Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency

With this study we aim to contribute to the empirical literature on privatisation processes by analysing the determinants of post-divestment private ownership concentration and its possible link to corporate efficiency. For Spanish firms, we find that the method of privatisation, the type of industry, the company’s size and its level of risk may help explain differences in private ownership concentration. We also find, after controlling for endogeneity, that ownership concentrated in the hands of private investors has a positive and significant effect on post-privatisation efficiency.     

POST‐PRIVATIZATION OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A LARGE META‐ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION LITERATURE

This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.     

股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响

在对大股东的性质作出清晰界定的基础上,本文考察了中国上市公司的股权集中度和股权制衡情况及其对公司经营绩效的影响。研究发现:股权集中度和经营绩效之间有着显著的正向线性关系,而且这种关系在不同性质的控股股东中都是存在的。具体来说,在中央直属国有企业和私有产权控股的上市公司中股权集中度所表现的激励程度最高,地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司次之,而国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司最低。同时,过高的股权制衡程度对公司的经营绩效有负面影响。但是,不同性质外部大股东的作用效果有明显差别,而且其在不同性质控股股东控制的上市公司中的表现也不尽一致。     

Origin and concentration

We analyse the effects of different types and concentration of ownership on performance using a large population of firms in the Czech Republic after mass privatization. Specifications based on first‐differences combined with instrumental variables show that the performance effects of different types and concentration of ownership are limited when compared to earlier studies. Often, concentrated ownership has a positive effect, a finding that supports the agency theory. The positive effect of foreign ownership is detected primarily for majority ownership and for ownership by foreign industrial firms. The state as a holder of the golden share has a positive effect on employment and sometimes, also on output and profitability. Overall, our results highlight the benefits of strategic restructuring accompanied by an inflow of new capital and managerial culture.     

Evidence of the Endowment Effect in Stock Market Order Placement

The psychological endowment effect is apparent when investors place greater value on something when they mentally "own" it than when someone else owns it. Although this effect is well established in laboratory studies, there is relatively little documented evidence of an endowment bias in actual trading. This study examines order placements of stock traders on the Australian Stock Exchange. Consistent with the endowment effect, sellers appear to value their own shares higher than buyers independent of current market price, by consistently placing sell orders on average "further from the market" (i.e., from the best quote) than buy orders. This asymmetry is more pronounced in private client trading than in orders made through institutional brokers, suggesting that more sophisticated investors are less affected by asset ownership than the private clients of retail brokers. Since private "day traders" have been able to trade online themselves rather than through a broker, the quote asymmetry relative to the best-standing quotes between asks and bids has become more pronounced. Over the same period, the relatively small asymmetry apparent in institutional quotes has remained unchanged.     

国有机构投资者持股能提升企业投资效率吗?

具有国资背景的机构投资者,对于资本市场平稳发展具有重要意义。本文基于我国2015—2019年A股上市公司样本,考察持股对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,持股显著提升了企业投资效率,并且该影响在代理冲突更严重和所处信息环境更不透明的公司中更加显著。机制检验表明,降低企业内外部信息不对称和代理成本是持股提升企业投资效率的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,国有机构投资者持股时间越长,对企业非效率投资的治理效果越好;细分国有机构投资者类型后发现,致力于长期维护资本市场稳定和上市公司长期健康发展的证金公司和汇金公司对企业投资效率的提升作用显著,但没有发现“救市”基金和外管局旗下的投资平台对企业投资效率有提升作用。研究结论从企业投资效率视角为国有机构投资者持股在微观企业日常经营中发挥的治理作用提供了新颖的经验证据,对进一步提高我国上市公司质量具有启示意义。     

The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring ∗

In the transitional economies of East and Central Europe, privatization is widely considered essential for transforming the large state-owned enterprises. However, eager to expose the public enterprises to ‘hard budget constraints’, economists have neglected the importance of who the owners are. Studies of ownership structures and post-privatization restructuring in east Germany provide evidence that ownership matters for transformation success. The adoption of west German institutions in the east and the sale of state industrial property in concentrated shares to ‘insider’ investors seem to have created good conditions for the long-term committed investments essential for the rebuilding of tangible and intangible assets in east German enterprises. However, the control structures of a sample of enterprises reveal a wide range of investment strategies between types of corporate investors. Just as legal and financial institutions set constraints on ownership structure, the ownership structure sets constraints on the range of investment choices. Whether committed investments occur will depend on constrained strategic decisions of the new private owners.     

异质机构、企业性质与关联交易

基于2007-2009年3618家A股上市公司数据,本文从关联交易密度和关联交易频率两个维度对机构持股、企业性质和关联交易之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现：机构持股对企业关联交易的抑制作用并不显著,这种不显著性主要归因于证券投资基金;不同性质的机构对企业关联交易的抑制作用不同,其中证券投资基金对企业关联交易基本不存在抑制作用,而险资和合格的境外机构投资者则相反;企业性质对异质机构和关联交易间的关系有显著的调节作用,民营上市公司中机构投资者的抑制作用要强于国有上市公司。     

价值选择VS.价值创造-来自中国市场机构投资者的证据

本文研究机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩和公司业绩改善的影响。实证研究显示,机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩具有显著的正面影响,但是,有别于先前的研究,本文发现这个影响在中长期迅速减弱。而且,中国市场不同类型机构投资者的价值选择和价值创造能力存在显著差异:(1)投资实力强、倾向于采用集中投资策略的基金、QFII具有较强的价值选择能力,券商、社保基金、信托公司的价值选择能力较弱;(2)基金表现出一定程度的价值创造能力,而其他机构投资者目前尚不具备价值创造能力。     

Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem

We determine the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the environmental problem exists. With regard to the ownership of the private firms, we analyze two cases: (h) the private firm is owned by domestic private investors and (f) it is owned by foreign private investors. A comparison of the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is always desirable in (h), and the optimal degree of privatization is independent of the degree of environmental damage. However, in (f), whether partial privatization is desirable or not depends on the degree of environmental damage: there are cases where full privatization or full nationalization is optimal.     

Herding by foreign investors and emerging market equity returns: Evidence from Korea

This paper studies the effect of herding by foreign investors on stock returns in the Korean market. We conduct both pre and post-liberalization analyses and utilize a three-stage least squares analysis in order to control for the simultaneous relationship. We find evidence of a significant impact of foreign investor herding on stock returns in addition to intra-year positive feedback trading by foreign investors. However, changes in domestic institutional ownership do not have any significant effect on stock returns. In addition, foreign investors tend to buy/sell shares that domestic institutions sell/buy in the herding year.     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

上市公司市值管理的有效性研究*——基于企业并购绩效的实证分析

在不完美市场和信息不对称的背景下,企业并购能否通过协同效应带来有效的市值管理？本文选取了在2007—2010年期间发生并购的A股上市公司,检验了并购的价值创造和市值管理有效性之间的联系,并做了分组检验。实证结果表明,对企业未来三年经营绩效有正协同效应的并购可以为上市公司带来更高的市值管理效用。分组检验结果进一步显示,投资者更为关注异地并购、同行业并购、民企并购以及股权分散型企业并购。这些并购类型的市值管理更为有效。     

股权特征对机构投资者与创新投入的调节作用

以2010-2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象，采用Tobit回归方法探讨不同类型机构投资者持股对企业创新投入的影响，并深入分析股权集中度与股权性质对机构投资者持股与创新投入关系的调节作用。研究发现，相比于交易型机构投资者，稳定型机构投资者更能提高企业创新投入；股权集中度在交易型机构投资者样本中削弱了机构投资者持股对创新投入的促进作用；机构投资者持股对国有企业提高创新投入的力度显著高于非国有企业。最后提出企业须正视机构投资者和使股东结构多元化，政府应加大证券市场监管力度与深化国企改革等建议。     

股权结构、产权性质与债券融资成本*——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

本文基于最近十年503家上市公司发行的984只债券数据，实证检验了股权结构、产权性质对债券融资成本的影响。研究表明：股权集中度与债券融资成本正相关，制衡度与债券融资成本负相关。进一步检验发现，股权结构对债券融资成本的影响在民营企业中比在国有企业中更显著，产权性质发挥了调节作用。本文一定程度上丰富了公司债券定价理论，为发行人降低债券融资成本、投资人评估债券投资风险提供了有益启示，并为监管部门完善债券市场监管政策提供了经验证据。       

“逆向混改”如何影响战略性新兴产业民企绿色创新？ ——基于代表性产业比较分析的视角

以“逆向混改”现象普遍的高新技术、节能环保两类战略性新兴产业为研究对象,基于民营企业“逆向混改”的准自然实验,实证检验“逆向混改”对民企绿色创新的影响。结果显示,“逆向混改”可以有效驱动战略性新兴产业民企提高绿色创新绩效。机制检验发现,“逆向混改”具有促进专业化发展和融资约束缓解的“双重功效”,有利于促成民企绿色创新发展的“护城河”和“蓄水池”。基于代表性产业比较分析发现,环境规制的合理设计及强化,可以有效地促进高新技术产业民企“逆向混改”对绿色创新的协同效应;创新补贴政策的适度强化及激励,可以有效地促进节能环保产业民企“逆向混改”对绿色创新的互补效应。研究揭示了“逆向混改”推进民企绿色创新的影响规律,为促进战略性新兴产业高质量发展提供了理论和政策启发。     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

道德偏好与道德改善:中国机构投资者持股研究

本文采用面板数据模型检验我国机构投资者持股与企业社会绩效的互动关系,以剖析机构投资者的道德偏好能力和道德改善能力。基于2006-2010年沪深两市918家样本的研究发现:(1)机构投资者偏好持股企业社会绩效好的公司,表明机构投资者具有道德偏好能力;(2)机构投资者持股对企业社会绩效存在微弱的正面影响,表明机构投资者具备道德改善能力,但非常有限;(3)不同类型机构投资者与企业社会绩效的互动关系差异较大,仅基金表现出道德偏好能力和道德改善能力。