The prospects for OPEC five years after 1973/74

This paper surveys more than a dozen models of OPEC and world energy markets that have appeared since 1976. Included are simulation models, optimization models, and analyses of energy balances. Attention is focused on the outlook for OPEC prices and the demand for OPEC oil exports over the next fifteen years. Virtually all analyses agree that substantial changes from current market conditions are unlikely over the next few years. Beyond 1985, however, some project a severe tightening in world oil markets, while others project no such change from current conditions.     

OPEC策略行为理论研究评述

OPEC策略行为理论是石油经济学研究的两大主题之一。本文在梳理20世纪70年代以来大量相关研究文献基础上,对OPEC策略行为理论的发展脉络、经典模型以及对经典模型的实证检验研究进行了较为全面分析。分析发现,虽然描述OPEC行为的模型越来越精细,但由于OPEC及其成员在不同时期策略行为方式和重点不同,每种模型只能解释部分时期的部分行为。OPEC对国际石油价格的影响主要体现在短期,长期看国际石油价格主要反映市场基本面变化。     

Oil market share dynamics: A Markov chain analysis of consumer and producer adjustments

We develop an “optimal market share rule” model of cartel behavior which when applied to the OPEC cartel appears capable of explaining its stability and responses to changed market events. In particular, by attaching importance to market shares based approximately on costs, OPEC members can by maintaining optimal shares deter deviant member attempts to break cartel rules. After a thorough discussion of the theory, the model is tested empirically using a Markov probability model. The estimated Markov transition matrix is further decomposed into what Theil has called the exchange matrix and the mean passage matrix. Dynamic adjustment processes in the market are revealed by the latter while an emerging pattern of OPEC member surveillance of consumers is revealed by the former which facilitates cartel stability. Inspection of these matrixes further suggests that after the formation of OPEC there is evidence of less potential for producer conflict while there appears more evidence for consumer conflict. While these results must be tentative in view of the fact that they have been estimated using a simplified two consumer — two producer model and limited data, it is argued that the results are highly suggestive and the approach in this study can be extended to cover all producer and consumers, and can be integrated into a complete model of the world oil market.     

The market power of OPEC 1973–2001

We apply a multi-equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of OPEC as a whole or different sub-groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973–2001. Our results indicate that the producers outside OPEC can be described as competitive producers, taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits. The OPEC members do not fit the behaviour of price-taking producers. Our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for OPEC underpin the potential market power of the producer group, and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies. On the other hand, our findings indicate that neither OPEC nor different sub-groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973–1994. However, we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit OPEC-Core as from 1994. Thus, although OPEC clearly has affected the market price, the producer group has not behaved as a pure profit-maximizing dominant producer.     

A dynamic model of OPEC trade and production

A dynamic simulation model is presented of the world energy market, covering the period 1974–1995. It is used to assess and rank six possible price or output policies that OPEC may adopt with respect to oil exports, given a range of assumptions relating to such important variables as the rate of growth of domestic absorption of oil revenues within OPEC, the rate of capacity expansion for oil production, the responsiveness of investment in alternative sources of energy to changes in oil prices, and the rate of growth of world demand for energy. Furthermore, an illustrative analysis is given of possible conflict situations within OPEC, and their impact on the choice of price or output policy is discussed. The main conclusion drawn is that the supply response of alternative energy sources to OPEC oil will be the key to predicting whether oil prices will go up or down.     

The prospects for OPEC: A critical survey of models of the world oil market

The paper critically surveys seven recent models of the world oil market and their evaluations of the prospects for OPEC: Blitzer-Meeraus-Stoutjesdijk, Bohi-Russell, the U.S. Federal Energy Administration, Kennedy, Kalymon, Levy and Nordhaus. After a brief discussion of the basic approaches to the problem, we examine the model specifications in some detail. The principal contributions and conclusions are summarized, as are the main limitations of these models. We conclude with some suggestions of the most promising areas for future research.     

Fundamentals and Oil Price Behaviour: New Evidence from Co‐integration Tests with Structural Breaks and Granger Causality Tests

As the world economy has undergone various changes and shocks, the oil market went through significant fluctuations during the period 1994–2015. This study focuses on discussing the possible factors that determine crude oil prices, which include world economic growth, market power of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), non‐OPEC supply and the value of dollar, taking into account the structural changes that influence the study period, which is quarterly data for the period of 1994.Q1–2015.Q3. For time series stationarity tests, Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1997) unit root test with structural break is used. To test the existence of a long relationship in the presence of structural changes, the Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) method of co‐integration is used. For long‐run coefficient, we proceed to estimate fully modified least squares. The result shows a significant influence of non‐OPEC supply, the dollar appreciation and world gross domestic product growth, but OPEC did not have a significant effect on the price of oil, which is indicated by the structural break for OPEC capacity utilisation at 2002.Q1, that indicates the starting point of the loss of OPEC power. Establishing the presence of co‐integration, we apply the evaluation of Granger causality for co‐integrated data, using vector error‐correction model.     

OPEC and the monopoly price of world oil

The paper presents a dynamic model of the behavior of OPEC viewed as a monopolist sharing the oil market with a competitive sector. The main conclusion is that the recent increase in the price of oil was a once and for all phenomenon due to the formation of the cartel and that prices should remain approximately constant during the next twenty years.     

Optimization agricultural production under financial risk of water constraint in the Jordan Valley

Using high-frequency data the co-movements among crude oil prices are analysed in order to address the question of regionalization of the world crude oil market. Time-series econometrics in the form of error-correction modelling is applied for daily crude oil price data covering the time period 1988 to 2004 and in this framework topics like weak and strong exogeneity among three major oil prices – represented by Brent, OPEC and Texas (WTI) – are addressed. The empirical results are that causality is most likely bi-directional among these crude oil prices – and hence rejecting a regionalization hypothesis of the global oil market – and also an influence from the OPEC oil price towards Bent and WTI, which are usually claimed to have a benchmark role.     

Short-Run Crude Oil Price and Surplus Production Capacity

This paper shows the effect that surplus crude oil production capacity has on short-term crude oil prices. A simple model using Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) industrial inventories and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) surplus production capacity is introduced. This model provides improved forecasts for the post Gulf War I time period over models without the capacity variable.     

一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析

中国作为大宗商品的国际大买家,争取国际定价权已经成为再也无法回避的问题.有鉴于此出,文章以石油为例,着重探讨石油定价战略选择的经济学机理,在一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易体系中,对OPEC和非OPEC石油输出国之间的博弈进行了一般均衡分析.根据模型设定参数及实验模拟发现,在Cournot双寡头垄断下,国家M的福利水平增加32.4%,而国家F的福利水平却下降0.8%.由此作出的解释是:与M相反,F是石油净进口国家,高油价和商品y较低的相对价格所产生的负面效应要大于闲暇带来的正面效应.此时,整个社会福利下降0.7%.石油在消费者效用函数中的权重较小时,石油生产的一个负向冲击对福利损失的影响非常有限.在F和M的纯策略集合{双寡头垄断,完全竞争,不生产石油}中,存在唯一的纳什均衡{完全竞争,完全竞争},这使得国家H和F从中获益.模型给人的启示是,除了尽快完善国家石油战略储备体系外,中国应积极参与到石油定价权的争夺中,改变目前完全被动承受油价变动影响的不利地位.     

TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OIL

The effect of terrorism on global oil prices has been largely explained through demand-side effects. We estimate an empirical model to re-examine the effect of terrorism on the price of global oil stocks across oil market regimes that reflect different supply constraints. We believe that terrorism will have larger impacts when global capacity is tight (i.e. when global demand is close to global supply). This means that any shock to capacity (say by conflict) should have the largest impact on profits before the first OPEC shock in the early 1970s. Since then, conflict shocks would not allow firms to exploit production in the same way, thus reducing the available profits that could be garnered by such production manipulation. If capacity constraints are binding when a conflict occurs, then we predict that a positive stock price reaction can be expected for oil firms from such a shock. We exploit a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between oil profitability and conflict, using conflict data from the top 20 oil producing and exporting countries in the world. We show that in the later part of our sample, 1974–2005, as cartel behavior of OPEC member countries has diminished and as conflict has become more regular and thus the information surrounding it noisier, oil stock prices do not increase in response to conflict. However, in earlier capacity constrained eras, we find that oil stocks can in fact increase in response to conflict. In some cases, the impact of conflict may cause the return of oil stocks to increase by as much as 10 percentage points.     

OPEC, rationality, and the macroeconomy

This paper builds a simple two-nation macro-model which includes a large manufacturing economy, such as the OECD and OPEC. Its distinguishing feature is that OPEC is a revenue-maximizing cartel who exploits the imperfectly elastic oil demand curve emerging from the rest of the world's use of imported oil as an intermediate good. Unlike the case of a small open economy facing OPEC, the large open economy is found to have a vertical aggregate supply curve. Consequently, anticipated macro-policies have no effect on real GNP. Moreover, micro-policies which induce the adoption of oil-saving technologies are also found to be neutral.     

政府干预风险投资的有效性:经验证据及启示

政府干预风险投资市场是国际上的一种普遍做法,然而就干预的有效性而言目前仍缺乏理论和实证上的明确回答。文章是对该问题的整体性实证研究,即考虑了常见的干预方式并以市场整体有效性为检验标准。基于经合组织国家数据的实证检验表明资金供给型政策没有显著效果,收益改善型政策有显著积极效果,这对调整我国倚重资金供给的政策格局有重要启示。     

OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements

This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model we find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables. It is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and OPEC chooses to be the follower. It is demonstrated, however, that for both agents the order of move is of minor (numerical) importance. Hence, the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour.     

Fuel Efficiency Improvements: Feedback Mechanisms and Distributional Effects in the Oil Market

We study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market, where the efficiency improvements are policy-induced in certain regions of the world. We are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect, carbon leakage and the “green paradox”, but also the distributional effects for oil producers. An intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced, where OPEC-Core producers have market power. We find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector, with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity. In the benchmark simulations, we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10% to oil price adjustments. In addition, there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy. There is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented. Finally, international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions; we estimate leakage rates of 35% or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies. Non-OPEC producers will to a larger degree than OPEC producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs.     

Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.     

CREDIT, MONEY AND THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT

A credit market is introduced into an IS-LM model with wealth effects and the government budget constraint explicitly considered, The model is able to handle issues such as a credit market shock that would be impossible to examine in standard models without a credit market. The analysis of more standard policies or shocks is enhanced by recognition of the role of the credit market, thus supporting the view that such recognition is both feasible and warranted.     

Predicting long-run risk factors of stock returns: Evidence from Australia

This study utilises the stock market data provided by the Australian Equity Database to analyse the long-run relationship between Australian stock returns and key macroeconomic variables over the period 1926–2017. To measure the diverse risk factors in the stock market, we examine the possible determinants in four main categories: real, financial, domestic and international. Our results reveal that historical stock returns are strongly connected to financial and international factors as compared to real and domestic factors. Both the 1973–1974 OPEC Oil Price Crisis and 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis had dampening effects on stock returns. There is a positive association between the US and Australian stock markets in the long-run. These findings on stock market dynamics and their linkages with domestic and international macroeconomic policy changes in the long-run have important implications for traders and practitioners.     

The validity of uncovered interest parity: Evidence from african members and non-member of the organisation of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC)

This paper re-examines uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzle using Africa where there is dearth of studies. It extends the previous literature in the following ways. It captures the heterogeneity (oil and non-oil sources of shocks) in the region by considering both African members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries- OPEC (Algeria, Nigeria and Angola) and non-member (South Africa) to ensure generalisation of findings. It also explores asymmetric exchange rate responses to diverse monetary policy stances from a new dimension by explicitly measuring asymmetries and capturing long- and short-run dynamics using the new non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) and asymmetric component AC-GARCH models along with other recent methods for results' robustness. Results from alternative methods show that UIP fails to hold in the African members and non-member of OPEC which is attributable to capital mobility restrictions and currency risk. However, asymmetric and permanent/transitory exchange rate response to monetary policy stances was noticed with little evidence of risk premium dynamics and role of price level instability in UIP validity.