Almost-objective uncertainty

Summary. Every subjective state space with Euclidean structure contains almost-objective events which arbitrarily closely approximate the properties of objectively uncertain events for all individuals with event-smooth betting preferences - whether or not they are expected utility, state-independent, or probabilistically sophisticated. These properties include unanimously agreed-upon revealed likelihoods, statistical independence from other subjective events, probabilistic sophistication over almost-objective bets, and linearity of state-independent and state-dependent expected utility in almost-objective likelihoods and mixtures. Most physical randomization devices are based on events of this form. Even in the presence of state-dependence, ambiguity, and ambiguity aversion, an individuals betting preferences over almost-objective events are based solely on their attitudes toward objective risk, and can fully predict (or be predicted from) their behavior in an idealized casino.Received: 17 July 2003, Revised: 12 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81.I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Erik Balder, Hoyt Bleakley, Richard Carson, Eddie Dekel, Larry Epstein, Clive Granger, Simon Grant, Peter Hammond, Jean-Yves Jaffray, Edi Karni, Peter Klibanoff, Duncan Luce, John Pratt, Chris Tyson, Uzi Segal, Peter Wakker, Joel Watson, Nicholas Yannelis, anonymous referees and especially Ted Groves and Joel Sobel for helpful comments. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 9870894.     

Preference for safety under the Choquet model: in search of a characterization

Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers a constant to an uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose expected utility (EU) version is Arrow and Pratt’s more risk aversion concept, will be studied in the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model. Necessary condition Pointwise inequality between a function of the utility functions and another of the capacities is necessary and sufficient for the preference by Victor of safety over a dichotomous act whenever such is the preference of Ursula. However, increased preference for safety versus dichotomous acts does not imply preference by Victor of safety over a general act whenever such is the preference of Ursula. A counterexample will be provided, via the casino theory of Dubins and Savage. Sufficient condition Separation of the two functions by some convex function is sufficient for Victor to prefer safety more than Ursula, over general acts. Furthermore, a condition on the capacities will be presented for simplicity seeking, the preference by Victor over any act for some dichotomous act that leaves Ursula indifferent. This condition is met in particular if Victor’s capacity is a convex function of Ursula’s capacity. For these cases, the pointwise inequality (necessary) condition is a characterization of greater preference for safety, extending the Arrow–Pratt notion from EU to CEU and rank-dependent utility (RDU). These inequalities preserve the flavor of the “more pessimism than greediness” characterization of monotone risk aversion by Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson in the RDU model and its extension by Grant and Quiggin to CEU. Preferences between safety and dichotomous acts are at the core of the biseparable preferences model of Ghirardato and Marinacci.     

Market Instability and Revision Error in Risk Premium

This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods.     

Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non‐stationary Time Preference and "Hyperbolic" Discounting

Despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting, there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi‐hyperbolic functional forms. The paper revives an earlier proposal in Prelec (1989) that the key property is Pratt–Arrow convexity of the log of the discount function, which corresponds to decreasing impatience(DI) at the level of preferences. DI provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater DI is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two‐stage decision problems, as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function. Inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments, or as unintended reversals of preference by “naïve” agents.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 1, Social Choice and Justice by K. J. Arrow Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 2, General Equilibrium, by K. J. Arrow Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 3, Individual Choice under Certainty, by K. J. Arrow Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 4, The Economics of Information, by K. J. Arrow Rational Expectations: Macroeconomics for the 1980's?, by M. Carter and R. Maddock Public Policy for Sustainable Growth, a special issue of the Australian Economic Review, 3rd Quarter 1984 Growth, Profits and Property. Essays in the Revival of Political Economy, edited by Edward J. Nell Free Market Conservatism. A Critique of Theory and Practice, edited by Edward J. Nell Incomes and Policy, by Ian Manning Optimization in Economic Analysis by G. Mills     

Does High‐skilled Migration Affect Publicly Financed Investments?

This paper analyzes the interaction between migration of high‐skilled labor and publicly financed investment. We develop a theoretical model with multiple, ex ante identical jurisdictions where individuals decide on education and subsequent emigration. Migration decisions are based on differences in net income across jurisdictions which may occur endogenously. The interaction between income differences and migration flows gives rise to the potential of multiple equilibria: a symmetric equilibrium without migration and an asymmetric equilibrium in which net income levels differ among jurisdictions and trigger migration flows. In the former equilibrium, all jurisdictions have the same public investment level. In the latter one, public investment is high in host economies of skilled expatriates and low in source economies. We empirically test the hypothesis that emigration rates are negatively associated with publicly financed investment levels for OECD countries.     

Greater downside risk aversion in the large

In this paper, we advance a definition of greater downside risk aversion that applies to both large and small changes in risk preference, and thereby complements the results for small changes reported previously. We show that a downside risk-averse transformation of a utility function results in a function that is more downside risk averse in the same manner that a risk-averse transformation increases risk aversion. Our demonstration is conducted first by using the compensated approach introduced by Diamond and Stiglitz [P. Diamond, J. Stiglitz, Increases in risk and in risk aversion, J. Econ. Theory 8 (1974) 337-360] and then by using an adaptation of the risk premium approach taken by Pratt [J. Pratt, Risk aversion in the small and in the large, Econometrica 32 (1964) 122-136].     

国外农村劳动力迁移理论的演变与发展

根据对农村劳动力迁移决策的不同解释,把国外有关劳动力迁移的主要文献分为三类:传统的劳动力迁移理论(包括刘易斯模型、拉尼斯-费景汉模型、托达罗模型)、人力资本劳动力迁移理论和新劳动力迁移理论.目前国内研究劳动力迁移的文献主要以传统劳动力迁移理论和人力资本劳动力迁移理论为研究基础,而对新劳动力迁移理论的借鉴和应用还比较罕见,因此值得我们学习和研究.     

Risk aversion and prudence in the large

The familiar measures of absolute and relative risk aversion constructed by Pratt and Arrow, along with the measures of absolute and relative prudence inspired by Leland and later developed by Kimball, are local instruments based on the first and second derivatives of utility at a specific level of wealth. As such, they are applicable only to infinitesimal risks—those for which differential calculus is a suitable analytical tool. Consequently, they may not accurately gauge preferences regarding the larger risks typically encountered in practice. To address this problem, the present paper develops more general, closed-form index measures of risk aversion and prudence that are applicable to either large or small risks. The new measures are exact in that they do not rely on approximations, they can be implemented empirically without knowledge of the functional form of utility, and they do not require information regarding pre-existing wealth.     

Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment

A competitive general equilibrium model with complete collateralized contracts under limited commitment is proposed and analyzed. With limited aggregate collateral, risk sharing is imperfect. There exists a minimal spanning set of finite collateralized contracts that generates the feasible space and that contains more than the complete set of collateralized Arrow securities. Examples show that exogenously restricting feasible contracts has a significant impact on agents’ welfare. I prove that constrained optimal allocations can be decentralized as a general equilibrium with collateral constraints, and vice versa. Because a capital good serves as collateral, it has an additional value, called collateral premium. The collateral premium is zero if and only if risk sharing is perfect. This is a testable implication of the model.     

Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia

Why do risk premia vary over time? We examine this problem theoretically and empirically by studying the effect of market belief on risk premia. Individual belief is taken as a fundamental primitive state variable. Market belief is observable; it is central to the empirical evaluation and we show how to measure it. Our asset pricing model is familiar from the noisy REE literature but we adapt it to an economy with diverse beliefs. We derive equilibrium asset prices and implied risk premium. Our approach permits a closed form solution of prices; hence we trace the exact effect of market belief on the time variability of asset prices and risk premia. We test empirically the theoretical conclusions. Our main result is that, above the effect of business cycles on risk premia, fluctuations in market belief have significant independent effect on the time variability of risk premia. We study the premia on long positions in Federal Funds Futures, 3- and 6-month Treasury Bills (T-Bills). The annual mean risk premium on holding such assets for 1?C12?months is about 40?C60 basis points and we find that, on average, the component of market belief in the risk premium exceeds 50% of the mean. Since time variability of market belief is large, this component frequently exceeds 50% of the mean premium. This component is larger the shorter is the holding period of an asset and it dominates the premium for very short holding returns of less than 2?months. As to the structure of the premium we show that when the market holds abnormally favorable belief about the future payoff of an asset the market views the long position as less risky hence the risk premium on that asset declines. More generally, periods of market optimism (i.e. ??bull?? markets) are shown to be periods when the market risk premium is low while in periods of pessimism (i.e. ??bear?? markets) the market??s risk premium is high. Fluctuations in risk premia are thus inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs. This effect is strong and economically very significant.     

Firm location,political geography and environmental information disclosure

As the subjective and objective factors that influence corporate behaviours, political region and firm location are of great importance to environmental information disclosure (EID). With spatial and political geography as a research perspective, this article makes a study by using the samples of manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2011. As a result, we determine that regulatory distance and political geography had negative effects on EID, while political geography weakens regulatory distance’s function. After considering an enterprise’s administrative rank, we determined that when the rank is higher, regulatory distance has negative effects on EID; when the rank is lower, the effects are the opposite. Regarding political geography, it always weakened the regulatory distance’s function. Moreover, the effects are significant only when the enterprises had low governmental regulation. The study shows the effects that firm location and political geography have made on EID. At the same time, this study also gives theoretical and empirical evidence to the necessity of raising governmental regulatory effectiveness.     

Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete

We show by means of an example that the result of Arrow [Arrow, K.J. (1953), Le rôle des valeurs boursières pour la répartition la meilleure des risques, Econométrie, 41–47, CNRS, Paris; translated as The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing, Review of Economic Studies, 31, 91–96] is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium continuations to the initial-period component of an intertemporal equilibrium.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

MARKET DISCIPLINING OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

In this article, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three‐stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country's default‐risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country's risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975–2008. We also employ the Arellano‐Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of nonlinearly behaving well‐functioning financial markets in the sample countries. (JEL C5, G1, G3)     

Equality of interest rates revisited: the multi‐country evidence

One influential aspect of international integration of financial markets is the possibility of reducing divergences between domestic interest rates and foreign interest rates or increasing the degree to which yields in different financial markets move together over time. In this study, we investigate the convergence of the real interest rates using the Kalman filter. Applying the modified Hall et al. () approach, we model the risk premium and convergence of real interest rates using the time‐varying parameter estimation techniques. We present evidence of risk premium and convergence for two blocks of countries—The Asian‐Pacific countries including the US, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea and the US‐European group including France, the UK, Germany and the US.     

Another Look at the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle

The model of Mehra and Prescott (1985, J. Econometrics, 22, 145–161) implies that reasonable coefficients of risk‐aversion of economic agents cannot explain the equity risk premium generated by financial markets. This discrepancy is hitherto regarded as a major financial puzzle. We propose an alternative model to explain the equity premium. For normally distributed returns and for returns far away from normality (but still light tailed), realistic equity risk premia do not imply puzzlingly high risk aversions. Following our approach, the ‘equity premium puzzle’ does not exist. We also consider fat‐tailed return distributions and show that Pareto tails are incompatible with constant relative risk aversion.     

The New Economics of Labor Migration: Beware of Neoclassicals Bearing Gifts

Abstract

Until the emergence of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) in the 1980s, migration scholars were largely divided into two main theoretical camps, viz. the neoclassical and historical-structural approaches to migration. Against this background, the NELM presented itself as a theoretical ‘third way’ between the two latter approaches, and purported to reconcile agency and structure in a way previously unachieved by either of them. While those pretensions gained a fair amount of acceptance and popularity, this paper argues that they are fundamentally misleading, and that the NELM is little more than a slightly more sophisticated avatar of the neoclassical approach to migration, whose fundamental weaknesses it has not, and cannot, shed. This paper further argues that, in so doing, the NELM effectively constitutes migration theory's own instance of economics imperialism, i.e. the attempt to advance the fundamental tenets of neoclassical economics (methodological individualism and the assumption of optimizing rationality) within the context of the study and interpretation of various social phenomena. In order to put forth these arguments, this paper provides a summary presentation of the standard neoclassical theory of migration, the historical-structural heterodoxy and the NELM; highlights why it is that the NELM should be regarded as a ‘reworked’ version of the neoclassical theoretical framework and discusses its inception in the context of the ‘information-theoretic revolution’ in economics; and argues for a new and improved ‘historical-structural synthesis’ as a more satisfactory alternative to both the NELM and the standard neoclassical theory.     

Migration and rural poverty in China

We analyze two complementary household datasets from China's poor areas to examine whether the poor migrate and whether migration helps the poor. We find an inverted-U-shaped relationship between household endowments and the likelihood of migration. Over time, the poor are more likely to migrate. Using household panel data and taking prior village migration networks as an instrument, we find that having a migrant increases a household's income per capita by 8.5 to 13.1 percent, but that the overall impact on poverty is modest because most poor people do not migrate. Migrants remit a large share of their income and the amount of these remittances is responsive somewhat to the needs of other family members. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 688–709.     

The optimal insurance contract in a competitive market

The author reviews some earlier work on optimal insurance contracts by Arrow and Mossin. He then shows that some results in this work carry over to any premium system which satisfies the additivity condition inherent in a competitive market.