Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting arrow social welfare functions

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternative effecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (i is indifferent between any two alternatives that have the same ith component) we characterize all the families of permissible individual preferences that admit nondictatorial Arrow-type social welfare functions. We also show that the existence of such a function for a given family of preferences is independent of n provided that is greater than one.     

Implementation with partial provability

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents? preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others? preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost.     

Provided and perceived status quo in choice experiments: Implications for valuing the outputs of multifunctional rural areas

This article presents a choice experiment analyzing multifunctional rural development policies targeting conservation and recovery of environmental, social and cultural assets. In choice experiments a base alternative is usually included in order to estimate the welfare change associated to policy proposals. This study is concerned with the much neglected issue of the impact on policy analysis of the definition of a ‘status quo’ alternative either as an objective assessment by experts, or as a self-reported perception by respondents. Convergent validity analysis and prospective policy scenarios show a significant impact of different status quo specifications on individuals' preferences and related welfare measures when complex and unfamiliar biophysical systems are involved in policy analysis and evaluation.     

Cost thresholds,cut-offs and sensitivities in stated choice analysis: Identification and implications

Within the discrete choice literature, there is growing recognition that some respondents do not process all attributes when evaluating their choice outcomes. Worryingly, the cost attribute is often among those attributes that are likely to be ignored by respondents. We use probabilistic decision process models (similar in form to latent class models, but where we define the classes to describe specific heuristics) to facilitate situations where respondents adopt cost thresholds and cut-offs. We further develop this model to address the potential confounding between preference heterogeneity and processing heterogeneity by simultaneously allowing for a segmentation of respondents based on their sensitivities to cost. Results, based on an empirical dataset on the existence value of rare fish species in Ireland, provide further confirmation that a share of respondents did not attended to cost. Importantly, however, when heterogeneity to cost levels is accounted for the inferred incidence of complete non-attendance is markedly lower, to the extent that when cost thresholds and cut-offs are also accommodated it almost disappears. This modelling approach leads to significant gains in model fit and has important implications for welfare analysis.     

The internalization of externalities in the production of electricity: Willingness to pay for the attributes of a policy for renewable energy

This paper investigates the willingness to pay of a sample of residents of Bath, England, for a hypothetical program that promotes the production of renewable energy. Using choice experiments, we assess the preferences of respondents for a policy for the promotion of renewable energy that: (i) contributes to the internalization of the external costs caused by fossil fuel technologies; (ii) affects the short-term security of energy supply; (iii) has an impact on the employment in the energy sector; and (iv) leads to an increase in the electricity bill. Responses to the choice questions show that our respondents are in favour of a policy for renewable energy and that they attach a high value to a policy that brings private and public benefits in terms of climate change and energy security benefits. Our results therefore suggest that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to internalize the external costs in terms of energy security, climate change and air pollution caused by the production of electricity.     

Choice and individual welfare

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is.     

Salience and social choice

The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In a controlled experiment with 100 subjects placed in the role of social planners, we test five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to determine the efficacy of traditional social choice models in predicting social planner allocations when presented with choice sets designed to test the axioms of the theory. We find that three properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, and a framing effect in social choice. We find support for scale invariance and a preference for tail-increasing transfers. Our experiment also enables us to test a model of salience-based social choice which predicts the systematic deviations and highlights the close relationship between these anomalies and the classical paradoxes for risk and time.

     

Standards and the regulation of environmental risk

We study regulatory design for a pollution-generating firm who is better informed than the regulator regarding pollution mitigation possibilities, and who chooses an unobservable action when employing a particular mitigation plan. We distinguish among performance, process, and design standards, and study the relative merit of each type of regulatory instrument. Relative to previous work on standards design, we emphasize technology and process verification. An optimal performance standard is relatively strict when regulator and firm preferences are congruent, but the regulator may prefer no performance standard at all if verification costs are sufficiently high. A process standard unambiguously increases expected surplus (relative to no regulation) in some environments, and otherwise improves welfare only when it is unlikely to generate a “bad” technology choice by the firm. A design standard can improve welfare if the regulator is sufficiently well informed about the technological possibilities for pollution control, but only when the firm’s private benefits from technology choice are sufficiently small.     

Rural versus urban preferences for renewable energy developments

Development of renewable energy resources, such as wind farms and hydro-electric schemes, are being promoted as a new method of expanding and diversifying employment in rural areas. However, such energy projects are associated with a range of environmental impacts which might be detrimental to other economic activities, such as those based on nature tourism. The authors use a Choice Experiment to quantify peoples' preferences over environmental and employment impacts that may result from the deployment of renewable energy projects in rural areas of Scotland, focussing in particular on any differences between the preferences of urban and rural dwellers, and on heterogeneity within these groups. Rural and urban households are shown to have different welfare gains which are dependent on the type of renewable energy technology and on the scale of project under consideration.     

Effects of income and social awareness on consumer WTP for social product attributes

Recent developments in environmental and animal welfare issues, and the introduction of new production practices may have affected consumer attitudes and preferences toward differentiated product choice. Factors such as animal well-being, environmentally friendly production, and the use of antibiotics appear to be increasingly core consumer concerns. We link the aforementioned with Maslow's hierarchy of needs suggesting that the higher income consumers should be more altruistic in their consumptive behavior and test this by evaluating consumer preferences for these attributes in pork chops. We also test whether social consciousness of the consumers translates into choice behavior. Data was obtained by choice experiment surveys and mixed logit estimation was used to estimate consumers' willingness-to-pay for the credence attributes. Results reveal that both, higher income and socially aware consumers are on average willing to pay higher premiums for the antibiotic-free attribute, but not for other two social attributes. Also, the group of higher income consumers is highly heterogeneous in their preferences, whereas socially aware consumers tend to be more homogeneous in their preferences.     

Parallel trade,product quality,and welfare

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.     

Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly

This article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.     

Reference Dependence Effects on WTA and WTP Value Functions and Their Disparity

In this study we investigate two reference dependence effects in a choice experiment. The first is the effect of the well-known distinction between gains and losses, the second is the effect of changing the reference value on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The latter has to our knowledge not been studied before. We hypothesize that there are differences between WTA and WTP, and that both value functions and their disparity are affected by the absolute value of the reference point. We test our hypotheses using a choice experiment with trade-offs between changes in flood probabilities and costs. The choice experiments elicit WTP and WTA, using two flood probability reference values, yielding four separate value functions. Our findings show that a substantial WTA–WTP disparity exists, and that this disparity increases when moving away from the reference point. Also, both WTA and WTP value functions are affected by the flood probability reference value, and the WTA–WTP disparity increases when the flood probability reference point increases. Both findings suggest that welfare effects caused by changes in public good provision depend not only on the direction of change (loss aversion), but also the reference value. Moreover, our results show that the latter effect is larger for losses than for gains. We introduce the concept of reference point updating as a possible explanation for these findings.     

Renewable energy innovations in Europe: a dynamic panel data approach

We investigate the determinants of renewable energy R&D intensity and the impact of renewable energy innovations on firm performance, using several dynamic panel data models. We estimate these models using a large data set of European firms from 19 different countries, with some patenting activity in areas related to renewable energies during the 1987 to 2007 period. Our results confirm our priors on the determinants of the rapid development of renewable energy R&D intensity during the past decades. Additionally, we find evidence that renewable patent intensity has a significant dynamic impact on the stock market value of firms.     

Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, D50.     

Farmers' preferences for crop variety traits: Lessons for on-farm conservation and technology adoption

Although in-situ conservation is increasingly considered an efficient way of conserving plant genetic resources, little is known about the incentives and constraints that govern conservation decisions among small farm holders in developing countries. Using a choice experiment approach, we investigated Ethiopian farmers' crop variety preferences, estimated the mean willingness to pay for each crop variety attribute, and identified household-specific and institutional factors that governed the preferences. We found that environmental adaptability and yield stability are important attributes for farmers' choice of crop varieties. Farmers are willing to forego some extra income or yield to obtain a more stable and environmentally adaptable crop variety. Among other things, household resource endowments (particularly land holdings and livestock ownership), years of farming experience, and contact with extension services are the major factors causing household heterogeneity of crop variety preferences. Based on our experimental results, we derived important policy implications for on-farm conservation, breeding priority setting, and improved variety adoption in Ethiopia.     

Tax principles and tax harmonization under imperfect competition: A cautionary example

This paper shows that under imperfect competition, the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ.     

A model of technological breakthrough in the renewable energy sector

Models with induced technological change in the energy sector often predict a gradual expansion of renewable energies, and a substantial share of fossil fuels remaining in the energy mix through the end of our century. However, there are historical examples where new products or technologies expanded rapidly and achieved a high output in a relatively short period of time. This paper explores the possibility of a ‘technological breakthrough’ in the renewable energy sector, using a partial equilibrium model of energy generation with endogenous R&D. Our results indicate, that due to increasing returns-to-scale, a multiplicity of equilibria can arise. In the model, two stable states can coexist, one characterized by a lower and one by higher supply of renewable energy. The transition from the low-output to the high-output equilibrium is characterized by a discontinuous rise in R&D activity and capacity investments in the renewable energy sector. The transition can be triggered by a rise in world energy demand, by a drop in the supply of fossil fuels, or by policy intervention. Under market conditions, the transition occurs later than in the social optimum. Hence, we identify a market failure related to path-dependence and technological lock-in, that can justify a strong policy intervention initially. Paradoxically, well-intended energy-saving policies can actually lead to higher emissions, as they reduce the incentives to invest in renewable energies by having a cushioning effect on the energy price. Hence, these policies should be supplemented by other instruments that restore the incentives to invest in renewable energies. Finally, we discuss the influence of monopoly power in the market for innovations. We show that market power can alleviate the problem of technological lock-in, but creates a new market failure that reduces static efficiency.     

Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice

Do violations of classical rationality theory imply that agents are acting against their self-interest? To answer this question, we investigate whether completeness and transitivity necessarily hold when agents choose outcome rationally—that is, their choice sequences do not lead to dominated outcomes. We show that, because of the danger of money pumps and other manipulations, outcome rationality implies that agents must have transitive psychological preferences. Revealed preferences, on the other hand, must be complete since agents can be forced to choose from any set of options. But these justifications of transitivity and completeness cannot be combined. We show that if psychological preferences are incomplete then revealed preferences can be intransitive without exposing agents to manipulations or violating outcome rationality. We also show that a specific case of nonstandard behavior, status quo maintenance, is outcome-rational in the simple environments considered in the experimental literature, but not in more complex settings.