Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Market competition,lobbying influence and environmental externalities

In this paper, we contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between lobbying and environmental regulation by explicitly taking into account the role of market competition. We analyse how the number of firms affects both the effectiveness of lobbying in fighting environmental regulation and the individual incentive for firms to switch to green technology. To explore this issue, we present a Cournot oligopoly where firms can choose between abating the environmental externality or lobbying the government to hold a loose regulation. We investigate two alternative government's political objectives. In the first, government aims to only minimise the externality, while in the second, it also cares about the consumers surplus. We find that, in both cases, the higher the number of firms, the higher the incentive to abate. However, while in the first case, either both types of firms coexist or all firms switch to be green, in the other case, there exists a minimum the number of firms below which all firms remain polluting.     

Coordination Costs,Market Size,and the Choice of Technology

Impact of coordination costs and market size on a firm's choice of technology is studied in a general equilibrium model in which finns engage in oligopolistic competition. A firm establishes an organizational hierarchy to coordinate its production. First, it is shown that an increase in market size leads a firm to choose a more specialized technology. Second, surprisingly, a robust result is that an increase in the level of coordination efficiency leads a firm to choose a less specialized technology.     

Market Liberalization,Regulatory Uncertainty,and Firm Investment

This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.     

Sunk Costs, Market Access, Economic Integration, and Welfare

The nature of the equilibrium that arises after economic integration is shown to depend crucially on how initial entry costs are divided along two separate dimensions: market access versus technology costs, and fixed versus sunk costs. There are three post-integration equilibrium regimes: a traditional trade theory regime which arises when both market access costs and fixed costs are small, a new trade theory regime which arises when market access costs are small but fixed costs are high, and a market access regime which arises when market access costs are high. While the first two regimes have already appeared in the literature, the third is new. The sign, magnitude, and qualitative behavior of the welfare effects of integration across all three regimes depend on the configuration of these costs.     

市场竞争、东道国引资政策与跨国公司的技术转移

在一个两阶段古诺竞争模型基础上,本文研究了东道国引资政策对跨国公司技术转移的影响,结果显示,跨国公司对东道国的技术转移取决于东道国市场竞争程度、本地企业的模仿能力与跨国公司的技术转移成本。在东道国企业模仿能力有限的情况下,跨国公司低技术的直接投资将损害东道国企业,从而降低东道国的国民福利水平;文章同时研究了市场竞争对跨国公司技术转移的影响,结果表明,对东道国来说,维持一个适度有序竞争的国内市场,同时对跨国公司的直接投资进行有选择地甄别与吸收,比单纯的竞争战略更有利于跨国公司的技术转移与技术扩散。     

产品市场竞争、知识外溢与企业技术效率提升

利用248家国防科技相关企业与具有军工资质的民营企业2009-2017年面板数据,分2009-2012年、2013-2017年两阶段研究产品市场竞争、知识外溢与企业技术效率间的关系。结果发现,产品市场竞争对于企业技术效率提升具有显著促进作用;相较于国防科技相关企业,这种正向效应在具有军工资质的民企中表现得更为显著,并且随着国防与民营经济的融合发展,这两种正向效应更为显著。进一步引入知识外溢与产品市场竞争交互项发现,无论是技术人员知识外溢还是技术人员产出外溢,随着外溢程度增加,均会抑制产品市场竞争对企业技术效率的正向影响;在国有国防科技相关企业中,技术人员产出外溢效应的抑制作用更强。     

市场信号、技术特征与中国国际高质量专利

近年来,中国专利申请量与授权量得到了快速飞跃,然而“专利泡沫”“专利沉睡”等问题也日益凸显,如何有效促进专利数量到专利质量的转变是实现专利强国的关键。本文基于信号传递理论,构建了市场信号与技术特征共同影响国际高质量专利形成的理论模型,并利用中国在美国专利与商标局(USPTO)申请的专利数据进行了实证检验。研究结果表明:市场信号有助于传递积极的专利信号与打破信息不对称,推动形成国际高质量专利;技术特征能够扩大专利自身的技术范围与技术合作空间,与国际高质量专利也存在显著正向关系;此外,技术特征能够产生技术噪音与技术竞争压力,弱化信号传递效率,从而负向调节市场信号对国际高质量专利的促进效应。本文认为与市场上的普通商品一样,专利存在“酒香也怕巷子深”问题,一方面企业应该加强专利国际推广;另一方面政府需要进一步完善市场机制与减弱信息不对称,共同塑造中国国际高质量专利。     

政府资助波动、技术市场发展程度与国有企业R&D投入

当前,我国政府对企业的研发资助金额快速增长,对企业研发活动产生了重要影响,但在动态的外部环境中,更应该关注研发资助波动对企业研发活动的影响。从政府资助波动视角对企业R&D投入进行考察,运用面板数据聚类分析法对2011-2018年我国各省市技术市场发展程度进行划分,以规模以上工业企业为样本,对政府资助波动、技术市场发展程度与企业R&D投入关系进行实证检验。结果发现：①政府资助波动对企业R&D投入具有负向影响;②技术市场发展程度对企业R&D投入具有逐渐减弱的正向影响;③技术市场发展程度显著调节政府资助波动对企业R&D投入的负向效应,并最终达到正向效应。最后,提出各省市合理制定政府资助计划、加速技术市场发展的政策建议。     

Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion

Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro–competitive effects from market integration.     

技术市场发展、实体企业金融化与创新质量

以2005—2020年中国A股上市企业为样本，实证研究实体企业金融化对创新质量的影响效应和机制，重点关注技术市场发展对上述影响效应和机制的调节作用。结果表明，实体企业金融化对创新质量具有负向影响效应，技术市场发展能够强化这一影响效应，在技术市场发展较快的地区，实体企业金融化对创新质量的负向影响效应更加显著，融资约束和全要素生产率是实体企业金融化影响企业创新质量的有效机制；技术市场发展的调节效应主要作用于影响机制的前半路径，在技术市场发展较快的地区，实体企业金融化对融资约束的缓解效应较弱，对全要素生产率的负向影响效应更强；实体企业金融化对创新质量的影响效应在产品市场竞争、是否为家族企业和银企关系方面存在异质性，当产品市场竞争更激烈、银企关系较差和企业为非家族企业时，实体企业金融化对创新质量的负向影响更显著。     

区域技术市场发展对创新的驱动作用

利用我国2002-2015年省级面板数据，考察技术市场对创新的影响，研究区域研发环境与技术创新的协同作用。首先，通过构建GMM模型稳健性检验，发现在控制物质资本、人力资本、制度因素、R&D投入、FDI、对外贸易、市场化程度等各种影响因素后，技术市场对创新具有显著影响，且对技术含量较高的发明专利的影响弹性最大；其次，通过交互项检验和门槛回归，发现R&D物质资本和人力资本对技术市场存在两个门槛，跨越门槛将增加技术市场的边际创新产出；再次，技术市场发展对各类专利贡献率的测度结果显示，发达地区技术市场对发明专利的贡献最大。据此提出加速我国技术市场发展、因地制宜改善区域研发环境、进一步强化技术市场驱动高质量创新发展等政策建议。     

Market Structure,Competition, and Welfare Change Due to Technological Innovations

This paper analyzes the change in social welfare brought about by a cost-reducing technological innovation. Each firm adopts a new technology at the expense of the other firms. Hence, competitive adoption of new technology can reduce social welfare. Because a technological innovation can change market structure in different ways under different kinds of competition it can cause quantity competition to generate greater social welfare than price competition does. [020]     

技术势力、市场势力与战略性新兴产业高端化发展研究

战略性新兴产业发展潜力大,引领作用强。为了抢占未来科技和经济发展的制高点,我国正在大力培育新兴产业。目前,我国战略性新兴产业呈现高端产业、低端制造的特征。如何避免我国刚起步的战略性新兴产业像传统产业一样陷入低端化发展困境,这是理论界和实践界关心的热点,产业高端化是产业势力提升的过程,战略新兴产业高端化必须培育和提升产业势力。为此,对技术势力、市场势力的内涵及形成,以及技术势力、市场势力与产业高端化三者之间的互动关系进行了研究,提出了培育技术势力和市场势力的相关建议。     

标准与技术、市场、政策之间的作用机理研究

以中国半导体照明产业标准光组件为例,对标准与技术、市场和政策间的作用机理进行了分析。研究表明：标准可以提高产业技术可接受度,使得技术在产业范围内得到更为广泛的应用;技术成熟度决定了产业标准化过程中采用的标准类型;标准的实施和应用可以使产业在全球市场竞争中获得优势;参与全球市场竞争,也将促使标准在制定过程中更多地注重开展本国产业内部及国际间的合作;标准的实施和应用将推动政策的示范和扩散;政策可以推动产业标准的制定工作。     

A Monetary Approach to Exchange Market Disequilibrium in Australia: 1975–97

Under a managed float, the central bank may respond to an exchange market disequilibrium by changing either the international reserves or the exchange rate or both such that neither the reserve changes nor the exchange rate movements convey an unambiguous indication of the nature or extent of the disequilibrium. Girton and Roper (1977) suggested an index, namely the exchange market pressure, to capture the disequilibrium. This paper utilises a similar framework to study the exchange market pressure in Australia during 1975–1997 and reserve transactions. It is found that there were substantial reserve transactions in the face of exchange market pressure even after the switch to the floating rate system and the deregulation of the financial system. As a result of these transactions, sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate were moderated and the actual exchange rate appeared to broadly follow the market equilibrium rate.     

中国股票市场流动性:过高还是过低 --一个国际比较视角的分析

现有中国证券市场流动性方面的研究在评价中国证券市场(尤其是股票市场)流动性水平问题上分歧相当严重.本文从国际比较的视角出发,利用波动性调整后的换手率指标对中国上海证券交易所、深圳股票交易所和纽约股票交易所的流动性水平进行度量.结论表明,中国股票市场流动性在一定程度上优于NYSE市场,同时,剧烈的市场波动对市场流动性造成了损害.     

Market Underreaction and Overreaction of Technology Stocks

Several studies have assessed stock market under- or overreaction of stocks and there is some agreement among them. However, there is much disagreement about what constitutes market underreaction or overreaction, and the conditions that cause it. The substantial variation in results among studies may be partially attributed to the types of firms that are contained in any sample. We investigate this premise by focusing on a sample of technology stocks that experienced an extreme change in stock price, along with a corresponding control sample of non-technology stocks that experienced a similar extreme change in stock price on the same day.

Based on the subsequent stock price behavior of each sample, we find a greater degree of overreaction within extreme positive changes in technology stock prices (winners) than in non-technology stock prices. In addition, we find a greater degree of underreaction within extreme negative changes in technology stock prices (losers) than in non-technology stock prices. When considering winners and losers collectively for technology and non-technology firms, it appears the market is overoptimistic when it initially revalues technology stock prices relative to non-technology stock prices.

The degree of under- or overreaction of technology stocks varies within the sample of technology stocks, and is conditioned on firm-specific characteristics. Overall, our results suggest that technology stocks exhibit unique stock price behavior subsequent to an extreme change in price, and that this unique behavior can even vary among technology firms according to firm-specific characteristics.     

Endogenous timing in the switching of technology with Marshallian externalities

We analyze endogenous timing in the switching of technology. Each user chooses when to purchase a new product which embodies new technologies characterized by Marshallian externalities. The technological switch occurs when a large number of users purchase new products. Under complete information, multiple market equilibria exist, and one of the equilibria in which technological switching occurs is efficient. However, if we introduce even a small amount of uncertainty, the switch is delayed in the unique equilibrium under perfect competition, resulting in a loss of social welfare. The market power of a monopolistic supplier of new products alleviates this inefficiency.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.