成本不对称条件下出口企业在面对反倾销时的战略选择

本文在成本不对称的假设下，利用Bertrand双寡头模型研究了追求利润最大化的企业遭受出口反倾销时在出口与对外直接投资之间的战略选择。文章首先分析了在进口国政府不同的反倾销措施情况下，出口国企业与生产相似产品的进口国企业之间的Bertrand价格竞争；其次分析了不同类型成本优势对出口企业战略选择的影响；文章最后得出结论：跨越反倾销的对外直接投资要求出口国企业的成本优势至少是部分可以转移的，并且对外直接投资的固定成本必须小于征收反倾销税情况下的主要固定费用；如果成本优势完全不可转移，或者对外直接投资的固定成本太高，则无论进口国政府采取何种反倾销措施，出口国企业都不会选择对外直接投资。     

出口企业应对反倾销搭便车行为分析

在国际贸易中,当出口企业面临国外的反倾销指控时,出口国同类产品出口企业都有义务积极应诉,但是每个企业都存在搭便车倾向。本文通过一个博弈论模型分析这种免费搭车现象的存在动因,讨论了哪些企业最易搭便车,市场结构对企业应诉反倾销行为的影响以及政府如何激励出口企业积极应诉。     

成本信息不对称、产品市场竞争与自动出口限制政策研究

自动出口限制政策是各国在国际贸易中经常采用的一种非贸易保护措施。结合不完全信息并同时以厂商利润、社会福利为指标,重新探讨VER的政策含义及出口国是否自愿执行的问题。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商信息不完全的情形下,其结果将与既有文献有所不同。若为Coumot竞争,VER将对两国产生实质的影响;对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商之类型而定。若为Bertrand竞争,则VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

反倾销争端与外国对华的歧视待遇--基于博弈论视角的解析

从动态博弈的角度看,进口国想方设法地加大出口商的在反倾销中的成本,是使得反倾销威胁变得可置信的一种“承诺行动;”外国对华涉案出口企业不区别征税是我国企业应诉积极性不高的重要原因;西方国家对华反倾销特点形成的主要原因是外国对华的歧视待遇。西方对华的歧视待遇实质上是增加其反倾销威胁的可信性的重要手段,改变这样的状况需要相当的努力和智慧。     

非对称信息条件下政府对互补性研发合作体的激励工具选择

基于信息不对称条件,通过引入社会扭曲成本与社会收益变量,解释了合作体成员可能出现的搭便车行为,并构建了互补性研发体成员在政府不同激励工具下的决策模型。分析表明,对于互补性研发合作体的激励,政府不完全监督是最优的政策选择。     

不完全竞争、非对称信息下的最优进口贸易政策和产业政策

本文讨论了不完全竞争和非对称信息情况下 ,如何运用进口贸易政策和产业政策增进本国福利的问题。本文发现 ,(1 )在Cournot同质产品竞争的情况下 ,制定可以诱使本国企业显示真实成本的政策规则可以实现与完全信息情况相同的配置结果 ;并且 ,本国企业的生产成本越低 ,政策规则规定的最优关税越低 ;在某些成本结构下 ,甚至应该执行零关税政策。 (2 )在圆形城市空间竞争 (SpatialCompetitioninCircularCity)的情况下 ,生产补贴和关税的作用完全等价 ;不存在可以实现事后效率的政策规则 ,并且 ,约束最优结果不是一个PBE均衡结果 ,本国政府的最优政策是制定等于单位运输成本的关税。上述结论蕴含 ,最优政策干预以及它能否消除非对称信息可能带来的效率损失依赖于竞争类型 ,而不依赖于信息结构 ,因此 ,它不会发生扭曲     

出口退税与出口促进:完全信息静态博弈分析

在不完全竞争市场中，各国都将出口贸易视为彼此间的市场份额竞争。在出口竞争中，出口退税政策之所以广受各国政府欢迎，是因为它有助于扩大本国在国际市场的份额(出口促进效应)，增加利润收益(利润转移效应)，改善本国厂商在与其它国家厂商的非合作性竞争中的相对地位。非合作性纳什出口退税均街是：各出口国政府都实行出口退税。但这不是实现共同福利最大化的最优解。     

论反倾销威胁下的出口产业政策

反倾销措施是世界各国普遍采用的一种保护国内产业的合法手段.建立在劳动力密集型产业基础上的中国出口导向型经济,其出口企业所面临的反倾销威胁将是长期而普遍的.文章建立了两阶段Cournot竞争模型对反倾销威胁下出口企业利润最大化行为与出口产业结构以及反倾销参考价格之间的内在联系机理进行了理论分析,并论证了在反倾销威胁下,政府实施以整个出口产业利润最大化为目标、以间接控制出口企业数量为手段的出口产业政策的必要性和可行性.     

基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析

文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

反倾销的经济学分析及合理性探讨——以欧盟对华反倾销为例

针对反倾销措施,借助经济学模型首先对发起反倾销国家经济造成的损益进行解析,指出实施反倾销措施是进口国追求国内自身利益的结果:再进一步分析实施反倾销措施对出口国出口贸易、出口企业规模经济以及社会净福利的影响,深刻挖掘出进口国发起反倾销的一般性经济学根源,在此基础上探讨反倾销的合理性与不合理性.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Antidumping and heterogeneous quality adjustment of multi-product firms: Evidence from Chinese exporters

This paper investigates the effect of antidumping on multi-product firms’ adjustment in export quality using highly disaggregated Chinese exports data at the firm-product-country level for the period 2000–2014. In response to antidumping, firms tend to upgrade the quality of their exports for targeted products in affected markets by product adjustment, with this effect being more pronounced for firms with ex ante higher product quality. Antidumping induces resource reallocation across firms for a product such that higher-quality firms upgrade the quality while lower-quality firms are unaffected, and reallocation across products within a firm with the quality of products of higher competency increasing more substantially under antidumping policy. Our paper contributes to our understanding on how a multi-product firm adjusts by reallocating resources across products in the face of trade policy shocks.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Tariff Policy and the Foreign Entry Decision in the Presence of a Cost-Based Informational Asymmetry

The paper demonstrates that the standard prediction on the relation between tariff rates and the mode of foreign entry—exports or direct investment—may not hold in the presence of incomplete information. A foreign firm lacks full information on the cost structure of an informed incumbent firm located in the domestic (potential) host country. Within a two‐period model, the local incumbent may behave in a manner which keeps the potential foreign entrant uninformed of its cost structure. In such a pooling equilibrium, the uninformed foreign firm either refrains from entering altogether or serves the host country via exports at tariff rates which would, otherwise under complete information, induce entry via direct investment. When entry mode is altered, other standard full‐information effects of trade policy may also no longer hold.     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

中国海外直接投资中的贸易保护因素实证研究

贸易保护因素历来是企业进行海外直接投资的重要动因。研究表明,国外关税壁垒的升级导致了近年来中国海外直接投资的增加;反倾销、反补贴及特保措施等贸易救济措施均使得中国加大了对贸易壁垒较少的中低收入国家的直接投资;中国的对外直接投资与东道国市场规模、中国对东道国的出口规模成正比,但没有更多地流入欧盟、东盟及北美自由贸易区等区域贸易组织的成员国中。因此在当前中美及中欧等贸易摩擦频繁的背景下,中国企业应对欧美等发达国家加大直接投资的力度,借此化解国外的贸易保护压力。     

Infant Industry Protection Revisited

In 1791, Alexander Hamilton suggested that assuring protection to domestic entrants Could pre-empt entry-degterrence by foreign firms. This paper reformulates his Argument in game-theoretic terms with asymmetric cost information, imposing the Requirement that both the foreign firm's threat and the home governments's promise of Protection should be credible. It derives a simple optimal tariff formula that depends Only on the expectation of foreign costs. It then shows that this tariff can lead to Welfare-decreasing entry, but only if thee foreign is relatively inefficient. However, If the formula is applied with dynamic consistency, and is rationally anticipated by both foreign and domestic firms, it prevents foreign entry-deterrence and improves deomestic welfare. [F13, 019]     

Cost‐reducing R&D Investment,Labor Market and Trade

This paper constructs a two‐country model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost‐reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. A decrease in the tariff rates in both countries decreases cost‐reducing R&D investment.     

欧盟反倾销政策特征及涉案企业战略行为分析

在分析欧盟反倾销政策的基础上,建立一个两阶段动态竞争模型,对进口国和出口国企业在反倾销博弈中的战略行为及其动机进行了分析。在此分析基础上可得,当中国企业遭遇欧盟反倾销措施时,需要在调查期间减少出口量．欧盟企业在反倾销税的影响下为追求利润最大化会改变产出,中国企业应关注欧盟企业的战略行为以对抗其反倾销措施,为中国企业应对欧盟反倾销措施提出了对策建议。