The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

Financial Liberalization as a Process of Flawed Institutional Change

I argue that the financial liberalization of the last decades, which resulted in a worldwide crisis, relied on an institutional change that ill-shaped actors’ behavior so as to let them enter into unsustainable speculative activities at the expense of macro-stability. To support such an assertion, I draw upon a specific Veblen-Minsky approach to a credit-money economy and its endogenous fragilities. I also maintain that, when financial markets are liberalized and private-interestsrelated self-regulation replaces public macro-prudential supervision, the financial system undergoes institutional deadlock and the ensuing confusion is transformed into a market gridlock. Markets then become unable to recover without public rescue operations of banks. The subsequent negative economic and social consequences are beyond the limits of any acceptable liberal ideology and scientific understanding. Therefore, systemic stability calls for a tighter macro-regulatory framework to remove the domination of speculative finance over economic decisions and activities.     

An Institutionalist Framework for a Consistent Financial Regulation

Abstract:

In the light of recurrent systemic crises that financialized market economies have been experiencing since the 1980s, this article seeks to determine the conditions required for a regulatory framework apt to ensure financial stability. Drawing upon an Institutionalist Minskyian endogenous financial instability approach, the article studies the fragilities of liberalized finance and points to some policy alternatives able to lead to an alternative financial regulatory model that is consistent with macroeconomic stability. It argues that in a weak regulatory environment financial markets naturally generate instabilities that could turn into systemic crises. The analysis maintains that in order to deal with such crises, a tight supervision should be framed under the aegis of public authorities and suggests some rules to develop a relevant regulatory system through an open and democratic decision process. Two points then deserve particular attention: a macro-prudential approach that regards instability as a systemic (non-individual) issue, and a preventive approach that aims at preventing systemic-risk generating activities from taking control over the markets.     

金融衍生品经济无限制膨胀是美国次贷危机、环球金融震荡的直接祸根

美国“次贷”危机的核心特徵是：“次贷”转为“次债”CDOs；从间接融资领域追入直接融资的资本市场领域；从美国金融市场跨越到国际金融市场；骨牌效应前所未有，皆归因于近年来美国金融衍生品经济的无限制膨胀。金融衍生品不断创新与发展基于上世纪70年代金汇兑本位货币制度的崩溃，是自由市场经济为解决自身矛盾在金融领域高度发展的必然结果。金融衍生品经济为发达市场经济运行带来了正效应，但其本质是虚拟经济运行，对实体经济必然呈现反向“锋刃”。近15年的环球金融风暴，无处不见发达市场经济金融衍生品泛滥的身影；规避的根本途径是：第一，约束发达市场经济国家金融衍生品经济的发展规模，其实体经济总规模应是“虚拟经济”交易总规模的理论最高值；第二，重建环球市场经济体系中的货币稳定机制与汇率稳定机制，建议建立环球中央银行，并构建环球中央银行的“基础货币”即国际通行储备货币与国际金融平衡调节货币。     

高校财务管理创新三论

我国正处于由计划经济向市场经济转轨期,国际、国内环境迫切要求我国高校财务改变原有的管理体制、管理观念、管理内容和运行模式,以促进我国高等教育事业的可持续发展。宏观和微观的制度环境决定着高校财务管理创新的基本边界和路径选择。     

热钱、房地产价格波动与金融体系稳定——基于SVAR模型的实证分析

热钱、房地产价格波动、银行信贷三者之间存在着一种自我强化的互馈机制,呈顺周期运行特征,会导致金融体系的不稳定,进而影响宏观经济。通过使用SVAR模型对我国房地产市场进行实证分析,结果发现：热钱推高了房价并且加剧了房价的波动,至少可以直接解释25％左右的房价波动,若进一步考虑货币供应量导致银行信贷扩张这一间接机制,其效果将更为可观。因此,要提高房地产调控政策的有效性、稳定金融市场,就必须加强对短期资本流动的监控,合理引导我国房地产市场的发展以及加速发展我国房地产金融体系,以达到控制和分散金融风险的目的。     

我国短期融资券的风险分析和控制

短期融资券作为我国货币市场的一个成功的金融创新产品,它的发行对我国宏观经济的发展和各微观主体有着重要的意义。尽管它一推出就受到市场的追捧,但我们也注意到其潜在的各种金融风险对它发展的阻碍作用。为了促进我国短期融资券市场的健康、持续发展,不仅需要加快金融创新产品的开发工具,更需要市场全体参与主体的共同努力,根据自身的存在问题,积极寻求风险控制的办法,形成一个全面防范风险和控制的体系。     

关于中国发展货币市场基金的思考

货币市场基金是实现货币市场与资本市场协调发展的重要制度安排。随着经济的发展和技术的进步,中国已经内生出对货币市场基金制度的创新需求,但仍存在一些制约其健康运行的制度障碍。通过比较制度分析,中国适宜采用融合发展型的制度变迁模型来推动中国的金融发展。     

农村基础性核心金融资源非农化配置的多角度分析

农村广义货币资本或资金处于农村金融资源系统中的基础性核心层次，是农村经济增长和发展中的重要基础性变量。当前，农村基础性核心金融资源正通过财政、金融、工农产品和要素剪刀差、农村经济主体生产消费等多种渠道流出农村领域，对农村经济系统造成了多方面的负面影响。     

金融强粤战略选择：构建南方（中小企业）债券交易中心

与上海、北京等全国金融中心相比,广东应选择特色金融强粤道路。广东可依靠市场机制完善,民营经济发达、中小企业发展迅速的优势,先行先试构建南方（中小企业）债券交易中心,在突破债券融资瓶颈的基础上,通过整合债券发行市场,创新中小企业债券,实现中小企业债券组合等来完善拓宽中小企业债券融资途径。为此,短期须降低债券市场准入门槛,控制债券市场风险;长期须完善二级交易市场,信息披露监管制度,投资者保护制度。     

Why Crisis Continue?——The Endogenous Reason of Financial Crisis and Evolution to the Debt Crisis and the Enlightenment

当前欧债危机越演越烈,需要重新思考金融危机爆发并且演化为主权债务危机的内生性根源.此次金融危机中,资本主义社会的基本矛盾是危机发生的制度性根源.这一矛盾外化为“相对过剩”.经济机制层面,新自由主义影响下的自由市场经济体制放大了市场经济固有的缺陷,为危机的爆发积累了机制性原因.微观市场层面,缺乏金融监管、不当的房地产和货币政策则是诱发危机的直接原因.高赤字和高负债的背景下,一些国内经济和社会矛盾突出的国家发生主权债务危机是金融危机深化的必然结果.处理好自由市场经济和规制市场经济、金融创新和金融监管、实体经济和虚拟经济的关系以及地方债务问题是此次金融和债务危机给我国的最大启示.     

韩国促进科技与金融结合的政策措施

韩国建立的致力于科技创新的金融支援体系,为创新经济、培育战略性新兴产业、应对金融危机等发挥了重要作用。长期以来,韩国陆续建立了各种金融资金支援制度,如,金融支援制度、租税支援制度、新技术产品市场支援制度等,大力发展创业风险投资和科技资本市场,使得科技与金融呈现出一种互利互动的关系,成为提高科技创新能力的基础和保障,韩国的高新技术产业乃至整体社会经济由此实现了持续快速增长。     

中国行政体制下的公共财政绩效提升

新世纪以来,随着中国财政体制改革的深化,公共财政绩效提升变得越来越重要,通过分析公共财政的基本内容和提升公共财政绩效的意义,提出在市场经济体制下提升公共财政绩效的对策。     

Market, civic virtues, and civic bargaining in the medieval and early modern age: some evidence from sixteenth century Italy

In the last decades, historians have shown that the modern market is rooted in the institutional system created in European towns since the middle ages. This approach leads us beyond the usual opposition between market and society or between public and private market. Indeed, in the medieval and early modern age, the market was part of a wider institutional design of civil life, which had a basic conceptual frame of reference in the notion of the common good, a feature typical of such organicistic and hierarchical societies. This paper explores the process of market construction in the medieval and early modern age. I firstly analysed the role of the market in these societies and then focused on the case of foodstuff provision: a key element of the non-written, ancient pact between rulers and people, based on the assurance of subsistence. As a basis for the study, I employed sixteenth century documents regarding Vicenza, a medium-sized town in the Republic of Venice. These show very clearly that, in general, market and price regulation was not the result of arbitrary interventions by public authorities; on the contrary, it was the result of a process of negotiation, which I call civic bargaining. This process involved??to various degrees??public authorities, landowners, merchants and guilds, and the town??s people, the pursuit of the common good being, in practice, a matter of balancing various needs and interests. Present-day economic and social public policies are, in many aspects, an inheritance of the institutional system created in the medieval and early modern age: knowledge of these origins is useful in the present debate regarding economic versus social development, as discussed at the end of the paper.     

为什么要加强对"国有资本财政"的研究

从近几年来的研究动态看,无论是财政理论界还是政府财政职能部门,关注的热点大多集中在如何建立“公共财政”上,把单一的“公共财政”作为与我国社会主义市场经济相适应的唯一目标模式。我国是以公有制为主体的国家,存在着面广量大的国有资产,这就决定了国有资产总量中除了非市场赢利性的部分外,还包含了巨额的经营性国有资产,因而我国在市场赢利性的国有经济基础上就必然相应产生“国有资本财政”。因此,由公共财政与国有资本财政所构成的国家财政必然要实行“双重(元)结构财政”模式,这是适应我国经济体制转轨特征和需要的财政运行模式。作为其重要组成部分的国有资本财政是社会主义市场经济的必然选择。加强对国有资本财政问题的研究有利于“双重(元)结构财政”模式的理论建构;有利于巩固我国公有制的主体地位;有利于矫正国有资本财政“越位”与公共财政“缺位”并存的格局;有利于澄清国有资本在市场竞争领域进与退的理论误区。     

近代中国的政府公债与金融市场

近代中国政府公债的发行开辟了政府动员国民储蓄的新时代,也为资本市场的发展提供了契机。事实上,公债已经在一定程度上介入了当时的金融市场,成为银行券的发行准备、储蓄存款的保证、银行放款的抵押品、金融业的投资筹码以及维护经济稳定的筹码;公债的交易也推动了近代中国证券市场的发展。然而,文章通过计量分析发现:利率对公债价格没有解释力。这说明政府公债还没有完全与金融市场融为一体,公债价格应该还受到很多非市场因素的影响或制约。1921年和1932年的公债整理对债信的维护具有重要意义,公债收益率的下降则是理性的回归。而法币改革则使政府摆脱了公债的财政制约。     

Comparative Capitalisms,Ideational Political Economy and French Post-Dirigiste Responses to the Global Financial Crisis

This article advances the case for the more systematic incorporation of ideational factors into comparative capitalisms analysis as a corrective to the rational choice proclivities of the Varieties of Capitalism approach. It demonstrates the pay-off of such an ideationally attuned approach through analysis of French capitalist restructuring over the last 25 years, placing it in comparative context. A modus operandi for such ideational explanation is elaborated through delineating different national conceptions of the market, and setting out their impacts on practices of market-making. The claim made in this article is that understanding the evolution of French capitalism requires recognition of the ongoing market-making role of the French State, in combination with the French conception of the market and its embedding within a social context characterised by the inter-penetration of public and private elitist networks of France's ‘financial network economy’ which remains substantially intact. The ideational dimension is crucial because French understandings of the market and competition, the ideational building blocks of market-making, inform French state interventions and leave footprints on French institutions and market structures, and the evolutionary trajectory of French capitalism. In charting this trajectory, this article deploys the concept of post-dirigisme. We map out the parameters and causes of the post-dirigiste condition in France through examination of French bond market development, privatisation, the shift from a government- to a market- dominated financial system, and French capitalism's internationalisation. It then uses post-dirigisme to explain French state responses to the financial crisis and the banking bailout, noting how state actors, in concert with the banking elites, actively facilitated dominant market positions of French international champions.