On technological objects and the adoption of technological product innovations: rules, routines and the transition from analogue photography to digital imaging

We extend the transformational model of social activity proposedin recent realist social theory by importing into it a theoryof technological objects and technological change. The paperbegins with an account of the transformational model, focusingparticularly on the relationship between routines and socialrules. We then outline a theory of what we call the ‘technicalidentity’ of technological objects, drawing on the notionof collective assignments of agentive functions proposed bythe philosopher John Searle. Finally, we link this theory tothe transformational model and derive three broad categoriesof technological change. The framework as a whole is illustratedwith empirical material drawn from a recent study of the shiftfrom analogue photography to digital imaging in consumer photography.     

Sraffa's legacy

This review essay of Critical Essays on Piero Sraffa's Legacyin economics situates Sraffa's work in relation to the Marshalliantradition and neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory, andreviews the current state of debate between adherents of thesetraditions on the role of demand, returns to scale, capitaltheory and policy analysis. Other issues considered includethe corn model, Sraffa's critique of Hayek, and the extensionof the capital theory critique to the intertemporal equilibriummodel.     

Ecological economics and the politics of knowledge: the debate between Hayek and Neurath

Hayek's epistemic arguments against planning were aimed notjust against socialism but also the tradition of ecologicaleconomics. The concern with the physical preconditions of economicactivity and defence of non-monetary measures in economic choicewere expressions of the same rationalist illusion about thescope of human knowledge that underpinned the socialist project.Neurath's commitment to physicalism, in natura calculation andplanning typified these errors. Neurath responded to these criticismsin unpublished notes and correspondence with Hayek. These highlightedthe epistemological premises his work shared with Hayek's, representinga response to Hayek from Hayek's own assumptions. This paperexamines the cogency and continuing relevance of the argumentsin this debate.     

Law, legislation, and local minima: Solving a problem in Hayek��s theory of common law judging, with historical examples

Friedrich Hayek??s Law, Legislation, and Liberty noted a problem in the common law system: Sometimes, following judicial precedent would lead to unforeseen bad outcomes over time. No judge can anticipate all possible implications of a precedent-setting decision, and sometimes later judges, bound by precedent, will be forced despite themselves to elaborate the law in ever more inefficient or unjust ways. Hayek proposed that one role of the legislator was to correct such ??dead ends?? in the common law. This paper proposes that judges working within the constraints of the common law and given only the tools Hayek himself allowed them are capable of escaping such binds on their own. It uses historical examples from the era of coverture to support this claim. Not only were judges willing to identify exceptions to coverture, these exceptions helped pave the way for coverture??s eventual abolition. This process is examined and found to be otherwise consonant with Hayek??s larger theory of the common law as a rule-finding process.     

Is social justice for or against liberty? The philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty

By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance.     

哈耶克反对社会主义的时代和理论背景分析

哈耶克是新自由主义的旗手,一生反对社会主义。学术界往往从哈耶克理论的本身去探讨其反对社会主义的原因,事实上哈耶克反对社会主义有其社会背景和知识根源,前者主要是苏德经济政治制度的弊端和凯恩斯主义失效后西方对新自由主义的重视,后者主要是哈耶克自身接触和掌握的心理学知识及自由主义政治经济理论。     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

Hercules and Penrose

Penrose's The Theory of the Growth of the Firm is one of mostimportant modern contributions to the theory of the firm. Inthis paper we are concerned with her analysis of the HerculesPowder Company published separately in Business History Review.The Hercules paper is important because it provides a uniquecase analysis of Penrosean growth processes, and indeed becausethere is reason to believe that it may have had a strong influenceon the development of the book itself. Since Hercules is stilloperating today, it also constitutes an interesting living laboratorythat may allow us to explore whether it has continued to pursuePenrosean growth processes over the intervening years.     

Did Hayek have a monetary theory of business cycles?

Joseph Schumpeter, a careful reader of Hayek, categorized Hayek??s theory of economic cycles as non-monetary. Almost every other source, including Hayek himself, categorized the theory as monetary. The issue turns on the concept of causality being used. The question of what causality concept to apply to complex phenomena has substantive implications for economic theory. A simple concept of causality, appropriate to the study of some physical phenomena, will mislead when applied to complex phenomena. We provide examples of errors in analysis that follow from the wrong choice of a causal paradigm.     

Marx's value forms and Hayek's rules: a reinterpretation in the light of the dichotomy between physis and nomos

This paper argues that both Marx and Hayek objected to the dichotomybetween physis and nomos, and offered concepts which integrate,or mediate between, the two. Marx's value forms and Hayek'srules aim to grasp something neither purely natural nor purelyartificial or social, but ‘socially natural’. Valueforms and rules are natural in the sense that they pre-existagents and are taken by agents as given. On the other hand,forms and rules are social in that production relations or spontaneousorder are reproduced as the unintended consequences of agents'using forms or following rules. Thus value forms and rules standas links between agents and production relations or spontaneousorder.     

邓正来式的哈耶克——思想研究的一种德勒兹主义进路

邓正来的哈耶克研究,在“寂寞”中连续做了十五年。衡量这一研究的贡献,可以从三个层面来切入：对国内哈耶克研究的意义;对自由主义研究的意义;以及,最高的层面上,对思想一学术研究本身的意义。在本文作者看来,如果评论者只关注前两个层面,那么邓氏历时十五年的研究就只对一小部分学者有价值。因此本文尝试在最后一个层面上展开考察。本文作者认为,邓正来的哈耶克研究,从某种意义上开启了思想研究的一种德勒兹主义进路。在作者看来,当邓正来尝试将哈耶克理论抽离其本身得以型构的历史语境与时代背景,而追索该理论本身的内在原创力及其所开放出来的理论问题,他就已经进入到了德勒兹主义的阅读视野中。     

The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle

In his early years, F. A. Hayek focused his research on the theory of capital and the business cycle. Later he turned to social philosophy and the theory of a spontaneous economic order. The two phases, it is argued in this paper, correspond to two basically incompatible research programs—general equilibrium theory vs. a theory of adapting, collective learning, and expectation formation. Hayek never reconsidered business cycle theory in the light of his later thought. The paper asks why and discusses what role cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity may have to be play in the theory of spontaneous economic order.     

Driven to abstraction? Critical realism and the search for the 'inner connection' of social phenomena

This paper examines critically the method of abstraction offeredby critical realism. Our main argument is that critical realismfails to articulate the synthetic side to abstraction. For thisreason, the critical realist method is unable to capture the‘inner connection’ of social phenomena. We arguethat critical realism is prone to extend a method (partially)applicable to the local and specific level of analysis to thehistorical level. The paper develops a method of abstraction,‘systematic abstraction’, that is appropriate tothis historical level. We argue that systematic abstractionconstitutes a radical addition to critical realism, one whichchallenges the fundamental precepts of the critical realistapproach to abstraction.     

Praxeology,Experimental Economics and the Process of Choice: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith on the Misesian Action Axiom

Mises’s action axiom postulates that human action is purposeful behavior. While this axiom is the building block for a powerful methodology, it is also incomplete, because it sets aside the underlying processes of decision-making. And while Mises does not dismiss the gap between intention and action, he is silent on it, relegating such a study to psychology. We contend that a study of underlying thought patterns and the process of choice – rather than contradicting praxeology and the action axiom – in fact complements the writings of Mises. To demonstrate this, we look at two authors: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith. Hayek’s theory of the sensory order sheds light on the process of choice, and explains how decision-making is contextually embedded. Smith’s concepts of ecological rationality and neurological “hard-wiring” help us understand decision-making. We argue that cognitive foundations enrich our understanding of the process of choice, and thus of the Misesian action axiom.     

Listen Libertarians!: A Review of John Tomasi’s “Free Market Fairness”

John Tomasi’s 2012 book, Free Market Fairness, has been well received. On the dust jacket, Tyler Cowen proclaims it “one of the very best philosophical treatments of libertarian thought, ever” and Deirdre McCloskey calls it a “long and friendly conversation between Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls — a conversation which, astonishingly, reaches agreement.” The book does present an authoritative state of the debate across the spectrum from right libertarianism, on one end, to high liberalism (that shares some ideas with democratic socialism), on the other end. My point is not to question Tomasi’s own version of “market democracy” as a remix of Hayek and Rawls, but to use his sympathetic restatements of views across the liberal spectrum in order to show the basic misframings and common misunderstandings that cut across the liberal-libertarian viewpoints surveyed in the book. The heart of the debate is not in the answers to carefully framed questions, but in the framing itself.