Decreasing marginal impatience in a two-country world economy

By using a two-country model with endogenous time preference, this paper examines the dynamic implication of decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). To ensure stability, we assume that one country has DMI whereas the other has increasing marginal impatience (IMI). The resultant equilibrium dynamics differ from what can be inferred from the analysis of the standard IMI model (e.g., Devereux and Shi in J Int Econ 30:1–25, 1991). An increase in fiscal spending, in either country with DMI or IMI, has always contrasting long-run effects on domestic and foreign consumption and hence on domestic and foreign welfare; and the same policy definitely raises the interest rate in the long run.     

ON DECREASING MARGINAL IMPATIENCE*

One of the most controversial assumptions in endogenous time preference theory is that the degree of impatience is marginally increasing in wealth. We examine the implications of an empirically more relevant specification whereby time preference exhibits decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). With DMI, there are multiple steady‐state non‐satiated and satiated equilibria. In a constant interest rate economy, the non‐satiated steady‐state point is necessarily unstable. In a capital economy with decreasing returns technology, both the non‐satiated and satiated steady‐state points can be saddlepoint stable. The model is used to examine policy implications for the effects of capital taxation and government spending.     

Fiat money and the value of binding portfolio constraints

We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the individual optimality of a consumption-portfolio plan in an infinite horizon economy where agents are uniformly impatient and fiat money is the only asset available for intertemporal transfers of wealth. Next, we show that fiat money has a positive equilibrium price if and only if for some agent the zero short sale constraint is binding and has a positive shadow price (now or in the future). As there is always an agent that is long, it follows that marginal rates of intertemporal substitution never coincide across agents. That is, monetary equilibria are never full Pareto efficient. We also give a counter-example illustrating the occurrence of monetary bubbles under incomplete markets in the absence of uniform impatience.     

Redistribution and persistent exploitation in an accumulation economy with decreasing marginal impatience

Abstract

A variant of John Roemer’s accumulation economy is studied in which agents have identical payoff functions characterized by decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), such that time discount rates are decreasing in individual wealth levels. The implications of DMI for the existence and persistence of positive rates of profit and exploitation in the presence of capital accumulation, as well as for the dynamic redistribution of wealth, are derived. It is demonstrated that with DMI, differential ownership of productive assets is sufficient to ensure ongoing capital scarcity, and thus persistently positive rates of return and exploitation, as well as eventual redistribution of productive assets to the wealthiest agents.     

Heterogeneity,impatience, and dynamic private provision of a discrete public good

We analyze dynamic private provision of a discrete public good by heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their levels of impatience, in a differential game framework. In contrast to the strategic complementarity result for homogeneous individuals, we show that an asymmetric completion Markov perfect equilibrium exists, where the individual contributions and the strategic behaviors depend crucially on an impatience differential: the difference in rates of time preference across groups of individuals. When this differential is insignificant, contributions of both types of individuals are strategic complements. On the other hand, when this impatience differential exceeds a threshold, the contributions of impatient individuals become strategic substitutes, whereas the contributions of patient individuals remain strategic complements. We show that group size has an interesting role to play in the strategic behavior: increasing the number of patient individuals aggravates the incentives to free‐ride by the impatient agents. We also derive a condition under which all the socially beneficial projects get completed in the equilibrium.     

Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.     

A model with endogenously determined cycles, discounting and growth

Summary. This article reexamines the role of consumption in growth and emphasises the external effects of aggregate consumption, viewed as consumption standards, as an additional impediment in the growth process. These external effects raise the productivity of the individuals and are positively related to their valuation of the future. Conditions are established under which this results in a marginal value of wealth that is an increasing function of consumption. This brings new types of multiple steady states, local indeterminacies and cyclical motions. Imposing extra homogeneity restrictions, balanced growth solutions with endogenous impatience emerge. The possibility of multiple convergent paths is univocally related to endogenous discount effects. A comparison with a benchmark planning economy indicates an excessive value for the rate of time preference and emphasises its insufficient adaptation to future utility in a stationary setting. Discrepancies along the transition path that rest on endogenous impatience versus fixed discount appear in a non-stationary environment when the competitive balanced growth solution is indeterminate. Received: May 5, 1996; revised version: May 19, 1997     

The Game Academics Play: Comment

A recent paper by Faria (Bulletin of Economic Research, 57 (2005), pp. 1–12) deals with the interplay between editors and authors. This research is a welcome addition to the literature on formal analyses of academic markets. This note points out a potential discrepancy in Faria's derivation of the equilibrium journal quality and clarifies the conditions under which journal quality responds to changes in editor's impatience and in author's impatience. Specifically, the effect of a change in author's impatience on journal quality is shown to be not unambiguous. Some implications of these findings are discussed.     

Precautionary demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New Mercantilism

Financial globalization had a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops. Foreign reserves have grown very rapidly since then, as if those countries were practicing a New Mercantilism that views foreign reserves as a war chest for defense against Sudden Stops. This paper conducts a quantitative assessment of this argument using a stochastic intertemporal equilibrium framework in which precautionary foreign asset demand is driven by output variability, financial globalization, and Sudden Stop risk. In this framework, credit constraints produce endogenous Sudden Stops. We find that financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk can explain the surge in reserves but output variability cannot. These results hold using the intertemporal preferences of the Bewley–Aiyagari–Hugget precautionary savings model or the Uzawa–Epstein setup with endogenous impatience.     

Some empirics of the bivariate relationship between average subjective well-being and the sustainable wealth of nations

The World Bank's Millennium Capital Assessment (MCA) has provided per capita estimates of total wealth and its major subcategories for a large number of countries. In this article, these macro-level estimates are used to explore bivariate cross-country ‘wealth–happiness’ relationships, focussing on issues of appropriate functional form, parameter stability and outliers. For comparative purposes, ‘income–happiness’ relationships are also explored. Total wealth turns out to be strongly related to Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, due to the importance of produced and intangible capital, but not to natural capital. In contrast, when the most natural capital intensive countries are excluded as outliers, a strong relationship emerges between Subjective Well-Being (SWB) and natural capital, especially amongst high income countries. In these countries, natural capital seems to be an important wealth correlate of SWB, despite accounting for only a very small proportion of total wealth.     

The relationship between wealth or income and time preference is empirical, not apodictic: a critique of Rothbard and Hoppe

There is no doubt that when income or wealth increases, impatience for present goods declines. When time preference for the present falls, interest rates decline as well. But is this phenomenon a necessary condition of human action as Rothbard and Hoppe contend? This is widely thought to be true when a man is on the very verge of death. There is an aphorism according to which “a drowning man will grasp even at the blade of a sword.” In this view, someone who is starving will not postpone the consumption of food for tomorrow that is necessary to keep him alive today. But we disagree. And what is the situation under more ordinary circumstances far removed from starvation? We argue in this paper that, contrary to Rothbard and Hoppe, under these conditions it is a reliable but only a broad empirical generalization that time preferences and interest rates are inversely related to wealth or income, it is not a matter of praxeology.     

The long run relationship between private consumption and wealth: common and idiosyncratic effects

We investigate the long run relationship between private consumption, disposable income and wealth approximated by equity and house price indices for a panel of 15 industrialized countries. Consumption, income and wealth are cointegrated in their common components. The impact of house prices exceeds the effect arising from equity wealth. The long run vector is broadly in line with the life cycle permanent income hypothesis, if house prices are allowed to enter the relationship. At the idiosyncratic level, a long run equilibrium is detected between consumption and income, i.e. the wealth variable can be excluded. The income elasticity in the idiosyncratic relationship is significantly less than unity. Hence, the presence of wealth effects in consumption equations arises from the international integration of asset markets and points to the relevance of risk sharing activities of agents. Without sufficient opportunities, an increase in national saving rates would be expected, leading to a lower path of private consumption expenditures.     

Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing

In an Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with identical agents except for their initial endowment, we examine how wealth inequality affects the equilibrium level of the equity premium and the risk-free rate. We first show that wealth inequality raises the equity premium if and only if the inverse of absolute risk aversion is concave in wealth. We then show that the equilibrium risk-free rate is reduced by wealth inequality if the inverse of the coefficient of absolute prudence is concave. We also prove that the combination of a small uninsurable background risk with wealth inequality biases asset pricing towards a larger equity premium and a smaller risk-free rate.     

Expropriation risk and discounting

This paper focuses on time preference and individual measures of expropriation risk. We use survey data on Italian households and on the 50+ population in eleven European countries. The surveys provide measures of discount rate and proxies for expropriation due to criminal offenses. We show that impatience increases with expropriation risk.     

中国城镇居民的财产分配

本文利用住户调查数据对 1 995年的中国城镇住户的财产分配状况进行了经验分析 ,包括对财产分配的差距进行了测量 ,影响财产分配的主要因素进行了估计 ,并将中国城镇住户的财产分配进行了国际比较。与大部分市场经济国家相比 ,中国城镇居民之间财产分配的差距并不大。但是中国城镇居民的财产分配差距超过了收入分配差距 ,而且从长期趋势上可能会出现加速扩大的势头。中国城镇居民之间财产分配的不均等并非全是经济市场化过程的结果。一些不均等的原因来自于传统计划经济遗留下来的分配模式。本文还发现 ,在户主一生中财产积累出现了两个高峰值。这是与正统的生命周期理论不同的。本文还表明了财产分配和收入分配之间的较强相关性。     

Sex Preference, Marriage of Heirs and Bequest Behaviour

This paper discusses some economic implications of sex preferences and the bequest behaviour of parents. A simple two-period model with general assumptions is developed. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not exist unless constraints are imposed. However, such an equilibrium exists if bequests are non-negative, if bequests to sons and daughters are equal or if preferences are heterogeneous. The model thus explains why such institutional constraints on bequests are observed in the real world, and why in some (developing) countries male children inherit the major wealth from parents. It also has useful implications for the debt neutrality proposition.
JEL Classification Numbers: D1, J12, J13, J16.     

Growth dynamics in a model of endogenous time preference

We incorporate endogenous time preference in a simple Diamond-type economy with production and analyze the resulting dynamics both for the competitive and command equilibrium. We assume an individual's rate of time preference is decreasing in consumption (decreasing marginal impatience) and show that this intuitively more appealing assumption is consistent with a stable, non-trivial competitive equilibrium. Analysis of the competitive equilibrium indicates that the observed ‘non-convergence’ of cross-country per capita income could partially be explained by cross-country differences in ‘innate patience’. Examination of the local dynamics around the ‘optimal’ solution suggests that this particular preference structure exhibiting diminishing marginal impatience may generate endogenous business cycle phenomenon.     

Risk aversion,impatience, and optimal timing decisions

In this paper, a theory measuring a decision maker's aversion to temporal risks is developed in the context of a simple choice framework that admits the interpretation “time varying utility of wealth.” A relation “more temporally risk averse” is defined and characterized in terms of instantaneous risk aversion (the usual single variable case) and impatience. A further characterization of this relation is obtained in the context of a class of action timing problems known as optimal stopping problems and is applied to preference based investigations of information production, incentives to innovate, and job search.     

International intellectual property rights: Effects on growth, welfare and income inequality

What are the effects of strengthening developing countries’ protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&;D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. In this growth-theoretic framework, we show that strengthening patent protection in either country increases economic growth and income inequality in both countries. Furthermore, we derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent breadth and find that it is sub-optimally low relative to globally optimal patent breadth due to the positive externality effects that are captured by a spillover parameter.     

Fashion and wealth accumulation

Summary. This paper examines the influence of fashion on wealth accumulation in an economy with two groups of agents. Fashion is modelled as an externality generated by a particular dependence of individual agents' time preference on the two groups' per-capita consumption habits. It is shown that fashion causes excessive wealth fluctuations in the sense that stronger and more persistent fashion is more likely to generate limit cycles in wealth. Opposite to intuitive arguments , however, the externality in fashion does not necessarily generate instability in wealth. In a special case, equilibrium consumption and wealth are stable but the optimal ones that internalize the externality are locally unstable. Whether equilibrium consumption is excessive relative to optimal consumption depends on the distribution as well as the aggregate level of wealth. Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: July 21, 1998