Performance Pay,Productivity and Morale*

This paper incorporates the notion of worker morale into an economic model of pay and performance, and examines its implications for the efficacy and design of performance-based pay schemes. A worker's morale is determined by his relative pay status. A contract that rewards only individual performance can therefore undermine the morale of the least skilled workers in a firm and thereby adversely affect their productivity. On the other hand, competition for relative pay status tends to boost the productivity of highly skilled workers in the firm. The net effect on productivity depends on the composition of the firm's workforce. If the workforce is sufficiently heterogeneous then the inclusion of a profit-sharing component in the pay contract, which reduces the pay differential across workers, can sufficiently boost the morale of the least skilled workers as to improve overall productivity and profitability.     

A spillover‐based theory of credentialism

I propose a model in which credentials, such as diplomas, are instrumentally valuable to workers. The model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker's wage to their output. A worker's productivity is influenced by the skills of their co‐workers, where such skills arise from an ability‐augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co‐workers. Credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market, thereby allowing them to match with high‐skill co‐workers in equilibrium. Despite the positive externality associated with a worker's investment, I show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium.     

Role of psychological variables in the determination of the worker's wage: Further evidence from the United States

The current study examines the roles of three psychological variables, job satisfaction, positive attitude and self‐satisfaction, in the determination of the worker's wage. Using two samples from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths, 1979 (NLSY79), the study for the first time models a possible simultaneous relationship among these four variables and estimates these equations by an appropriate two‐stage procedure. Our results indicate that the worker's wage is positively related to these psychological variables. This finding has important policy implications and thus it calls for future research in this direction.     

Monetary Reference Points of Managers – Empirical Evidence of Status Quo Preferences and Social Comparisons

We explore whether monetary reference points affect managers′ job satisfaction. These reference points include a manager′s own status quo and the incomes of comparable managers within the same firm and also at the market level. Making use of a unique panel data set of managers in the German chemical sector, we find that social comparisons of compensation do affect reported job satisfaction. Both the relative income position within a manager's own firm and a manager's wage rank on the market have positive relations with job satisfaction. There is no evidence of the relevance of status quo considerations once we control for firm‐related pay variables.     

The impact of job security on job satisfaction in economic contractions versus expansions

Job security, often measured using the perceived risk of job loss in the near future, is a significant determinant of job satisfaction. We posit that the impact job security has on job satisfaction is not only a function of how likely it is that a worker loses a job but also how likely it is that a worker could find another. The effect this has on worker job satisfaction then is different depending on whether perceived job loss occurs (or not) when job openings are scarce or when job openings are plentiful. We use difference-in-differences analysis of the 1997 and 2008 waves from the National Study of the Changing Workforce to show that three measures of job security increase private sector worker job satisfaction, and reduce worker incentives to quit, more when job openings are relatively scarce (during contractions) than when job openings are relatively plentiful (during expansions). We find that our results are strongest among less-educated workers.     

How amenities affect job and wage choices over the life cycle

Job amenities are explicitly included in a model of job choice over the life cycle. The amenities are characterized by an indivisibility—a worker must be present at a job to enjoy its amenities. This characterization has implications on initial job choice, a worker's wage profile and whether they move to a higher or lower paying job.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long-term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.     

Promises in contract design

In this paper, we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency. If deviating from one's own words induces a self-imposed moral burden, the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract to whoever has the residual right to break such promise, in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). To study whether a worker's own promise of effort level governs his real choice of effort in a gift exchange game, we implement four treatments in our experiments by varying two factors: (1) who (the firm or the worker) takes the position of the proposer to propose the contract and (2) whether the proposed contract includes a nonbinding specification of the worker's effort level. Our key finding is that when it is the worker who proposes the contract and the contract includes the worker's promised effort level, both the worker's actual effort choice and the aggregate profits are significantly higher than in each of the other three treatments (and there is little difference in worker effort otherwise).     

情感型领导对同事关系亲密度与员工创新行为的影响:一个被调节的中介模型

基于中国本土学者提出的情感型领导风格,以社会学习理论与创新成分模型为理论视角,考察了情感型领导对员工创新行为的影响,探讨了同事关系亲密度的中介作用和工作自主性的调节作用。采用层级回归分析、验证性因素分析和基于SPSS插件PROCESS的Bootstrap方法,对收集的360份配对问卷进行分析。结果发现,情感型领导对员工创新行为与同事关系亲密度有显著正向作用;同事关系亲密度中介了情感型领导与创新行为关系;工作自主性调节了情感型领导对同事关系亲密度的影响,工作自主性越高,情感型领导对同事关系亲密度的影响越显著;另外,工作自主性也调节了情感型领导通过同事关系亲密度对工作绩效的间接影响,工作自主性越高,关系亲密度的中介作用越显著。     

Returns to job satisfaction in the presence of horizontal mismatch

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we study the relationship among horizontal mismatch, job satisfaction and wages using data from the 2013 Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT). Estimates from 2SLS indicate that 1) field-occupation match in the highest degree has a positive effect on job satisfaction and wages; and 2) controlling for field-occupation matches, job satisfaction has a positive but diminishing effect on wages with a large heterogeneity across different age groups. In addition, we also distinguish between job satisfaction arising from benefits and job satisfaction that is productivity enhancing and find both to have a positive but nonlinear effect on wages.     

Towards a More Complete Efficiency Wage Theory

The efficiency wage is an important topic in the theory of employment. In a traditional efficiency wage model, only the representative firm is optimizing against an assumed S‐shaped effort supply function. This S‐shaped supply curve is critical for the model and the absence of a derivation of the curve in the literature means that it is an incomplete theory. In the present paper, we extend the model by specifying a worker's representative utility function so that the corresponding argmax function will be the S‐shaped effort supply curve. This will make the worker's decision process endogenous and will produce a more complete model. The importance of this extension is clear. The characterization of the utility function will make explicit the necessary conditions and crucial assumptions of the traditional model. More importantly, the extension will allow researchers to introduce employment compensation factors into the worker's utility function for analysis. This has important bearings on future development in employment theory. For example, a worker's satisfaction from shirking (net of dismissal risks), or his or her willingness to search for jobs (net of search cost), can now be included in his or her utility function to form an optimal work or search strategy. Incorporating the worker's optimization behaviour into the model will also enable researchers to study policy directed not just towards firms but also towards the worker's decision process. Furthermore, this approach provides a framework for researchers to generate comparative statics. These comparative statics can lead to interesting topics for econometric models or to further research within this field.     

The Productivity Effects of Worker Mobility Between Heterogeneous Firms

We analyze the effect of worker inflows on establishments’ productivity, using German data. Previous studies for other countries have found positive effects of hiring workers from superior (more productive or higher paying) firms. Ranking establishments by their median wage, we find that inflows from inferior establishments seem to increase hiring establishments’ productivity. Further empirical analyses suggest our findings are due to a positive selection of such inflows from their sending establishments. These workers might have to find a better job match in order to advance their careers, an interpretation supported by the finding that the effect is driven by workers with short tenure at their previous employer. Our findings reflect the increasingly assortative pattern of worker mobility in Germany found in a related strand of literature.     

共创价值对顾客忠诚和员工工作绩效的影响

利用对420名消费者的问卷调查数据,运用结构方程模型实证分析了共创价值是如何影响顾客满意和员工工作满意度、进而如何作用于顾客忠诚和员工工作绩效水平的。结果表明:共创价值与顾客满意显著相关,并对顾客满意具有促进作用;顾客满意对顾客忠诚具有促进作用;共创价值与员工工作满意度显著相关,并对员工工作满意度具有促进作用;员工工作满意度对其工作绩效具有促进作用;顾客满意与员工工作绩效显著相关,并对员工工作绩效具有促进作用;员工工作满意度与顾客忠诚显著相关,并对顾客忠诚具有促进作用。     

New implications of Lazear's skill-weights approach

A new approach to the theory of specific human capital, proposed by Lazear (2009), assumes that all skills are general but that firms use them with different weights attached. In Lazear's analysis, the decision to invest in the worker's acquisition of various skills is assumed to maximize the expected net joint surplus of the worker and the employer. This paper explores new implications of the skill-weights approach when the worker and the firm independently and non-cooperatively invest in the worker's skills.     

企业员工人口特征对薪酬满意度影响实证研究——以建筑行业为例

薪酬体系是人力资源管理的关键环节和重要内容。本文从人口特征的视角研究了建筑企业员工薪酬满意度,通过对建筑企业200名员工的调查数据分析,发现除了性别、年龄之外,婚姻状况、学历、职位、工龄等对薪酬满意度(包括薪酬水平、薪酬结构、薪酬体系、薪酬形式等)均有不同程度的影响。最后,对研究结果进行了讨论并提出了管理建议:树立人力资本理念,提高员工薪酬总体满意度;提高已婚员工的福利水平;建立动态薪酬管理体系;优化薪酬结构设计。     

Monitored by your friends,not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.     

Entry costs and cross-country differences in productivity and output

This paper contributes to the literature on cross-country income differences by studying the effect of entry barriers on productivity and output. Using instrumental variable regressions I show that higher entry costs significantly reduce output per worker and that they do so by lowering total factor productivity. In particular, an increase in entry costs by 80% of income per capita, which is one half of their standard deviation in my sample, is estimated to decrease total factor productivity and output per worker by 22% and 29%, respectively.