Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach

In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social welfare functions for uncertain incomes. Our most general result is that a small number of reasonable assumptions regarding welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure ex ante as well as pure ex post evaluations. Any social welfare function that satisfies these axioms should lie strictly between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted average of the minimum and the maximum of ex post and ex ante evaluations.     

Dynamic Choice and the Common Ratio Effect: an Experimental Investigation

The common ratio effect is a well-attested violation of expected utility theory. This paper uses four principles of dynamic choice to characterise alternative theoretical strategies for explaining the effect. It reports an experiment which tests these principles and, by implication, several well-known accounts of the common ratio effect. Unlike previous work, the experimental design uses real financial incentives without presupposing any dynamic choice principles. We find violation of a principle of 'timing independence', which is part of most existing theories of dynamic choice. We examine the implications of this finding for decision theory and economics.     

Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.     

Should refusal to sell be illegal?

We analyse a private firm's decision of whether to refuse to sell to a particular group of consumers whose interaction with other consumers generates negative externalities. The literature has rarely incorporated this motive directly into the firm's profit-maximisation problem. Discriminatory refusal-to-sell policies can increase profits and consumer utility among those affected by the negative externality. Of course it also reduces utility among consumers who are refused, raising the possibility of an indeterminate effect on social welfare. We obtain a stark and rather surprising result: The refusal-to-sell policy is socially optimal whenever it is individually optimal for a profit-maximising firm to adopt such a policy. No legislation or regulation is required from a social-welfare perspective (under the assumptions used in the specification of the social welfare function). We prove this result analytically for the case of linear demand functions. Numerical simulations show that the result also holds for constant-price-elasticity demand functions.     

Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization

Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondences resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. We also show that these axioms are logically independent.     

Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy

Economic evaluation of climate policy traditionally treats uncertainty by appealing to expected utility theory. Yet our knowledge of the impacts of climate policy may not be of sufficient quality to be described by unique probabilistic beliefs. In such circumstances, it has been argued that the axioms of expected utility theory may not be the correct standard of rationality. By contrast, several axiomatic frameworks have recently been proposed that account for ambiguous knowledge. In this paper, we apply static and dynamic versions of a smooth ambiguity model to climate mitigation policy. We obtain a general result on the comparative statics of optimal abatement and ambiguity aversion, and then extend our analysis to a more realistic, dynamic setting, where we introduce scientific ambiguity into the well-known DICE model of the climate-economy system. For policy-relevant exogenous mitigation policies, we show that the value of emissions abatement increases as ambiguity aversion increases, and that this ‘ambiguity premium’ can in some plausible cases be very large. In these cases the effect of ambiguity aversion on welfare is comparable to that of other much studied welfare parameters. Thus ambiguity aversion may be an important neglected aspect of climate change economics, and seems likely to provide another argument for strong abatement policy.     

Choice, preference and rationalizability in pareto’s theory of economic behavior

Pareto initiated the shift of economic theory from utility/preference to choice in order to fill a gap between theoretical and empirical economics. His suggestions for an empirically-oriented theory of choice were to be developed decades later in the literature on revealed preference and on the conditions of equivalence between preference-based and choice-based axiomatic structures. In the process, however, substantial departures from Pareto’s implicit design of the situation of choice were introduced. In this paper, the conditions for the rationalizability of choice are re-defined so that they fit the type of situation that Pareto had in mind. The result is that the main consistency axioms of standard choice theory have to give way to a different combination of axioms that concern decisiveness as well as consistency. (JEL:B13, D01, D11).     

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom

We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense.     

Deriving and Testing Efficient Estimates of WTP Distributions in Destination Choice Models

Estimation of welfare measures is often a dominant driver in the empirical literature on nonmarket valuation. To this end, qualitative choice models based on random utility theory have been widely employed in outdoor recreation studies. A frequent goal of applied studies has been the estimation of welfare changes associated with site attribute changes at recreation sites in order to inform regulatory policy and resource management. We review the evolution of the methodology of random utility theory in this field with a focus on taste heterogeneity models and then focus on the recent proposal of specifying utility in the WTP-space (Train K, Weeks M (2005) Discrete choice models in preference space and willing-to-pay space. In: Scarpa R, Alberini A (eds) Applications of simulation methods in environmental and resource economics, chapter 1. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 1–16). Our empirical application is on outdoor alpine recreation data. We emphasize the efficiency and direct testing that using the maximum simulated likelihood estimator affords to practitioners using the WTP-space approach, and illustrate these with examples.     

Reference Dependence Effects on WTA and WTP Value Functions and Their Disparity

In this study we investigate two reference dependence effects in a choice experiment. The first is the effect of the well-known distinction between gains and losses, the second is the effect of changing the reference value on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The latter has to our knowledge not been studied before. We hypothesize that there are differences between WTA and WTP, and that both value functions and their disparity are affected by the absolute value of the reference point. We test our hypotheses using a choice experiment with trade-offs between changes in flood probabilities and costs. The choice experiments elicit WTP and WTA, using two flood probability reference values, yielding four separate value functions. Our findings show that a substantial WTA–WTP disparity exists, and that this disparity increases when moving away from the reference point. Also, both WTA and WTP value functions are affected by the flood probability reference value, and the WTA–WTP disparity increases when the flood probability reference point increases. Both findings suggest that welfare effects caused by changes in public good provision depend not only on the direction of change (loss aversion), but also the reference value. Moreover, our results show that the latter effect is larger for losses than for gains. We introduce the concept of reference point updating as a possible explanation for these findings.     

An approximate solution to Arrow's problem

We impose a lattice-theoretic structure on a class of social welfare functions, which properly include Arrowian social welfare functions, by ordering their families of decisive sets by set inclusion. We show that this lattice is compactly generated and characterize the completely meet irreducible elements of this lattice. Certain completely meet irreducible elements correspond to Arrowian social welfare functions. Those social welfare functions corresponding to the other completely meet irreducible families of decisive sets are approximate solutions to the problem of social choice as posed by Arrow.     

Measurement of Changes in Economic Welfare in India: 1970–2001

This paper provides time series estimates of measures of economic welfare, inequality, decile class specific true cost of living index and poverty measures based on 20 rounds of National Sample Survey data for the period 1970–2001. It has estimated piece-wise Linear Expenditure System (LES) for very poor, moderately poor, non-poor low and non-poor high expenditure groups for rural as well as urban areas. Money metric utility for deciles are derived from the money metric utility function and social welfare index is constructed by aggregating metric utility of the deciles. Using social welfare index as well as real per capita consumption, the paper analyses the changes in economic welfare over the three decades. Using conventional measures, the paper analyses the changes in poverty and inequality during 1970–2001. The paper also provides estimates of the welfare effects of commodity prices.

     

Using Choice Experiments to Value the Environment

This paper we outline the “choice experiment” approach to environmental valuation. This approach has its roots in Lancaster's characteristics theory of value, in random utility theory and in experimental design. We show how marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets, such as forests and rivers, can be estimated from pair-wise choices, as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole. These choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient statistical estimation of the underlying utility function, and to minimise required sample size. Choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods, such as contingent valuation and travel cost-type models, although many design issues remain unresolved. Applications to environmental issues have so far been relatively limited. We illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent UK study on public preferences for alternative forest landscapes. This study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay.     

Household inequality, social welfare, and trade

Working with Sen social welfare functions (meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion), we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium. We highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality-based models, using our dual framework to explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy. Our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality. We also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality.     

Estimating intergenerational distribution preferences

Resource management decisions influence not only the output of the economy but also the distribution of utility between groups within the community. The theory of cost benefit analysis provides a means of incorporating distributional changes into the decision making calculus through the application of distributional or welfare weights. However, this practice has not been widely adopted in part due to difficulties in the estimation of distributional weights. This paper addresses this problem by using the stated preference method of choice modelling to estimate distributional weights suitable for inclusion in a cost benefit analysis framework. The findings of a choice modelling experiment designed to estimate community preferences with respect to intergenerational utility distribution illustrate the potential of this method in addressing distributional issues.     

Dual interpersonal comparisons of utility and the welfare economics of income distribution

Interpersonal comparisons can be of utility levels and/or of utility differences. Comparisons of levels can be used to define equity in distributing income. Comparisons of differences can be used to construct an additive Bergson social welfare function over income distributions. When both utility levels and utility differences are compared, one can require the constructed additive Bergson social welfare function to indicate a preference for more equitable income distributions. This restricts the form of both the individual utility functions and the optimal distribution of income. The form of these restrictions depends on whether the levels and differences of the same utility functions are being compared.     

A reformulation of the theory of demand by compensated demand functions

We present a formal approach to consumer demand by compensated demand functions. In accordance with the integrability theory or with the theory of revealed preference, we do not require the existence of a utility function, but we do assume certain hypotheses concerning functions describing rational behavior. In view of their properties, these functions can be interpreted as compensated demand functions. According to traditional neoclassical consumer theory, Shephard's lemma and the symmetry and negative semidefiniteness of the Slutsky-Hicks matrix can be shown. We shall also see that a convex, continuous, and monotonic preference ordering, which is representable by income compensation functions, can be introduced. It can also be shown that the existence of a compensated equilibrium can be derived within this approach by compensated demand functions. In order to obtain the existence of a compensated equilibrium under less stringent conditions we finally generalize the axioms assuming that a compensated demand correspondence is given.     

Quantifying landscape externalities of renewable energy development: Implications of attribute cut-offs in choice experiments

Renewable energy is worldwide seen as a key element necessary to address climate change. However, finding socially acceptable locations for renewable energy facilities and the accompanying infrastructure increasingly often faces fierce opposition. This paper quantifies the landscape externalities of renewable energies employing a choice experiment. In addition, it is investigated how accounting for non-compensatory choice behavior, i.e. attribute cut-offs, affects welfare measures and subsequently policy recommendations. The empirical application is Germany where we conducted a nationwide survey on the development of renewable energies. We first show that cut-off elicitation questions prior to the choice experiment at least partially influence preferences. We further find that most participants state cut-off levels for attributes. Many are, however, at the same time willing to violate the self-imposed thresholds when choosing among the alternatives. To account for this effect, stated cut-offs are incorporated into a mixed logit model following the soft cut-off approach. Model results indicate substantial taste heterogeneity in preferences and in the use of cutoffs. Also, welfare estimates are substantially affected. We conclude that welfare changes from renewable energy development could be strongly underestimated when cut-offs are ignored.     

The dynamics of distributive politics

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period, a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t + 1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee “impatience”). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.