THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879–1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914–1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns.     

REFORMING THE FED: ITS INDEPENDENCE AND LESSONS FROM HUMPHREY-HAWKINS

The last session of Congress witnessed renewed calls for reforming the Federal Reserve System so as to better coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. This paper examines how the current institutional structure, established by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, performed when the supply-side tax cuts were implemented during 1981 and 1982. The findings reveal that authorities barely discussed the necessary policy coordination at the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings. Further, the record reveals that Fed Chairman Volcker refused to utilize the Fed's independence to publicly oppose the supply-side tax cuts.     

THE IMPACT OF A NEW FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN

This paper treats appointing a Federal Reserve Chairman as a portfolio investment made by the United States President. It models Ronald Reagan's 1987 choice between Paul Volcker and other candidates as a trade-off between a potentially unfavorable short-term market response to replacing Volcker and various long-term political benefits from installing Reagan's own man. The paper discusses possible effects of Alan Greenspan's chairmanship on the trajectory of future monetary policy, on the Fed's preferences for financial reform, and on the Fed's corporate culture.     

ESTIMATED DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE TAIWANESE ECONOMY

Abstract.  I develop a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study monetary policy and the business cycle in Taiwan. Several versions of the model with different representations of Taiwanese monetary policy are estimated using Bayesian techniques. The major findings are that: (i) monetary policy in Taiwan is best described by a money supply growth rate rule; (ii) the Taiwanese economy is more flexible than the Euro area economy; and (iii) export price mark-up and investment-specific technology shocks are the main driving forces of output growth fluctuations in Taiwan.     

Why has US monetary policy become ineffective lately?

Some recent studies show that US monetary policy has lost its stimulative traction, especially since the early 1980s. They argue that the Fed’s forward guidance has enabled economic agents to anticipate the changes in interest rates more accurately. As a result, it is harder to find truly exogenous monetary policy shocks, which has made monetary policy ineffective. In this article, we find that anomalous economic behaviours of financial institutions might be the true reason for the ineffective monetary policy. Our structural vector autoregressive model shows that increases in the US money supply mostly flowed into the financial sector to increase its profits instead of stimulating the real sector of the economy through business investment.     

A Tacit Monetary Policy of the Gulf Countries: Is There a Remittances Channel?

The strong economic ties between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies and the USA are manifested in three ways: currency peg, coupling of monetary policy, and the adoption of the US dollar as the trading currency for oil. This paper examines how these dynamics result in a misalignment of the US monetary policy with the business cycles of the GCC economies. The study shows how the staggering amount of remittances outflow of the GCC economies plays a stabilizing role as a tacit monetary policy tool. Incorporating remittances in the money‐demand equation results in a more robust model than otherwise. We further find that the effect of the Federal Funds rate on money demand in these countries diminishes in significance during the period of oil boom between 2002 and 2009. However, the transmission effect of the recession periods in the USA into the demand for money in the GCC countries is not statistically significant.     

Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand logic

This paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis. Aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation. While ‘moderate’ participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy, low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom. The slope of the ‘IS’ curve changes sign, the ‘Taylor principle’ is inverted, optimal welfare-maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the effects and propagation of shocks are changed. However, a targeting rule implementing optimal policy under commitment delivers equilibrium determinacy regardless of the degree of asset market participation. Our results may justify Fed's behavior during the ‘Great Inflation’ period.     

THE CYCLICAL EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY REGIMES*

A 1979 change in U.S. monetary policy coincided with a break in the cyclical behavior of monetary aggregates, while the cyclical behavior of all other real and nominal variables remained relatively constant. A model is developed to assess the quantitative importance of a change in monetary policy in accounting for these observations. The monetary authority's reaction function is estimated conditionally on the theoretical model and accounts for upward of 72–95% of all observed changes, including inside money preceding the business cycle and a qualitative change in the cyclical behavior of the monetary base.     

WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The Fed has often been accused of using ambiguity, concealment, and deception when it is subject to intense scrutiny and pressure. We investigate this issue by examining the relationship between the Fed's policy statements and its subsequent use of a key policy instrument, the federal funds rate. Our analysis shows that the Fed usually does what it says it will do during times of economic distress (recessions), but that its actions are more inclined to diverge from its stated intent when a sluggish economy coincides with presidential elections.     

DO POLITICS CAUSE REGIME SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY?

Whether or not politics cause changes in monetary policy is controversial in the literature. This article re‐examines the link between politics and regime shifts in monetary policy using two alternative approaches. First, empirical results show that both the presidential and Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) chairmanship regimes do not influence monetary policy under the assumption that the Fed closely follows an interest rate rule. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that changes in political regimes are able to account for the deviations from the optimal Taylor rule. (JEL E52, E58, D78)     

HOW DO FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND FISCAL STIMULI IMPACT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF BUSINESS CYCLES?

Using quarterly data for a panel of advanced economies, we show that synchronized fiscal consolidation (stimulus) programmes in different countries make their business cycles more closely linked. We also find: (i) some evidence of decoupling when an inflation targeting regime is unilaterally adopted; (ii) an increase in business cycle synchronization when countries fix their exchange rates and become members of a monetary union; (iii) a positive effect of bilateral trade on the synchronization of business cycles. Global factors, such as a rise in global risk aversion and uncertainty and a reversal of nonstandard expansionary monetary policy, can also reduce the degree of co‐movement of business cycles across countries. From a policy perspective, our work shows that an inflation targeting regime coupled with simultaneous fiscal consolidations can lead to more business cycle synchronization.     

BEN BERNANKE AND THE ZERO BOUND

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money‐financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero‐bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision‐making. (JEL E52, E58)     

TALKING LESS AND MOVING THE MARKET MORE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECB AND THE FED

This paper examines and compares the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and their effectiveness. First, we find that the surprise components of both monetary policy actions and statements have important but differing effects on asset prices, with unexpected communication having a much greater impact on longer‐term interest rates. Second, both the ECB and the Fed have proven to be equally successful in moving their domestic asset prices using either monetary policy or news shocks. However, the response of the American yield curve to the surprise component of Fed's statements is larger than the reaction of the European term structure to ECB's announcements. This result is intimately related to the amplitude of the policy rate cycle that is much larger in the US than in the euro area combined with the bounded support of the news shock. Third, we analyze the cross‐effects and show that the Fed has been more able to move the European interest rates of all maturities than the ECB to move American rates. This finding is tied to the predominance of dollar fixed income assets rather than to an attempt of the ECB to mimic the Fed.     

房地产周期、固定资产 投资周期与经济周期的关联性 ——基于货币政策视角下的分析

本文应用TVSTAR方法实证研究了房地产周期、固定资产投资周期与经济周期的关联性，以及货币供给量M0，M1和利率的调整对联动的影响。研究结果显示，经济增长周期与房地产周期间存在显著的区制性特征。在收缩区制，房地产周期的变动是引起CPI周期变动的原因，而固定资产投资周期具有显著的逆经济增长周期的波动特征。在扩张区制，货币供给量M0和M1增加，对稳定经济增长、增加投资和维持房地产市场的繁荣具有积极作用，但持续和过度的宽松货币政策易引发通胀和房地产泡沫，在收缩区制，上述货币政策工具失效。     

State politics,tuition, and the dynamics of a political budget cycle

This paper attempts to improve the understanding of political budget cycles by first identifying a previously undocumented cycle in tuition and required fees at public four-year institutions of higher education in the United States. I find that tuition and fees are 1.5 % lower during gubernatorial election years than in non-election years. No similar cycle is found in private tuition and fees. Using a newly constructed dataset, I then explore the variation in electoral competition in gubernatorial and state legislative elections within states over time to uncover the underlying electoral incentives creating the cycle. The results suggest that the tuition cycle is not designed to increase the reelection prospects of governors as standard theories would predict. I find that tuition decreases during gubernatorial election years as the reelection prospects of the incumbent governor increases. Instead, the evidence suggests that popular governors use lower tuition as political pork to expand party power in the state by capturing swing districts in concurrent state legislative elections. I find that the magnitude of the cycle increases with the level of competition in state house elections and that the effect is concentrated among those districts held by the opposition party, particularly if those opposition districts are populated with voters likely to be responsive to tuition as a policy lever. These results reveal important dynamics about party competition within states in the United States and suggest that the electoral incentives driving political budget cycles can be complex.     

Hot Money Flows,Cycles in Primary Commodity Prices,and Financial Control in Developing Countries

Because the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets (EM) with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States (and to other industrial countries) as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, African countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and—being less industrialized—they are more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of their commodity exports. Supply-side shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products—minerals, energy, cereals, and so on—reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.     

Bank Behaviour and the Channel of Monetary Policy in Japan, 1965–1999

Using monthly data, this paper investigates whether there are differential effects of monetary policy across bank size and business size in Japan, to test the presence of the "bank lending channel" of monetary policy. It also considers that channel for the aggregate of banks. Prior to the end of 1984, support is found for the bank lending channel and also partly for the money channel. The study of the period from 1985 onwards suggests that no channel of monetary policy has been substantially effective in Japan.