The Long‐Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark

We use historical publications and micro data from tax returns to construct internationally comparable estimates of the development in income inequality in Denmark over the last 140 years. The study shows that income inequality and top income shares have declined during several distinct phases in between periods of stability. Furthermore, the quality of the Danish data allows us to analyse not only the development in top income shares but also broader inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. These analyses show that top income shares are a good proxy for the underlying development in inequality.     

Mobility of Top Incomes in Germany

I analyze German top income mobility using micro‐level panel data of personal income tax returns which are highly representative for top income taxpayers for the years 2001–06. Top income mobility is assessed in three dimensions: (i) persistence in top income fractiles and its stability over time, (ii) measures of individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size: the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, and (iii) mobility's impact on top income shares. Persistence in top income fractiles is comparatively high and fairly stable across the analyzed period. Top income recipients are less prone to downward mobility and see less variation in annual ranks than less rich tax units. Mobility's impact on income concentration is moderate. The top percentile's share is reduced by roughly 5 percent over six years.     

ON THE ROLE OF CAPITAL GAINS IN SWEDISH INCOME INEQUALITY

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re‐rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains‐driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post‐1980 deregulated financial markets.     

Correction of China's income inequality for missing top incomes

After accounting for top incomes missing from the Chinese Household Income Project, this paper examines the income inequality trend in China during the 21st century. Our analysis, which involves fitting the upper tail of the income distribution to a power-law model, reveals that the authoritative income survey data miss 0.68% of the population and 6.19% of aggregate income in 2018. Despite the most recent survey data providing better coverage of top incomes, our correction is still crucial. The raw survey data indicate a consistently increasing Gini coefficient between 2002 and 2018, but the corrected index starts to decline from 2013. Meanwhile, the revised top 1% income share increases from 7.01% in 2002 to 7.89% in 2013 and then slightly decreases to 7.64% in 2018, while the revised top 10% income share stabilises at around 33% throughout the period. Notably, China's revised top 10% and top 50% income shares in 2018 are close to those of the United Kingdom but are considerably lower than those of the United States.     

Genetic distance,economic growth and top income shares: Evidence from OECD countries

The relationship between economic growth and income inequality remains a puzzle in the literature. The main problem has been finding a way to account for the endogeneity of growth. Using century-long data of 14 OECD countries, this study disentangles the growth–inequality relationship. In doing so, our main contribution is employing genetic and geographical distances as instruments for economic growth. The instruments are constructed on the premise that the growth of one country spills over to the others if they are connected through trade and other forms of exchange; however, the genetic and geographical distances between countries represent barriers to such spillovers. Using alternative specifications and measures, we find that growth reduces the inequality measured by top income shares. As capital share increases in the growth process and capital substitutes labour, inequality-reducing strength of growth declines. Another important finding is that the effect of growth on top income shares is more significant among the highest income groups.     

Inflation and income distribution in Central America,Mexico, Panama,and the Dominican Republic

Analyses of the impact of inflation on income distribution typically only consider the general inflation rate. However, when the consumption structure of households is shaped by its income level and inflation varies across goods and services, they are affected differently by inflation. The aim of this study is to contribute to the analysis of this effect in Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), Panama, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic (CAPMDR) for the period 2007–2018. According to our findings, there have been significant differences in the inflation rates faced by different income groups. By employing these percentile‐specific inflation rates, we have computed an “inflation‐corrected Gini index.” This adjustment is important because although inequality has been decreasing during past years in the countries in our sample, on average, about half of the gains observed using the standard Gini index are lost once the Gini indices are corrected for inflation, a clearly nonnegligible magnitude.     

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS' HOUSEIIOLD INCOME AND MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN: 1963–88

An attempt is made to examine empirically the relationship between the size distribution of workers' household incomes and the variables expressing macroeconomic activities. As a preliminary implementation, the income shares are first estimated by decile groups and several subdivided top income groups. Applying Blinder and Esaki's regression approach to the estimated data, the ratio of job offers to applicants, inflation rate, and the terms of trade arc found to significantly affect the distribution. Of these variables, the terms of trade should be taken into account to ascertain precisely the income distribution in Japan where foreign trade heavily affects economic conditions.     

我国城镇居民收入差距演变及"十一五"趋势分析

笔者通过综合使用基尼系数、分组收入份额和分组人均可支配收入实际增长率等指标,多角度定量分析我国城镇居民收入差距的演变过程,认为1985年以来,城镇居民收入差距一直在不断扩大;收入差距加速扩大的局面在2006年开始出现扭转势头。立足于宏观经济背景,作者预测"十一五"期间分组收入份额差距将继续缩小,基尼系数将会降低,有望实现"十一五"规划和十七大提出的"逐步扭转收入分配差距扩大趋势"的目标。     

TOP INCOMES IN NEW ZEALAND 1921–2005: UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF MARGINAL TAX RATES, MIGRATION THREAT, AND THE MACROECONOMY

Using taxation statistics, we estimate the income share held by top income groups in New Zealand over the period 1921–2005. We find that the income share of the richest fell during the 1930s, rose again after the Second World War, and steadily declined from the late-1950s until the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, top income shares rose rapidly, particularly at the very top of the distribution. We present evidence that top marginal tax rates and changing top income shares in Australia and the United Kingdom may have contributed to fluctuations in the income share of the richest 1 percent. Past economic growth does not seem to have a strong effect on the income share of the top percentile group.     

Behind rising inequality and falling growth

This paper investigates why the upsurge of top income shares has coincided with economic slowdowns in the US since the late 1970s. I argue that a fast-growing unearned income from ‘wealth residual’ – the unexplained increase in wealth that is not accompanied by any increase in real output – lies behind them. To support this hypothesis, I measure wealth residual from the national accounts and associated statistics, and then perform a set of panel regressions using a comprehensive panel dataset of the US at the state level. The estimation results demonstrate that the rapid growth of wealth residual during the last four decades has contributed to a co-evolution of fast-growing inequality and falling growth.     

Top Wealth Shares in Australia 1915–2012

Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two‐thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.     

国民收入分配效率对通货膨胀的影响——基于1978～2007年时间序列数据的分析

运用计量经济模型,通过对现金净投放量、居民收入、通货膨胀率和国内生产总值四者之间的相互关系进行研究,在比较和分析了居民收入对现金净投放量的反应速度、CPI指数对现金净投放量的反应速度的基础上,发现整体居民收入增加时间点与物价上涨时间点之间存在一定时差,从而论证了国民收入分配效率对通货膨胀的影响。建议通过居民财富分配结构、国民收入分配结构的调整和政府干预机制的建立,来提高国民收入的分配效率,从而抵减通货膨胀的不利影响。     

Understanding the dynamics of labor shares and inflation

Calvo-style models of nominal rigidities currently provide the dominant paradigm for understanding the linkages between wage and price dynamics. Recent empirical implementations stress the idea that these models link inflation to the behavior of the labor share of income. Ga?´ et al. (2001) argue that the model explains the combination of declining inflation and labor shares in Euro area. In this paper, we show that with realistic parameters, the canonical Calvo-style model cannot explain the joint behavior of inflation and the labor share in Europe. In addition, we show that the model fails very badly in sectoral data with consistently negative estimated coefficients on the labor share in a number of different inflation specifications. Indeed, the use of a traditional output gap measure proved more successful in terms of a positive relationship with inflation.     

The long-run determinants of inequality: What can we learn from top income data?

This paper studies determinants of income inequality using a newly assembled panel of 16 countries over the entire twentieth century. We focus on three groups of income earners: the rich (P99–100), the upper middle class (P90–99), and the rest of the population (P0–90). The results show that periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile income share at the expense of the rest of the top decile. Financial development is also pro-rich and the outbreak of banking crises is associated with reduced income shares of the rich. Trade openness has no clear distributional impact (if anything openness reduces top shares). Government spending, however, is negative for the upper middle class and positive for the nine lowest deciles but does not seem to affect the rich. Finally, tax progressivity reduces top income shares and when accounting for real dynamic effects the impact can be important over time.     

城镇家庭收入差异研究——基于2005-2009年安徽省城镇家庭月度住户调查数据的分析

本文以经典的经济增长理论为基础，结合中等收入国家的特点，提出如下理论假设：通胀所造成的家庭福利损失会影响中等收入国家宏观经济的发展，进而推动相关国家陷入“中等收入陷阱”。而后通过FGLS、差分GMM，以及系统GMM的方法对陷入“中等收入陷阱”的典型国家进行回归分析。分析结果表明，在控制了基础设施、债务水平、技术创新以及储蓄率这些影响因素之后，通胀对上述国家人均GDP增长率均有显著的负向影响，即使是在年均通胀率只有514%的东亚国家组，通胀对人均GDP增长率的平均影响也达到了123个百分点～221个百分点，影响比重达到了27%～48%。所以，我们应该加强对通胀的调控，以确保我国经济能够持续健康地发展。     

The Evolution of Income Composition Inequality in Italy, 1989–2016

We study the evolution of inequality in income composition in terms of capital and labor income in Italy between 1989 and 2016. We document a rise in the share of capital income accruing to the bottom of the distribution, while the top of the distribution increases its share of labor income. This implies a falling degree of income composition inequality in the period considered and a weaker relationship between the functional and personal distribution of income in Italy. This result is robust to various specifications of self-employment income; nonetheless, it hinges crucially on the treatment of rental incomes. While the dynamics of imputed rents has brought about a more equitable distribution of capital incomes across the income distribution, that of actual rents has led to higher concentration of capital incomes at the top in the decade preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis. Finally, we conceptualize a rule of thumb for policy makers seeking to reduce income inequality in the long run.     

Aggregate demand, conflict and capacity in the inflationary process

This paper focuses on an alternative perspective on inflationto that of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment(NAIRU). It indicates that there are no automatic forces leadingto a level of aggregate demand consistent with constant inflation.Inflationary pressures arise from conflict over income shares,and from cost elements, with the price of raw materials, especiallyoil, being the most important. There are supply-side factorsimpinging on the inflationary process, which arise from thelevel of productive capacity (relative to aggregate demand).The supply-side constraints are viewed as arising from capacityconstraints, rather than from the operation of the labour market.     

Wealth,Capital and the Theory of Distribution: Some Implications for Piketty’s Analysis

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) has been spectacularly successful. One reason for this is that while it often challenges received views and supports a non-apologetic interpretation of capitalism, at the same time it relies on mainstream economics. This theoretical framework, however, is not always conducive to consistency and interpretative accuracy. This paper points out some of the book’s analytical weaknesses and shows that some empirical evidence, a clearer distinction between wealth and capital, and a different theoretical perspective, could lead to questioning some of the book’s claims. In particular, it argues that the increase in the wealth-to-output ratio (but not the capital-to-output ratio) cannot explain the observed changes in income shares. It also contends that non-mainstream perspectives on income distribution and growth suggest that changes in income distribution are due more to policy and power relations than to the factors Piketty identifies.     

Inequality in Japan*

This paper analyzes income inequality, based on government income statistics and an attitude survey. First, the paper describes the present income inequality in Japan by using Gini coefficients, the income share of the top and bottom income classes, and mobilities among income classes. Second, by using the Japan–USA international survey, this paper analyzes the cause of the increasing awareness that Japan's income gap is widening. In these two countries, their distinct value judgments about the causes for the gap influence how they perceive it. The Japanese have negative perceptions about the income gap because they perceive it to be influenced by talent, academic background, or luck, and this perception seems relatively uncommon in the USA. A large percentage of Japanese also think one's income is decided by talent, academic background, or luck, although it should not be. Such disagreements between the desired and perceived determinants of income are thought to raise their negative perception of the gap.     

Income Shifting within a Dual Income Tax System: Evidence from the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993*

Dual income tax systems can suffer from income that shifts from progressively taxed labour income to capital income, which is taxed at a lower, flat rate. This paper empirically examines the 1993 Finnish dual income tax reform, which radically reduced the marginal tax rates on capital income for some, but not all, taxpayers. We measure how overall taxable income and the relative shares of capital income and labour income reacted to the reform. We find that the reform led to a small positive impact on overall taxable income, but part of the positive response was probably offset by income shifting among the self‐employed.