, non-profit organizations and individuals. Here we formulate corporate philanthropy as the product of two possible motivations: either as a means of long-term profit maximization, or as a direct element in an objective function of a firm.     

Government grants,private R&D funding and innovation efficiency in transition economy

Although the development of the high-tech industry is part of the national agenda of many countries, particularly transition economies, few studies have analysed innovation efficiency in countries with environments unfavourable to high-tech industry development. This study explores the relationships of government grants, private R&D funding and innovation efficiencies of the high-tech industry in China. We use a stochastic frontier analysis model to study the roles of government and market mechanisms in high-tech industry innovation from 1995 to 2008. Findings show that government grants do not crowd out private funding, but stimulate private R&D expenditure. Private R&D funding has positively influenced innovation in the Chinese high-tech industry, and efficiency potentials are widely under-exploited. Additionally, government grants are observed to negatively impact innovation by large firms in the Chinese high-tech industry. Furthermore, we reveal that human capital can promote the innovation performance of high-tech firms, excepting those of medium scale. The findings provide insightful perspectives on China's high-tech industry.     

Nationalizations,bailouts and efficiency

ABSTRACT

We develop a theoretical model in which there are public and private firms and a government. When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with bailouts or nationalizations. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In this setting, we analyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalizations of private firms after unprofitable investments lead to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers and employees working for a firm is also affected by the possibility of government interventions, reducing the productive efficiency advantage of private firms.     

Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 751–773.     

地方政治权力转移与企业社会资本投资周期--基于政企关系重构的动态研究

文章以2007－2012年我国A 股上市公司为样本,从政企关系重构的视角研究了地方政治权力转移对企业社会资本投资的影响。研究发现：(1)在地方政治权力转移当年,企业会显著提高社会资本投资力度。随着主政官员任期的增加,企业社会资本投资呈现下降趋势。这说明在主政官员任期内,企业社会资本投资呈现先增后减的周期性特点。这种周期性特点仅在民营企业中存在。(2)民营企业社会资本投资的周期性特点在地方官员来自外地、继任官员预期任期较长、管制行业以及融资约束程度高和无政治关联的企业样本中更加显著。(3)在地方政治权力转移当年,民营企业提高社会资本投资力度能够帮助其获得政府补助,但这种优势并不会立刻体现出来;同时,企业提高社会资本投资力度也会对自身的研发投入产生挤出效应,且挤出效应持续存在于继任官员的整个任期中。文章的研究为理解企业建立政企关系的手段、过程与效果提供了新的视角。     

Governing uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified crops

This paper analyzes the capabilities of three different governance regimes for adequately handling uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified (GM) crops. Adequate handling requires the development of sound procedures for identification of uncertainty and ignorance (U&I), reduction of U&I, decisions on how to treat irreducible U&I and monitoring of unexpected effects. The nature of U&I implies, however, that these procedures will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality are therefore needed. The three governance regimes (GRs) compared are: GM-crops are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1); GM-crops are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2); and GM-crops are produced and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). The effect of bringing the civil society into the decision-making process is also analyzed. GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organizations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality.     

You are suffocating me: Firm-level analysis of state-owned enterprises and private investment

Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.