Tax Reform,Structural Unemployment and the Environment

The effects of environmental tax reform, i.e., using the proceeds of a higher energy tax rate to lower the labour tax rate, on wage formation, employment and environmental quality are analysed in the context of a small open economy with structural unemployment caused by hiring costs. We find that such a reform may boost employment if it shifts the tax burden away from workers towards those without employment in the formal sector. Environmental tax reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers in the formal sector if higher energy taxes reduce earnings in the informal sector by reducing labour productivity.     

Does labour supply respond to a flat tax?

We exploit the exogenous change in marginal tax rates created by the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of taxes on the labour supply of men and women. We apply a weighted difference‐in‐difference regression approach and instrumental variables to estimate labour supply functions using a panel dataset. The mean regression results indicate that the tax reform led to a statistically significant increase in hours of work for men but had no effect on work hours for women. However, we find a positive response to tax changes in both tails of the female work hour distribution. We also find that the reform increased the probability of finding a job among both men and women. Despite significant variation in individual responses, the aggregate labour supply elasticities are trivial. This suggests that reform‐induced changes in labour supply are an unlikely explanation for the amplified personal income tax revenues that followed the reform.     

Flat income taxation,redistribution and labour market performance

A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way.     

Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Unemployment and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effects of environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the proceeds to reduce distortionary taxes on labour. The framework of analysis is a small open economy with involuntary unemployment due to a rigid consumer wage. Environmental tax reform boosts not only environmental quality but also employment if substitution between labour and resources is easy, the production share of the fixed factor is large, and the initial tax rates on resources and profits are small. If the initial tax system is sub-optimal with a negligible tax on resources, profits rise as well.     

The Household, Time Use and Tax Policy

This paper is concerned with modelling household decisions andthe welfare effects of tax policy. It seeks to emphasise theimportance of a model that incorporates household productionand can take account of the evident female labour supply heterogeneityacross two-parent families. If, after having children, someproportion of households substitute domestic for market laboursupply, the income and consumption variables used as the taxbase in most countries may be poorly correlated with livingstandards. Taxes and welfare programs based on these variablesmay increase inequality by shifting the overall tax burden tolow and middle wage families with both partners in work, awayfrom families with much higher wages and in which only one memberworks to earn the same joint market income. The paper combinesdata on time use, income, taxes and benefits to show how theytrack female labour supply over the life cycle, resulting inmuch higher tax burdens on two-earner households. (JEL D13,D91, H31, J22)     

Effect of the Tax System ON R&D Intensity,Growth, Wages and Consumption Share

We propose a general equilibrium knowledge‐driven (semi‐)endogenous‐growth model with horizontal R&D, which is extended to consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and exogenous government expenditure, financed through taxes on financial assets and on labour income, to analyse the implications of the tax system on R&D intensity, economic growth, wage inequality and consumption share in the output. In particular, we show that: (i) taxes have negative influence in the consumption share, being higher the marginal effect of the labour‐income tax; (ii) for any given government expenditure share, an increase (a decrease) in financial‐assets tax decreases (increases) the labour‐income tax; (iii) only the financial‐assets tax affects negatively the R&D intensity and the skill‐premium; thus, to reduce the skill‐premium the financial‐assets tax must increase; (iv) ignoring the effect on wage inequality and on R&D intensity, taxes are substitutes.     

The Impact of Income Taxation on the Labor Supply of Part-time and Full-time Workers

This paper estimates the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of part-time and full-time workers in the United States. Using a model that incorporates the endogeneity of the net wage rate and the virtual income, and correcting for self-selection into part-time and full-time jobs, the results indicate that part-time workers are relatively more responsive to changes in income tax than full-time workers. Estimated wage elasticities are relatively larger for part-time than for full-time workers.The simulation results indicate that income tax has a disincentive effect on both part-time and full-time workers, with part-time and full-time workers reducing their labor supply by 0.87 and 0.58 hours, respectively, if a 5% tax is imposed. However, the percentage reduction in hours of work is very small, and a tax policy may have little effect on the labor supply of workers.The results seem to suggest that female and black part-time workers are more likely to drop out of the labor force at higher levels of income tax. It also tests the hypothesis that the labor supply behavior of parttime and full-time workers differs.The test results indicate that the determinants of the labor supply of part-time workers are different from those of full-time workers. It is noted that there is a significant difference between the labor supply of male part-time and female parttime workers, as well as between the black part-time and white part-time workers. In order to reduce voluntary unemployment in market activities among married females and blacks, the government can encourage part-time work by sponsoring legislation or instituting a scheme that will allow part-time workers to pay relatively less in payroll taxes.     

Taxation and labour supply: Evidence from a representative population survey

We study how taxation influences labour supply using a specifically designed representative survey of the German population. First, we investigate whether taxes generally matter for the labour supply decisions of our respondents. Around 41 per cent report taking taxes into consideration, implying that the majority of the German population is unresponsive to taxation. Second, we look at self-reported labour supply adjustments following a recently enacted payroll tax change. Only around 12 per cent of our respondents report an actual labour supply response, but we find evidence of an income, as well as a substitution, effect of the tax change. Our conclusion is that the effects of taxes on labour supply in Germany are likely small. We analyse the correlation with economic and socio-demographic variables and find that the self-employed are relatively more sensitive to taxation and that low interest rates reduce incentives for expanding the labour supply.     

The impact of taxes on female labour supply

There is little agreement in economics on the factors influencing labour supply and hence on the impact of taxes. Within the marginal model, real wages and incomes are directing people's labour market behaviour independent of time and space, whereas the human resources approach takes account of the social environment and past behaviour. Even if strong assumptions are made, the neoclassical theory cannot predict the outcome of a wage increase. The labour supply response depends on the relative strengths of the substitution and the income effect. Since nonparticipation in the labour market is explained by a reservation wage being higher than the market wage, this is the only situation in which neoclassical theory would predict a rise in labour force participation with a wage increase. This case occured in a ‘natural experiment’ in Sweden. The Swedish tax system changed in 1971 from joint to separate taxation of spouses resulting in a substantial increase in the net wage of married women. This article investigates the impact of the change in the Swedish tax system on female labour force participation, concluding that it cannot explain the substantial rise in the participation rates of Swedish women. This is a significant result, questioning standard neoclassical theory and supporting the more institutional views of human labour market behaviour. That is that time and space as well as the social environment are important when analyzing labour supply. This will have consequences for international comparisons. Only factors which explain developments within one country might be relevant for explaining international differences, e.g. in labour force participation.     

Taxes,female labour supply and household income: differences between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany

The article investigates the effect of taxes and social premiums on female labour supply and household income. A comparison is made between labour supply and household income between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1992. A discrete choice model for labour supply is used in which taxes and social premiums are implicitly incorporated. As male labour supply is highly inelastic an individual, male chauvinist model is used. The estimated models are used to simulate the effect of the differences in the tax and social premium system on the differences in labour supply and income between both countries. The results indicate that labour force participation is higher the more individualized the system. The German system leads to a lower tax burden compared to the Dutch system. It is concluded that differences in the tax and social premium system between both countries have hardly any influence on the differences in the inequality of net household labour income. There is evidence that the German system leads to a slightly more unequal distribution of household income. It is also concluded that although the tax and social premium system does influence labour supply and income, it can be doubted whether these effects are substantial.     

Efficiency Wages and Taxes

Various taxes influence wage and employment outcomes in efficiency wage models. These findings are extended by incorporating more comprehensive tax functions and additional tax parameters. Moreover, the importance of different effort functions is evaluated. It is shown that higher marginal tax rates, holding the level of taxes constant, reduce wages and increase employment. Higher levels of taxes on income, labour costs and value-added tend to raise unemployment.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Green Tax Reform and Competitiveness

This paper studies a revenue-neutral green tax reform that substitutes energy for wage taxes in an open economy with unemployment. As long as the labour tax rate exceeds the energy tax rate, such a reform will increase employment, reduce the domestic firms' unit cost of production and hence increase international competitiveness and output of the economy. The driving force behind these results is the technological substitution process that a green tax reform will bring about. The resulting reduction in unemployment is welfare increasing since energy, which the country has to buy at its true national opportunity cost, is replaced with labour, whose price is above its social opportunity cost.     

Labor taxation, public finance, and wage determination: evidence from OECD countries

This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment, average effective labour tax rates and public spending in 17 OECD countries. The focus is on the degree of centralization and cooperation in wage setting. Estimation results from a dynamic time-series-cross-section model suggest that the countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less extensively in financing welfare spending, compared to countries with centralized or decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with another finding, according to which labour taxes distort the labour demand the least in the countries with firm level bargaining.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Estimating labour supply responses and welfare participation: Using a natural experiment to validate a structural labour supply model

We estimate an economic model of labour supply and welfare participation using data on single men from Quebec drawn from the 1986 Canadian Census. Detailed budget sets for each work‐welfare combination—accounting for income taxes, tax credits and welfare benefit rules—are derived using a micro‐simulation model. We show that predicted reactions to a welfare reform that took place in 1989 replicate actual changes in labour supply and welfare participation. We also illustrate the advantage of having estimated a structural model by showing how labour supply and welfare participation change when income taxes and benefit levels change.     

Progressive Taxation and the Life-Cycle Model: An Application of the Theory of Firm*

In the presence of a progressive consumption (wage income) lax the marginal cost of consumption (leisure) is rising and* the life-cycle allocation problem of an individual is presentable in the framework of a monopsony. Although the progressive taxes do not in general alter the qualitative nature of standard results on life-cycle theory, their quantitative implications are serious. In contrast to the equivalence between proportional consumption and wage income taxes, the effects of the two progressive taxes on the life-cycle consumption and labour supply allocation decision are not only different but in most cases also in opposite directions.     

Nonlinear taxes in a life-cycle consistent model of family labour supply

This paper deals with family labour supply under nonlinear income taxation in a life-cycle consistent framework. A major purpose of the paper is, therefore, to bring together previous research on how to model joint supply decisions, life-cycle consistency and piecewise linear taxation, and then perform an econometric application using Swedish cross-section data. The paper starts by constructing an intertemporal model of household behaviour, which is used to derive optimal hours of work for the husband and the wife, respectively. Then, given the appropriate theoretical framework, the model is specified in a way suitable for econometric analysis. Regarding the estimation results, we find that both male and female labour supply are sensitive not only to changes in the own marginal wage rate and the virtual nonlabour income, but also to changes in the marginal wage rate of the spouse. The latter means that cross-wage effects are important when it comes to interpret the consequences of income taxation.     

Moonlighting: multiple motives and gender differences

This paper examines the incidence and reasons for moonlighting with a focus on gender differences. The study specifies and estimates a bivariate probit model of labour supply and the decision to hold more than one job. It is found that the factors leading men and women to moonlight are similar. A wage decomposition analysis reveals that 93 percent of the differential between male and female moonlighters' wages is not explained by differences in characteristics, and little connection is found between an individual's human capital and their moonlighting wage. Finally, it is found that moonlighters are less likely to report their income.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.