Does financial development reduce corruption?

We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls.     

Industrial loans and market structure

Based on the observation that financing is one of the main obstacles to create new firms, this paper deals with the interactions between the market structure of both the banking sector and the borrowing industries. We consider that firms’ installation costs are financed by means of industrial loans from specialized banks. With endogenous entry in banking activity as well as in the borrowing industry, we find that a natural oligopoly emerges in both sectors if the entry cost in the industrial sector is small enough, relative to the banks’ entry cost.     

Deregulation, competition and consumer welfare in a banking market: evidence from Hong Kong

This paper examines competition among commercial banks following deregulation in a small open economy. I jointly estimate a system of differentiated product demand and pricing equations, and use conduct parameters to identify market structure. Overall, I find positive outcomes for the banking deregulation, which suggest that the benefits of deregulation understood in large industrialized economies indeed apply to a small open economy. Encouragingly, the industry becomes more competitive and the consumers are better-off after the deregulation. Empirical results also indicate that the banking sector is characterized by non-cooperative competitive behavior. Bank size is an important determinant of consumer’s bank choice.     

HOW DOES FOREIGN BANK OWNERSHIP IN THE BANKING SECTOR AFFECT DOMESTIC BANK BEHAVIOUR? A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how foreign bank ownership in the banking sector affects domestic bank behaviour and whether this relationship depends on the economic and financial conditions of the host country. This paper contains 795 individual banks in 39 countries covering the period 1999–2006. Foreign ownership is calculated using bank level data as a proxy for the degree of foreign bank ownership in the banking sector. First, we find that foreign bank ownership is associated with a decrease in both the profitability and overhead expenses of the domestic bank after applying the system panel Generalized Method of Moments model. Second, a lower level of economic development of the host country enhances the positive effects of foreign bank ownership on the income, profit and cost of domestic banks. Third, financial development plays an important role in determining the effect of foreign bank ownership. Fourth, while the use of aggregate foreign ownership data may provide us with a big picture, it may not explain why individual banks in the same country perform differently, which this study will answer.     

Financial openness,market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation

Consistent with recent theoretical models, this paper finds that financial openness has a positive effect on private credit in economies characterized by a competitive banking sector, but that this effect vanishes and even becomes negative in economies with imperfect banking competition.     

银行业竞争、客户筛选与村镇银行二元绩效：传导机制与实证研究*

村镇银行承担着支持“三农”和发展普惠金融的重要使命,但关于银行业竞争对村镇银行经营绩效的影响及其传导机制的研究较少。利用江苏省县域村镇银行2008年至2013年的面板数据,在数理模型分析的基础上实证检验了银行业竞争对村镇银行财务绩效和社会绩效的影响。结果表明,银行业竞争显著降低了村镇银行的财务绩效,但显著提升了社会绩效。进一步分析发现,银行业竞争通过改变村镇银行市场定位和客户筛选行为的作用机制,影响村镇银行经营绩效。因此,应坚持金融改革的市场化方向并建立更加精准的补贴机制,促进村镇银行在可持续发展的同时提升社会绩效。     

The welfare cost of banking regulation

The Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking sector's stability. Unfortunately, this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive, risky investment projects toward less productive but safer projects. This paper introduces banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a banking crisis is initiated by an aggregated shock (in the risky sector) in a banking system with implicit bailout, and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximal share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off, inherent in this type of regulation, between ensuring banking stability and fostering economic growth. The model implies an optimal level of regulation that prevents crises but at the same time is detrimental to growth. We find that the overall effect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when productivity shocks are sufficiently high (for example, in the subprime banking crisis episode) and economic agents are sufficiently risk-averse. Finally, we find that there is a trade-off between regulating the economy upfront (i.e. before the shock) and facing the challenge of making a huge bailout after the crisis.     

Monetary Policy and Market Power in Banking

Applying a spatial competition model to banking, we analyze the effects of the choice of a monetary policy rule by the central bank on banks market power as measured by the Lerner index. We show that a procyclical monetary policy may reinforce the countercyclical movement of the Lerner index. That is, this measure of competitiveness of the banking sector may vary more over the business cycle due to the monetary policy rule.JEL classification: G21, E52, L13.Acknowledgements The author thanks Hans Degryse, Hans van Ees, Marco Haan, Eko Riyanto, Bert Schoonbeek, Elmer Sterken, three anonymous referees, and participants of the EARIE 2001 conference (Dublin), the NAKE Day 2002 (Amsterdam), and a seminar at Ghent University for their constructive comments.revised version received November 11, 2003     

Overcapacities in banking: Measurement,trends and determinants

Global banks face profitability challenges since the global financial crisis. Besides cyclical factors, structural features such as overcapacities have been identified as root causes. While policymakers agree on the need for bank consolidation, there is less consensus on the definition and measurement of overcapacities in banking. This paper contributes by conceptualising and formalising the different dimensions of overcapacities in banking and by constructing a novel measure thereof. In addition, it empirically tests the main determinants of overcapacities in banking from 2006 to 2017 and assesses their relative importance. The results indicate that non-bank competition, the interest rate environment and bank business models are the most important driving factors of banking sector overcapacities. This is because shadow banks, benefitting from regulatory arbitrage, have altered banks’ capacity needs, low rates compressed margins and increased pressure to improve cost efficiencies, and retail-oriented business models have operated extensive branch networks entailing heavy fixed costs.     

Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

Intricacies of competition,stability, and diversification: Evidence from dual banking economies

This paper investigates the nexus of competition and stability by introducing the interaction of diversification and competition. We use a sample of both conventional and Islamic banks from 14 dual banking economies over 2005–2016. The core finding illustrates that competition does not impact bank stability and that diversification is insignificant in the competition-stability nexus. Further, we find that concentration is beneficial for the banking stability of both types of banks. In most of our results, we found no difference in the impact of competition and diversification on the stability of conventional and Islamic banks. To put our findings in a broader context, we argue that no difference between the business models can be considered an early signal of possible convergence between the two systems.     

The relationship banking paradox: No pain no gain versus raison d'être

Relationship banking paradox refers to the case that credit market competition may threaten relationship banking practice, but it may stimulate it as well because of differentiation. Using a mixed model of adverse selection and double moral hazard, this paper shows that for some parameter values, relationship banking arises even when the banks compete à la Bertrand, hence supporting the no pain no gain hypothesis. This is due to multilayer nature of the information asymmetry by double moral hazard where an outside bank that does not have the borrower's proprietary information is unable to exert optimal levels of effort in the continuation game.     

银行业竞争加剧还是抑制了企业金融化*

银行业竞争与企业金融化有多种关联机制，既可能加剧企业金融化，也可能抑制企业金融化。本文利用2007—2019年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司的面板数据，考察了二者之间的关系。结果发现：（1）竞争性的银行业市场结构抑制了企业金融化。（2）银行业竞争不仅缓解了债务成本对企业利润的侵蚀，有助于缩小金融行业与实体企业之间的利润率差距，进而抑制企业利润追逐动机的金融化行为，而且通过引导信贷资源配置促进了企业创新，从而对实体企业金融投资产生挤出效应；此外，银行业竞争还通过促使银行积极发挥信息监督作用，抑制了企业内部人金融投机套利的机会主义行为。（3）银行业竞争对企业金融化的抑制效应在非国有企业、中小企业以及市场化水平较低地区的企业中更为显著。这些结果说明，提高银行业竞争水平有助于抑制企业金融化趋势，扭转经济“脱实向虚”的局面。     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

The impact of bank competition and concentration on industrial growth

This paper studies whether bank competition affects growth of non-banking industries. We find that non-cooperative bank competition and stability promote industrial growth robustly. Bank concentration may also affect growth positively; the latter effect increases for higher levels of competition.     

Small business lending and credit risk: Granger causality evidence

Because of their opaque nature, SMEs are overly reliant on bank lending. Therefore, we examine whether banks' credit supply to SMEs are affected by their financial conditions. To this end, we employ a Granger causality analysis to examine whether there is an indication of a significant direction of determination between SME lending and non-performing SME loans. The results reveal no bidirectional relationship between SME lending and NPL for the entire banking sector. For Islamic banks, however, we find two-way linkages between these two parameters: a negative causation is running both from SME lending to NPL growth and from NPL to SME lending. Given Islamic banks' deposit-oriented funding practices and their adherence to profit-and-loss sharing principles, this finding suggests the presence of heightened market discipline within the Islamic banking system.     

Why are interest spreads so high in Uganda?

Using international comparisons and a unique bank-level dataset on the Ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005, we explore the factors behind consistently high interest rate spreads and margins. International comparisons show that the small size of Ugandan banks, persistently high T-Bill rates and institutional deficiencies explain large proportions of the high Ugandan interest rate margins. The Ugandan bank panel confirms the importance of macroeconomic factors, such as high inflation, high T-Bill rates and exchange rate appreciation. There is also evidence for the small market place and high costs of doing business explaining persistently high spreads and margins; smaller banks and banks targeting the low end of the market incur higher costs and therefore higher margins. Spreads and margins also vary significantly with the sectoral loan portfolio composition of banks, while there is little evidence for foreign bank entry, privatization or changes in market structure explaining variation in spreads or margins over time.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.     

Financial structure,productivity, and risk of foreign direct investment

This study investigates how heterogeneous firms choose their lenders when they raise external finance for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and how the choice of financing structure affects FDI activities. We establish an asymmetric information model to analyze why certain firms use private bank loans while others use public bonds to finance foreign production. The hidden information is the productivity shock to FDI. Banks are willing to monitor the risk of FDI, while bondholders are not; hence, banks act as a costly middleman that enables firms to avoid excessive risk. We show that firms’ productivity levels, the riskiness of FDI, and the relative costs of bank finance and bond finance are three key determinants of the firm’s financing choice. Countries with higher productivity, higher bank costs, or investment in less risky destinations, use more bond finance than bank finance. These results are supported by evidence from OECD countries.     

Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?

Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects, where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock. Recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages. We use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion. We find that in the absence of a safety net, there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system. The financial safety net (in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks) considerably reduces—but does not eliminate—the danger of contagion. Even so, the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking system in terms of assets.