CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INVESTMENT AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES: AN EXAMINATION ON SOCIAL WELFARE INVESTMENT OF CHINESE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

We apply the theory of corporate social responsibility to analyse social welfare investment undertaken by Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). We present a simple theoretical model to illustrate how the presence of social objectives in the firm's objective function changes its investment behaviour. Our theoretical model accommodates special features of Chinese SOEs, whose social welfare investment is driven by both social objectives and profit concerns. The model is then tested using a panel of Chinese enterprises during the period 1995–1999. The empirical analysis indicates that despite of the corporatization reform social welfare investment undertaken by Chinese SOEs is still inefficient due to the lack of profit concerns, suggesting that social objectives still dominate profit concerns in motivating the SOEs' social welfare investment. However, we do obtain clear-cut evidence showing that social objectives become less important as time progresses.     

Enterprise Productivity and Efficiency: When Is Up Really Down?

A substantial body of literature has documented impressive total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the period of China's enterprise reform. Such growth rates have been used to support the view that China's reforms of SOEs have been highly successful. In this paper, we question the validity of using TFP growth rates as a “bottom line” measure of performance. In the spirit of a counterexample, we use a simple model to show that when firms are not profit maximizers for whatever reason, higher productivity may actually lead to greater allocative distortion, lower profits, and lower economic efficiency. On the basis of existing evidence, we argue that these conditions held for many Chinese state enterprises during the reform.J. Comp. Econom.,June 1997,24(3), pp. 265–280. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1220; and Industrial Relations Center, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 271 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455.     

Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

Dynamic welfare costs of the 1997 Asian crisis

This paper measures and investigates the welfare costs, other effects and recovery process of the 1997 Asian crisis, and evaluates the impact of the policy program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main findings are as follows. First, the ratio of ‘whole cost’ to the level of consumption in a hypothetical economy is high: 50% for Indonesia, 39% for Hong Kong, 36% for Korea, 30% for Thailand and 18% for Malaysia. Second, the dynamic process of ‘cost at period t’ quickly converges to 40% immediately after the crisis, though the costs for Indonesia and Hong Kong gradually increase toward 100%. Third, the IMF-supported programs in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea were implemented straight after the peak cost. Finally, the cost of the IMF-supported program was relatively inexpensive compared with the welfare cost of the crisis. The authors would like to thank Kenneth S. Chan, Makoto Saito, Yum K. Kwan, Yong Wang, Eiji Ogawa, Yoshiro Tsutsui, Yuzo Honda, Shinsuke Ikeda, Soyoung Kim, Joshua Aizenman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and useful suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2003 at Osaka University and Hitotsubashi University, in 2004 at the City University of Hong Kong, Tokyo University and the Western Regional Science Association Conference (Hawaii), Western Economic Association Conference (Vancouver) and East Asian Economic Association Conference (Hong Kong). Funding from a Grant-in-Aid 16530204 from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, Technology of Japan, the Nomura Foundation for Social Science 2005 and Kanpo Foundation 2002 supported the first-named author’s research.     

China's new agricultural-policy program: Major economic consequences, 1979–1983

While the bulk of the farm surplus is still compulsorily siphoned off to support the Stalinist strategy of maximizing growth of heavy industry, the new policy attempts to ease the agricultural constraints by drastically raising procurement prices, reparcelizing farmland to the households, and promoting rural diversification to help accommodate both redundant labor and increased local demands for consumables. The new emphasis on maximization of short-run investments makes it difficult to cope with natural disasters and to undertake large-scale irrigation projects. Hence bureaucratic correctives appear to remain indispensable, hopefully without impairing peasants' incentives. J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1984, 8(4), pp. 353–375. Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London WC1E 7HP.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.     

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31.     

Trends and Inequalities of Rural Welfare in China: Evidence from Rural Households in Guangdong and Sichuan

This paper studies the trend of Chinese rural welfare and its inequality in the second half of the 1980's using rural household survey data of Guangdong and Sichuan. In this connection, different indicators of economic well-being are used. Compared with other transitional economies, rural inequality in China increased moderately in the second half of the 1980's. In spite of a more rapid pace of transition, Guangdong's rural inequality did not increase. No monotonic relationship between the pace of transition and rural inequality is thus discernible. Finally, by decomposing overall rural inequality into its between-region and within-region inequalities, we explore the relative importance of inter-provincial inequality.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 783–804. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

中国内地公司香港上市:实证分析与理论反思

通过对中国内地在港上市公司发展概况、公司特征等状况的实证统计分析,可以发现尽管内地上市公司已经成为香港市场的重要部分,但不同模式上市的内地公司在行业分布、盈利状况以及市场特征指标上仍存在一定差异。从现实看,尽管内地企业赴港上市符合其微观利益且在短期内无法避免,但从中国金融体系功能完善视角着眼,把优质企业留在内地,夯实内地市场的经济基础是中国金融市场发展进程中至关重要的战略选择。     

Does competition cause government decentralization? The case of state-owned enterprises

This paper examines the causal effects of competition on governments’ incentives in decentralizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By using the shocks to product market competition caused by China's trade liberalization, we find that competition substantially improves SOEs’ decentralization. Furthermore, we also provide evidence of the incentive to exploit local information and roll out an alternative interpretation that government divests itself of SOEs because they become burdensome. Finally, we find that the effect of competition on decentralization is augmented when governments are geographically distant from their SOEs or when SOEs are located in regions characterized by low social trust, high dialect diversity, or heavy pressure for economic growth.     

R&D subsidy and output subsidy in a duopoly: The role of technology spillover and R&D budget

Technology spillover and research and development (R&D) budget are relevant on government subsidies that aim at improving social welfare through enhancing R&D incentives of firms. However, there has not been related literature considering these two factors. To fill this gap, this paper examines the effect of technology spillover and R&D budget on R&D competition of duopolistic firms and government subsidies by constructing a game-theoretic model. We find that while each firm's profit sometimes increases with R&D budget for low coefficient of technology spillover, this profit may decrease with R&D budget for high coefficient of technology spillover due to the intensified R&D competition. We show that when both R&D budget and the coefficient of technology spillover remain high, R&D subsidy leads to higher social welfare than output subsidy and otherwise R&D subsidy results in lower social welfare.     

The Impact of the China Factor on the pre-1997 Hong Kong Economy: a macroeconometric analysis

After the reunification of Hong Kong and China in 1997, Hong Kong is assured of a high degree of autonomy by the Basic Law. However, there remains some worry about the territory's economic viability and financial stability. Whether Chinese policies and China's remarkable growth momentum could continue to boost Hong Kong's prosperity has become an issue of concern. As the Chinese economic reform proceeds, the ‘China factor’ has been generating an increasing influence on the performance of the Hong Kong economy. Unfortunately, there have been very few rigorous quantitative analyses of this rapidly evolving development. To fill the gap, we have constructed a macroeconometric model of Hong Kong which takes into detailed account the linkages of the two economies including trade and capital flows. Estimation of the model incorporates error correction techniques to establish short-run dynamics and long-run equilibria. Our findings have identified crucial channels through which the ‘China factor’ has exerted impact on the Hong Kong economy. It is shown that the factor was not overwhelming up to the recent past, in terms of its stabilizing effects in the financial market and its stimulation on growth, although its influence may rise in the post-1997 era.     

On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

We study renegotiation in an agency setting where the number of offers and accept/reject decisions parties can make is potentially unlimited. Thus any contract, either on or off the equilibrium path, may be subject to possible renegotiation. We first show that the principal will not be able to gain complete access to the agent’s private information with unlimited renegotiation, unlike when the potential number of renegotiations is finite. Rather the agent either employ a randomized reporting strategy or do not to report at all. We then identify conditions under which expected allocations are most efficient with the contract that induces no agent communication. More significantly, by doing so we also identify conditions under which the parties are made strictly worse off by committing to end renegotiation after a fixed number of rounds. We thank workshop participants at University of California, Irvine, University of Chicago, Duke University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Houston, London School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, the Carnegie Mellon Accounting Research Conference, the editor, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Hardened Budgets and Enterprise Restructuring: Theory and an Application to Romania

We identify the presence of soft budgets and analyze their impact on enterprise restructuring in Romania over the initial transition period. A simple analytical framework is developed to show that hardened budget constraints foster rationalization of costs but not new investment. The latter requires availability of external financing. The model emphasizes the importance of the credibility of hardened budgets and the empirical findings are consistent with its predictions. Using a sample of over 4000 Romanian enterprises from 1992 to 1995, we show that hardened budget constraints induce labor shedding. However, there is no evidence of new investments. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 749–763. University of Sienna, Central European University, and CEPR; and World Bank and CEPR. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G32, G34.     

Factor supply interruption, welfare loss and shortage management

Factor supply shortage is a common problem faced by a firm. Solutions for allocating the limited supply include rationing, interruption and pricing. While previous research has examined the welfare losses generated by each solution, there is little evidence on their relative magnitudes within a common framework. The objective of this paper is to specify a model of firm behaviour under service interruption to estimate the welfare loss of service interruption. The same model is used to estimate the loss due to a price increase intended to resolve a supply shortage. Using water consumption data collected for Hong Kong, we find that relative to pricing, service interruption is inefficient for water shortage management.     

THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP IN NGOS’ COMMERCIAL VENTURES

ABSTRACT: Amidst pressure to become self‐financing, Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly involved in profit‐generating business ventures. Because NGOs are traditionally financed by donations with the expectation that they focus on their social mission, the commercialization of NGOs has generated criticism. This paper examines the effect of ownership on investment incentives in NGOs’ commercial ventures, using an incomplete contracts framework. NGO‐ownership helps minimize the tension between primary social mission and managerial decisions. However, external ownership provides better incentives to invest in mission‐enhancing innovations. Finally, because relationships with firms are repeated, NGOs may use relational contracts to align their ventures’ incentives. However, such contracts need to be credible to work.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets

Abstract We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms’ incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications. We find that the CSR certification standard is the lowest under for‐profit private certifiers and the highest under a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), with the standard of a welfare‐maximizing public certifier lying in between. Yet, regarding industry output, this ranking is reversed. Certification of CSR activities is welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and should be encouraged. Finally, the market and societal outcomes of CSR certification depend crucially on whether certification takes place before or after firms’ CSR activities.