Timing under individual evolutionary learning in a continuous double auction

The moment of order submission plays an important role for the trading outcome in a Continuous Double Auction; submitting an offer at the beginning of the trading period may yield a lower profit, as the trade is likely to be settled at the own offered price, whereas late offers result in a lower probability of trading. This timing problem makes the order submission strategy more difficult. We extend the behavioral model of Individual Evolutionary Learning to incorporate the timing problem and study the limiting distribution of submission moments and the resulting offer function that maps submission moments to offers. We find that traders submit different offers at different submission moments the distribution of which uni-modal with a peak moving from late to early as the market size increases. This behavior exacerbates efficiency loss from learning. If traders evaluate profitability of their strategies over longer history, orders are submitted later with the same effect of market size.     

Price movement and trade size on the National Stock Exchange of India

Using data for the National Stock Exchange of India, we examine three hypotheses about which trades move prices. The Stealth Trading Hypothesis proposes that cumulative price changes (CPCs) are concentrated in particular trade sizes due to the strategic trading of informed traders. We find that depending on market conditions, from 60% to 80% of the CPC is concentrated in small trade sizes, with almost all of the remaining price change concentrated in medium trade sizes. These results support the Stealth Trading Hypothesis.     

Intermarket sweep order trade size clustering around corporate announcements

Investors have different trade size preferences depending on their information advantage. Using intermarket sweep orders (ISOs), we find that investors appear to prefer using small, round lot trades around corporate events with higher announcement frequency and more predictable timing, such as earnings announcements. Around these corporate events, information is revealed, and analyst estimates are confirmed or rejected. Conversely, share repurchase announcements happen less frequently and the timing of these announcements are unpredictable. Relative to earnings announcements, share repurchase announcements create more uncertainty than they resolve. We find that when investors have less information, they tend to use costlier, larger trade size multiples. We further support the extant finding that trade sizes are smaller with the advent of high-frequency trading.     

The intraday relation between return volatility, transactions, and volume

In this article, we examine the relation between return volatility, average trade size, and the frequency of transactions using transaction data. Consistent with Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994)(. Review of Financial Studies, 7, 631–651), our results show that the frequency of trades has a high explanatory power for return volatility. However, contrary to their finding, we find that average trade size contains nontrivial information for return volatility. The positive relation between return volatility and average trade size is more significant for actively traded stocks. Furthermore, return volatility exhibits significant intraday variations. It is found that the effect of trade frequency on return volatility is much stronger in the opening trading period.     

Market for Information and Identity Disclosure in an Experimental Open Limit Order Book

This paper analyses the effects of pre‐trade transparency on market quality in an experimental open limit order book preceded by a market for information. The design of the trading game is akin to the system in use in an increasing number of financial markets. We find that the disclosure of traders' identities reduces the incentive to acquire information, liquidity and volatility. We also show that a positive relation exists between the proportion of traders buying information and liquidity. The results are consistent with a standard model of price formation where the number of informed traders is endogenous .     

Who trades quickly?

We examine differences among US equity market participants according to how quickly, on average, they execute their orders. When traders who execute faster buy (sell), market prices tend to rise (decline). Those who trade more quickly take liquidity more, use smaller trade sizes, transact more frequently, and spread their trading across more venues. Although faster traders are net liquidity demanders, they pay a lower cost to trade. Our results indicate that systematic differences exist across market participants according to how fast they transact, and those with a shorter time to execution exhibit traits that are consistent with information-based trading.     

Intra-good trade in Germany: a first look at the evidence

This article contributes to the literature by using newly released comprehensive transaction-level data on all exports and imports to document facts about the amount of intra-good trade – the simultaneous export and import of identical goods by one firm – in Germany. Combined data for trade transactions and for characteristics of a representative large sample of trading firms are then used to report differences between firms that export and import different goods only (inter-good traders) and firms that engage in the simultaneous export and import of identical goods (intra-good traders). We find that the share of intra-good trade in total trade was some 17% in Germany in 2012. Intra-good trade matters. This share differs widely between broadly defined groups of goods and between industries. Controlling for detailed industry affiliation, intra-good traders differ significantly from inter-good traders – they are larger, more human capital intensive, more productive, have a higher R&D intensity and are more profitable. The data, however, are not rich enough to reveal the direction of causality between intra-good trade and firm performance and to investigate empirically the reasons why some firms engage in intra-good trade.     

Information, trade and incomplete markets

The no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey, J Econ Theory 26:17–27 (1982), states that if rational traders begin with an ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation then the arrival of information cannot generate trade. This paper allows traders to trade before and after the arrival of information. If there are enough securities to hedge against all payoff relevant risk, then the preinformation-arrival allocation is Pareto optimal and information arrival has no effect. This no-retrade result is the competitive analog of the no-trade result of (1982). However, information generically generates trade when markets are state-contingent incomplete.We thank seminar participants at Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon,Cornell, Essex, London, Maastricht, USC, and York and participants at the 2003 SITE, the 2003 SAET and the Fall 2002 Cornell–Penn State Macro Conference. We also thank Karl Shell and a referee for this journal for useful comments     

Commissions Matter: The Trading Behavior of Institutional and Individual Active Traders

We examine how commissions influence trading behavior by analyzing a unique data set of the equity trades of both individual and institutional active traders. Individual traders pay higher trading costs than institutional traders. As a result, they engage in more risky trading behaviors in order to cover these costs. Individual traders also trade significantly less because of their higher cost of trading. Individual traders tend to trade higher-priced stocks, hold their trades longer, and they experience much larger price swings than institutional traders. This leads individual traders to realize more dramatic gains and losses on their round-trips.     

Speculative securities

Summary. A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends in part on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it is a poorer hedge against their endowment risks at the time of trade, and has an associated adverse selection cost. In the specific institutional setting of innovation of futures contracts, we show that a futures exchange may not have an incentive to introduce a speculative security even when all traders favor it. Received: July 19, 1998; revised version: August 31, 1998     

成交风险、交易成本、逆向选择风险与投资者订单选择

本文利用多元对教条件自田归计数模型讨论了交易概率、交易成本以及选择成本等市场微观结构因素对中国证券市场投资者订单选择的影响.实证研究发现:(1)交易成本的增加会削弱投贵者递交指令的积极性,当成交风险较大时,投资者更偏好市价订单;(2)由于中国证券市场订单类型较为单一,逆向选择风险对投资者订单选择行为并无显著性的影响;(3)在同质信息的驱动下不同类型订单之间具有显著的持续和交叉相关性.     

Limit order books,uninformed traders and commodity derivatives: Insights from the European carbon futures

This paper provides a suitable model for studying the strategic behavior of uninformed investors that trade commodity derivatives via limit order books. Two main testable implications are obtained after solving for the model equilibrium. The adverse selection costs of uninformed traders depend on the inflow of market orders and their risk aversion. Next, the adverse selection costs of uninformed buyers and sellers and the difference of their asset valuations determine the size of their bid-ask spread.An analysis of European carbon futures data confirms the relevance of these implications. Moreover, we detect a diagonal effect that results in a positive correlation of market orders, which is driven by adverse selection, then by order splitting strategies and by imitative strategies of uninformed traders to a lesser extent.     

Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as real estate agencies in the housing market and employment agencies (or newspapers) in the labour market, which puts traders into direct contact with each other. With heterogeneity of trader preferences, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on each side of the market trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade co-exist, namely a strategic bilateral bargaining process and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.     

Herding,contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time.     

Zero-intelligence versus human agents: An experimental analysis of the efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter markets of varying sizes

We study two well-known electronic markets: an over-the-counter (OTC) market, in which each trader looks for the best counterpart through bilateral negotiations, and a double auction (DA) market, in which traders post their quotes publicly. We focus on the DA–OTC efficiency gap and show how it varies with different market sizes (10, 20, 40, and 80 traders). We compare experimental results from a sample of 6400 undergraduate students in Economics and Management with zero-intelligence agent-based simulations. Simulation results show that the traded quantity increases with market size under both DA and OTC. Experimental results confirm the same tendency under DA, while the share of periods in which the traded quantity is lower than the efficient one increases with market size under OTC, ultimately leading to a DA–OTC efficiency gap increasing with the market size. We rationalize these results by putting forward a simple model of OTC market as a repeated bargaining procedure under incomplete information on buyers' valuations and sellers' costs. We show that efficiency decreases slightly with size due to two counteracting effects: acceptance rates in earlier interactions decrease with size, and earlier offers increase, but not always enough to compensate for the decrease in acceptance rates.     

Informational efficiency: ranking markets

Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market (OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset. Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999     

Information,trade and common knowledge

In any voluntary trading process, if agents have rational expectations, then it is common knowledge among them that the equilibrium trade is feasible and individually rational. This condition is used to show that when risk-averse traders begin at a Pareto optimal allocation (relative to their prior beliefs) and then receive private information (which disturbs the marginal conditions), they can still never agree to any non-null trade. On markets, information is revealed by price changes. An equilibrium with fully revealing price changes always exists, and even at other equilibria the information revealed by price changes “swamps” each trader's private information.     

Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents

Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving. Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California.     

Order Flows,Investor Sentiments and Feedback Trade in Index Futures Market

This paper examines the presence of feedback trading, and investor sentiment drove feedback trading by traders in the Nifty 50 index futures contract in India. The results of the study using high-frequency data sampled at 10 min interval using VAR and contemporaneous VAR model as applied to market microstructure settings reveals negative evidence of feedback trade and investor sentiment-driven feedback trade in Nifty 50 futures contract. Further, consistency with noise trading hypothesis, order flows in Nifty 50 futures contract is less informative when traders are overly optimistic.

     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.