Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training

This article studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers' career concerns. The model builds on the argument that the provision of general training reduces the employer's monopsony power. In this context, it is shown that the worker's implicit incentives to provide effort increase with the level of acquired general skills. The employer takes this reciprocal effect into account and becomes more willing to invest in general human capital. When the positive effect of training on worker's effort incentives is strong enough, the equilibrium outcome may involve overinvestment relative to the first-best. It is also shown that a sharper increase in worker's power associated with additional training may either strengthen or weaken the employer's investment incentives and can have either beneficial or detrimental effects on welfare.     

Promises in contract design

In this paper, we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency. If deviating from one's own words induces a self-imposed moral burden, the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract to whoever has the residual right to break such promise, in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). To study whether a worker's own promise of effort level governs his real choice of effort in a gift exchange game, we implement four treatments in our experiments by varying two factors: (1) who (the firm or the worker) takes the position of the proposer to propose the contract and (2) whether the proposed contract includes a nonbinding specification of the worker's effort level. Our key finding is that when it is the worker who proposes the contract and the contract includes the worker's promised effort level, both the worker's actual effort choice and the aggregate profits are significantly higher than in each of the other three treatments (and there is little difference in worker effort otherwise).     

STRATEGIC WITHHOLDING OF FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILLS IN WAGE BARGAINING

The bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm‐specific human capital is examined. It is shown that the worker's ability to withhold his/her skills strategically increases his/her bargaining power. Multiple efficient as well as inefficient equilibria involving delays in negotiation are characterized. When the firm has outside options, the range of both efficient and inefficient equilibria shrinks; moreover, delays are shortened in inefficient equilibria. The model predicts that wages are procyclical.     

A spillover‐based theory of credentialism

I propose a model in which credentials, such as diplomas, are instrumentally valuable to workers. The model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker's wage to their output. A worker's productivity is influenced by the skills of their co‐workers, where such skills arise from an ability‐augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co‐workers. Credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market, thereby allowing them to match with high‐skill co‐workers in equilibrium. Despite the positive externality associated with a worker's investment, I show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium.     

Job satisfaction and co-worker pay in Canadian firms

One reason to be concerned about income inequality is the idea that people care about not only their own absolute income but also their income relative to various reference groups (co-workers, friends, neighbours, relatives, etc.). We use Canadian linked employer–employee data to estimate the casual effect of co-worker pay on a worker's reported job and pay satisfaction. Since worker satisfaction can affect the worker's productivity, organizational commitment, turnover, creativity and innovation as well as the firm's productivity and profitability, this is an issue that requires more attention and careful examination. In models that control for a rich set of workplace characteristics, we find that co-worker pay has a large positive and significant effect on both pay and job satisfaction. In our preferred models with establishment-level fixed effects, the effect of co-worker pay on pay satisfaction is half as large and the effect on job satisfaction completely disappears, suggesting that part (all) of what previous studies attribute to the effect of co-worker pay on worker pay (job) satisfaction is driven by unobserved heterogeneity across firms or establishments. Our results also suggest that the effect of co-worker pay on worker satisfaction is much stronger for workers who leave their job during the following year. Finally, we find that while co-worker pay has a positive effect on pay satisfaction among Canadian-born whites, it has a negative effect among immigrants and Canadian-born visible minorities.     

Towards a More Complete Efficiency Wage Theory

The efficiency wage is an important topic in the theory of employment. In a traditional efficiency wage model, only the representative firm is optimizing against an assumed S‐shaped effort supply function. This S‐shaped supply curve is critical for the model and the absence of a derivation of the curve in the literature means that it is an incomplete theory. In the present paper, we extend the model by specifying a worker's representative utility function so that the corresponding argmax function will be the S‐shaped effort supply curve. This will make the worker's decision process endogenous and will produce a more complete model. The importance of this extension is clear. The characterization of the utility function will make explicit the necessary conditions and crucial assumptions of the traditional model. More importantly, the extension will allow researchers to introduce employment compensation factors into the worker's utility function for analysis. This has important bearings on future development in employment theory. For example, a worker's satisfaction from shirking (net of dismissal risks), or his or her willingness to search for jobs (net of search cost), can now be included in his or her utility function to form an optimal work or search strategy. Incorporating the worker's optimization behaviour into the model will also enable researchers to study policy directed not just towards firms but also towards the worker's decision process. Furthermore, this approach provides a framework for researchers to generate comparative statics. These comparative statics can lead to interesting topics for econometric models or to further research within this field.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

How amenities affect job and wage choices over the life cycle

Job amenities are explicitly included in a model of job choice over the life cycle. The amenities are characterized by an indivisibility—a worker must be present at a job to enjoy its amenities. This characterization has implications on initial job choice, a worker's wage profile and whether they move to a higher or lower paying job.     

Monitored by your friends,not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?

The aim of the paper is to determine the impact of severance payment on the motivation of the worker to make an effort, when there is a risk for him to be dismissed once his effort was made. We highlight through a two‐stage model the various factors which influence the dismissal decision by the firm and the worker's effort, such as the initial wage, the litigation costs and the relative bargaining powers of the parties when the relationship ends or goes on. In this context, we show that the impact of the severance payment paid ex post in case of dismissal on the level of effort chosen by the worker ex ante may depend on such characteristics.     

Employment And Mobility Of Workers In Industries With Different Intensity Of Innovation: Evidence On Italy From A Panel Of Workers And Firms

In this paper a panel of workers and firms is used to investigate employment composition and dynamics in industries which differ by innovation intensity. To define the latter industry-wide statistics were used (for a subset of 2,800 firms, individual data on R&D expenditures and investments in innovative processes were available from a survey on manufacturing). Firms and workers are observed over the period 1985–1991. The paper document an high rate of labour turnover. Annual separation rates are high in all size-classes, but they decline from 50% in small firms (less than 20 employees) to 13% in large ones (with more than 1,000 employees). Separations are inversely related to an industry's innovative intensity (from 18% in the highly innovative industries to 31% in the traditional industries). A logit model, which controlled for the characteristics of workers and firms, showed that the probability of separation is higher among manual and young workers and decreases monotonically with the firm size. The probability of separation declines as job tenure and, perhaps more importantly, the individual's wage increases. After controlling for these factors, the evidence suggests that the highest probability of separation is in traditional industries, the lowest is in the more innovative industries. The result is strengthened when firm-level data on R&D and other innovative expenditures are used. Other things being equal, firms that invest in R&D have a more stable labour force, and firms that invest in non-innovative processes have a less stable labour force. We therefore find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that more innovative firms cultivate more durable employer-employee relationships. The fraction of job-to-job moves (with no intervening period of unemployment) on total separations qualifies the turnover of workers. Controlling for firm size, the percentage of job-to-job moves increases fairly regularly with worker's skills and with the industry's innovative intensity. Thus the innovative intensity of he industry appears to have a positive effect on the share of job-to-job moves, while there is some evidence that it lowers the chances of separation. This result may be linked to the skills and specialisations of the workforce; it is certainly related to the higher demand for labour in the High Tech Sectors (where employment is growing) relative to the less innovative sectors.     

Performance Pay,Productivity and Morale*

This paper incorporates the notion of worker morale into an economic model of pay and performance, and examines its implications for the efficacy and design of performance-based pay schemes. A worker's morale is determined by his relative pay status. A contract that rewards only individual performance can therefore undermine the morale of the least skilled workers in a firm and thereby adversely affect their productivity. On the other hand, competition for relative pay status tends to boost the productivity of highly skilled workers in the firm. The net effect on productivity depends on the composition of the firm's workforce. If the workforce is sufficiently heterogeneous then the inclusion of a profit-sharing component in the pay contract, which reduces the pay differential across workers, can sufficiently boost the morale of the least skilled workers as to improve overall productivity and profitability.     

Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long-term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

Role of psychological variables in the determination of the worker's wage: Further evidence from the United States

The current study examines the roles of three psychological variables, job satisfaction, positive attitude and self‐satisfaction, in the determination of the worker's wage. Using two samples from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths, 1979 (NLSY79), the study for the first time models a possible simultaneous relationship among these four variables and estimates these equations by an appropriate two‐stage procedure. Our results indicate that the worker's wage is positively related to these psychological variables. This finding has important policy implications and thus it calls for future research in this direction.     

Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using questionnaire data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.     

Evolution of the Interindustry Wage Structure in China Since the 1980s

Industry mean wages in China have exhibited sharply increased dispersion since the early1990s. Researchers have attributed this rising inequality within the industrial wage structure to: (i) increasingly competitive labour markets leading to better matches between worker pay, worker skills and employer demands; or (ii) residual government control in some industrial sectors that has generated high wages through monopoly rent sharing. We argue that the rise in China's industrial wage dispersion is primarily attributable to increasingly competitive labour markets, which have led to greater returns to schooling and to efficient redistribution of workers across major industry groups. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the level or changes in government monopoly power has had negligible impact on China's rising industrial wage dispersion.     

A bivariate probit approach to the determination of employment: a study of teen employment differentials in Los Angeles County

Following a bivariate probit approach and using the 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) for Los Angeles County, this study shows that the employment of teenage workers depends on both the worker's participation decision as well as the employer's hiring decision. Omission of the role of participation decision from the estimation of employment probability yields misleading evidence of hiring discrimination against Blacks. This evidence, however, disappears when the participation and hiring equations are estimated jointly in a bivariate framework. The study finds no evidence of discrimination against females and Latinos. In addition, the study shows that family, household and neighbourhood characteristics play significant roles in the determination of teen employment.     

The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.