SYNCHRONIZATION OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS BETWEEN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES,EUROPE, JAPAN,AND OIL MARKET: CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME†

Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with block exogeneity, this study examines the impacts of external shocks originating from the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the oil market as well as those of the regional shocks, on the oil‐rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), viewed as a prospective monetary union. It takes into account the implications of the shock impacts for selecting an appropriate common exchange rate arrangement. The SVAR variance decomposition and impulse response analyses strongly underscore the relative impacts of the global shocks over the regional ones. The findings imply that the world's two major currencies, the U.S. dollar and the euro, should figure highly in a GCC's common basket of currencies. Accordingly, a transitional movement to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement such as a basket peg may be desirable for these trade‐dependent economies in the long run, as is argued in the optimal currency literature for developing countries. (JEL E52, O52, C22)     

Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?

Following the East Asian crisis, a number of observers have advocated that small and open economies in Asia adopt an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments as well as the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? In order to answer this question, we consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore. While both of these economies share a number of broad similarities, the former operates a US dollar–linked currency board arrangement and the latter maintains an adjustable peg in the form of a monitoring band arrangement with the central parity based on an undisclosed trade–weighted currency basket.     

Monetary stabilization in countries in transition

The best way to prevent hyperinflation when domestic prices are liberalized is to initiate the transition from a planned economy to a market economy with a currency reform. In the following period, moderate inflation and flexible exchange rates are suitable to facilitate relative price adjustments. Only after the bulk of alignments has been accomplished can a switch in the exchange rate regime be convenient. The nominal peg of a stable reference currency lowers the level and the variance of domestic inflation rates. The credibility of an exchange rate target may best be achieved by combining a currency board (objective sustainability) with a crawling peg (political sustainability). Price stability can be realized in the long run by reducing the annual depreciation rate in regular, preannounced steps.     

一个双重货币区域与国际公共货币的理论-一个共同区域,两类商品市场,两套货币体系

本文首次提出,以不同的竞争性的各国主权货币体系中的各国主权货币及其利率与浮动汇率工具来应对其各自的个性化的国内市场,以新型的国际公共货币体系中的国际公共货币及其利率与固定汇率工具来应对该区域内统一的共性化的国际市场这一"双重货币区域理论",彻底解决"最优货币区域理论"无法处理而一直悬而未决的这个国际经济难题,从而最终为"亚元"、"超区域元"或"世界元"等区域性、超区域性或世界性国际公共货币的建立开辟一条可行的全新道路.     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

External Shocks, Balance Sheet Contagion, and Speculative Attack on the Pegged Exchange Rate System

A simple monetary model is built to illustrate that the pegged exchange rate system will collapse under an unstable external environment via the balance sheet contagion and the "boiling frog" effect, even if the domestic policy and the fundamentals are sound. If agents anticipate this happening, a speculative attack may still occur. This result is different from that of the first-generation currency crisis model, where the inconsistent domestic policy brings in the collapse of the peg. The policy options to defend the peg in the author's model depend on the nature of the shock. Effective capital control can only be implemented for capital outflow shock. Capital account deregulation is more stabilizing under a current account deficit shock, however. This paper also distinguishes the effect of capital mobility with that of the asset substitutability, as they have completely different impacts on the peg.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

The macrodynamics of financial fragility within a hard peg arrangement

The paper presents an open-economy macrodynamical growth model with the aim of giving an endogenous characterisation to the process that leads a small country with a currency-board arrangement to accumulate dangerously high levels of external debt and become vulnerable to macroeconomic instability. The macrodynamics of the model results from the combination of the commitment to maintain the peg - that makes liquidity closely dependent on the dynamics of foreign reserves - and the non-linear real and financial interactions that drives the pro-cyclical behaviour of the economy. Within this context, the external financing ease during an economic upswing leads to debt-supported growth and financial fragility; the consequent deterioration of profitability expectations brings about a capital reversal that, in the absence of monetary stabilisation tools, makes the currency arrangement unsustainable. A financial crisis may thus turn into a currency crisis.We run a continuous-time estimation of a non-linear differential equations system for Argentina during the years of the currency-board arrangement. We find that two steady-state solutions exist. The local stability and sensitivity analysis show that both equilibria are unstable and that the qualitative nature of the equilibria depends in particular on lenders' responsiveness to the degree of leverage. We also show that relaxing the assumption on the currency arrangement and allowing for an autonomous monetary policy makes both equilibria stable.     

Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies: New Evidence from Treatment‐effect Estimations

The way central banks react to exchange market pressure is likely to affect the subsequent economic development and the associated economic costs. In a situation of currency pressure the central bank can in principle decide to let the currency float freely, to maintain the peg or to implement a managed float policy, i.e. a mix of depreciation and intervention. As the central bank's choices are subject to self selection and endogeneity, we use propensity score matching to adequately cope with these methodical challenges. We find that monetary authorities have two options to keep down the economic costs in terms of output, namely stabilizing the exchange rate or letting the currency float freely. In contrast, a managed float under currency pressure is accompanied by the worst possible outcome with an average loss of gross domestic product (GDP) between 5% and 6%.     

Exchange Market Pressure in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) Area: Empirical Assessment of the Macroeconomic Determinants

ABSTRACT

The current empirical study contributes to the literature on the exchange market pressure. First we construct as proposed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz [1996. Contagious currency crises: First tests. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98 (4), 463–484], a continuous measure of EMP for the CAEMC franc zone, using quarterly data from 1985Q1 to 2012Q2. We then address the main macroeconomic determinants of this EMP.

We find that our main measure for EMP as well as two alternative measures of this index captures quite well episodes of crises of the CFA (XAF) currency. During the period of study, the common currency of the CAEMC countries experienced about four speculative attacks, with the one in 1993 ending with the devaluation of that currency in January 1994. The other attacks were warded off through reserves losses, as it is clear that the currency peg was maintained principally through changes in reserves. We also find that the GDP growth, the trade balance and the international oil price are the main contributors of EMP and therefore the most significant predictors of currency crises in the CAEMC area.     

Fundamentals, the exchange rate and prospects for the current and future EU enlargements: evidence from Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey

We analyze the link between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate dynamics in two new and two potential EU member states: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey. Given the different institutional settings of the exchange rate market in the countries of interest, we follow two different modelling strategies. For Romania and Turkey, we evaluate possible exchange rate misalignments based on a monetary model of exchange rate determination. In the case of Bulgaria and Croatia, with currency board and narrow-band peg arrangements against the euro, we discuss possible exit strategies and quantitatively assess the effects of the peg arrangements by means of simulation.

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Choice of currency basket weights and its implications on trade balance

This paper seeks to find an optimal choice of currency basket weights for emerging economies that peg their currencies to a currency basket, and to examine the long-run relationship between the real exchange rates of a group of trading partners. A general equilibrium model is set up to establish an optimal set of currency basket weights, coupled with the choice of fiscal policy, to simultaneously stabilize trade balance and aggregate price level of an economy. This optimal set of weights is a weighted average of two sets of weights; each targets at one policy goal (stabilizing either balance of trade or aggregate price level) at a time. Empirical studies including vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and cointegration analysis on the long-run relationship between the Thai baht and the real exchange rates of its major trading partners are presented.     

Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards

The paper models the choice between currency boards (CBs) and adjustable pegs (or managed floating). Countries adopting CBs have grown faster and inflated less on average than countries adopting other regimes. The explanation hinges on key features of CBs: policy discipline and inflation credibility. The authors find separating equilibria in which a weak government chooses a CB as a discipline device while a tough government chooses a standard peg for its policy flexibility. Paradoxically, the weak government can then outperform the tough government on average. In simulations performed, CBs welfare can exceed peg welfare even when unemployment persistence is strong.     

Fiscal Trends and Self-Fulfilling Crises

This paper develops a second-generation currency crisis model with endogenously changing fundamentals. Previous second-generation models are static, e.g. Obstfeld (1994 ), or dynamic with exogenous paths of fundamentals, e.g. Obstfeld (1986 ). In our model, the government weighs the disutility of making fundamentals consistent with a peg against a penalty for floating. If the former dominates, the government runs expansionary policies, precipitating a crisis. For some parameters, self-fulfilling speculation affects when the crisis happens, but not whether it happens. For other values, there are "purely self-fulfilling" crises, where a peg that could have survived forever collapses if attacked in the first few periods.     

Exchange Rate Movements and Unemployment in the EU Accession Countries—A Panel Analysis

According to the traditional “optimum currency area” approach, not much will be lost from a very hard peg to a currency union if there has been little reason for variations in the exchange rate. This paper takes a different approach, and highlights the fact that high exchange rate volatility may as well signal high costs for labor markets. The impact of exchange rate volatility on labor markets in the CEECs is put to the test, finding that volatility vis‐à‐vis the euro significantly increases unemployment. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility could be considered as a substitute for a removal of employment protection legislation. However, labor market reform could be argued to be an equally worthy strategy, backed up by central bank independence and the adoption of an anti‐inflation monetary policy rule.     

Bilateral Exchange Rates and Jobs

We study the labor market effects of realignment in fixed bilateral exchange rates, such as China's peg to the US dollar. We employ the open economy model by de Melo and Robinson to identify the core parameters of the real, trade side of the economy driving the unemployment effects of bilateral exchange rate realignment. A small open economy version of the model is explored analytically and a large multicountry version numerically. Analytics in the small open economy model show that unemployment effects of adjusting of a bilateral peg hinge on the fraction exported to and imported from the trading partner. A larger fraction exported to and a smaller fraction imported from the trading partner make it more likely that revaluation of a trading partner's currency has beneficial effects. Numerics in the large economy model show that Chinese revaluation can generate both positive and negative unemployment effects depending upon underlying parameter values. Adverse unemployment effects can go along with an improving trade balance.     

On the Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor: The Rise and Fall of the Credibility Hypothesis

The credibility hypothesis, which was used to support the use of a pegged exchange rate arrangement as a nominal anchor mechanism, is based on restrictive analytical foundations that circumscribe its real world applicability. While all pegged exchange rate arrangements are subject to circumstances that can undermine the sustainability of the peg, exchange rate nominal anchor pegs are especially fragile because such arrangements introduce problems that are endogenous to that particular type of regime. The East Asian crisis is used to demonstrate the fragility of exchange rate nominal anchor pegs, while the case of Australia demonstrates how a floating currency escaped the contagion of the East Asian crisis.     

NEW ESTIMATION OF CHINA'S EXCHANGE RATE REGIME

Abstract. The present paper updates the question: what precisely is the exchange rate regime that China has put into place since 2005, when it announced a move away from the US dollar peg? Is it a basket anchor with the possibility of cumulatable daily appreciations, as was announced at the time? We apply to this question a new approach of estimating countries’ de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that has been used in the past to estimate implicit de facto currency weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the US dollar or some other single major currency. Because the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly follow variants of band‐basket‐crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. The synthesis adds a variable representing ‘exchange market pressure’ to the currency basket equation, whereby the degree of flexibility is estimated at the same time as the currency weights. This approach reveals that by mid‐2007, the RMB basket had switched a substantial part of the US dollar's weight onto the euro. The implication is that the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar during this period was due to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to any upward trend in the RMB relative to its basket.     

Altered bank and exchange volatility

This paper examines the behaviour of the Czech crown's exchange rate when pegged to a currency basket. The peg is supposed to limit the overall instability of the currency. The GARCH(1,1) model with a dummy variable for the volatility response is used to account for a change in the width of the fluctuation band. The results of this paper show that volatility of the exchange rate decreased after a much wider fluctuation band was introduced to limit movements of the currency basket index.