Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment

We study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons: those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. Voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences, while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage. We consider the employment policies of a well-informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies. The model is simple, yet rich enough to reflect real-world policies, including transfers to the disabled, welfare for non-working employables, unemployment insurance, employment subsidies, and taxes on workers and firms.     

Foreign capital inflow,skilled–unskilled wage inequality and unemployment of unskilled labour in a fair wage model

This paper has developed a three-sector general equilibrium framework that explains unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. Unemployment of unskilled labour is of the Harris–Todaro (1970) type while unemployment of skilled labour is caused due to the validity of the FWH in the high-skill sector. There are two types of capital one of which is specific to the primary export sector while the other moves freely among the different sectors. Inflows of foreign capital of either type unambiguously improve the economic conditions of the unskilled working class. However, the effects on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality and the extent of unemployment of both types of labour crucially hinge on the properties implied by the efficiency function of the skilled workers.     

Beyond Eurosclerosis

Europe no longer suffers from Eurosclerosis; unemployment, notably long-term unemployment, had decreased substantially for more than a decade. Mobility across labour market states increased in those countries where unemployment has been falling the most. Institutional reforms -- such as declining employment protection for new entrants in the labour market and less generous unemployment benefits -- account for this increase in mobility. Focusing on these reforms, we rationalize why EU workers, including those with permanent contracts, are increasingly unhappy about labour market conditions in spite of the disappearance of mass unemployment in Europe. Due to these perceptions, policy reversals cannot be ruled out. Governments wishing to minimize the risk of going back to Eurosclerosis should move towards flexicurity configurations, compensating workers for higher risks of job loss, and introduce tenure tracks to the labour market, preventing the development of dual labour market structures. This would avoid dissipating the employment gains of the last decade during this recession.
--- Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

The Effectiveness of Employment Vouchers: A Simple Approach

This paper explores the optimal design of subsidies for hiring unemployed workers ('employment vouchers' for short) in the context of a simple dynamic model of the labour market. Focusing on the short-term and long-term effects of the vouchers on employment and unemployment, the analysis shows how the optimal policy depends on the rates of hiring and firing, and on the problems of displacement and deadweight. It also examines the roles of the government budget constraint and of the level of unemployment benefits in optimal policy design. We calibrate the model and evaluate the effectiveness of employment vouchers in reducing unemployment for a wide range of feasible parameters.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

The Beveridge curve in Europe: new evidence using national and regional data

The Beveridge curve depicts the empirical negative relationship between job vacancy rate and unemployment rate, and reflects the efficiency of the job matching process. Movements along a fixed downward sloping Beveridge curve are associated with cyclical shocks, while shifts of the curve arise from structural factors that alter the matching efficiency between job vacancies and unemployed workers. National and regional data on job vacancies and unemployment are combined to estimate the Beveridge curves of five European countries and their regions, focusing on the period 1975 to 2004. I also analyse whether shifts in European Beveridge curves are due to changes in the composition of the unemployed pool, labour market rigidities or cyclical and structural shocks. The empirical evidence suggests that changes in labour market rigidities, long term unemployment, as well as cyclical shocks are responsible for outward shifts in European Beveridge curves. I also find evidence of nonlinearities in the relation between unemployment and labour market institutions.     

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self‐selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance – or subsidy to unemployment – reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

Search,shirking and labor market volatility

This paper proposes a modified version of the standard search and matching model of the labour market that includes a shirking mechanism. We show that our model delivers a close match to the simulated volatilities, correlations and autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job finding rate with values observed in US data. In doing so, it outperforms prominent alternative models. Our model also has novel policy implications for the impact of income taxes, subsidies on hiring and employment taxes on unemployment and its volatility.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Flexicurity Labour Market Performance in Denmark

Unemployment is at a low and stable level in Denmark. This achievementis often attributed to the so-called flexicurity model combiningflexible hiring and firing rules for employers with income securityfor employees. Whatever virtues this model may have, a low andstable unemployment rate is not automatically among them sincethe basic flexicurity properties were also in place during the1970s and 1980s where high and persistent unemployment was prevalent.Labour market performance has changed due to a series of reformsduring the 1990s, the main thrust of which was a shift froma passive focus of labour market policies to a more active focuson job search and employment. The policy tightened eligibilityfor unemployment benefits and their duration as well as introducedworkfare elements into unemployment insurance and social policiesin general. Thereby, policy makers attempted to strengthen theincentive structure without taking resort to general benefitreductions. We argue that the workfare policies have playedan important role running primarily via motivation/threat andwage effects. However, active labour market policies are resourcedemanding, and although the workfare reforms have improved costeffectiveness, there is still an issue as to whether the resourcesgoing into active labour market policies are used efficiently.(JEL codes: J30, J40, J60, H53)     

Labour market transitions and unemployment duration: Evidence from Bulgarian and Polish micro-data1

The segmentation of the labour market is one of the most striking characteristics of the transition process in Central and Eastern European countries. Not only do the young, unskilled workers and women face a high risk of unemployment, but joblessness also varies significantly geographically. This paper sheds some light on labour market segmentation in transition countries by analysing individual records of individuals registered at the labour offices of two Polish regions (Warsaw and Ciechanov and two Bulgarian regions (Sofia and Botevgrad) over the initial three to four years of the transition to a market economy. The empirical results confirm the existence of highly selective firing and hiring processes in the Polish and Bulgarian labour markets. Overall, unskilled or poorly educated workers have the highest probability of becoming unemployed and remaining without a job for a long period of time. We also analysed the determinants of unemployment duration across regions and over time using a piece-wise constant hazard model with multiple destinations, i.e. employment and exit from the labour force. The results suggest that the unemployed with a high education and previous experience in the private sector have a higher probability of getting a new job, especially in the more dynamic labour markets, while those without previous work experience tend to stay unemployed for a longer period of time and often leave the labour market. The econometric results also suggest that the reforms of the unemployment benefit systems have produced important effects on unemployment flows.     

Technological choices and unemployment benefits in a matching model with heterogenous workers

This article aims at understanding the interactions between public policies, such as unemployment benefit systems, and firms’ technological choices. For this purpose, we use a matching model in which workers are vertically differentiated and where the nature of jobs is endogenous. We show that an improvement in unemployment benefits leads to an increase in productivity by making agents more selective and jobs more complex. However, the impact on labour market participation is negative.     

North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

Labour market reform and the macroeconomic efficiency of the labour market in Australia

This paper assesses the effects of a decade and a half of labourmarket reform in Australia on labour market flexibility at themacroeconomic level. Increased labour market flexibility isinterpreted as reduced structural unemployment and enhancedefficiency of matching. We use shifts in the Beveridge Curveas a measure of changes in labour market efficiency (followingSolow, R., What is labour-market flexibility? What is it goodfor?, Keynes Lecture, British Academy, London, December, 1997).Time series analysis of unemployment, vacancies and other relevantvariables strongly suggests that changes in the efficiency oflabour market matching over the period reflect the cyclicaleffects of hysteresis rather than the effects of labour marketreform.     

Exports, unemployment, and the welfare state

Abstract .  The paper analyzes the labour market effects of globalization when foreign market entry is costly and risky. With flexible labour markets, a fall in foreign market entry cost tends to generate more income inequality, but not necessarily so, as more firms pay foreign entry cost. By contrast, when labour markets are inflexible in the short run, globalization tends to increase unemployment. In this situation, government unemployment benefits reduce the wages that exporting firms need to pay workers as risk compensation. Thus more firms within an industry and more industries enter the foreign market, which in turn tends to increase unemployment.     

Unemployment and interindustry labour mobility in Canada in the 1980s

The determinants of interindustry mobility of labour, and its relationship to the unemployment rate is examined, using micro-data on Canadian workers from 1980/81, 1982/83 and 1985/86. It contrasts the implications of the ‘dynamic reallocation’ model (Lilien, 1982) in which rising aggregate unemployment is due to in creased dispersion in the net hiring rates of firms (implying positive covariance of interindustry mobility and unemployment rates) with the older ‘Keynesian’ perspective that high unemployment ‘chills’ labour market mobility, implying a neative relationship. Qualified support is obtained for the ‘chilling’ model, as well as standard results on the role of job tenure, hours worked, etc. The general moral is the cyclical sensitivity of labour market behaviour, i.e. individuals appear to react to the aggregate unemployment rate.     

Social Security and Early Retirement: The Relationship Between Workers,Firms and Governments

In this paper we survey a number of theoretical and empirical studies in order to propose explanations to the fall of labour force participation at older age. Starting from the largely studied effect of social security schemes on labour supply, we explore the employers behaviour and the role of governments in the development of early retirement schemes. We show that early retirement is the result of a global agreement between firms and government where workers have incentives to early exit the labour market due to generous non actuarial benefits. Firms have an advantage to separate older workers because they are costly compared to young workers and governments hope that by pushing elderly into early retirement they will solve the massive unemployment problem.