激励手段与海洋资源的可持续利用与管理——兼析澳大利亚海洋政策的政策手段

海洋资源的可持续利用及其管理需要多种激励手段,包括财政和经济手段、法律手段、教育、共同管理、行业自律以及基于社区的管理机制和科研等.1998年,澳大利亚政府制定并正式通过了一项"海洋政策",旨在为有效管理和可持续利用其专属经济区内的海洋资源提供有力的政策支持.文章通过介绍此政策下的一些政策手段,总结出了一些有助于实现海洋资源可持续利用与管理的有效激励手段,同时也提出了激励手段的评估标准和设计激励手段时应遵循的主要原则.     

技术路线图方法及其在高校科研规划中的应用

在高校科研管理实践中,应将科研战略、科研发展路线图和科研政策逐步有机地结合起来,形成"目标、决策、操作"三位一体的政策实施体系。其中:科研战略主要解决目标、定位的问题,科研发展路线图重点解决目标与决策之间的可控选择与动态优化问题,科研政策着重针对各层面的操作问题提出指导意见并给予双向激励。在上述三者之间,科研发展路线图起着承上启下、担当枢纽的关键作用。     

俄罗斯科技人才队伍现状及政策研究

前苏联解体后,俄罗斯科技人员外流严重,科技人才队伍建设正面临着前所未有的挑战。俄罗斯政府为了复兴科技人才在国际上的霸主地位,出台了一系列政策和措施,如,加大科研投入力度,提高科研人员工资待遇,制定青年科技人才激励政策,吸引顶尖科学家进行科学研究等。近两年来,俄罗斯科技人才数量及质量有所改善,科研实力与创新能力日益强大。俄罗斯人才培养及激励政策对我国科教人才发展战略有一定借鉴意义。     

独立学院岗位薪酬与科研

本文以浙江工业大学之江学院为例,分析了独立学院的薪酬政策对教师科研的影响.通过介绍与分析之江学院岗位薪酬政策及科研激励政策的特点,本文讨论了薪酬政策对教师科研工作的导向作用.并针对独立学院的特点,对现行政策做了一些有益的思考.     

经济政策有效性的理论分析* ——以货币政策为例

本文在更一般的不完全信息情形下，以货币政策为例，分析了经济政策的时间不一致问题。结果表明，当私人部门与政府部门存在不对称信息，政府部门具有信息优势时，最优经济政策与私人部门所持有的关于经济状态的信念有关。从福利的角度看，当现实经济状态对经济政策灵敏时，政府部门有公开经济状态信息的激励；反之，政府部门则有隐瞒经济状态信息的激励。因此，在市场经济的顶层设计中，除政府部门需要建立相关经济决策咨询机构外，还要推动独立的民间智库发展，使公众逐步摆脱信息劣势。     

高校科研经费配置结构与科研绩效的门槛效应——以教育部直属高校为例

利用2006—2012年中国65所教育部直属高校的面板数据,在考虑高校科研经费投入强度差异的情况下,利用门槛面板模型对高校科研经费配置结构与科研绩效的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果显示:科研经费配置结构与科研绩效之间会因高校科研经费投入强度的不同而呈现出显著的区间效应,表现为投入强度较低时科研经费配置结构与科研绩效正相关但不显著,投入强度中等和较高时两者显著正相关。最后从整体与个体、纵向与横向、监管与激励3个关系层面提出了相关政策建议。     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

高校科研团队知识隐匿研究——基于知识共享激励视角

基于对中国高校科研团队的实地调研和考察,结合激励理论、社会偏好理论、互惠理论以及公平理论等多种理论,从激励的视角研究了知识隐匿与知识共享之间关系及其调节作用.文章运用投影寻踪法和层次回归分析法开展实证研究,研究发现:高校科研团队知识隐匿与知识共享自我效能呈现出显著的负相关关系,并且在考虑科研团队成员不同异质性的条件下,这一负相关关系具有高度的稳健性.在考虑到激励因子时,内部激励具有比外部激励更强的激励效果,即内部激励更有利于高校科研团队的知识共享.在调节效应方面,总体而言,激励能够抑制高校科研团队的知识隐匿行为,增强高校团队成员之间的知识共享自我效能.     

动态博弈视角下绿色住宅激励模式优选研究

为探讨政府不同激励政策对提高绿色住宅有效供给与需求的有效性,运用动态博弈法构建了政府不介入情形下、补贴型激励模式下及补贴—惩罚型激励模式下绿色住宅开发销售的决策模型,并相互比较了三种情形的决策结果。研究表明,当奖惩与补贴满足一定条件时:补贴—惩罚型激励模式下高质量绿色住宅的消费率最高,且消费率随着奖惩力度的增大而提高;补贴型激励模式下绿色住宅销售价格最低;补贴—惩罚型激励模式下开发商与消费者的利润高于政府不介入情形和补贴型激励模式下的利润。通过比较分析,发现补贴—惩罚型激励模式比补贴型激励模式和政府不介入情形都更有效。研究结果能够为政府制定绿色住宅激励政策提供决策支持。     

核心利益相关者认知差异视角下高校科技成果转化问题及对策研究

科技成果转化新政颁布并未从根本上改善高校科技成果转化现状。鉴于此,首先,梳理、归纳出科技成果转化关键节点,整合成果转化影响因素,并收集企业、高校和科研者对这些因素的认知数据;然后,分析核心利益相关者认知偏差,得出政策失灵的直接原因是政策不协同导致政策难以具体落实,间接原因是成果与市场对接不力、中试环节缺乏、激励失调;最后,针对我国现行高校科研管理体制,提出政策优化建议。     

Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools

This paper studies the effects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and students, in a set-up where the students' educational attainment depends on their peer group, on their effort, and on the quality of the school's teaching. We show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the effectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive effect of lowering the students' effort. In a simple dynamic set-up, where the reputation of the schools affects recruitment, we show that more powerful incentives and increased competition lead to segregation of pupils by ability, and may also determine lower attainment in some schools.     

基于双重委托-代理的科研团队成员知识创新激励机制研究

采用双重委托-代理关系模型研究科研团队成员知识创新激励机制,强化主体创新参与意识和知识贡献精神。在团队知识创新个体成员角色划分的基础上,论述团队知识创新中的双重委托-代理关系,进而分析双重关系中的知识创新激励机制,并提出基于人力资本价值差异的激励措施。团队层面的委托-代理关系表明,个体成员的拟线性效用令有效努力水平与其收益独立分配,符合科斯定理的“行动有效,与利益分配无关”的思想;个体层面的委托-代理关系分析表明,实施基于人力资本价值的差异化激励合约,其数值模拟和参数分析结果验证了知识贡献者的产出份额、努力程度以及确定性等价收入明显得到优化。     

Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines

We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay the rich. Even the possibility of price discrimination does not remove this incentive. We demonstrate that the weaknesses of standard policy measures are mitigated when income heterogeneity is taken into account. This offers an efficiency based rationale for distribution oriented national or international public health interventions.     

Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment?

Contracts that involve the government differ from contractsbetween two private parties in that the identity of one of theparties, the government, is subject to change. Given that theincumbent government knows that it might not be in power whenthe contract is completed, it may have an incentive to structurethe contract to make it more difficult for a new governmentto renegotiate it. I show that traditional damage measures usedin contracts between two private parties exacerbate this problem.The reliance damage measure induces the incumbent governmentto enlarge projects beyond the socially optimal level when itfears that a new government will want to cut it back. Expectationdamages suffer from the same defect, though to a lesser extent.     

推动企业生态经济管理的政策系统研究

推动企业生态经济管理的政策系统可由来政府与非政府两方面的强制、激励、压力和支持四大系统构成，本文详细分析了这四大系统，并指出综合政策系统的结构重心应由强制性与支持性政策措施为主逐渐转向基于激励与压力性政策措施。     

财政收入最大化与地方政府地价竞争

本文借鉴制度经济学研究方法,将中央政府的若干治理手段嵌入到地方政府地价决定函数中,对财政收入最大化与地方政府地价竞争的治理策略做比较制度分析。本文认为,地方政府在地价决定中具有产业间边际财政总收入均等化的动机,适度提高农地征收价格以及服务业税负,有助于压缩地方政府的恶性竞争空间。产业性税收优惠政策可能只对那些租赁而不是持有地产的经营者才有效,可以考虑适度增加住宅所有者的税负来实现“增税降费”的财政收入结构调整,同时继续维持对营业场所以租赁为主的知识密集型服务业的税收优惠。     

Limitations on the use of information-revealing incentive schemes in economic organizations

Hierarchical organizations often use formal information channels to facilitate communication between center and subordinate units. Unfortunately subgoal pursuit may lead subordinates to be dishonest when responding to information requests. One way to overcome this problem is to design incentive schemes that encourage honesty. While incentive schemes that successfully encourage accurate information revelation exist for certain environments, this will not always be the case. In particular, if managerial effort is considered or if the center's objective is defined net of bonuses there may not exist any incentive scheme leading simultaneously to honest reporting and to maximization of the center's objective function.     

Strategic delegation under quality competition

This paper examines strategic manipulations of incentive contracts in a model where firms compete in quality as well as in price. Compensation schemes for managers are based on a linear combination of profits and sales. For a given level of quality, a firm desires to reduce the manager's compensation when product sales increase; this serves as the firm's commitment to raise prices. Nevertheless, in general, a manager has a stronger incentive to produce goods of higher quality if he is compensated according to sales. Therefore, a compensation scheme that penalizes a manager when sales increase may result in products that are inferior to those of its rival. We show that, depending on the nature of quality, a positive weight on sales may be desirable when firms compete in quality and price. Welfare implications are also explored.     

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.     

Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete

The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's ex ante incentive to invest in a “cooperative” innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold‐up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the ex ante firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over‐investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation—which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient—the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations.