Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Taxation of International Private Capital Flows and Securities Transactions in Developing Countries: Do Public Finance Considerations Augment the Macroeconomic Dividends?

This paper examines policies to tax international private capital flows and securities transactions in developing countries. Many recent studies focus on the macroeconomic dividends associated with these policies (namely, their contribution to macroeconomic and financial stability and lengthened investor time horizons). In this paper I explore whether the potential of these policies to raise much‐needed tax revenues in developing countries augments their well‐known macroeconomic benefits. To my knowledge, there has been no effort to examine systematically the public finance issues related to the taxation of international private capital flows or securities transactions in the developing country context. I conclude that the public finance implications of these policies in middle‐income developing countries offers additional support to the macroeconomic case for them. To different degrees, taxation of international private capital flows and securities transactions has the potential to raise modest revenues in middle‐income countries. However, far more important is the potential of these policies to offer valuable macroeconomic dividends on the national level. These national macroeconomic dividends have the potential to bear fruit globally. This is because experiences with financial contagion over the last decade suggest that global financial stability can be enhanced via the promotion of domestic financial stability in developing countries.     

Managing Financial Integration and Capital Mobility—Policy Lessons from the Past Two Decades

Emerging market experience over the past two decades has revealed the tenuous links between external financial integration and faster growth, and the proclivity of such integration to fuel costly crises. Emerging markets learned, converging to the middle ground of the macroeconomic trilemma. Following their crises of 1997–2001, emerging markets added financial stability as a goal, self‐insured by building up international reserves, and adopted a public finance approach to financial integration. The global crisis of 2008–09 illustrated that the advanced economies “overshot” the optimal degree of financial deregulation, while the resilience of the emerging markets validated their public finance approach to financial integration.     

Public or Private Orientation of Pension Systems in the Light of the Recent Financial Crisis

This paper studies the appropriateness of a public or private orientation of pension systems in the light of the recent financial crisis, which has underscored the difficulties and contradictions associated with each system. The different institutional arrangements, in which public or private pension systems are embedded, are key components when assessing their responses to the crisis. Particularly, private pension systems are intertwined with financial markets, while social insurance-based pension systems are linked to the labour market mechanisms. This paper compares the British and French pension systems, as “archetypes” of private-oriented and public-oriented systems, respectively, the first relying on the market and private pension schemes, and the second on mandatory social insurance. This paper shows that the crisis has upheld the founding principles of the public (French) and private (British) pension systems to maintain the existing institutional configurations. At the same time, both systems have strengthened the role played by means-tested benefits and minimum pensions for low-income groups to offset the weaknesses of one or the other system, as emphasised by the crisis.     

Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the role of equity: The accounting behind hedge,speculative, and Ponzi finance

Hyman Minsky’s primary legacy to Keynesian macroeconomics involves two related features. He emphasized that real (market) analysis and financial (market) analysis should be analyzed together, not separately; and that the macro economy is inherently unstable (his “financial instability hypothesis”). He melded financial analysis and the “real” market economy to interpret cycles in economic activity. An economy in boom (euphoria, animal spirits) eventually runs out of steam, reaches a peak, and descends into recession. The recession after the Minsky-moment peak segues through several financial stages based on the financial conditions of individual firms; he termed these stages as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance. The fragility of the economy depends on the relative weights or importance of the economy’s firms in each of the three stages.     

Global Production Networks and the Private Organization of World Trade

As John R. Commons understood, the role of the firm in providing employment and income distribution is a form of public power (Munkirs and Knoedler 1987). This public power of firms is supported by the laws of the state, which protect private property and enforce market transactions. The Global Production Network (GPN) is a new form of the firm, influenced by information technology to lower “transaction costs” (Coase 1937), as well as international trade regimes, such as the Washington Consensus to improve the ease of world trade and investment. The GPN is globe-scanning, yet private and able to shape the economies and policies of countries. Under the banner of branded products, the lead firm in a supply chain exercises considerable power over subsidiaries, contractors, workers, communities, and countries. By influencing trade relations, GPNs also influence international finance, foreign currency reserves and exchange rates, as well as trade deficits and “race to the bottom” of taxes and environmental protection. Drawing on interdisciplinary research, this topic benefits from an alliance of sociology, business, history, law, and international as well as institutional economics in the AFEE tradition. I draw on the work of leading scholars in the field (Antras 2016; Baldwin 2016; Gereffi 2013; Milberg and Winkler 2013) and analyze the implications for the world trade system, as well as the ongoing political resistance to globalization. These GPNs are no longer “of” their country of origin (Tyson vs. Reich).     

“Big Man” politics in the social economy: a case study of microfinance in Kingston,Jamaica

Microfinance and its “reinvention as bankers-for-the-poor” to create financial inclusion has not been effective everywhere. The literature seems to suggest that the social economy and microfinance help marginalized business people; yet no one considers that political bias interferes with the social economy, making it hard for it to be just. The promise of micro-credit was to achieve a double bottom line: first, the financial sustainability of the lending institution itself, and second, the social benefit of providing loans to low-income business people. Yet, alternative pitches of a social economy to “help people” fail to analyze the embedded power dynamics within the social economy. In this case study in downtown Kingston, Jamaica, 233 small-business people who depend on development finance because of social exclusion now find that these targeted programs are intertwined in partisan, sometimes dangerous, politics. As a result, oppressed people opt out of micro-banking programs to resist “Big Man” politics – the politicians or gangsters attempting to control them. In this study of 307 interviews, I analyze the informal politics of Dons and politicians who misuse micro-credit for their own ends. I find that the coupling of class biases and clientelist practices in the social economy discourages eligible business people from taking micro-loans, and argue that the microfinance industry needs to pay close attention to this issue if it is to continue to help marginalized business people.     

Financial and Capital Account Liberalization,Financial Development and Economic Development: A Review of Some Recent Contributions

Abstract

This article presents a review of some recent contributions on the relation between global finance and economic development in emerging economies. It first, stresses the growing consensus among economists on the financial instability that financial and capital account liberalization can possibly cause in emerging economies. It then outlines and compares two alternative strategies to tame such instability. The comparison is between the “good-institutions need-to-come-first” approach put forward by some mainstream economists, and the request for a deeper reform of the existing monetary system advocated by heterodox economists.     

Financial Liberalization as a Process of Flawed Institutional Change

I argue that the financial liberalization of the last decades, which resulted in a worldwide crisis, relied on an institutional change that ill-shaped actors’ behavior so as to let them enter into unsustainable speculative activities at the expense of macro-stability. To support such an assertion, I draw upon a specific Veblen-Minsky approach to a credit-money economy and its endogenous fragilities. I also maintain that, when financial markets are liberalized and private-interestsrelated self-regulation replaces public macro-prudential supervision, the financial system undergoes institutional deadlock and the ensuing confusion is transformed into a market gridlock. Markets then become unable to recover without public rescue operations of banks. The subsequent negative economic and social consequences are beyond the limits of any acceptable liberal ideology and scientific understanding. Therefore, systemic stability calls for a tighter macro-regulatory framework to remove the domination of speculative finance over economic decisions and activities.     

社会地位会影响企业融资约束吗?——来自A股民营上市公司的经验证据

本文从企业的社会性对经济性行为影响的视角研究社会地位对民营企业融资约束的影响。以2009—2018年沪深A股民营上市公司为研究样本,研究发现社会地位越高的企业面临的融资约束程度越小。将企业所在地区的市场化程度以及企业高管的金融背景纳入考虑之后,研究发现相比于市场化程度较高的地区,在市场化程度较低地区,社会地位缓解企业融资约束的效果更为显著;相较于拥有金融关联的企业,没有金融关联的企业提升社会地位更有利于缓解融资约束。且进一步研究发现,在市场化程度较低地区,没有金融关联的企业社会地位缓解融资约束的效果最为显著。这些结论不仅拓展了企业“社会属性”对其“经济性”行为的影响研究,而且能够为民营企业缓解融资约束提供有益借鉴,尤其是处在市场化程度不高地区,且不存在金融关联的民营企业。     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.     

Globalization,Neoliberalism and the attack on social security

Neoliberal political movements advocate privatization of public pension systems. Globalization imposes pressure on nations to conform to neoliberal policy views with respect to the design and structure of social insurance, including public pension systems. The paper begins with an investigation of the economic, ethical and ideological dimensions of the privatization debates in the U.S.; it argues that privatization advocates may be largely moved by ideology, since the other reasons advanced appear weak or unfounded. The second part discusses the history of Social Security, the purposes for its creation, and some of its economic effects. Differences between public and private pension systems are considered. A brief international comparison of some aspects of public pension system finance and benefit structures is presented. The final section considers the ethical, macroeconomic and distributional implications of privatization, prefunding and payroll tax funding, and argues for a pay as you go system financed with income taxes. In order to promote equity, economic security, community, and social cohesion, public pension systems should be universal in coverage. In order to reduce the inequality, income insecurity, and aged poverty generated by market economies, public pension systems ought to be progressive: benefit/contribution ratios should be inversely proportional to income, and progressive income taxes should finance the system. To promote economic growth, the systems should be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and should not be prefunded except for an emergency reserve. The fiscal policy recommendations partially depend upon the theory developed by Abba Lerner in the 1940s, and recently advanced by Wynne Godley and Randy Wray: Lerner's “principle of functional finance.”     

Revisiting the finance–growth nexus: the Turkish case, 1980–2010

In Turkey, the empirical results on the link between financial development and economic growth are mixed. The existing studies do not take into account the fact that Turkey has experienced endemic political and economic instabilities over extended periods. This study aims to analyse the role of macroeconomic instability and public borrowing on the finance–growth nexus in Turkey by using time series econometric techniques over the 1980–2010 period. In doing so, we attempt to extend the existing literature by taking into account the role of macroeconomic instability as well as public borrowing. Our results reveal that there are additional – albeit indirect – channels between finance and growth via the effects of macro instability and public borrowing on financial development and economic growth. After taking into account the effects of overall instability and public borrowing, we found that growth–financial development relationship is bidirectional and permanent. In other words, in Turkish case, economic growth and financial development are jointly determined. Thus, our results shed some light on the ambiguity of the evidence on the link between financial development and economic growth for Turkey.     

The economic spin

In business today “spinning” typically has a negative connotation. But it's more basic meaning, as a counter-twisting action producing multipurpose threads, actually better describes economic acts and relations. It especially illustrates Adam Smith's basic insight into the economic act as blending the mutual self-interests of buyers and sellers, of workers and employers, of borrowers and lenders. This meaning is obviously evident in private economic actions but it is also implicit in public undertakings. Indeed, just a few “look-sees” into the histories of national economies demonstrate the conclusion that where economic “weaving and spinning” interests are most effective, their economies evolve most productively and where not, they don’t.     

资产专用性、网络扩展和私人秩序

“公地悲剧”自哈丁提出以来 ,该名词成了揭示并批判公有产权的理论依据。可是 ,回眸现实 ,我们常听到网络、网络外部性 ,也常看到经济中的许多现象是公有产权 ,并且这些公有产权还在不断地扩展并呈繁荣之势。对此 ,理论上的解释是一个模糊的概念———网络外部性。本人对此提出自己的解释。通过自我实施的合约分析 ,我认为由于资产专用性的存在 ,个人进入网络投下不可收回的沉淀成本 ,由此构成可置信性承诺 ,通过私人秩序扩展了网络 ,实现了“公地繁荣”①。本文分为四部分 :第一部分提出观点 ;第二部分是私人秩序的博弈分析与论证 ,第三部分理论应用 ;最后归纳全文。     

Conformism and public news

We study a model where investment decisions are based on investor’s information about the unknown and endogenous return of the investment. The information of investors consists of endogenously determined messages sold by financial analysts who have access to both public and private information on the return. We assume that the return is increasing in the aggregate investment. This results into a beauty contest among analysts (or a “conformism” effect). There may exist multiple equilibria, each of which entails analysts sending the most informative messages possible. Beyond the “regular” equilibrium involving an overweighing of the public information, multiplicity introduces “inverted” equilibria where public information is negatively correlated with the return. The correlation across analysts’ information sources implies that not all the information available is transmitted to investors.     

The Social Economy Sector in Japan

The Social Economy Sector is a new comer in Japanese society. Based on two experiments and theories derived from the European concept of social economy and the American concept of the non profit organization, the Japanese way of integration of a social economy sector is developing under the name of the Non Profit and Co-operative Sector. The change of social policy and public policy under the influence of the new liberalism has urged a change in traditional relations between public sector and private sectors and created the new role of a social economy sector. Even though there is no clear image of the sector, both the financial need of public authorities and the social needs of citizen users especially in social security and medical care has made the social economy sector an alternative for realizing better service supply.     

Changes in Development Finance in Asia: Trends,Challenges, and Policy Implications

There have been shifts in the composition and nature of development finance in Asia, such as the mainstreaming of private sources of finance and the emergence of domestic resources potentially available for development purposes. In parallel, new trends and challenges are identified in such areas as the transformation of development aid, public–private partnerships, and green finance. A common challenge is how to strengthen financial intermediaries for longer term sustainable financing from domestic and external sources for investment serving development purposes. To address this, policymakers should bear in mind policy coherence and consistency from macro, sector, and micro perspectives. For various financial resources to bring about tangible benefits, policymakers should take account of complementarities and synergies among the full range of available financial resources. The effective utilization of private sources of finance depends on commercial viability. The key to success is incentive design and risk mitigation measures.     

Do Irrational Investors Destabilize?

In a financial market where all investors have valuable private information, full rationality requires that investors have an unlimited ability of figuring out the equilibrium model. Instead, I assume that due to a lack of knowledge or experience, some investors do not know the equilibrium model and use only their private information in forming their demand. By investigating the investment behavior of these “boundedly rational” investors and contrasting it with that of the rational ones, I find that in a market where the two kinds of investors coexist, it is the boundedly rational investors who contribute to price stability. The welfare implication is that, although each investor benefits from conditioning his asset demand on the information transmitted by the equilibrium price, it can happen that all investors lose by doing so because the equilibrium price becomes too volatile.